This dissertation addresses early British intelligence activities and Anglo-Ottoman relations by viewing the activities of army officers and private individuals as a collective pursuit to safeguard British imperial interests. It offers a new understanding of the relationships between intelligence, grand strategy, and diplomacy before the Great War. It also examines the role that pre-1914 intelligence played in that conflict. The Boer War had shown that the geographic expanse of the British Empire was a source of strategic danger as well as a foundation of global power. The revelation of weakness propelled Britain to begin collecting intelligence on possible sources of conflict in preparation for the next war. A 1906 border incident between Egypt and Turkey marked turning points in Anglo-Ottoman relations and British intelligence efforts. Intelligence began to focus on railways that threatened Britain’s commercial position, on the disposition of Arab tribes who might revolt against Turkish authority, on the state of the Turkish army, and on the extent of European activity in Turkey. In 1914, British policy in the Middle East was unco-ordinated. Needing an effective means of combatting the Turco-German Jihad proclaimed in 1915, London created the Arab Bureau as an advisory organ based in Cairo. It became the central repository for much of the intelligence gathered before 1914. Officials in Cairo and London created new maps, compiled route reports, and assembled intelligence handbooks for distribution. Once the Arab Revolt began in 1916, intelligence helped marshal Britain’s resources effectively in pursuit of victory. Placing pre-1914 intelligence in the context of British imperial concerns extends our understanding of Anglo-Ottoman relations by considering strategic and diplomatic issues within a single frame. It demonstrates the influence of the Boer War in initiating intelligence-gathering missions in the Ottoman Empire, showing that even those undertaken before the establishment of a professional intelligence service in 1909, although lacking organization, were surprisingly modern, and ultimately successful. Analysis of under-utilized sources, such as the handbooks created by the Arab Bureau and the Royal Geographical Society, demonstrates the value of pre-war intelligence in detailed ways. It deepens understanding of the role British intelligence played in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and shows how one nation’s intelligence, military, and diplomatic bodies operated separately and collectively in an era that presented them with unprecedented challenges and opportunities.

The 1933 genocidal attacks on Assyrians in the Simele region defined the birth of the nascent Iraqi nation and identity. Iraq has ever been in the spotlight of ethnic and cultural strife, especially concerning Sunni-Shia animosity, and more recently in dealing with the Kurdish people and Iraqi Kurdistan. In most cases, however, the Assyrians are completely neglected from scholarship concerning Iraq and its peoples. This work reinserts the Assyrian people into the fabric of Iraq and discusses the violent and non-violent suppression of Assyrian identity and culture through genocide, cultural genocide, and ethnic cleansing. Three fundamental factors emerge from this reinsertion with respect to Iraq and genocide. First, this approach introduces an often-neglected element in Iraqi studies: the inclusion of minorities, or micro-minorities, within the existing discourse on Iraqi studies. Second, it contributes to genocide studies by examining the impact of the non-physical, or cultural, aspect of genocide. Further, it discusses the importance of the Assyrian case in Iraq for understanding Iraqi history, and serves as a case in point of scaling suffering and for understanding how and why a hierarchy of genocide exists.

