In recent decades, a debate has arisen within analytic philosophy concerning the nature, validity and possible uses of Kantian transcendental arguments. This thesis examines two of the main questions within this debate: (i) what is a transcendental argument, and (ii) could there be a successful transcendental argument. The first chapter surveys some recent attempts at definition. A general lack of consistency in the literature makes it impossible to reach any precise conclusion about what a transcendental argument is, but a two-fold working definition is proposed on the basis of two identifiable general approaches to this question. The second chapter looks at two forms of scepticism about our knowledge of the external world in order to set up in a Kantian way the two epistemological problems to which transcendental arguments have been proposed as solutions. One problem concerns how it can be known that the external world exists; the other concerns conceptual relativism and the possibility of transcendental justification of a particular conceptual scheme. The third chapter examines and expands upon Stephan Korner's forceful argument to show that transcendental arguments are impossible. This argument counts decisively against the possibility of a transcendental solution to the problem of conceptual relativism, but does not touch arguments to demonstrate that we have knowledge of the existence of the external world. The fourth chapter examines several transcendental arguments which attempt the latter demonstration, beginning with Kant's Refutation of Idealism and then turning to some recent variations on this argument. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Thesis advisor: John Sallis / Martin Heidegger’s work centers on the task of retrieving the traditional problem of ontology, metaphysics, and first philosophy: the problem of Being. There has been a tendency in the scholarship to take Heidegger’s formulation and solution to the problem together as a whole. In contrast, I propose to differentiate between the two, and to engage Heidegger’s formulation of the problem as such, which takes shape as phenomenological ontology in the second half of the 1920s. I claim that the subject matter of phenomenological ontology, the problem of Being, is in fact the unitary articulation of four problems: the ontological difference, the basic articulation of Being, the possible modifications of Being, and the truth-character of Being. My analysis shows that these four problems are Heidegger’s problematization (following Brentano) of the four main senses of Being, traditionally associated with Aristotle and Aristotelianism: the difference between the incidental and the in itself; the articulation of being-at-work, potency, and being-at-work-staying-itself; Being in the sense of the categories; and Being in the sense of truth. Concerning its method, I claim that phenomenological ontology reformulates the problem of Being in three moments: reduction, construction, and destruction. My analysis shows that, with these three moments, Heidegger problematizes (following Husserl) the movement of ascent and descent traditionally associated with Plato and Platonism. Although Heidegger never makes it fully explicit, the problem of the phenomenologically reductive, constructive, and destructive unitary whole of the four basic problems of Being is in fact his problematization of a (the) perennial locus philosophiae—the unity of the four senses of Being in an ascent and a descent. Moreover, I claim that phenomenological ontology has a transcendental-architectonic character, in a Kantian sense. The problem of Being is formulated in three differentiated moments: the reductive fundamental ontology asks and answers the question of the sense of Dasein’s Being; the constructive transcendental science of Being asks and answers the question of the sense of Being as such; and the destructive groundwork of metaphysics asks and answers the question of the (historical) whole [καθ'ὅλου] of the Being of entities. Heidegger considers that his own architectonic is the historical outcome of the ontotheological orientation of the problem since Antiquity (Aristotle’s Metaphysics), during the Middle Ages (Suárez’s Disputationes), and throughout Modernity (Kant’s Critiques.) Because my interest lies in the problem itself, my aim is to problematize Heidegger’s ontotheological interpretation of the locus philosophiae. The first task in this direction is to clarify Heidegger’s incomplete construction of a unitary phenomenological ontology during the mid-late 1920s. The present text begins this clarification by outlining the reconstruction of fundamental ontology as projected upon the science of Being, and on the basis of the indicated locus. The reconstruction is a clarification in that it exhibits the simplest moments of the inner structure of phenomenological ontology. The dissertation is divided into two main parts. In the first part, I analyze the basic concepts of phenomenological ontology. I exhibit first the basic concepts of fundamental ontology (Chapter 1), and then the basic concepts of the science of Being (Chapter 2.) Through these first two chapters I show the correspondence between the concepts of fundamental ontology and the science of Being based on the projection of the former onto the latter. It is here that I argue that fundamental ontology and the science of Being are two stages in Heidegger’s architectonic reformulation of the problem of Being. I also argue that each of these stages reflects the whole problem from its own standpoint. In the second part, I begin the reconstruction of fundamental ontology as projected upon the science of Being. I claim that the analytic of Dasein is to be understood as the reduction of Dasein. The reduction of Dasein is articulated in two distinct moments that I call ‘ontological’ and ‘existential.’ I first characterize the reduction of Dasein as a whole (Chapter 3) and then its first moment—the ontological reduction (Chapter 4.) The text ends with an Appendix where I clarify Heidegger’s lexicon of Being. Here, I anticipate fundamental aspects of the existential reduction, and point toward the connection between Heidegger’s and Husserl’s accounts of the reduction. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2021. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

This study was concerned with the degree to which the practice of transcendental meditation (TM) aids in the long-term reduction of anxiety. The Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (TMAS), short form, was given to 16 Ss about to learn the technique of TM and to 16 control Ss. Eighteen weeks later, the TMAS was again administered to both groups. A significant difference was found in TMAS score reduction between the two groups, with the meditation group showing the greater reduction. These findings lend support to the hypothesis that TM aids in the long-term reduction of anxiety. It is recommended that further research in this area be undertaken to further validate the results of this study.

