In contrast to his rationalist predecessors, Kant insists that feeling has a pos- itive role to play in moral life. But the exact nature of this role is far from clear. As much as Kant insists that moral action must proceed from a feeling of respect, he maintains with equal insistence that the objective basis of acting from duty must come from practical reason alone, and that when we act from duty we must exclude sensibility from the determining grounds of choice. In what way, then, is respect for the law a feeling? And what place does this feeling have—if any—in Kant’s ethics? The aim of my dissertation is to answer these questions, in part through a close engagement with Kant’s second Critique. I provide a close reading of his claim that our recognition of the moral law must effect both painful and pleasurable feelings in us, and I argue that these feelings, for Kant, are meant to explain how the moral law can figure into the basis of a maxim. By showing why our recognition of the law must be painful from the perspective of self-love, but pleasurable from the perspective of practical reason, Kant is able to show how our desires can acquire normative direction. On my reading, then, the theory of moral sensibility we find in the second Critique addresses a rather troubling form of skepticism: skepticism about moral motivation.In the course of defending this claim, I provide an alternative reading of the development of Kant’s project of moral justification from Groundwork III to the second Critique. Against a wide-spread view in the literature, I suggest that what changes between these texts is not a direction of argument (from freedom to morality, or morality to freedom), but a methodological shift toward the concept of human sensibility. In the later work, I argue, Kant develops a novel approach to moral feeling from the perspective of the deliberating agent; and this in turn clears room in Kant’s ethics for a new kind of a priori knowledge—namely, knowledge of what the activity of practical reason must feel like. The broader aim of my dissertation is thus to put Kant’s work on meta-ethics and moral psychology in closer proximity.

The potential of a broad enactive approach in education has yet to be realized. This thesis contributes to the development of a well-rounded enactive educational theory and practice. This thesis argues that a broad enactive perspective has the potential to challenge, reframe and reconfigure problems, issues and practices in education in ways that improve teaching, learning and research communities. It establishes that a broad enactive approach as a theory of embodied mind, a dynamic co-emergence theory, and a method of examining human experience helps to realize the meaning, scope, and potential of enactive education. It takes as its point of departure Dewey’s broad enactive philosophy of mind, cognition, embodiment, experience, and dynamic co-emergence. It shows, through an examination of an actual public classroom encounter, that a broad enactive approach has the potential to reconfigure responsibility, ethics and justice in education. It demonstrates using a case study of the enactment of impostor feelings in higher education how a broad enactive approach to education as the potential to reconfigure teaching, learning and research practices.