The present dissertation seeks to present and analyze the hitherto poorly understood first encounter between the Ottoman Empire and the Tsardom of Muscovy in the North Caucasus from the Muscovites’ annexation of the nearby Khanate of Astrakhan in 1556 and subsequent penetration into this region, to their expulsion from it by the Ottomans in 1605. The study relies on both Ottoman and Muscovite sources, both documentary and narrative, as well as archival and published. The main archival documentary sources are the Ottoman mühimme defters (registers of orders issued by the Imperial Council [Divan-i Hümayun]) and the Muscovite posol’skie knigi (registers of diplomatic documentation, including ambassadorial reports, diplomatic correspondence, and other documents administered by the Ambassadorial Office [Posol’skii Prikaz]). The main narrative sources are sixteenth-century Ottoman and Muscovite chronicles. On the basis of the Ottoman and Muscovite documentary sources it is possible to determine what Ottoman and Muscovite policies in the North Caucasus were, to what degree they were well-formulated, and how they evolved during the aforementioned time period. It becomes clear that Ottoman and Muscovite policies in the Pontic-Caspian steppes and specifically in the North Caucasus had some superficial similarities, but were in essence fundamentally different. Taking into account that it was only after Muscovy’s expansion into the North Caucasus that the Ottomans decided to take an active stand in the north, the dissertation also shows the ways in which Muscovite steppe policy not only affected the political structures on the frontiers but also influenced Ottoman northern policy, and specifically in the North Caucasus. However, this dissertation is not solely a study of an imperial rivalry in a contested frontier zone. The Ottoman and Muscovite involvement brought about changes to the internal dynamics of the polities within the North Caucasus. Lastly, during the first round of this imperial clash, Ottoman and Muscovite presence and sway in the North Caucasus underwent several extreme and unexpected shifts. These shifts and resulting new strategies that the Ottomans and Muscovites had to develop in the North Caucasus played an important role in their future encounters in the northern Black Sea region.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Michael Krysko / David Stone / Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who was a nationalist leader and founder and first president of the republic of Turkey, still remains an important figure in the Turkish political and social landscape. Kemalist historiography, which is based on Mustafa Kemal’s six-day speech (Nutuk) in October 1927, emphasizes the foundation of the Republic as central to Turkish history. While this historiography emphasizes that Mustafa Kemal had an explicit plan during his modernization efforts, this dissertation will cover how Mustafa Kemal was incoherent in his actions and changed his discourses over and over again during the change of the political structure of Turkey. Beyond that, this study will suggest that Mustafa Kemal was an opportunist and pragmatist who utilized every single event to establish a Jacobin style autocracy. This research will discuss how Mustafa Kemal succeeded in using every opportunity, such as the Law of Supreme Commander Act in August 1921, the abolition of Sultanate in 1922, the establishment of Republic in 1923, the abolition of Caliphate in 1924, and the elimination of opposition in 1925, to establish his personal autocracy. In particular, the records of Assembly debates, not sufficiently used by Turkish historians, will be helpful to understand the creation of this personal autocracy. While Kemalist historiography credits Mustafa Kemal Ataturk with the original and unique conception of the social, legal, and educational reforms of the early Republican period, this dissertation argues that this approach is not balanced. Although the Kemalist historiography asserts that Mustafa Kemal and his legacy represent carrying out Enlightenment ideals in an obsolete society almost totally ignorant of these principles, the Kemalist modernization got a great inheritance from its predecessors, the Young Turks. Therefore, the Kemalist overstatement of an idealist figure of Mustafa Kemal is wrong in some degree. This dissertation aims to scrutinize the contribution of the Ottoman reformers and contradictions, mistakes, and overstatements of the Kemalist modernization project in social, legal, and educational areas by the help of wide primary sources which include official reports of the Grand National Assembly, the Republican Era archives and a mass of periodicals which were published in 1920s in Turkey.

La présente thèse de recherche concerne l’évolution du système éducatif iranien à l’époque des Qâdjârs, et étudie notamment le rôle qu’y ont eu la France et les acteurs français. Il s’agit de mettre en, exergue l’influence du système éducatif français sur celui de l’Iran, sans pour autant être une comparaison de ces deux systèmes. Ce travail est une recherche historique, qui prend pour but d’étudier le processus de formation d’une structure scolaire moderne en Iran de 1851 à 1925. En prenant contact avec l’Occident, l’Iran du début du XIXème siècle cherche à combler son retard par rapport aux pays européens industrialisés, en leur empruntant savoirs, technologies et méthodes. La mise en place d’un système éducatif radicalement différent de la structure préexistante des écoles coraniques, dites maktab, participe de ce mouvement et est vue par les élites progressistes comme une condition sine qua non à la modernisation du pays. Le modèle éducatif français leur apparait comme étant le meilleur à suivre, et avec lui se diffusent dans le pays la langue et la culture française. Dans cette thèse de doctorat, nous entendons d’abord analyser l’arrière-plan sociopolitique à la mise en place d’un nouveau système scolaire, via la fondation d’écoles modernes, en Iran. Nous tâchons ensuite d’étudier les modalités de mise en œuvre de ce système par les acteurs aussi bien étatiques que privés, tant français qu’iraniens. / The present work concerns the evolution of the educational system in Iran during the Qâdjâr dynasty and the role the French state and French actors played in this evolution. It seeks to highlight the influence of the French educational system on that of Iran, while at the same time avoiding a comparison between the two systems. This is a work of historical research, that aims to study the process of the creation of a modern educational system in Iran between 1851 and 1925. In seeking out the West, early 19th century Iran looked to make up for its tardiness in relation to industrialised European nations by borrowing their knowledge, technology and methods. Putting in place an educational system radically different from the preexisting system based on Quranic schools, called maktab, was a part of this movement and was seen by the progressive elite as a necessary condition for the modernisation of the country. The French educational model seemed to them to be the best one to follow, and with it French language and culture spread throughout the country. In this doctoral thesis, I intend first to analyse the socio-political backdrop of the installation of this new educational system via the creation of modern schools in Iran. I will then look at the modalities of the implementation of the system by both state and private actors, both Iranian and French.