Este trabalho aborda, por meio de uma revisão bibliográfica analítico-reflexiva, a possível contribuição da filosofia de Karl Otto Apel no sentido de fundamentar no a priori da comunidade de comunicação para uma perspectiva de educação intencionada na emancipação e na corresponsabilidade. Estruturalmente, este trabalho abrange três partes. Na primeira parte, procura-se compreender a problemática da transformação da filosofia apeliana como abertura para repensar a fundamentação filosófica da educação. São considerados aspectos referentes à retranscendentalização da filosofia no marco do paradigma da linguagem, à recuperação da dimensão pragmática da linguagem na semiótica transcendental de Apel e à pretensão de superação do solipsismo metódico pressuposto na concepção de ciência unitária. Em razão da aparente invisibilidade da questão da educação na filosofia de Apel, inclusive em suas publicações relativas ao campo ético-político, a hipótese guia dessa primeira parte é a suspeita de um déficit de abordagem da filosofia de Apel em relação ao campo da pedagogia e da filosofia da educação. O foco da segunda parte é a especulação acerca de possíveis pontos de desdobramentos da semiótica transcendental, a concepção filosófica original como paradigma de prima philosophia no que tange à razão teorética, para o âmbito da educação. Para tanto, explicita-se o itinerário analítico-crítico de Apel em redor do linguistichermeneutic-pragmatic turn e, em seguida, como contribuição especulativa depreendida da semiótica transcendental, tematiza-se sobre a educação no sentido de uma formação que visa à elevação da humanidade e à autoria do sujeito. A terceira parte trata do entrelaçamento colateral dos conceitos de emancipação, apresentado com a pretensão de esboçar um novo viés da Teoria Crítica ligada à Escola de Frankfurt, e de corresponsabilidade, tematizado no âmbito da ética do discurso de Apel, com a compreensão geral da educação como ciência social da mediação entre teoria e práxis em vista do interesse cognitivo emancipador e da responsabilidade solidária. Com base no a priori da comunidade de comunicação, pretende-se demonstrar que a filosofia de Apel representa uma contribuição relevante para a reflexão de natureza filosófica em meio às abordagens das ciências da educação, à medida que ela fornece a pressuposição última racional dos fundamentos do campo da educação. Como elemento original desse trabalho, defende-se a ideia de que, de modo suplementar à filosofia prática de Apel, a esfera da educação possa figurar, transversalmente aos subsistemas coercitivos da responsabilidade ligados à política, ao direito e à economia, como uma mediação institucional contraestratégica responsável pela formação para a emancipação e corresponsabilidade histórica do homem pelo mundo. A educação pode, então, constituir-se, no sentido da formação que eleva à humanidade e desenvolve o primado judicativo do sujeito com base nos mínimos éticos universais implícitos no jogo hermenêutico-pragmático transcendental de linguagem. Tal via é fundamental para reduzir paulatinamente a diferença radical entre as condições ideais de uma comunidade ilimitada de comunicação e as condições históricas e contingentes da situação da comunidade real de comunicação. Enquanto mediação contraestratégica, a educação pode contribuir na criação das condições sociais suficientes para possibilitar a efetivação da resolução consensual-argumentativa dos problemas teóricos e práticos na sociedade. / This work addresses, through an analytical-reflexive bibliographical revision, the possible contribution of Karl Otto Apels philosophy with the intent of substantiating in the a priori of the communication community a purposeful education perspective in emancipation and corresponsability. Structurally, this work encompasses three parts. In the first part, we seek to comprehend the Apelian philosophy transformation issue as an opening to rethink the philosophical basis of education. We will consider aspects referred to the retranscendentalization of philosophy on what is referenced to the languages paradigm, the recuperation of the pragmatic dimension of language in the transcendental-semiotic of Apel, and to the desire of the surpassing of the methodic solipsism in the conception of unitary science. Because of the apparent invisibility of education in Apels philosophy, even in his publications in the ethical-political field, the guide-hypothesis is the idea of a deficit in the approach of Apels philosophy relating to the field of pedagogy and education philosophy. The second parts focus concerns the speculation on possible unfolding points in transcendental-semiotics, the original philosophical concept as a paradigm of prima philosophia in terms of theoretical reason in the context of education. For that, we clarify Apels analytical-critical itinerary around the linguistic-hermeneutic-pragmatic