O presente trabalho baseia-se no levantamento histórico sobre a proteção dos direitos humanos da criança e do adolescente, na análise de referências teóricas sobre comunidades epistêmicas e movimentos sociais, e em entrevistas com pessoas envolvidas na criação do Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente (ECA) - Lei Federal n.º 8.069/90. Identifica cinco comunidades epistêmicas (internacional, estatal, militante, religiosa e jurídica), presentes no Movimento de Defesa dos Direitos da Criança e do Adolescente dos anos 80. Ao identificar essas comunidades, cujas influências técnicas e políticas foram essenciais para a elaboração coletiva do ECA, procuramos evidenciar teorias que geraram consenso à época e orientaram a formulação da norma jurídica. As duas principais são: Teologia da Libertação e Pedagogia do Oprimido. O reconhecimento dessas teorias fundantes pode inspirar o desenvolvimento de indicadores que auxiliariam na avaliação da implementação do Estatuto em trabalhos futuros. A pesquisa, para os fins desta dissertação, é descritiva e documental, com dimensão histórica e processo interdisciplinar. Situa-se no campo das ciências sociais aplicadas, e baseia-se em entrevistas semiestruturadas, documentação oficial e textos científicos com suporte bibliográfico, que reúnem trabalhos de natureza jurídica, política, sociológica, teológica e filosófica / The present work is based on a historical survey of the protection of the human rights of children and adolescents (both in Brazil and across the world), an analysis of theoretical references on epistemic communities and social movements, and interviews with people involved in the formulation of the Child and Adolescent Statute (CAS) - Federal Law n.º 8.069/90. It identifies five epistemic communities (international; state; militant; religious; legal) presents in the Social Movement to Defend the Rights of Children and Adolescents in the 1980s. In identifying these communities, whose technical and political influences contributed to the formulation of the CAS, we can highlight which scientific theories generated consensus at the time and founded the legal norm, such as Liberation Theology and Pedagogy of the Oppressed. The principles of those theories also reveal indicators for evaluating the implementation of the Statute in future work. The research carried out for the purposes of this dissertation is descriptive and documentary with historical dimension and interdisciplinary process. It is situated in the field of applied social sciences, and is based on semi-structured interviews, official documentation and scientific texts with bibliographic support, which bring together works of a juridical, political, sociological, theological and philosophical nature

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mariana Battistini Dalmolin.pdf: 713395 bytes, checksum: 70d562c24a86d270ac99faa7f6717490 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-05-11 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / This work is a study on the theory of laws of nature proposed by the Australian philosopher D. M. Armstrong in his work What is a Law of Nature?, published in 1983. In that text, Armstrong shows the insufficiency of the regularty theory and, then, proceeds to develop his own theory, which is able to answer to several of the regularity theory's outstanding issues. In the first chapter of this work, we present (1.1) the naive regularity theory, as well as the critiques that it received from Armstrong and other authors. Afterwards (1.2), we present three suggestions to sophisticate that theory, which are not successful to address the difficulties found in its naive version. Therefore, the regularity theory is refuted, and a new theory of laws is needed. In the second chapter, we present, firstly (2.1), an assumption of Armstrong's theory of laws his realism about universals , and we see how it can be applied to a theory of laws. Afterwards (2.2), we present Armstrong's fundamental thesis: a law is a relation between universals and simultaneously an universal in itself, which regulates the behavior of particulars and generates uniformities in nature in virtue of the instaniation relation. We also show (2.3) how such theory makes it possible to deal with the difficulties faced by the regularity theory. In the third chapter, we evaluate the role of the concept of necessity in Armstrong's theory. Firstly (3.1), we deepen our understanding of the necessitation relation N, and, afterwards (3.2), we show that Armstrong rejects the thesis according to which laws are metaphisically necessary and advocates for their contingency. Therefore, the understanding of his theory is centered in the distinction between the nomic necessity asserted in his conception of laws, on one hand, and the metaphysic necessity of laws, which Armstrong denies, on the other / Este trabalho é um estudo sobre a teoria de leis da natureza proposta pelo filósofo australiano D. M. Armstrong em sua obra What is a Law of Nature?, publicada em 1983. Neste texto, Armstrong mostra a insuficiência da teoria regularista de leis e procede, então, a desenvolver sua própria teoria, que se mostra capaz de resolver diversos problemas que a teoria regularista deixava em aberto. No primeiro capítulo deste trabalho, apresentamos (1.1) a teoria regularista ingênua, bem como as críticas que ela recebeu de Armstrong e de outros autores. Em seguida (1.2), mostramos que três propostas de sofisticação da teoria não são bem-sucedidas para resolver as dificuldades encontradas na versão ingênua. A teoria regularista fica, assim, refutada, e uma nova teoria sobre leis é necessária. No segundo capítulo, apresentamos, primeiramente (2.1), um pressuposto à teoria de leis de Armstrong seu realismo sobre universais , e vemos como este pode ser aplicado a uma teoria de leis. A seguir (2.2), apresentamos a tese fundamental de Armstrong: uma lei é uma relação entre universais e, simultaneamente, um universal em si mesma que, devido à relação de instanciação, regula o comportamento de particulares e gera uniformidades na natureza. Mostramos, também, (2.3) como tal teoria permite dar conta das dificuldades enfrentadas pela teoria regularista. No terceiro capítulo, avaliamos o papel do conceito de necessidade na teoria de Armstrong. Em primeiro lugar (3.1), aprofundamos nosso entendimento da relação de necessitação N, que tem um papel central na teoria apresentada, e, a seguir (3.2), mostramos que Armstrong rejeita a tese de que leis são metafisicamente necessárias, defendendo sua contingência. O entendimento de sua teoria está centrado, portanto, na distinção entre a necessidade nômica afirmada em sua concepção de leis, por um lado, e a necessidade metafísica das leis, que Armstrong rejeita