Résumé : Ni une narration chronologique, ni une exploration détaillée d'un ou de quelques événements, cette thèse aborde l'ensemble de la période mandataire d'un angle particulier, celui de la réponse française au nationalisme arabe en Syrie telle que révélée dans les archives et autres sources françaises. Elle s'intéresse aux mécanismes de pensée par lesquels une pionnière de l'idée nationale s'est trouvée à combattre cette idée chez un autre peuple. Le Mandat accordé par la Société des nations a pour but déclaré d'accompagner les sociétés nouvellement libérées de l'occupation ottomane sur le chemin de la maturité politique complète et, donc, de l'indépendance. Utilisant ce cadre juridique qu'elle a elle-même mis en place de concert avec la Grande-Bretagne et d'autres vainqueurs de la Première Guerre mondiale, la France occupe la Syrie et le Liban entre 1920 et 1946 et administre jusqu'en 1943 leur vie politique, leurs finances et leur économie. Or, ne ré-pondant ni au texte ni à l'esprit du Mandat, ses agissements soulèvent des interrogations sur les vrais objectifs. Cette thèse propose une réponse en montrant que le but ultime de la France est d'assurer une position dominante pérenne au Levant, militairement, culturellement et politiquement, et qu'elle conçoit le Mandat comme une mainmise coloniale, adoucie, peut-être, mais aucunement différente dans son essence des autres conquêtes coloniales entreprises dès le XIXe siècle. Un obstacle majeur se dresse toutefois contre l'ambition française : le nationalisme des Syriens. La thèse fait état des méthodes utilisées pour mettre au pas le mouvement nationaliste. La France qualifie la Syrie d'agglomération de communautés, une antithèse du concept de nation. Elle entame son Mandat par une division du pays en plusieurs petits États, une division qu'elle finit par abandonner en 1936 au prix de luttes politiques et de révoltes sanglantes, sans toutefois renoncer à sa perception irrémédiablement communautariste de la population syrienne. En plus de la division politique, les manipulations de l'économie, des finances et des classes sociales font partie de l'arsenal exploré dans la thèse, de même que les méthodes militaires et policières ininterrompues tout au long du Mandat, quoique avec une intensité variable. La thèse attribue l'échec, que l'on constate inévitable, de la France à réaliser aucune de ses ambitions à des idées préconçues sur la région, au refus de prendre en compte les réalités et à une intransigeance condescendante dans les relations avec les Syriens. / Abstract: This thesis is neither a chronological narration, nor a detailed exploration of events. It examines the French response to Arab nationalism in Syria during the entire Mandate period as revealed in the archives and other French sources. A thorough look is given to the mechanisms of thought by which a pioneering country of the national idea fights this very idea embraced by another population. The Mandate granted by the League of Nations has the stated aim of guiding populations that are newly liberated from Ottoman occupation on the path of full political maturity and, therefore, independence. Set up in concert with Great Britain and other victors of the First World War, this legal framework was used by France to occupy Syria and Lebanon militarily between 1920 and 1946 and, until 1943, to administer their political life, as well as their finances and economy. However, observing neither the letter nor the spirit of the Mandate, her actions cannot but raise questions about the real objectives. This thesis proposes an answer. It shows that France's purpose is to ensure in the Levant a lasting dominant position, militarily, culturally and politically, and that she perceives the Mandate as a license for a colonial grip, similar at its base – but not in its form – to other colonial conquests undertaken since the 19th century. However, the nationalism of the Syrians stands as a major obstacle against the French ambition. The thesis describes the methods used to bring the nationalist movement to heel. France perceives Syria as an agglomeration of communities, an antithesis of the concept of nation, and she began the Mandate by dividing the country into several small states. The division ends in 1936 at the cost of political struggles and bloody revolts, although France never renounced her communitarian perception of the Syrian population. In addition to the political division, the thesis explores the manipulations of the economy, finances and social classes, as well as the military and police methods exercised through-out the Mandate, albeit with a varying density. The thesis attributes France's inevitable failure to realize any of its ambitions to her rigid, preconceived, perception of the region with a refusal to adapt it to the realities, and to a condescending intransigence in relations with the Syrians.