turn and, following that, as speculative contribution taken from transcendental-semiotics, we argue about education in the sense of a formation that seeks to elevate mankind and the subjects authorship. The third part is about the collateral interweaving of the emancipation concepts, presented with the intent of outlining a new view of Critical Theory, connected to the Frankfurt School, and of corresponsability, in the context of Apels discourse ethics, with the general comprehension of education as a social science of theory and practice mediation, considering the cognitive emancipatory interest and of solidary responsibility. Supported on the communication community a priori, we intend to demonstrate that Apels philosophy represents a relevant contribution to the philosophical reflection in the midst of educational sciences approaches, as it provides the final reasoning of the educational science field. As an unique element in this work, we defend the idea that, in addition to Apels practical philosophy, the educational sphere can appear transversally to the coercive responsibility subsystems, connected to politics, law and economy, as an anti-strategic institutional mediation that results in the formation towards emancipation and historical corresponsability of men throughout the world. Therefore education can be constituted in the sense of formation that elevates to humanity and develops the priority to form a critical opinion of the subjects with a basis on the basic universal ethics implicit in the hermeneutic-pragmatic transcendental game of language. This view is fundamental to slowly reduce the radical differences between an unlimited communication communitys ideal conditions and the eventual situations in a real communication community. As an anti-strategic mediation, education can contribute in creating enough social conditions to make possible the establishing of the consensualargumentative resolution of the theoretical and practical problems in society.

Esta tese de doutorado estuda o perspectivismo na obra de Nietzsche, bem como o confronto com a verdade que ele representa. Para tanto, procuramos mostrar que esse confronto atravessa toda a obra de Nietzsche, pois já os seus escritos iniciais investigam as condições para o surgimento da crença na verdade, além dos interesses a que ela atendia. Expondo que Nietzsche, apropriando-se do legado crítico de Kant em suas primeiras obras, ensaia uma destruição completa da verdade, pretendemos demonstrar que ele falha em seus objetivos porque a radicalidade de seus argumentos destruiria os próprios pressupostos em que estão baseados, ou seja, os do idealismo transcendental kantiano. Nesse momento em que circunscrevemos nossa análise aos escritos inicias, tentamos demonstrar que Nietzsche limita-se a refutar a noção de verdade como adequação com a coisa-em-si, mas falha ao querer ampliar esse refutação além desses limites. Por isso, analisando a maneira pela qual o combate à verdade se posiciona a partir dos escritos da década de 80, defendemos que neles o perspectivismo se torna decisivo para os problemas enfrentados inicialmente por Nietzsche. Interpretando o perspectivismo como um fenomenalismo da consciência e um interpretacionismo, investigamos, no decorrer deste trabalho, a forma pela qual Nietzsche re-elabora a crítica à verdade em seus escritos tardios. Considerando essa crítica ainda a partir da apropriação de Kant, buscamos demonstrar que ela atinge os fins perseguidos por Nietzsche sem, contudo, ficar preso aos impasses das primeiras 5 obras. Isso implica mostrar que Nietzsche vai recusar não apenas a noção de verdade como adequação com a coisa-em-si, mas também a concepção moderna de verdade como certeza e fundamento para o conhecimento. Eis por que Nietzsche alveja a noção cartesiana do eu penso como a primeira verdade, assim como a concepção kantiana de verdade expressa nos juízos lógicos. Sustentamos, assim, que o fenomenalismo da consciência refuta a noção de unidade, pressuposto fundamental às filosofias cartesiana e kantiana. Em seguida, analisamos como Nietzsche, apropriando-se da ideia kantiana de princípios regulativos, afirma que todas as visões com que avaliamos o mundo são ficções, erros, ótica-de-perspectivas da vida com valor regulativo para a existência. Defendemos, por fim, que embora se posicione radicalmente contra a verdade a partir da luta de interpretações, o perspectivismo não se torna um relativismo, na medida em que se liga à teoria da vontade de potência, a qual é o critério para avaliar as perspectivas e ela mesma apresentada como interpretação. / This Doctoral Thesis studies perspectivism on the work of Nietzsche, as well as the confrontation with the truth it represents. In order to do so, we try to show that this confrontation pervades Nietzsche\'s work, as his former writings investigate the conditions for the emergence of the belief