Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:55:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000437406-Texto+Completo-0.pdf: 726488 bytes, checksum: b05b0e2f3f2f3fe7e5bcf26c74468349 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / This paper deals with the concept of "self" in the "critical" period of Immanuel Kant's theoretical philosophy. The analysis focuses on the Critique of Pure Reason text. Drawing a distinction between empirical, rational and transcendental psychology (to which the paradigm of analysis of Kant belongs), it begins with an attempt to determine cognitive subject's place and character in the genesis of the transcendental epistemology. Pointing out the essentiality of the psychological aspects to a correct textual interpretation, even when they refer to transcendental psychology, it supports the idea that a purely semantic analysis of the Critique of Pure Reason text cannot lead to a legitimate interpretation. Subsequently, a description of the transcendental idealism doctrine is presented, in which the differences between the transcendental and realistic (or transcendent) perspectives are discussed, followed by the rise of two different ways to understand objects: as phenomenon and as noumenon. Following that, an analysis on the limits of knowledge is developed, also centering on ways of thinking the theory's subject itself in relation to those limits. Three distinct perspectives of the "self" approach arise: phenomenal self, transcendental self and noumenal self, each one's analysis being presented separately. Firstly, the phenomenal self and the relation between the intuition of space and time as an essential factor to think the unity of time in a continuous timeline, on which one can identify the chronological sequence of events and that allows us to reflect on the empirical permanency of the "self" in inner sense; secondly, the analysis of the transcendental self, which begins with a basic introduction to the faculty of understanding, its spontaneity and the synthesis ability and its importance to theme comprehension and finally brings up the concept of transcendental apperception and the distinction between conscience's unity and conscience's identity, from which our transcendental concept of "self" can be determined. The analysis also deals with four critics' (Strawson, Henrich, Pippin and Patricia Kitcher) view on transcendental apperception and conscience's identity; lastly, the noumenal self and the psychological understanding of "soul", according to its two kinds of use: constitutive and regulative. / Neste trabalho abordamos a concepção de “eu” na filosofia teórica do período chamado “crítico” da filosofia de Immanuel Kant. Para tanto, focamos nossa análise no texto da Crítica da Razão Pura. Iniciamos pela tentativa de determinar o lugar e o caráter do sujeito cognitivo no ponto de partida da construção epistêmica transcendental, distinguindo entre psicologia empírica, psicologia racional e psicologia transcendental, pertencendo a esta última o paradigma de análise de Kant. Apontamos para a impossibilidade de interpretar corretamente o texto sem que se leve em consideração os aspectos psicologistas, ainda que esta psicologia seja a de caráter transcendental. Assim, negamos que a possibilidade de uma análise puramente semântica do texto da Crítica da Razão Pura seja uma alternativa viável para uma interpretação legítima. Partimos posteriormente para a descrição da doutrina do idealismo transcendental, onde se trata da diferença da perspectiva transcendental da perspectiva realista ou transcendente, por onde aparecerão duas perspectivas distintas para o conhecimento de objetos: como fenômeno e como númeno. Seguindo, trataremos sobre os limites do conhecimento e como podemos pensar o sujeito da teoria diante destes limites propostos. Então surge uma tripla distinção das diferentes perspectivas da abordagem do “eu”: “eu” fenomênico, “eu” transcendental e “eu” numênico. Disto trabalharemos cada uma destas três perspectivas, tratando primeiramente do “eu” fenomênico e da relação entre a intuição do espaço e do tempo como condição para pensar a unidade do tempo em uma linha contínua temporal, de onde se distingue a sucessão dos eventos temporais e que pode servir para pensar a permanência empírica do “eu” no sentido interno. Depois tratamos do “eu” transcendental, iniciando com alguns esclarecimentos básicos sobre a faculdade do entendimento, seu caráter espontâneo, a capacidade de síntese e a sua importância para compreender o tema, para finalmente tratarmos do conceito de apercepção transcendental e da distinção entre a unidade e a identidade da consciência, a partir da qual podemos definir o nosso conceito transcendental de “eu”. Ainda nesta análise, abordamos a leitura de quatro comentadores (Strawson, Henrich, Pippin e Patricia Kitcher) sobre a apercepção transcendental e a identidade da consciência. Por término, tratamos do “eu” numênico e da ideia psicológica de alma, de acordo com os dois usos possíveis: o constitutivo e o regulativo.

Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:56:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000425431-Texto+Completo-0.pdf: 377029 bytes, checksum: 80b2d42e99d441364398965ef99a3e95 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / This thesis aims to investigate the overcoming of the kantian transcendental idealism held by the hegelian absolute idealism. The arguments in favor of hegelian overcoming the dualism between thing in itself and the phenomenon will be detailed and tested. As Kant points out that metaphysics as a science is impossible, ie the objects that denote the transcendental ideas are beyond space and time, since there are no corresponding object in the sensible world to her and therefore can not be known, because not affect the sensitivity, Hegel presents the reality as subject and denies any form of division between being and thinking. / Esta dissertação tem como objetivo investigar a superação do idealismo transcendental kantiano realizada pelo idealismo absoluto hegeliano. Os argumentos hegelianos em prol da superação do dualismo entre coisa-em-si e fenômeno serão detalhados e postos à prova. Enquanto Kant salienta que a metafísica como ciência é impossível, ou seja, os objetos que as Idéias transcendentais denotam estão além do espaço e do tempo, não existindo nenhum objeto no mundo sensível correspondentes a ela e, portanto, não podem ser conhecidas, pois não afetam a sensibilidade, Hegel apresenta a realidade como sujeito e nega qualquer forma de cisão entre o ser e o pensar.

Starting from an analysis of Heidegger’s consideration of the being-toward-death phenomenon, we establish a link between two fundamental axes for hermeneutic phenomenology: intentionality and facticity. We argue that the only possible comprehension of being-toward-death must to be understood before the modern object/ subject division and at the margin of any realistic or idealistic premises. Furthermore, we propose to understand the emergence of hermeneutics as an “immanent critique” to Husserlian transcendentalism. The ultimate purpose of this short paper is to bridge some gaps between transcendental phenomenology and hermeneutics. / A partir de un análisis de la manera heideggeriana de considerar el fenómeno de la muerte, el estar vuelto hacia la muerte, establecemos el vínculo de dos ejes fundamentales para la fenomenología hermenéutica, la intencionalidad y la facticidad. Afirmaremos que el estar vuelto sólo podrá ser comprendido “más acá” de la separación sujeto/objeto y al margen de las premisas realistas o idealistas; asimismo, propondremos una comprensión del surgir de la hermenéutica en tanto “crítica inmanente” al trascendentalismo husserliano. El propósito más amplio en el que se inscribe este breve artículo es el de trazar puentes entre la fenomenología trascendental y la hermenéutica.

