Die Dissertation wendet sich insbesondere der Rolle der Ökonomik auf der Metaebene der wissenschaftsphilosophischen Argumentation zu. Ziel ist zu klären, welchen Erklärungsgehalt ökonomische Instrumente in der Wissenschaftsphilosophie haben können. Mit der Economics of Scientific Knowledge (ESK) hat sich seit Mitte der 1990er Jahre ein Literaturzweig herausgebildet, in dem genau diese Zielsetzung verfolgt wird, nämlich das Erkenntnisobjekt der wissenschaftlichen Koordination mit unterschiedlichen Methoden und Instrumenten der Ökonomik zu untersuchen. Es wird gezeigt, dass den analytischen Modellen der ESK einige Probleme inhärent sind, die prinzipiell durch neue Methoden und Instrumente gelöst werden können. Als ein geeigneter Kandidat wird die Agentenbasierte Modellierung (ABM) identifiziert, die eine realitätsnähere Abbildung der Akteure, eine ergebnisoffene Modellierung ihrer Entscheidungen und des Koordinationsprozesses erlaubt. Der Analyse von der ESK zuzuordnenden analytischen und agentenbasierten Modellen folgt im zweiten Teil der Dissertation die Programmierung einer eigenen ABM Continuous Opinions of Satisficing Agents and Discrete Actions (COSDA) mit Hilfe der Multi-Agenten-Programmiersprache NetLogo. In der heuristischen ABM COSDA werden zentrale wissenschaftsphilosophische und ökonomische Prämissen, die im ersten Teil der Arbeit als Problemfelder identifiziert wurden, aufgegeben. Mit Modellierung heterogener Agententypen, die - mit unterschiedlichen Präferenzen und Verhaltensheuristiken ausgestattet - miteinander interagieren, wird eine mögliche Mikrospezifikation für die Emergenz eines Makrophänomens erzeugt. Das Makrophänomen, d.h. die unterschiedlichen Resultate im wissenschaftlichen Koordinationsprozess, sind aus den selbstverstärkenden Effekten der Interaktion erklärbar, aber nicht vorhersehbar. Die Mikrospezifikation kann als relevante, durch eine kohärente Fiktion formulierte Möglichkeit interpretiert werden, die anders als analytische Modelle der ESK kein rationales Entscheidungskalkül der Agenten voraussetzt.

Charles Renouvier, philosophe savant, honnête chercheur, se bat contre les mystères et la métaphysique en utilisant la méthode scientifique. Il appuie son néocriticisme sur l’esprit de la science, il voit même dans la critique cet esprit. Il n’omet pas d’étudier les premiers principes des sciences, les notions de phénomène et de loi, les catégories, lois irréductibles au fondement des sciences. Rejetant le noumène, il articule son phénoménisme entre les catégories de relation, d’où découle l’absurdité de l’infini actuel, et de personne, toute chose étant par le biais de représentations. Il use des principes de relativité et de contradiction, propose un classement des sciences, prenant en compte ses principes et posant la critique comme tronc commun des sciences. Ce polytechnicien voit l’objet des mathématiques dans le rapport du multiple à l’un, et le nombre comme un tout d’unités, un nombre discret. Sa loi du nombre lui permet de sortir des antinomies kantiennes, de penser l’indéfini, les nombres négatifs et fractionnaires. Il analyse les concepts élémentaires de la géométrie, il présente les enjeux du calcul des probabilités et se positionne par rapport aux géométries imaginaires, tout cela en vue de débarrasser les mathématiques de toute métaphysique. Il étudie également les sciences physiques, faisant valoir l’hypothèse scientifique dans les sciences expérimentales, il s’interroge sur les notions de matière et de force. Considérant la place de la liberté et de la volonté en l’homme, il y voit une différence spécifique d’avec l’animal. Dans sa philosophie de l’histoire des sciences et des idées, et dans ses ouvrages ultérieurs, l’académicien montre le lien entre croyance et savoir, et il milite pour une religion raisonnée et un progrès moral. / Philosopher - scientist, hobest researcher, Charles Renouvier fights against the mysteries and the metaphysics using the scientific method.He bases his néocriticisme on the spirit of science, that he sees in the critic itself. He does not omit to study the first principles of science : the conxepts of phenomenon, law and category, the latest constituting irreducible rules at the foundation of sciences. Rejecting the noumenon, he articulates his phenomenalism between the categories of relation, from which flows the absurdity of the actual infinity and of person, all things being through representations. He uses the principles of relativity of contradiction, offers a classification of sciences, taking into account his principles and stating the critic at the core of sciences. This ex-student from the Ecole Polytechnique sees the object of mathematics in the connection between multiple and one, and the number as a set of units, consequently being a discrete number. His law of number permits him to get out of the Kantian antinomies, to think out the indefinite, negative and fractionnal numbers. He discusses the basic concepts og geometry. He presents the issues of probability calculations and takes a position on imaginary geometries. All these aim to get rid of any metaphysics in mathematics. He also examines physical sciences. Arguing for scientific hypothesis in experimental siences, he examines the concepts of matter and force. Considering the importance of freedom and will in the man, he sees in that a significant difference from tha animal. In his philosophy of history of science and ideas and in his later works, the Academician shows the relationship between belief and knowledge, and argues for a rational religion and moral progress.