This research discusses communication and meaning in the context of orality, using a variety of theoretical perspectives, including memory theory, media and communication theory, and semiotics. Drawing on the work of Walter Ong, it provides new insight about the characteristics and limits of oralnarration by assessing the memes, tropes, and phraseological units in the oral narrations of Armenian Genocide survivors. This research identifies a list of replicable forms of stories and oral devices that are used by the group in question; it then proposes that oral narration of non-fictional topics designed to convey historical or episodic information to others is intuitive, reactive, directed, fuzzy, and sticky. Concerns about the legitimacy and historical value of the narrations under review do not play a role in this research; instead, the focal point is the meaning embedded in the form and structure of the narrations under study.

This research discusses communication and meaning in the context of orality, using a variety of theoretical perspectives, including memory theory, media and communication theory, and semiotics. Drawing on the work of Walter Ong, it provides new insight about the characteristics and limits of oralnarration by assessing the memes, tropes, and phraseological units in the oral narrations of Armenian Genocide survivors. This research identifies a list of replicable forms of stories and oral devices that are used by the group in question; it then proposes that oral narration of non-fictional topics designed to convey historical or episodic information to others is intuitive, reactive, directed, fuzzy, and sticky. Concerns about the legitimacy and historical value of the narrations under review do not play a role in this research; instead, the focal point is the meaning embedded in the form and structure of the narrations under study.

Facile de discourir sur la paix ; complexe, par contre, d’évaluer si paroles et gestes y contribuent vraiment. De manière critique, ce mémoire cherche à contextualiser l’émergence de la nation israélienne de 1881 à 1948, de même qu’un certain nombre de forces pacifistes juives, religieuses comme séculières, sionistes comme anti-sionistes, que cette société a engendrées ou provoquées de la fin du XIXe siècle à aujourd’hui. Dans un premier temps, quatre stratégies utilisées pour construire l’État juif sont explorées : la voie pratique (l’établissement de mochavot, kibboutzim et mochavim), la voie diplomatique (le lobbying de Herzl et Weizmann), la voie sociopolitique (la formation de syndicats, de l’Agence juive et du Va’ad Leoumi) et enfin la voie militaire (la mise sur pied d’organisations paramilitaires telles la Hagana, l’Irgoun, le Lehi et le Palmah). Cette exploration permet de mieux camper le problème de la légalité et de la légitimité des nations palestinienne et israélienne. Dans un deuxième temps, une approche conceptuelle et une approche empirique sont combinées pour mieux comprendre ce qu’est un camp de la paix. L’exploration conceptuelle remet en question les critères qu’utilisent certains chercheurs afin d’identifier si une organisation contribue, ou non, à la construction de la paix. L’exploration empirique trace les contours de deux camps de la paix israéliens : les militants de la gauche séculière achkenazi (un pacifisme qui a émergé dans les années 1970) et les religieux haredim (un pacifisme opposé à l’idéologie sioniste dès ses débuts). Ce survol permet de saisir que tout système de croyances peut provoquer la guerre autant que la paix. La conclusion discute des défis du dialogue intercivilisationnel, des défis tant intranationaux (l’harmonie sociale israélienne entre les juifs achkenazim, mizrahim, russes, éthiopiens, etc.) qu’internationaux (la paix entre les Palestiniens et les Israéliens). / It is easy to speak of peace, but much more difficult to evaluate to what extent one’s actions really contribute to it. This master’s thesis seeks to critically contextualize the emergence of the Israeli nation from 1881 to 1948 and highlight certain Jewish pacifist forces, religious and secular, zionist and anti-zionist, which this society has generated or compelled into being from the end of the XIXth century until today. First, four strategies used to build the Jewish state are explored: the practical path (setting up moshavot, kibbutzim and moshavim), the diplomatic path (Herzl and Weizmann’s lobbying), the sociopolitical path (establishing unions, the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad Leumi) and finally the military path (setting up paramilitary organizations such as Hagana, Irgun, Lehi and Palmach). This exploration allows the researcher to better frame the issue of the legality and legitimacy of the Palestinian and Israeli nations. Secondly, the notion of peace camp is investigated using a combined conceptual and empirical approach. The conceptual inquiry questions the criteria used by some scholars to determine whether an organization contributes or not to peacebuilding. The empirical inquiry examines two peace camps: the Ashkenazi secular left (a pacifism that emerged in the 1970s) and the religious Haredim (a pacifism opposed to the zionist ideology from the start). This overview highlights the fact that any belief system can incite war as well as peace. The conclusion discusses the challenges of intercivilizational dialogue, challenges that are both intranational (social harmony between Ashkenazim, Mizrachim, Russian, Ethiopian, etc. Israeli Jews) and international (peace between Palestinians and Israelis).