A preliminary overview of Husserl reading Kant shows that both thinkers represent two essentially different types of philosophies in their methods and reach. The judgement made by Husserl about Kant allows to state that we are facing two different privileged intuitions. Nevertheless, it also allows to state a family resemblance”–if not in their styles and methodology– in certain ground convictions regarding philosophy and reason’s finite nature. This paper approaches, from a Husserlian perspective, the relationship between experience and judgment” –proper to a Transcendental Theory of Elements”– and in that between science and philosophy” –corresponding to a Transcendental Theory of Method”. Furthermore, it will approach the distinction between natural and transcendental-phenomenological attitudes that allow Husserl to introduce two levels of philosophical interrogation and two types of philosophical anthropologies, corresponding to the splitting of the ego – a pure constitutive ego and a constituted one. This last will lead to the genetic problem of the ego’s self-constitution from the deepest strata of passive instinctive life (unconscious and irrational) towards rational life in a teleological ascending movement that enacts the Kantian problem of reason’s finitude. Despite of the incorporation that Husserl makes of a teleology of Leibnizian type that resolves the Kantian hiatus between sensible and intelligible world, the Kant connoisseurs will recognize his tracks in the configuration of the Husserlian trascendental phenomenology. / Una revisión preliminar de la lectura que hace Husserl de Kant muestra que ambos pensadores representan dos tipos de filosofía esencialmente distintas en sus métodos y alcances. El juicio que hace Husserl sobre Kant permite constatar que estamos ante distintas intuiciones privilegiadas. Empero, también permite constatar un aire de familia” –si no en los estilos y la metodología– en ciertas convicciones de fondo respecto de la filosofía y la naturaleza finita de la razón. En este trabajo se aborda, desde la perspectiva husserliana, la relación entre experiencia y juicio” –propia de una teoría trascendental de los elementos” –y entre ciencia y filosofía” –correspondiente a una teoría trascendental del método.”Asimismo, se hará ver la distinción entre las actitudes natural y fenomenológica-trascendental que permite a Husserl introducir dos niveles de interrogaciónfilosófica, y dos tipos de antropologías filosóficas, correspondientes al desdoblamientodel yo– un yo puro constituyente y otro constituido. Esto último conducirá al problema genético de la auto-constitución del yo desde lo más profundo dela vida instintiva pasiva (inconsciente e irracional) hasta la vida racional en un movimiento de ascenso teleológico, que da lugar al replanteamiento del problema kantiano de la finitud de la razón. A pesar de que Husserl incorpora una teleología de tipo leibniziano que resuelve el hiato kantiano entre mundo sensible e inteligible, los conocedores de Kant podrán reconocer sus huellas en la configuración de la fenomenología trascendental husserliana.

nÃo hà / O autor apresenta a filosofia de Apel articulada a partir do confronto da filosofia transcendental kantiana com a reviravolta lingÃÃstico-pragmÃtica na filosofiado sÃculo XX. Para Apel, a filosofia de Kant tem que ser confrontada com a linguistic turn. Para ele, trata-se de compreender que a pergunta transcendental implica necessariamente a pergunta pela linguagem humana como condiÃÃo de possibilidade e validade da compreensÃo intersubjetiva e estabelecer, a partir do nÃvel atingido hoje pela reflexÃo epistemolÃgica, o jogo de linguagem prÃprio à filosofia. Por isso, em virtude de uma articulaÃÃo teÃrica mais adequada atravÃs da compreensÃo da centralidade da linguagem na reflexÃo filosÃfica, a filosofia està apta a enfrentar, sem ingenuidade, os desafios do mundo contemporÃneo. / The author presents the Apelâs philosophy from the confrontation of the kantâs philosophy transcendental with the linguistic-pragmatic overturn in the philosophy of the XX century. To Apel, the Kantâs philosophy has to be faced with linguistic turn. To him, it means to understand that the transcendental question necessarily implies for the language human being question as a condition to the possibility and validity of the intersubjective understanding and to estabilish, from the nowadays reached level for the epistemological reflection, the proper language game, related to the philosophy. Therefore, according to a theorical articulation more elaborated thought comprehension of the language in the philosophical reflection, the philosophy is apt to face, without naivety, the challenges of the contemporary world.