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<p>This dissertation is a rhetorical-historiographic analysis of the emergence and dissolution of a model of therapy, one that showed promise in the 1950s as a treatment for a deadly disease (alcoholism) using a recently developed pharmaceutical drug (LSD-25). By the time this treatment model, called “psychedelic therapy,” was fully developed and ready to be tested, the rhetoric surrounding LSD in the 1960s public sphere had already turned mainstream psychiatry against the drug. Psychedelic therapy became rhetorically inextricable from the counterculture that grew out of its fringes, although its basic principles were actually borrowed from the widely-accepted Alcoholics Anonymous recovery movement. Moreover, the therapy only worked if the patient took the drug in a context designed to facilitate a particular type of experience, akin to a spiritual conversion. This method flew in the face of psychiatry’s insistence on double-blind placebo-controlled trials, which could only account for the drug’s strictly biochemical effects, regardless of therapeutic context. Through my analysis of archival sources, letters, conference proceedings, and research publications, I argue that psychedelic therapy’s failure to gain legitimacy despite its early success indicates how attributions of  rhetorical action (or lack thereof) serve to mark out the boundaries of discursive arenas. These demarcations of <em>rhetorical </em>legitimacy thus allow for disciplinary legitimacy, even while the techniques, strategies, and materials of particular rhetorical appeals circulate among disciplines and other arenas without regard for these limits of legitimate persuasion. A drug may undeniably affect a person’s behavior, but to assert that the drug is persuasive will necessarily raise questions of legitimacy that must be resolved before it can be incorporated into a set of disciplinary practices.</p>

<p>Unfortunately I have had bit of difficulty with setting up the page numbers appropriately. I have been unable to figure out how to make the preliminary part of document in Roman numerals while at the same time separating this from the main body of the text using Arabic numbers. My apologies, but I sincerely do not know how to resolve this frustrating problem. I can resolve this problem if I send you the preliminary part and main body as separate documents, but just not as one continuous document. Please contact me if this latter method is the way to go.</p> / <p>This thesis provides an expository account and critical analysis of Friedrich Nietzsche’s genealogical position on cruelty. Its primary engagement is with Nietzsche’s <em>On The Genealogy of Morals</em>, however, other works by this author are discussed when relevant. The general import of this thesis is threefold. First, it demonstrates Nietzsche’s genealogical account of cruelty, detailing its complex evolutionary progression and its various facets of influence. Second, this work identifies some authors who are critical of Nietzsche position on cruelty. These criticisms are identified and are then largely refuted on various grounds. Third, this thesis argues that an appropriate critical analysis of Nietzsche’s genealogical theorizing will be based on a cross-examination of his positions with current palaeoanthropological findings. The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that there is insufficient empirical evidence to substantiate Nietzsche’s accounts and his methodical approach to genealogical theorizing is, furthermore, untenable.</p>

Increasingly, teachers are encouraged to use data resources in their classrooms, which are becoming more widely available on the web through organizations such as Digital Library for Earth System Education, National Science Digital Library, Project Kaleidoscope, and the National Science Teachers Association. As "real" data becomes readily accessible, studies are needed to assess and describe how to effectively use data to convey both content material and the nature of scientific inquiry and discovery. In this study, we created two introductory undergraduate physical geology lab modules for calculating plate motion. One engages students with a model-driven approach using contrived data. Students are taught a descriptive model and work with a set of contrived data that supports the model. The other lab exercise uses a data-driven approach with real data. Students are given the real data and are asked to make sense of it. They must use the data to create a descriptive model. Student content knowledge and understanding of the nature of science were assessed in a pretest-posttest experimental design using a survey containing 11 Likert-like scale questions covering the nature of science and 9 modified true/false format questions covering content knowledge. Survey results indicated that students gained content knowledge and increased their understanding of the nature of science with both approaches. Lab observations and written interviews indicate these gains resulted from students experiencing different pedagogical approaches used in each of the two labs. / Master of Science

