A guerra que desmembrou a ex-Federação das Repúblicas da Iugoslávia ainda apresenta conseqüências tanto na vida dos iugoslavos quanto no sistema internacional. Este estudo busca repensar algumas das teses básicas apontadas pela mídia e por alguns analistas como sendo as causas da guerra. Partindo do questionamento da principal destas teses – de que o conflito tem uma origem estritamente étnica – fazemos breves anotações sobre as teorias de etnicidade/nacionalismo, passamos para um estudo histórico do conflito, buscando agregar um maior número de dimensões, e finalmente concluímos analisando a participação dos atores do sistema internacional no desenvolvimento do conflito. / The war that dismembered the former-Federation of the Republics of Yugoslavia still, through its consequences, presents in the life of the Yugoslavians as in the international system. This study directed to the rethinking of some of the pointed basic theses that may have caused the war; the most important ones are those pointed by the media and by some analysts. Starting from what may be the most important of these theses – that the conflict has an strictly ethnic origin – we make brief annotations on etnicity and nationalism theories', then we passed for a historical study of the conflict, in an effort to join a larger number of dimensions, and finally we concluded analyzing the participation of some actors of the international system in the development of the conflict.

The thesis traces the construction of the Western Balkans since the end of the armed conflict in 1995. The term Western Balkans has become a commonplace in international politics that refers to a recognisable region on the European map – ignoring that it does not constitute a historical formation of European and Balkan politics. Most contemporary analysis focuses on functional aspects of economic cohesiveness and security interdependence. However, this thesis argues that the concept of Western Balkans is better understood as a social construction, externally-driven. The argument is that the Western Balkans is what the European Union makes of it. By taking a macro-historical perspective, we look at the long and special ties that the EU has had from the time of Yugoslavia to the Western Balkans until the mid-2000s. What we uncover is a special and consistent involvement of the European Commission into the regional affairs. The Western Balkans starts as a small organisational department within the institutional structure of the external relations' portfolio to become a regional identity question for the local populations. Also, the thesis points to the Commission’s actions as not just the outcome of micro-calculations but part of a social context of competing world-views; and, finally, this is the reason that the end-product of the Western Balkans resembles more a messy amalgam rather than a rational design.

In this thesis I explore the effects of the recent introduction of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) to the post-conflict and postsocialist discourse of Croatian psychiatry. In recent years Croatian psychiatrists have been faced with a significant increase in the number of reported cases of various types of war-related disorders. PTSD, in particular, is spreading among the population of veterans from Croatia’s Homeland War that lasted from 1991 to 1995. To explore the effects of the introduction of PTSD to the discourse of Croatian psychiatry I am raising the following questions: (1) how was the diagnostic category of PTSD introduced; (2) how are Croatian war veterans encouraged to communicate their traumatic experiences; (3) how are ideas about the effective treatment of PTSD reproduced, transformed, and resisted by individual medical practitioners? In the final analysis, I argue that PTSD in Croatian psychiatry is constituted in a way that makes it both a medically recognizable form of emotional suffering and an instrument in post-conflict governmentality.