O trabalho que apresentamos é o resultado de uma pesquisa teórica acerca dos elementos necessários para que uma Sequência de Ensino Investigativo (SEI) possa promover a Argumentação e a Alfabetização Científica em sala de aula. Neste trabalho buscamos saber quais elementos deveríamos inserir nesta sequência de ensino para que realmente se tornasse um trabalho útil para o professor do Ensino Médio, e dessa forma, o trabalho tornou-se uma pesquisa teórica. Buscamos então, elaborar uma sequência de ensino sobre a dualidade onda-partícula do elétron, pois o elétron é a menor partícula com massa que pode-se trabalhar em sala de aula, a nosso ver. Para tratar a dualidade do elétron, fizemos o uso de material histórico que relaciona a Física Clássica e a Física Moderna, com destaque para a Física Quântica. Dentro da literatura pesquisada, pudemos compreender que uma sequência de ensino pode ser mais desenvolvida e aplicada, no que concerne à argumentação e à alfabetização científica, caso considere alguns pressupostos. Para tanto, utilizamos aspectos fundamentais e importantes de uma SEI (CARVALHO, 2011) e de eixos estruturantes e indicadores de Alfabetização Científica (SASSERON, 2008; SASSERON e CARVALHO, 2008). A sequência de ensino elaborada tem, a nosso ver, várias características de ensino investigativo, o que favoreceria a Argumentação e a Alfabetização Científica. Nossa análise feita para cada atividade indicou boa aceitabilidade quanto à utilização dos aspectos fundamentais e importantes para se elaborar uma SEI. Ainda mais, a análise também mostrou que as atividades também podem favorecer o surgimento de indicadores de Alfabetização Científica (indicadores de AC), o que implica em favorecimento dos eixos estruturantes da AC. / The work we present is the result of a theoretical research on the elements necessary for a Sequence of Investigative Education (SEI) can promote Argumentation and Scientific Literacy in the classroom. In this work we know which elements should enter this teaching sequence that actually became useful work for the teacher of high school, and thus, the work became a theoretical research. We seek then develop a teaching sequence on the wave-particle duality of the electron, because the electron is the smallest particle with mass that can work in the classroom, in our view. To deal with the duality of the electron we use of historical material relating to Classical Physics and Modern Physics, especially Quantum Physics. Within the literature, we understand that a teaching sequence can be further developed and applied, with respect to the Argumentation and Scientific Literacy, should consider some assumptions. To use both fundamental and important aspects of an SEI (CARVALHO, 2011) and structural axes and indicators of Scientific Literacy (SASSERON, 2008; SASSERON and CARVALHO, 2008). The teaching sequence is prepared has, in our view, several characteristics about the investigative teaching, which would favor the Argument and Scientific Literacy. In our analysis for each activity indicated good acceptability for the use of the fundamental aspects and important to develop a SEI. Moreover, the analysis also showed that the activities can also favor the emergence of indicators of Scientific Literacy (AC indicators), which implies favoring the structural axes of the AC.

