這篇哲學論文是對約翰．麥克道爾(John McDowell)對「主體性」(subjectivity)看法的一個探究。這個計畫由兩部分所組成。一方面，我將討論麥克道爾如何理解並回應他所處理的諸多議題；另一方面，我將藉由考慮主體性的不同面向來進行相關的討論：一個主體是一個存在世界中的知覺者、知識者、思想者、說話者、行動者、具人格者(person)、以及(自我)意識者。我藉由指出並消解一個出自於「理性動物」這個概念的緊張關係來開始這個探究：人類是自然的，卻也同時是理性的。稍後這個探究藉由考慮麥克道爾的「第二自然∕天性」(second nature)概念如何使我們成為具有多重面貌的人類主體來推進。透過細究麥克道爾的診斷與回應，現代與當代哲學中的兩個中心錯誤–狹窄的自然觀以及「笛卡兒式的內在空間」(Cartesian inner space)–將被指出並且拒斥。 在導論章裡我首先建議我們應該為某個對「世界」的看法留下空間。我進一步論證「心靈性」(mentality)具有許多面向，而了解這些面向便是去了解人類主體的多重面貌。在第一章裡，我解釋為了消解「理性動物」這個概念所產生的緊張關係，亞里斯多德(Aristotle)的「第二自然∕天性」概念如何被引進。其後我回應一些對這個策略的擔憂，包括萊特(Crispin Wright)及其它哲學家的批評。高達美(Hans-Georg Gadamer)的「世界∕環境」區分也被引介並關聯到麥克道爾的思想。第二章討論知覺與知識；麥克道爾的主要標的–笛卡兒式的內在空間–被引進並批評。我也對史卓(Barry Stroud)與布雷克本(Simon Blackburn)的相關立場進行評價。稍後我把心靈與世界(Mind and World)的主題和現有的脈絡關聯起來；具體來說，我討論麥克道爾對戴維森(Donald Davidson)與康德(Immanuel Kant)的引用與延伸。然後我討論一個常被提及的「觀念論」指控，以及布蘭登(Robert Brandom)的「殘餘笛卡兒主義」(residual Cartesianism)批評。第三章專注於庫律普基(Saul Kripke)的維根斯坦(Ludwig Wittgenstein)，指出在規則依循背後的一個主要論題是內在空間模型的一個版本，而且庫律普基的維根斯坦其實並不是真正的維根斯坦。我回應來自庫許(Martin Kusch)的許多批評；達美特(Michael Dummett)對化約論的要求也被駁斥。其後，我考慮戴維森的「無語言」宣稱，並討論麥克道爾在多大的程度上同意他。第四章我衡量來自德雷弗斯(Hubert Dreyfus)關於行動和行動者的批評。我討論麥克道爾如何論證德雷弗斯與梅洛龐蒂(Maurice Merleau-Ponty)都犯了「無身體的智性主體迷思」(the Myth of the Disembodied Intellect)。討論當中也回應了艾爾斯(Michael Ayers)的智性主義指控。其後我引入麥克道爾對帕菲特(Derek Parfit)人格看法、以及對戴維森對心物關聯說法的批評。在第五章我專注於意識和自我意識。麥克道爾將他對帕菲特的論證應用在康德身上，但基尼斯弗(Maximilian de Gaynesford)認為麥克道爾誤讀了康德。我為麥克道爾回應這些批評。我進一步把這個討論關聯到麥克道爾對「概念架構–內容二元論」(scheme-content dualism)的攻擊。這把我們帶領到麥克道爾式看法對「感質」(qualia)的拒斥，並進一步到錯覺論證脈絡下「意向主義」(intentionalism)和「選言主義」(disjunctivism)的爭論。我批評克瑞(Tim Crane)設想意向主義以及錯覺論證的方式。我也討論了許多版本的選言主義。在結論章裡，我表達了對麥克道爾「自我決定主體性」(self-determining subjectivity)這個概念的疑慮。根據麥克道爾，人類的自由為「理由空間中的因果關係」(causations in the space of reasons)所構成，但如同賈斯金(Richard Gaskin)所指出，對它的一個完整說明尚未被提供。我以一些關於要如何填滿這個麥克道爾式圖像的約略想法來作結。 / This essay is an inquiry into John McDowell’s thinking on ‘subjectivity.’ The project consists in two parts. On the one hand, I will discuss how McDowell understands and responds to the various issues he is tackling; on the other, I will approach relevant issues concerning subjectivity by considering different aspects of it: a subject as a perceiver, knower, thinker, speaker, agent, person and (self-) conscious being in the world. The inquiry begins by identifying and resolving a tension generated by the very idea of ‘rational animal’: human beings are at the same time natural and rational. Later the inquiry proceeds by considering how McDowell’s notion of ‘second nature’ enables us to be human subjects with many faces. By going through the diagnoses and responses of McDowell, two central problems in modern and contemporary philosophy – the narrow conception of nature and the Cartesian inner space model – are identified and repelled. In Episode N I first urge that we should leave room for a certain notion of ‘world.’ I further argue that mentality has many aspects, and to understand those aspects is to understand the many faces of human subject. In Episode Ⅰ the Aristotelian notion of ‘second nature’ is discussed in order to resolve the tension in the very idea of ‘rational animal.’ Later I reply to some worries about this maneuver, including the objection from Crispin Wright. Hans-Georg Gadamer’s distinction between world and environment is introduced and related to McDowell’s thinking. Episode Ⅱ discusses perception and knowledge; McDowell’s main target – the Cartesian inner space – is introduced and criticized. Barry Stroud’s and Simon Blackburn’s positions are evaluated. Later I connect the main theme of Mind and World to the present context; in particular, I discuss McDowell’s invocation of Donald Davidson and Immanuel Kant. And then I discuss a common accusation of idealism, and Robert Brandom’s accusation of ‘residual individualism.’ Episode Ⅲ concentrates on Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein, arguing that the master thesis behind the rule-following paradox is a version of the inner space model, and that Kripke’s Wittgenstein is not Wittgenstein. Martin Kusch’s objections are answered; Michael Dummett’s demand of reductionism is rebutted. After this, I turn to Davidson’s ‘no language’ claim, and discuss to what extent McDowell agrees with him. In Episode Ⅳ I evaluate objections from Hubert Dreyfus concerning action and agency. I discuss how Dreyfus and Maurice Merleau-Ponty commit ‘the Myth of the Disembodied Intellect’ identified by McDowell. I answer Michael Ayer’s charge of intellectualism in passing. Later I bring in McDowell’s objections to Derek Parfit on personhood and to Davidson on the mind-body relation. In Episode Ⅴ I focus on consciousness and self-consciousness. McDowell applies his argument against Parfit to Kant, but Maximilian de Gaynesford dissents. I reply to his objections on McDowell’s behalf. I further connect this to McDowell’s attacks on the dualism of scheme and content. This leads to my McDowellian rejection to the existence of qualia, and further brings me to the debate between intentionalism and disjunctivism in the context of the argument from illusion. I argue against Tim Crane’s ways of conceiving issues about intentionalism and the argument from illusion. Varieties of disjunctivism are also discussed. In my Epilogue, I express my worry about McDowell’s notion of ‘self-determining subjectivity.’ According to McDowell, human freedom consists in causations in the space of reason, but as Richard Gaskin points out, a satisfying story of it is yet to be provided. I close this essay with some rough ideas about how to fill in the details of the McDowellian picture.