Notwithstanding a broad range of internal and external stresses, Macedonia was the only republic to attain its independence peacefully from the otherwise violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Subject of a timely and sustained international response, it was feted as a rare preventive success for the international community. Whilst not necessarily decisive, this mobilisation helped ensure a non-violent transition to independence. Yet, much to the surprise of outside observers, Macedonia would fall into conflict a decade after independence, when self-styled freedom fighters purporting to represent the local Albanian community launched an eight-month insurgency in the name of political and cultural equality. Triggered by a coalescence of political, nationalist, ideological and criminal interests, the insurgency had complex roots, as much an intra-Albanian putsch as a struggle for greater group rights. Regardless of their precise genesis, from the perspective of conflict prevention, the events of 2001 challenge popular assumptions of Macedonia as an international success story. Above all, they reinforce the need for external actors to incorporate short-term strategies of prevention targeting immediate sources of instability within a more comprehensive, long-term framework that addresses structural, underlying conflict causes. Indeed, whilst proximate threats to Macedonian stability were addressed, fundamental risk factors remained, namely social polarisation, a large ethnic minority disenfranchised with the state, economic under-development, high levels of organised crime and corruption, a weak rule-of-law and continuing regional uncertainty. These were partly aggravated by the mistakes of a complacent international community, whose engagement in the country, accordingly, receded over time. In particular, the dissertation is critical of the European Union for its initial failure to articulate a genuine pathway to membership for Macedonia and the broader western Balkans, as well as the handling of NATO's military intervention in neighbouring Kosovo. Of course, in any preventive endeavour, the international community can only do so much; in the first instance, responsibility lay with unresponsive Macedonian institutions, who failed to adequately address legitime Albanian demands dating from independence. Be that as it may, the international community was culpable for its failure to sufficiently apply the formidable soft-power leverage it wields over a weak Macedonian state to implement reforms that, conceivably, could have precluded the outbreak of armed conflict. As a case-study of prevention, Macedonia holds instructive lessons for scholars and policymakers. Yet it remains under-researched. Examining the period 1991-2001, this investigation analyses precisely why and how Macedonia avoided violence during the process of Yugoslav dissolution yet ultimately fell into conflict, and extrapolates broader lessons that may be applied to other at-risk societies. Its purpose is to advance understanding of a poorly understood country, and contribute knowledge to key on-going international security debates. Highlighting the inter-connectedness and trans-national character of contemporary security threats, it posits that the major powers have a practical interest in addressing emerging intra-state crises, even when the putative national interest appears marginal. To facilitate more timely multilateral responses, it calls for the de-nationalisation of security, and its conceptualisation in international - as opposed to strictly national - terms.

Notwithstanding a broad range of internal and external stresses, Macedonia was the only republic to attain its independence peacefully from the otherwise violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Subject of a timely and sustained international response, it was feted as a rare preventive success for the international community. Whilst not necessarily decisive, this mobilisation helped ensure a non-violent transition to independence. Yet, much to the surprise of outside observers, Macedonia would fall into conflict a decade after independence, when self-styled freedom fighters purporting to represent the local Albanian community launched an eight-month insurgency in the name of political and cultural equality. Triggered by a coalescence of political, nationalist, ideological and criminal interests, the insurgency had complex roots, as much an intra-Albanian putsch as a struggle for greater group rights. Regardless of their precise genesis, from the perspective of conflict prevention, the events of 2001 challenge popular assumptions of Macedonia as an international success story. Above all, they reinforce the need for external actors to incorporate short-term strategies of prevention targeting immediate sources of instability within a more comprehensive, long-term framework that addresses structural, underlying conflict causes. Indeed, whilst proximate threats to Macedonian stability were addressed, fundamental risk factors remained, namely social polarisation, a large ethnic minority disenfranchised with the state, economic under-development, high levels of organised crime and corruption, a weak rule-of-law and continuing regional uncertainty. These were partly aggravated by the mistakes of a complacent international community, whose engagement in the country, accordingly, receded over time. In particular, the dissertation is critical of the European Union for its initial failure to articulate a genuine pathway to membership for Macedonia and the broader western Balkans, as well as the handling of NATO's military intervention in neighbouring Kosovo. Of course, in any preventive endeavour, the international community can only do so much; in the first instance, responsibility lay with unresponsive Macedonian institutions, who failed to adequately address legitime Albanian demands dating from independence. Be that as it may, the international community was culpable for its failure to sufficiently apply the formidable soft-power leverage it wields over a weak Macedonian state to implement reforms that, conceivably, could have precluded the outbreak of armed conflict. As a case-study of prevention, Macedonia holds instructive lessons for scholars and policymakers. Yet it remains under-researched. Examining the period 1991-2001, this investigation analyses precisely why and how Macedonia avoided violence during the process of Yugoslav dissolution yet ultimately fell into conflict, and extrapolates broader lessons that may be applied to other at-risk societies. Its purpose is to advance understanding of a poorly understood country, and contribute knowledge to key on-going international security debates. Highlighting the inter-connectedness and trans-national character of contemporary security threats, it posits that the major powers have a practical interest in addressing emerging intra-state crises, even when the putative national interest appears marginal. To facilitate more timely multilateral responses, it calls for the de-nationalisation of security, and its conceptualisation in international - as opposed to strictly national - terms.