Orientador: Zeljko Loparic / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-03T19:23:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Pimenta_OlavoCalabria_M.pdf: 8184899 bytes, checksum: 73889509bbd7aa624843c4a04003deab (MD5) Previous issue date: 2003 / Resumo: Neste trabalho identifiquei os elementos mais importantes envolvidos na argumentação de Kant na sua Analítica Transcendental, isto é, por um lado, as representações intuitivas (sensações, intuições empíricas, intuições puras e aparecimentos) tratadas na Estética Transcendental e, por outro, tanto as representações discursivas (conceitos) como as operações (associadas a unidades, regras e julgamentos) tratadas na sua Lógica Transcendental. Em relação a cada um destes elementos, faço um confronto entre trechos de diversas obras de Kant onde eles são explicitados, buscando identificar, nesta multiplicidade de descrições, informações complementares e/ou possíveis incoerências, na intenção de compreender cada um deles de maneira clara e precisa. Finalmente, exponho como Kant opera com tais elementos para resolver seu problema fundamental relacionado à possibilidade dos juízos sintéticos, inicialmente no Esquematismo dos conceitos e, depois, nas Proposições Fundamentais do entendimento puro / Abstract: In this work I have identified the most important elements in Kant' s argumentation in his Transcendental Analytic, that is, on one side, the intuitive representations (sensations, empirical intuitions, pure intuitions and appearances) covered in his Transcendental Aesthetic, and, on the other side, as much the discursive representations (concepts) as the operations (associated to unity, mIes andjudgments) treated in his Transcendental Logic. In relation to each of theses elements, I have made a confrontation between parts of Kant's manifold works where they are explained, searching to identify, in that multiplicity of descriptions, informations and/or possible incoherencies, aimed to comprehend each one of them in a clear and precise way. Finally, I exposed how Kant operates with these elements to solve his fundamental problem relatively to the possibility of synthetic judgments, first in his Schematism of the Conceptions and, afier, in his Principies of pure understanding / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia

[pt] Neste trabalho, buscamos identificar a gênese do conceito de Imagem do pensamento em duas obras da primeira fase da filosofia deleuziana, Nietzsche e a filosofia e Proust e os signos. É nosso objetivo mostrar a importância central desse conceito para a elaboração do pensamento deleuziano e a evolução da filosofia de Deleuze verificada em torno desse tema. Assim, na primeira dessas duas obras, a imagem do pensamento liga-se à profunda renovação crítica da filosofia operada por Nietzsche e reivindicada também por Deleuze. Em Proust e os signos, verificamos um aprofundamento dessa concepção crítica, que agora, para além da filosofia, é operada a partir da não-filosofia, da literatura e, em particular, da obra proustiana. Trata-se, agora, de ligar a filosofia à não-filosofia, de criar uma interferência criativa entre esses dois planos, e de renovar nossa imagem do pensamento a partir dessa intercessão. / [en] The aim of this study is to identify the genesis of the concept of image of thought in two works belonging to Deleuze’s first philosophical phase: Nietzsche and Philosophy and Proust and the Signs. In our reading of these works, we show the central importance of this concept for the elaboration of Deleuzian thought. We also confirm the importance of the concept in relation to the evolution of Deleuze’s philosophy. In the first of these works, the image of thought is linked to the profound critical renewal of Nietzsche’s philosophy as claimed by Deleuze. In Proust and the Signs, we observe a deepening of this critical conception which is operated from beyond philosophy, i.e. non-philosophy, literature and, in particular, the Proustian oeuvre. It is thus a matter here of linking philosophy to non-philosophy, creating a creative interference between these two planes, and renewing our image of thought from this intercession.

Naturalizing the Unity of Consciousness: can neuroscience explain a fundamental feature of subjectivity? Martin Vraný Abstract The aim of the dissertation is to analyze the concept of the unity of conscious- ness as an explanandum for natural sciences and assess how good an explanation do leading neuroscientific theories of consciousness provide. The motivation be- hind this project is the idea that it is the unity which poses the greatest challenge for the scientific quest for consciousness. I argue in the Introduction that the reason why some theories of consciousness lead to what Dennett calls Cartesian materialism is precisely because they fail to address the problem of the unity of consciousness. If we had a good understanding of the unity of consciousness and its place in nature, we could more easily avoid the tendency to devise accounts of consciousness that are homuncular in disguise. In chapter 2 I analyze various aspects in which consciousness is thought be unified and conclude that two such aspects are particularly challenging for natu- ralizing the unity and that they cannot be treated separately. They are the unity of conscious contents at a time and the unity in the sense of a single subject having conscious contents and being able to reflect on them. Chapter 3 describes main conceptual and...