History is descriptive. Epistemology is conceived as normative. It appears, then, that a historical approach to epistemology, like historical epistemology, might not be epistemically normative. In our context here, epistemology is not a systematic theory of knowledge, truth, or justification. In this thesis I approach epistemic justification through the vantage point of practice of science. Practice is about reasoning. Reasoning, conceived as the human propensity to order perceptions, beliefs, memories, etc., in ways that permit us to have understanding, is not only about thinking. Reasoning has to do with our actions, too: In the ordering of reasoning we take into account the desires of ourselves and others. Reasoning has to do with tinkering with stuff, physical or abstract. Practice is primarily about skills. Practices are not mere groping. They have a form. Performing according to a practice is an activity with a lot of plasticity. The skilled performer retains the form of the practice in many different situations. Finally, practices are not static in time. Practices develop. People try new things, some of which may work out, others not. The technology involved in how to go about doing things in a particular practice changes, and the concepts concerning understanding what one is doing also may change. This is the point where history enters the picture. In this thesis I explore the interactions between history, reasoning, and skills from the viewpoint of a particular type of epistemic justification: a priori justification. An a priori justified proposition is a proposition which is evident independent of experience. Such propositions are self-evident. We will make sense of a priori justification in a context of regarding science as practice, so that we will be able to demonstrate that the latter accommodates the normative character of science.

Nesta pesquisa analiso as metodologias de luteria experimental chamadas Circuit-Bending e Hardware Hacking, as quais englobo no termo Circuito Alterado, criado especificamente para este trabalho. Tais metodologias baseiam-se na construção de aparelhos musicais a partir da reutilização de componentes eletrônicos descartados. O principal objetivo desta dissertação é estabelecer relações contextuais entre os três atos fundamentais envolvidos na alteração de circuitos - abrir o circuito, tateá-lo em busca de sonoridades interessantes e multiplicar a metodologia, através de concertos, blogs e/ou oficinas - e questões culturais relacionadas a cada ato. / On this research I analyze the experimental luthier methodologies called Circuit-Bending and Hardware Hacking, which I call Circuito Alterado (Altered Circuits). This methodologies are based in the construction of musical instruments from the reuse of obsolete electronic components. The main goal of this dissertation is to establish contextual relationships between the tree acts involved in the methodologies - to open-up the circuit, to touch it, in the search of interesting sonorities and to multiply it, through concerts, blogs and/or workshops - and cultural issues related to each act.

Ce travail fait l’analyse du concept de « principe de coordination » tel qu’il se développe au sein de la théorie coordinative de la connaissance, et plus particulièrement au sein du mouvement empiriste-logique, à partir de la deuxième décennie du XXème siècle. Ce concept est primordial lorsqu’il s’agit de comprendre la manière dont la définition des concepts de grandeur en physique se construit comme la mise en rapport, la coordination, des variables mathématiques de la théorie avec les opérations de mesure dans le laboratoire. L’enjeu est de montrer qu’un des concepts centraux de l’empirisme au XXème siècle est utilisé initialement, par Schlick et Reichenbach, pour analyser la théorie de la relativité, mais qu’il devient rapidement l’outil d’un programme plus spécifique, entrepris par Carnap et Hempel, de reconstruction logique des théories physiques. Pourtant ce concept, pris au sein de l’épistémologie coordinative, permet un empirisme qui laisse une place au développement historique des concepts de grandeur. Analysé et compris correctement il peut permettre de poser les fondements d’un empirisme historique, au sein duquel les concepts théoriques ne seraient plus reconstruits seulement à partir des mesures empiriques, mais aussi à partir des concepts hérités de théories historiquement antérieures. / This work analyzes the concept of "principle of coordination" as it develops within the coordinative theory of knowledge, and more particularly within the empiricist-logical movement, from the second decade of the twentieth century. This concept is essential to understand the way in which the definition of the concepts of magnitude in physics is constructed as the linking, the coordination, of the mathematical variables of the theory with the measurement operations in the laboratory. The challenge is to show that one of the central concepts of empiricism in the twentieth century is used initially, by Schlick and Reichenbach, to analyze the theory of relativity, but that it quickly becomes the tool of a more specific program, undertaken by Carnap and Hempel, of logical reconstruction of physical theories. Yet this concept, along with other concepts from coordinative epistemology, allows an empiricism that leaves room for the historical development of the concepts of magnitude. Analyzed and understood correctly, it can lay the foundations of a historical empiricism, in which theoretical concepts would no longer be reconstructed only from empirical measurements, but also from concepts inherited from historically antecedent theories.