The present study deals with the very difficult Czechoslovak-Yugoslav relations immediately before and at the beginning of WWII. At that time, an independent Czechoslovakia no longer existed, and Yugoslavia was forced to balance between the interests of stronger countries, mainly Germany and Great Britain, in order to save their territory and ensure for its citizens a future without a war. Yugoslavia's reserved attitude towards the happenings in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, the establishment of rather formal than friendly and cordial Slovak-Yugoslav relations, the presence of Czechoslovak emigrants in Yugoslavia, the absence of any intervention by Yugoslav bodies against the activities of the members of Czech and Slovak minorities against the Protectorate, Slovakia, and Germany, and, finally, the negative Yugoslav attitude towards the state of Slovakia - this all constituted a complex and colourful world of Czechoslovak-Yugoslav relations in 1939-1941. An analysis of these relations was based primarily on an exhausting archival research as well as on a survey of relevant literature, memoirs, and the period press. This subject has not yet been studied in detail in the Czech Republic and abroad.

The theories on how to use airpower as coercion are divided between those who advocate strategic bombing and those who advocate support for land operations. The purpose of this study is to analyze whether Pape and/or Warden´s airpower theories applied on Operation Allied Force can explain how NATO´s air force was used. The result shows that both the Warden´s Enemy as a system and Pape´s Denial strategy can partly explain the outcome. Warden´s 5-ring system is the only variable in the survey assigned with a high variable value; this is because the analysis shows that it is judged to influence the outcome extensively. Parallel attacks occurred at low frequency and have a low variable value. Pape´s theory occurred with high frequency in variable support for the ground forces, however, the analysis shows that no variable value from Pape´s theory received higher variables than the medium. The conclusion is that both theories can explain how NATO used airpower during the operation but to different degrees.

A guerra que desmembrou a ex-Federação das Repúblicas da Iugoslávia ainda apresenta conseqüências tanto na vida dos iugoslavos quanto no sistema internacional. Este estudo busca repensar algumas das teses básicas apontadas pela mídia e por alguns analistas como sendo as causas da guerra. Partindo do questionamento da principal destas teses – de que o conflito tem uma origem estritamente étnica – fazemos breves anotações sobre as teorias de etnicidade/nacionalismo, passamos para um estudo histórico do conflito, buscando agregar um maior número de dimensões, e finalmente concluímos analisando a participação dos atores do sistema internacional no desenvolvimento do conflito. / The war that dismembered the former-Federation of the Republics of Yugoslavia still, through its consequences, presents in the life of the Yugoslavians as in the international system. This study directed to the rethinking of some of the pointed basic theses that may have caused the war; the most important ones are those pointed by the media and by some analysts. Starting from what may be the most important of these theses – that the conflict has an strictly ethnic origin – we make brief annotations on etnicity and nationalism theories', then we passed for a historical study of the conflict, in an effort to join a larger number of dimensions, and finally we concluded analyzing the participation of some actors of the international system in the development of the conflict.

Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales) / No cabe duda que la situación del continente africano es sumamente compleja, en particular en lo que se refiere a las graves violaciones que se han cometido en contra del Derecho Internacional Humanitario. Es por ello que en el curso de este trabajo, aún cuando hicimos el tratamiento de las dos instancias jurisdiccionales creadas por el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU en la década de los ’90, el TPIR y el TPIY, nos hemos centrado primordialmente en el caso ruandés, ya que es el que más aportes jurisprudenciales ha efectuado al Derecho Internacional Penal del último tiempo. Además, es aquel que ha sido objeto de menos estudio por parte de la doctrina, la cual se ha visto bastante más interesada en el caso yugoslavo que en el africano, según pudimos constatar al buscar información sobre el tema. La cruda realidad de lo que allí se sucede es una cuestión que a los ojos de occidente puede resultar no solo chocante sino que también muchas veces incomprensible. En África el respeto a la vida y a la integridad de las personas es algo que se encuentra lejos aún de transformarse en una prioridad, tanto de los gobiernos como de los habitantes de la región

Nous posons la question de la relation entre les langues et l’identité d’individus d’origine-exyougoslave nés en France ou venus jeunes avec leurs parents avant la dissolution du pays en 1991. Les expressions identitaires et les pratiques langagières déclarées ont été collectées auprès de quinze personnes en utilisant deux méthodes : l’entretien semi-directif et le questionnaire. Les noms employés pour désigner l’identité nationale ont été comparés aux dénominations officielles actuelles des États issus de la disparation de la Yougoslavie et ont permis de mettre à jour le maintien de l’identité yougoslave parallèlement à l’utilisation des noms actuels. Les informations ainsi obtenues permettent de distinguer la part individuelle de la (re)présentation identitaire et le rapport entretenu avec la langue d’origine, qui est la fois l’outil communicationnel et l’un des éléments d’affirmation identitaire. Les pratiques langagières déclarées informent sur l’autoévaluation bilingue et dévoilent une forte détermination à l’approfondissement des compétences linguistiques en langue d’origine. Différentes situations de bilinguisme ont pu être constatées. Les compétences à l’oral sont déterminées, le plus souvent, par les compétences communicationnelles (pratiques langagières en famille ou dans le cadre professionnel). L’étude du bilinguisme, dans ce qu’il révèle de la relation ente langues et identité, fait apparaître très nettement le rôle de la langue d’origine comme « marqueur » d’identité. Les réflexions exprimées sur l’identité nationale montrent qu’elle est aussi problématisée à partir du rapport entretenu avec le pays d’accueil (et le plus souvent de naissance) la France. Ainsi, l’identification française influence d’une certaine manière le rapport à l’identité (ex)-yougoslave, d’une part par la relation des noms entre langue et pays (France-français ; Yougoslavie-yougoslave), mais aussi, par le fait que le maintien de l’utilisation du nom yougoslave reste possible en France où elle ne fait pas polémique. La relation entre les deux identités principales (française et ex-yougoslave) doit être envisagée comme une construction « mixte », même si l’identification française est parfois considérée avec une certaine distance. / We are questioning the relationship between language and identity of ex-Yugoslav youth, born or settled in France before the dissolution of the country in 1991. Expressions of identity and language practices were collected from fifteen people through two methods: semi-structured interview and questionnaire. The names used as national self-assignment were compared with the official names of the current states stemming from ex-Yugoslavia and revealed the maintenance of a Yugoslav identity along with the use of current state or national names among the studied sample. Thereby, obtained informations helped to distinguish the individual identification process from the interaction through the original language, which is both communication tool and an element of identity affirmation. Declared language practices inform on bilingual self assessment and reveal a strong commitment to the development of language skills in original language. Different situations of bilingualism have been identified. The speaking skills are usually determined by communication skills (language practices in family or in the workplace). The study of bilingualism, in that it reveals the relationship between language and identity, shows very clearly the role of the original language as "marker" of identity. Expressed reflections show that national identity is also problematized from the interactions with the host country (most often birth pace), France. Thus, French assignment influence in some way the report to (ex-)Yugoslav identity, by the relations between language and names of countries (France-French; Yugoslavia -“Yugoslav”), but also by the fact that it is still possible to use “Yugoslav” as self-assignment in France, where it is not controversial. The relationship between the two main identities (French and ex-Yugoslav) should be considered as a "mixed" construction, even if the identification with French is sometimes regarded with a certain distance.