En quel sens les livres que Deleuze a écrits sur le cinéma sont-ils des livres de philosophie ? Dans une démarche généalogique, notre travail montre comment Deleuze « capture » de façons différentes les œuvres de quatre philosophes – Kant, Bergson, Peirce, Spinoza – afin de lui permettre d’avancer dans sa propre philosophie. A partir d’une rencontre avec le cinéma dans son ensemble, Deleuze prolonge sa réflexion sur l’empirisme transcendantal, reconsidère la question de l’image et des signes, revisite secrètement l’éthique de Spinoza afin de nous proposer une nouvelle éthique, qui ne répond plus à la question « Que peut un corps ? » mais à sa généralisation « Que peut une image ? ». Suivant la figure d’un spinozisme post-kantien que nous identifions chez Deleuze, le temps comme affect de soi par soi chez Kant équivaut aux auto-affections du second genre de connaissance chez Spinoza : le temps devient le lieu où se déploie la vie spirituelle dans l’attribut de la pensée. A la fois genèse de la sensibilité, cosmogonie, sémiotique et éthique, L’Image-mouvement et L’Image-temps construisent une génétique des puissances de l’image dont les œuvres singulières des cinéastes sont à la fois les jalons et les pierres de touche : la rencontre avec ces œuvres permet à la philosophie de Deleuze de subir l’épreuve du réel et de la faire bifurquer au gré des rencontres avec les pensées des cinéastes. Deleuze se sert du cinéma, qui devient la vérification expérimentale de sa philosophie, cependant que le cinéma « capture » Deleuze, et l’amène à tracer des cheminements de pensée inédits. Dans cette parade amoureuse, Deleuze est la guêpe, le cinéma l’orchidée. / To what extent are the books written by Deleuze about cinéma philosophy books ? Following a genealogical reasoning, our study shows how Deleuze “captures” in different ways the works of four philosophers – Kant, Bergson, Peirce, Spinoza – in order to get ahead in his own philosophy. From his encounter with cinema as a whole, Deleuze continues his reflection about transcendental empiricism, reconsidering the issue of image ands signs and secretly revisiting Spinoza’s ethics to offer a new system of ethics which no longer answers the question “What can a body live ?” but its generalization “what can an image live ?” Following the figure of a post-kantian spinozism that we have identified in Deleuze’s work, time as an affect of the self by the self in Kant’s philosophy can be equated with the self-affections of the second kind of knowledge in Spinoza’s work : time becomes the place where spiritual life can spread in the attribute of thought. Being at the same time a genesis of sensitivity, a cosmogony, semiotics and ethics, The Movement-image and The Time-image constitute a system of genetics of image powers of which film-makers singular creations are both the landmarks and the touchstones : Deleuze’s encounter with these movies allows his philosophy to undergo the test of the real and to make it change its course each time he meets a film-maker’s thinking. Deleuze uses cinema which becomes the experimental checking of his philosophy where as cinema “captures” Deleuze and leads him to open up new ways of thinking. In this mating display, Deleuze is the wasp and cinema is the orchid.

Present thesis attempts to lay foundations of interpretation of Deleuzeʼs project of transcendental empiricism as a transcendental critical philosophy which develops itself upon the critique of traditional metaphysics founded on representative thought. For understanding this project it is essential to grasp its relation to Kantʼs critical philosophy. Present thesis focuses mainly on the importance of Maïmonʼs critique of Kant and his suggested revision of Kantʼs philosophy for the Deleuzeʼs project. In the first chapter, critique of representative metaphysics and its consequences for Deleuzeʼs transcendental empiricism is pursued. Second chapter deals with the character of differential transcendental organization which Deleuzeʼs project develops. This organization will be interpreted as a symbolic structural space constantly changing in time, which represents Deleuzeʼs "philosophical interpretation" of Riemannʼs conception of continuous manifold. Third chapter will show the consistency of this unconscious transcendental space with our phenomenal subjective perspective and will sketch an explanation of its genesis through such transcendental organization.