本論文約九萬字，共分六章，主要是採文獻研究法，希望透過對菲律賓的研究，了解 民主政治的社會、經濟、文化基礎。以下則簡述各章內容。 第一章緒論，包括研究動機、名詞界定、研究架構。主要是以道爾（Robert A．Dahl ）「多元政策－－參與與反對」一書中所提出的七個變項，為研究架構，來檢視菲國 為何會從民主政治，變成馬可仕一人的獨裁。 第二章菲國政體的變遷。從歷史的描述中，可以了解菲律賓基本上是符合道爾在「歷 史順序」中所說的自由化先於包容性，此是有利於民主政治的發展。然簡由於菲國曾 是西班牙與美國的殖民地，所以外力干涉程度便十分明顯，不僅表現在政治上，也在 經濟上。 第三章社會經濟環境，主要敘述西、美兩國對菲律賓的經濟政策，造成了菲國社會極 端的不平等及貧富差距過大，以及經濟上的依賴美國。其次在社會結構方面，則敘述 菲的家族制。 第四章政治文化與次文化分裂。在政治文化中，主要強調傳統文化對政治行為的影響 。另外在次文化的分裂上則說明，雖然菲國是一個多種族多語國的國家，但是並不因 此面造成大的分裂。 第五章官僚體制與政當。主要是從政黨的輸入面與官僚體制的輸出面來探討菲國政黨 的轉性與官僚甄補，貪污腐化的情形。 第六章結論。從社經環境、政治文化、官僚體制等方面來說明菲變成獨裁政治的原因 。

班雅明在拱廊計畫中專章探討布爾喬亞室內空間概念的思想理論啟發了本論文。在資本主義盛行工業革命興起的十九世紀，室內空間成為中產階級儲存財產、保障私人安全舒適、以及抵禦外在威脅的所在，然而班雅明不僅僅質疑這種布爾喬亞室內空間的穩固，他更直接點出中產階級表面上寄託於室內空間，潛意識卻也不信任其牢靠。而我將延續班雅明的論點解讀十九世紀偵探文類中屢屢發生的室內犯罪，這樣的劇情設計事實上就是投射了偵探文類中產階級讀者對於室內空間潛在的焦慮。本論文以班雅明為基礎，使用艾徳加．愛倫坡和柯南道爾的偵探短篇小說，探討這些作品如何呈現布爾喬亞室內空間，作者如何回應室內空間的議題，以及偵探在布爾喬亞室內空間中扮演什麼樣的角色，同時從十九世紀初的艾倫波到十九世紀末的柯南道爾，我也欲探討布爾喬亞室內空間從都市化初期到都市化末期中產階級移往郊區定居的過程中所發生的轉變。本文認為，愛倫坡和柯南道爾的偵探故事中藉由顯示室內空間的危險與不穩定挑戰了傳統的布爾橋亞室內空間觀。 / Walter Benjamin’s conceptualization of the bourgeois interior inspired this dissertation. As the nineteenth century witnessed capitalism and Industrial Revolution, the domestic interior served the bourgeoisie to store property, ensure comfort and security, and withstand the outdoor dangers. However, Benjamin not only questions the impregnability of this bourgeois interior but also directly points out the bourgeoisie’s unconscious anxiety over the interior despite their conscious confidence in it. Using Benjamin’s theory as my critical framework, I analyze the frequent occurrences of domestic crimes in the nineteenth-century detective genre. This formula, I argue, projects its middle-class readers’ anxiety over the domestic space as the domestic space is repeatedly invaded and disturbed by crimes. Based on Benjamin’s theory, I use Edgar Allen Poe and Conan Doyle’s detective stories to explore how these works depict the bourgeois interior, how their authors address the issues about the bourgeois interior, and what role the detective plays, a protector or a transgressor, when involved into the invasions of the bourgeois interior. From Poe at the beginning of the nineteenth century to Doyle at the end, I also examine the changes of the bourgeois interior during the process of the middle class’ migration from the city center to suburbs. I argue that both Poe’s and Doyle’s detective stories challenges the ideology of bourgeois spatiality by showing the interior is unsafe and unstable against the bourgeoisie’s imagination.