This work offers a framework for researchers by linking service-dominant (S-D) logic to an intersubjective stream of philosophy of science. Service-dominant logic has resonated in marketing, but no existing research has attempted to link S-D logic with basic meta-theory to provide a framework. Since the range of philosophies of science (isms) referred to in the marketing literature is broad, varying from ‘realism’ to ‘relativism’, from ‘positivism’ to ‘constructivism’ and from ‘structuralism’ to ‘post-structuralism/postmodernism’, first the different isms are grouped into four main groups/streams and then S-D logic is analyzed and classified according to these streams. The four streams are: object-orientation (realism, positivism, empiricism, and so on); subject orientation (constructivism, interpretivism, and so forth); intersubjective orientation (social constructionism, pancritical rationalism, methodological constructivism, and so on); and sign orientation (post-structuralism, postmodernism, and variations). S-D logic is mainly underpinned by an intersubjective orientation and has a huge potential for further development both in and for marketing if seen from a sign-orientated, post-structural perspective and linked to the theory of practices.

Reflecting on fieldwork carried out in the UK insurance sector, the thesis explores the role played by various types of actuarial and hydrological expertise in the performance of flooding as a matter of sustained public concern. In doing so, the question is raised: what analytical status to give the concept of risk when accounting for the epistemic doings involved in bringing yet unrealised future floods to bear on the present? Contrary to most other European countries the provision of flood insurance in the UK is left to the market and organised via an agreement under which insurers pledge to provide cover in areas protected by the Government to a standard of 1:75 years (the average return period between floods). What should be taken into account when mapping out this 1:75 year flood zone is subject to debates constantly revitalised by flood events with changing characteristics as well as new ways of modelling and anticipating what has yet to take place. How should we understand the knowledge claims hardwired into these debates through the involvement of actuarial and hydrological expertise? The thesis will argue that a reorientation of flood risk away from a status as the (multiple) object of these claims towards a status as an event in which a diverse variety of other things are brought into being (maps, futures, frequencies, anxieties, publics, geographies, things which are not necessarily very well understood as risk per se), will give rise to more productive and eventful questions. In the terminology of Isabelle Stengers, to risk is to create the possibility of bringing new things to life – the risking of floods seems to be constantly exciting such creativities.

Ce mémoire propose une conception naturaliste et normative de l'axiologie scientifique contemporaine, c'est-à-dire des buts de la science et des scientifiques. Nous commençons par présenter le naturalisme en philosophie des sciences, en particulier ses dimensions scientifique, méthodologique et ontologique. Nous discutons le sophisme naturaliste et l'objection de la normativité souvent adressée aux approches naturalistes, principalement à travers le prisme de l'épistémologie naturalisée de Quine (1969). Nous illustrons ensuite ces thèmes - naturalisme, normativité, et axiologie scientifique - au moyen de la théorie de Laudan (1987), qui articule un début de théorie axiologique de la science qui se veut naturaliste et normative. Nous soulignons le caractère insatisfaisant de sa théorie, et proposons une conception plus riche et plus détaillée de l'axiologie scientifique. Nous analysons pour ce faire différents liens entre la science, l'industrie, le gouvernement et la société. Nous dégageons en particulier une tendance axiologique pragmatique de la science contemporaine. Finalement, nous ébauchons un cadre normatif instrumental inspiré de Laudan (1987)pour réfléchir sur l'axiologie scientifique. / This master proposes a naturalist and normative conception of contemporary scientific axiology, i.e., of science's and scientists' goals. We start off by discussing some naturalistic positions in philosophy of science, their scientific, methodological and ontological dimensions as well. We review the naturalistic fallacy and the normativity objection against naturalistic approaches, mostly in light of Quine's (1969) naturalized epistemology. We then illustrate these themes - naturalism, normativity, and scientific axiology - by discussing Laudan's (1987) naturalistic and normative theory of scientific axiology. We underscore the unsatisfying character of his theory, and propose instead a richer and more detailed one. In order to do that, we analyse some relations between science, industry, government and society. We identify and discuss a pragmatic axiological trend in particular. Finally, we sketch an instrumental normative framework for thinking about scientific axiology.