Facile de discourir sur la paix ; complexe, par contre, d’évaluer si paroles et gestes y contribuent vraiment. De manière critique, ce mémoire cherche à contextualiser l’émergence de la nation israélienne de 1881 à 1948, de même qu’un certain nombre de forces pacifistes juives, religieuses comme séculières, sionistes comme anti-sionistes, que cette société a engendrées ou provoquées de la fin du XIXe siècle à aujourd’hui. Dans un premier temps, quatre stratégies utilisées pour construire l’État juif sont explorées : la voie pratique (l’établissement de mochavot, kibboutzim et mochavim), la voie diplomatique (le lobbying de Herzl et Weizmann), la voie sociopolitique (la formation de syndicats, de l’Agence juive et du Va’ad Leoumi) et enfin la voie militaire (la mise sur pied d’organisations paramilitaires telles la Hagana, l’Irgoun, le Lehi et le Palmah). Cette exploration permet de mieux camper le problème de la légalité et de la légitimité des nations palestinienne et israélienne. Dans un deuxième temps, une approche conceptuelle et une approche empirique sont combinées pour mieux comprendre ce qu’est un camp de la paix. L’exploration conceptuelle remet en question les critères qu’utilisent certains chercheurs afin d’identifier si une organisation contribue, ou non, à la construction de la paix. L’exploration empirique trace les contours de deux camps de la paix israéliens : les militants de la gauche séculière achkenazi (un pacifisme qui a émergé dans les années 1970) et les religieux haredim (un pacifisme opposé à l’idéologie sioniste dès ses débuts). Ce survol permet de saisir que tout système de croyances peut provoquer la guerre autant que la paix. La conclusion discute des défis du dialogue intercivilisationnel, des défis tant intranationaux (l’harmonie sociale israélienne entre les juifs achkenazim, mizrahim, russes, éthiopiens, etc.) qu’internationaux (la paix entre les Palestiniens et les Israéliens). / It is easy to speak of peace, but much more difficult to evaluate to what extent one’s actions really contribute to it. This master’s thesis seeks to critically contextualize the emergence of the Israeli nation from 1881 to 1948 and highlight certain Jewish pacifist forces, religious and secular, zionist and anti-zionist, which this society has generated or compelled into being from the end of the XIXth century until today. First, four strategies used to build the Jewish state are explored: the practical path (setting up moshavot, kibbutzim and moshavim), the diplomatic path (Herzl and Weizmann’s lobbying), the sociopolitical path (establishing unions, the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad Leumi) and finally the military path (setting up paramilitary organizations such as Hagana, Irgun, Lehi and Palmach). This exploration allows the researcher to better frame the issue of the legality and legitimacy of the Palestinian and Israeli nations. Secondly, the notion of peace camp is investigated using a combined conceptual and empirical approach. The conceptual inquiry questions the criteria used by some scholars to determine whether an organization contributes or not to peacebuilding. The empirical inquiry examines two peace camps: the Ashkenazi secular left (a pacifism that emerged in the 1970s) and the religious Haredim (a pacifism opposed to the zionist ideology from the start). This overview highlights the fact that any belief system can incite war as well as peace. The conclusion discusses the challenges of intercivilizational dialogue, challenges that are both intranational (social harmony between Ashkenazim, Mizrachim, Russian, Ethiopian, etc. Israeli Jews) and international (peace between Palestinians and Israelis).