in the truth, beyond the interests to which it served. By expounding that Nietzsche, borrowing Kant\'s critical legacy in his early works, starts out a complete destruction of truth, we intend to demonstrate that he fails in his objectives. This occurs because the radicalism of his arguments would destroy the very foundations which they are based upon, that is, Kantian transcendental idealism. At the moment we circumscribe our analysis to the early writings, we intend to demonstrate that Nietzsche limits himself to refuting the notion of truth as an adequacy to the thing-in-itself, but fails to widen this refutation beyond these limits. Therefore, we analyze the means of the fight against the truth, as presented in his writings from the 80`s. We defend that, in these writings, perspectivism becomes decisive in relation to the problems formerly faced by Nietzsche. By interpreting perspectivism as a phenomenalism of the conscience and interpretationism, we investigate the means by which Nietzsche re-elaborates the critique of truth in his late writings. Through the understanding of this critique as an appropriation of Kant\'s ideas, we try to demonstrate that it reaches the goals set by Nietzsche. Therefore it bypasses the impasses of his early work. This is to show that Nietzsche declines not only the notion of truth as adequacy to the thing-in-itself, but also the modern concept of truth as certainty and foundation of knowledge. That is 7 why Nietzsche aims at the Cartesian notion of \"I think\" as the first truth, as well as the Kantian conception of truth as expressed in logical judgments. Therefore, we sustain that phenomenalism of the conscience refutes the notion of unity, fundamental presupposition to Cartesian and Kantian philosophies. Additionally, we analyze the way Nietzsche, appropriating the Kantian idea of regulative principles, asserts that every vision we take to evaluate the world is fiction, a mistake, a perspectives-optic of life with a regulative value to existence. We defend, finally, that, even perspectivism radically stands against the truth - understood as strife of interpretations. It does not become relativism, since it is connected to the Theory of the Will to Power, which is the criterion to evaluate perspectives and which is itself presented as interpretation.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:26:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Erico de Lima Azevedo.pdf: 679684 bytes, checksum: dcd96c2f133eb45b0aa3d2fdc130bba8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-20 / The present study aims to present one of the most important and difficult works of the German philosopher Edmund Husserl The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology , 1936. It is a significant work in Husserl s development because he evolves the concept of life-world (Lebenswelt), but, besides, the text also reveals another novelty dimension: this is the first work in which Husserl takes expressly a position about history and deals with the problem of historicity of philosophy, doing long historical-teleological analysis. However, before understanding why it is possible to declare a crisis of sciences , why, for Husserl, logic, mathematics and physics were still in need of a last grounding and, finally, why philosophy is the science capable of providing such grounding, it is necessary to pay special attention to his notion of science. The historical-teleological analysis play, indeed, an outstanding role in the last great work of Husserl, corresponding to the next logic step: to show how , historically, the mistakes of philosophy and science have been possible. Husserl analyses the intrinsic teleology of the history of philosophy in the search for its own grounding, which was not correctly captured by both of main positions of modern philosophy: physicalistic objectivism and transcendental subjectivism. Such path leads philosophy to the need of a specific task, which is phenomenology. This is called to accomplish an authentic and consistent intentional analysis of the consciousness that constitutes the world, revealing for the first time as a philosophical theme the life-world , which appears then as the grounding soil for all sciences: philosophy, logic, mathematics, natural sciences etc. The study then performs a revision of part of the literature regarding the concept of life-world , following detailed considerations of a few important critics: in the perspective of the evolution of the idea of world in Husserl s texts, in the perspective of intersubjective constitution of the world and historical relativism, but also in the perspective of a universum of being and truth , and finally, in the perspective of the totality of intentional life. Regarding the problems of the ways into transcendental philosophy, corresponding to the third part of the text, we have analysed in this study