The inspiration behind this philosophical endeavor is an ethical one: interested in what it means to flourish as a human being – how to live well and authentically. Similar to medicine and how the ability to prescribe the appropriate treatment depends on first making a diagnosis, the focus of this work will to be understand the human condition and the ways in which subjectivity, one’s sense of self, is constituted. Given the general dissatisfaction with the modern metaphysical picture of the world, which analyzes the world in terms of the mutually exclusive and completely separate categories of nature/objects and society/subjects, I proceed from an alternative conceptual perspective, that of non-modernity, offered by Bruno Latour. By focusing on the actual practice of the sciences Latour develops one of his central concepts: mediation. From this understanding of the practices of mediation the world is revealed as an ontological continuum of hybrids – mixtures of human and nonhuman elements – that ranges from quasi-object to quasi-subject. Rather than being separate, nature and society are intimately interwoven and co-constituted, forming a nature-culture collective that is connected and defined by the network of relations between existing hybrids. Given this philosophical landscape of mediation, hybrids and networks, the question that I seek to address is how does this effect what it means to be human? What does it mean to human living in a hybrid world? I answer this question by articulating and developing Latour’s concept of quasi-subject. This will ultimately amount to saying that as humans, our sense of self and agency is co-constituted through our networks of relations with both humans and nonhumans. I conclude the paper by exploring some of the ethical implications that naturally emerge from such an understanding.

Science has been identified as a crucial element in the competitiveness and sustainability of America in the global economy. American citizens, especially minority populations, however, are not pursuing science education or careers. Past research has implicated `attitudes toward science' as an important factor in the public's participation in science. I applied Ajzen's (1991) Theory of Planned Behavior to attitudes toward science to predict science-related sustainability-action intentions and evaluated whether scientists and Native Americans differed in their general attitudes toward science, cultural values, and specific beliefs about science. Analyses revealed that positive attitude toward science and the cultural value of individualism predicted intentions to engage with science-related sustainability actions. Unexpectedly, scientists and Native Americans did not differ in their cultural values or positive attitude toward science. However, Natives Americans held significantly more negative attitude toward science than scientists. Implications for science education and attitudes towards science theory and application are discussed.

Many prominent scientists have pointed out that philosophy is of no benefit to science. Stephen Hawking asserts: Philosophy is dead! Sciences use conceptions like natural laws, matter, nature, theories, etc. But science is also confronted with questions such as: "What is a natural law?" "What is nature?" "What is matter?" and "What is a scientific theory?" These (metatheoretical) questions exceed the sphere of competence of science – they are items of the philosophy of science. Philosophy of science is a metatheory of science. The Philosophy of science overlaps epistemology, ontology, and metaphysics by exploring whether scientific results are true, or whether entities like quarks or electrons really exist. More detailed investigations bring various questions into consideration such as: "How do we define the boundaries between different scientific disciplines?" "Is there a relation between the beauty and the truth of a scientific theory?" and "How do we distinguish between science and pseudoscience?" Additionally, the philosophy of science is concerned with ethical problems of modern technology, with the methodological questions, with the reconstruction of the structure and the development of scientific theories, and with revealing of any indoctrination of science. The optimistic conclusion of this paper is: Philosophy is still alive – but the philosopher has to participate in round-table discussions with scientists. We just want philosophers talking to scientists!

Many prominent scientists have pointed out that philosophy is of no benefit to science. Stephen Hawking asserts: Philosophy is dead! Sciences use conceptions like natural laws, matter, nature, theories, etc. But science is also confronted with questions such as: "What is a natural law?" "What is nature?" "What is matter?" and "What is a scientific theory?" These (metatheoretical) questions exceed the sphere of competence of science – they are items of the philosophy of science. Philosophy of science is a metatheory of science. The Philosophy of science overlaps epistemology, ontology, and metaphysics by exploring whether scientific results are true, or whether entities like quarks or electrons really exist. More detailed investigations bring various questions into consideration such as: "How do we define the boundaries between different scientific disciplines?" "Is there a relation between the beauty and the truth of a scientific theory?" and "How do we distinguish between science and pseudoscience?" Additionally, the philosophy of science is concerned with ethical problems of modern technology, with the methodological questions, with the reconstruction of the structure and the development of scientific theories, and with revealing of any indoctrination of science. The optimistic conclusion of this paper is: Philosophy is still alive – but the philosopher has to participate in round-table discussions with scientists. We just want philosophers talking to scientists!