only the way by inquiring back from the pregiven lifeworld, while the way from psychology was left for a future investigation / Este trabalho tem por objetivo apresentar uma das mais importantes e intricadas obras do filósofo alemão Edmund Husserl: A crise das ciências européias e a fenomenologia transcendental , de 1936. Trata-se de uma obra significativa no desenvolvimento de Husserl por causa da elaboração do conceito de mundo-da-vida (Lebenswelt), mas, além disso, o texto contém uma dimensão adicional, igualmente inovadora: é a primeira publicação na qual Husserl toma expressamente uma posição sobre a história e na qual trata o problema da historicidade da filosofia, empreendendo longas análises histórico-teleológicas . Porém, antes de compreender porque é possível falar de uma crise das ciências, porque, para Husserl, a lógica, a matemática e a física ainda precisassem de um fundamento último, e, finalmente, porque, para ele, a filosofia seja a ciência capaz de prover este fundamento, o primeiro passo é compreender a sua noção de ciência . As análises histórico-teleológicas ocupam uma posição de destaque na última grande obra de Husserl, correspondendo ao próximo passo lógico : demonstrar como , historicamente, tenham-se construído os equívocos da filosofia e da ciência. Husserl analisa a teleologia ínsita no percurso histórico da filosofia na busca de um fundamento definitivo, o qual, não fora corretamente capturado pelas duas principais posições da filosofia moderna: o objetivismo fisicalista e o subjetivismo transcendental. Tal percurso conduz a filosofia à necessidade de uma tarefa específica, que é a fenomenologia. Esta é chamada a realizar o empreendimento de uma análise intencional da consciência constitutiva do mundo, a qual desvelará pela primeira vez como tema filosófico o mundo-davida , o qual surge como fundamento de todas as ciências: filosofia, lógica, matemática, ciências naturais etc. O trabalho faz então uma revisão de parte da vasta literatura acerca da noção de mundo-da-vida , seguindo as minuciosas considerações de alguns autores: segundo a perspectiva da evolução da idéia de mundo na obra de Husserl, segundo a constituição intersubjetiva do mundo e o relativismo histórico, mas também segundo a consideração do problema filosófico do mundo-da-vida enquanto um universo de ser e de verdade, apresentando, por fim, uma análise segundo a perspectiva da totalidade da vida intencional. No que se refere ao problema das vias para a redução fenomenológica transcendental, que ocupa a terceira parte da obra, analisamos apenas a via por meio da reconsideração do mundo-da-vida já dado, deixando a via da psicologia para uma investigação futura

Master of Philosophy (Dept. of Philosophy) / This thesis explores the evolution of the way the Phenomenology of Perception is read for the purpose of determining its relevance to cognitive science. It looks at the ways in which the descriptions of phenomena are taken to converge with connectionist and enactivist accounts (the "psychological" aspect of this reading) and the way Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of intellectualism end empiricism are treated as effective responses to the philosophical foundations of cognitivism. The analysis reveals a general assumption that Merleau-Ponty's thought is compatible with a broadly naturalistic approach to cognition. This assumption has its roots in the belief that Merleau-Ponty's proximity to the existential tradition is incompatible with a commitment to a genuine transcendental philosophical standpoint. I argue that this suspicion is unfounded, and that it neglects the internal structure of the Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty's criticism of classical forms of transcendental philosophy is not a rejection of that tradition, but instead prompts his unorthodox use of pathological case-studies. For Merleau-Ponty, this engagement with pathology constitutes a kind of transcendental strategy, a strategy that is much closer to Husserl's later work than is commonly acknowledged. The thesis also demonstrates a different mode of engagement with cognitive science, through a critical encounter with John Haugeland's transcendental account of the perception of objects. Confronting his account with the phenomenon of anorexia, I challenge him to differentiate his notion of an existential commitment from the anorexic's pathological over-commitment to a particular body image. Merleau-Ponty's account does not suffer from the same problems as Haugeland's because transcendence is not construed in terms of independence, but in terms of the fecundity and inexhaustibility of the sensible. I attempt to articulate Merleau-Ponty's own notion of a pre-personal commitment through the metaphor of invitation and show how this commitment and the Husserlian notion of open intersubjectivity can shed light on the anorexic's predicament.

Master of Philosophy (Dept. of Philosophy) / This thesis explores the evolution of the way the Phenomenology of Perception is read for the purpose of determining its relevance to cognitive science. It looks at the ways in which the descriptions of phenomena are taken to converge with connectionist and enactivist accounts (the "psychological" aspect of this reading) and the way Merleau-Ponty's criticisms of intellectualism end empiricism are treated as effective responses to the philosophical foundations of cognitivism. The analysis reveals a general assumption that Merleau-Ponty's thought is compatible with a broadly naturalistic approach to cognition. This assumption has its roots in the belief that Merleau-Ponty's proximity to the existential tradition is incompatible with a commitment to a genuine transcendental philosophical standpoint. I argue that this suspicion is unfounded, and that it neglects the internal structure of the Phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty's criticism of classical forms of transcendental philosophy is not a rejection of that tradition, but instead prompts his unorthodox use of pathological case-studies. For Merleau-Ponty, this engagement with pathology constitutes a kind of transcendental strategy, a strategy that is much closer to Husserl's later work than is commonly acknowledged. The thesis also demonstrates a different mode of engagement with cognitive science, through a critical encounter with John Haugeland's transcendental account of the perception of objects. Confronting his account with the phenomenon of anorexia, I challenge him to differentiate his notion of an existential commitment from the anorexic's pathological over-commitment to a particular body image. Merleau-Ponty's account does not suffer from the same problems as Haugeland's because transcendence is not construed in terms of independence, but in terms of the fecundity and inexhaustibility of the sensible. I attempt to articulate Merleau-Ponty's own notion of a pre-personal commitment through the metaphor of invitation and show how this commitment and the Husserlian notion of open intersubjectivity can shed light on the anorexic's predicament.

No presente trabalho, apresentamos uma reconstrução do argumento kantiano em favor da tese que objetividade implica espacialidade. O argumento é exposto na Crítica da Razão Pura (e parcialmente reformulado em algumas Reflexões que integram o Nachlass). Kant, no entanto, é extremamente conciso em alguns de seus passos fundamentais. Para contornar essa dificuldade, recorremos ao trabalho de outros filósofos que defenderam a mesma tese, notadamente, L.Wittgenstein, P.F.Strawson e Gareth Evans. Mesmo nas ocasiões em que nos distanciamos da letra de Kant, porém, buscamos preservar sua estratégia de prova, a saber, fundamentar o vínculo entre as noções de objetividade e espacialidade a partir de sua relação com a noção de temporalidade. A ‘Refutação do Idealismo (problemático)’, acrescentada na segunda edição da Crítica, desempenha um papel central nessa estratégia. Sendo assim, procuramos razões para a afirmação que a representação objetiva de uma existência no tempo – a representação da existência de um sujeito de consciência, para tomar o caso destacado por Kant – pressupõe a representação de objetos espaciais e independentes da mente. Argumentamos que a melhor defesa da validade da Refutação kantiana é uma doutrina da cognição de inspiração wittgensteiniana, mais exatamente, da concepção de conceitos como regras cuja aplicação requer padrões de correção (também denominados, pelo próprio Wittgenstein, de ‘paradigmas’). Segundo essa concepção, padrões devem ser objetos permanentes, existentes no espaço, independentes da mente e usados como paradigmas da aplicação correta de conceitos. Para que sejam usados dessa maneira, devem ser conhecidos pelo sujeito de pensamentos, isto é, por aquele que emprega conceitos e, portanto, segue regras. No primeiro capítulo, é discutida a teoria kantiana da cognição. Isso inclui o esclarecimento da noção de objetividade, assim como da tese que toda cognição requer conceitos. O segundo capítulo trata da relação entre objetividade e temporalidade. Há duas etapas principais nessa discussão. A primeira é uma análise da estrutura diacrônica da atividade conceitual. Nessa parte, examinamos as noções kantianas de juízo e de sujeito de pensamentos, especialmente como expostas na ‘Analítica dos Conceitos’. A segunda etapa é uma análise do argumento em favor da tese que a representação objetiva do tempo requer a representação de um objeto permanente. Kant desenvolve esse argumento na ‘Primeira Analogia (da Experiência)’. O segundo capítulo encerra, assim, com uma interpretação desse texto. Finalmente, no terceiro capítulo, consideramos a relação entre representação objetiva do tempo e espacialidade. Nessa parte, são examinadas duas vias de reconstrução do argumento da ‘Refutação do Idealismo’. A primeira é caracterizada pelo fato de não pressupor uma leitura forte da tese que cognição implica conceitos. Essa é a reconstrução que deve ser adotada pelo não-conceitualista. A segunda, ao contrário, admite a leitura forte da tese, bem como a concepção de conceitos como dependentes do conhecimento de padrões de correção. Defendemos que a segunda reconstrução é, das duas, a que está mais próxima de alcançar o resultado pretendido. / In this work we offer a reconstruction of Kant’s argument for the thesis that objectivity implies spatiality. The argument is presented in the Critique of Pure Reason (and further articulated in the so-called ‘Reflexionen’), but Kant's rendering of some of its fundamental steps is extremely laconic, to say the least. In our attempt to fill up the gaps in Kant's presentation, we make use of the work of other philosophers who defended the same thesis, most notably L.Wittgenstein, P.F.Strawson and Gareth Evans. Kant’s main strategy of proof is carefully preserved nevertheless: we try to establish, following Kant's lead, the link between the notions of objectivity and spatiality through the way the two notions a related to that of temporality. Kant's ‘Refutation of (problematic) Idealism’ plays a central role in this strategy. Accordingly, we undertake to show that the objective representation of something as existing in time – the representation, to take Kant's own privileged case, of the existence of a subject of consciousness – presupposes the representation of spatial objects which subsist independently of the representing mind. We argue that the best available defense of the validity of Kant’s Refutation makes use of a theory of cognition strongly inspired by Wittgenstein’s notion of concepts, in particular by his view of concepts as rules whose application is essentially dependent on concrete standards of correctness (also called, by Wittgenstein himself, paradigms). According to this view, standards must be permanent objects existing in space, which are used as paradigms of the correct application of concepts and which must, in order to be so used, be epistemically accessible to the thinking, concept-using, rule-following subject. In the first chapter, we discuss Kant’s theory of cognition. This involves clarifying his notion of objectivity, as well as his thesis that all cognition requires concepts. The second chapter examines the relation between objectivity and temporality. There are two main stages in this discussion. The first is an analysis of the diachronic structure of conceptual activity. At this stage we offer an examination of the Kantian notions of a judgment and of a subject of thoughts, especially as these are presented in the ‘Analytic of Concepts’. The second stage is the analysis of the argument for the thesis that the objective representation of time requires the representation of a permanent object. Kant's argument for that thesis is presented in the ‘First Analogy (of Experience)’. So, we finish the second chapter with our reading of that text. Finally, in the third chapter, we consider the relation between the objective representation of time and spatiality. Here we consider two ways of reconstructing the argument of the ‘Refutation’. The first one does not presuppose what we call a strong reading of the thesis that cognition implies concepts. That is the reconstruction which should be adopted by the nonconceptualist. The second, on the contrary, accepts the strong reading of the thesis, combining it with the idea of concepts as dependent on standards for correct application. We argue that the second reconstruction is the one which is more likely to achieve the intended result.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This thesis deals with the problem of the foundations of a Universal History on the bases of the Kantian critical-transcendental system. Its objective is to demonstrate that the theme of Universal History possesses transcendental legitimacy, that is to say it can be seen from the horizon of the Copernican Revolution of thinking. In the first chapter, the nature of the project of a Universal History is characterized and it is sustained that the reflections about history form a unitary and coherent doctrine. In the second chapter, the transcendental legitimacy of the notion of teleology is reconstructed from the Critique of Judgement and it is shown how teleology determined the conception of history. In the last chapter, it is defended that Universal History should be seen as a response to the question what may I hope? and, consequently, as founded on a particular human interest of reason. / Este trabalho de mestrado aborda o problema da fundamentação de uma História universal sobre as bases do sistema crítico-transcendental kantiano. Seu objetivo é mostrar que o tema da história possui legitimidade transcendental, isto é, que ele pode ser visto a partir do horizonte da revolução copernicana do pensamento. No primeiro capítulo, caracteriza-se a natureza do projeto de uma História universal e sustenta-se que as reflexões sobre a história formam uma doutrina unitária e coerente. No segundo capítulo, reconstrói-se, a partir da Crítica da faculdade do juízo, a legitimidade transcendental da noção de teleologia e se mostra como ela determina a concepção de história. No último capítulo, defende-se que a História universal deve ser vista como uma resposta à pertunta que me é permitido esperar? e, por conseguinte, como fundada sobre um particular interesse da razão humana.