Ce mémoire a pour but d’élucider l’analyse et l’évaluation nietzschéennes du sens et de la portée de la figure de Socrate dans les cultures antique et moderne. Pour ce faire, nous nous pencherons d’abord sur la question de l’identité de Socrate, ce qui permettra d’introduire une distinction centrale à l’analyse de Nietzsche, soit celle entre la doctrine et la personnalité du célèbre Athénien. En effet, Nietzsche isole la personnalité de Socrate, qu’il circonscrit à partir des notions d’instinct, de pulsion et d’affect, de sa doctrine, qu’il appelle le socratisme et qu’il définit à partir de l’équation socratique raison = vertu = bonheur. Ensuite, nous développerons les trois éléments sur lesquels il s’appuie pour expliquer que Socrate ait pu séduire les Grecs, soit le fait qu’il fut un grand érotique, qu’il introduisit une nouvelle forme de joute à Athènes et qu’il apparut comme étant un médecin pour ses contemporains. Cette question des raisons permettant d’expliquer que Socrate ait pu séduire les Grecs est déterminante pour Nietzsche, puisque c’est de là qu’il est amené à se demander qui est ce Socrate et quel a été son véritable impact sur la culture, soit les deux questions qui sont au cœur de ce qu’il appelle « le problème de Socrate ». Enfin, nous nous pencherons sur le diagnostic que le philosophe allemand pose sur le célèbre Athénien ainsi que sur son évaluation de l’impact du socratisme sur les cultures antique et moderne, après quoi nous présenterons l’inversion des valeurs que Nietzsche tente d’opérer dans sa propre culture. Nous verrons alors qu’il cherche entre autres par cette inversion des valeurs à nous libérer du socratisme, car il est d’avis que cette doctrine dévalorise toute forme d’agir puisant ses motifs dans ce qui relève de l’inconscient et survalorise une morale luttant contre les pulsions dominantes en nous. / The purpose of this thesis is to investigate Nietzsche’s analysis and assessment of the meaning and the impact of Socrates’ character on the classical and modern culture. To that effect, I will emphasize the question of Socrates’ identity, in order to introduce the crucial issue in Nietzsche’s analysis, namely the distinction between Socrates’ doctrine and his character. Nietzsche isolated Socrates’ character – which he defined through the categories of instinct, drive, and affect – from his doctrine, which he labelled socratism and defined through the Socratic equation reason = virtue = happiness. This thesis explores the three core elements Nietzsche used to explain how Socrates was able to seduce the Greeks: not only was Socrates a very erotic figure, he also introduced a new form of debate to Athens, and was considered an eminent physician by his contemporaries. Socrates’ appeal to the Greek is of fundamental importance to Nietzsche, since it prompted him to question Socrates’ inherent character, and his true impact on Athenian culture. It thus forms the crux of what he called “the problem of Socrates.” Nietzsche’s understanding of socratism as well as its impact on classical and modern culture allows him to revaluate all values within his own culture. To that effect, I reveal Nietzsche’s critiques of socratism – in particular, his belief that society needed to be liberated from socratism, since it denies all agency to individuals. Given that it was strongly motivated by the unconscious, socratism, according to Nietzsche, overemphasizes a certain morality in the struggle against our dominant impulses.

Cet essai a pour objet le rôle de la notion de fiction dans les domaines de l’art et de la science. Essentiellement, je soutiens que « fiction » dans ce contexte est « a category mistake » (concept versus genre) et je crois que cet essai peut réussir à « cuire du pain philosophique » en dévoilant une dispute verbale. Je suggère donc de clore un débat philosophique dans son intégralité. Je présente un exposé du style de fictionnalisme abordé par Catherine Z. Elgin et Nelson Goodman (que ce soit dans le contexte des arts ou des sciences, nous parvenons à la compréhension grâce à des fictions sous formes de « vérités non littérales ») et j’explore le concept de la fiction. Je soutiens que les représentations (textes descriptifs de toutes sortes, incluant les modèles) sont constituées d’éléments fictionnels et d’éléments facettés (à l’exception de la version idéale possible ou impossible, c’est-à-dire dans l’esprit de Dieu, qui n’inclurait que les facettes.) La compréhension ne peut provenir de la fiction, mais plutôt d’éléments facettés ordonnés de manière à créer une compréhension qui conduit généralement à des prédictions, des explications et des manipulations. Je définis les facettes comme ayant des caractéristiques organisées, alors que les fictions ont des caractéristiques désorganisées. La fiction dans son intégralité est donc, par définition, l’expression du néant (of nothing), ou en matière de langues idéales (mathématiques), l’expression de contradiction. Les fictions et les facettes relèvent des représentations qui sont elles-mêmes primitives. Les textes descriptifs sont donc fictionnels par degré. Les récits qui sont très fictionnels ont une certaine valeur (souvent ludique) mais contiennent toujours au moins une facette. En fin de compte, toutes les activités représentationnelles devraient être considérées irréelles, incomplètes, bien que parfois connectées à la réalité, c’est-à-dire, prises entre une description réaliste facettée et une fiction dans son intégralité. / This essay concerns fiction in art and science. I argue that the term ‘fiction’ used in this manner is a category mistake (concept versus genre) and I believe this essay may succeed in “baking philosophical bread” by recognizing a verbal dispute. I am, therefore, suggesting an entire thread of discussion be re-evaluated. I provide an exposé of Catherine Z. Elgin and Nelson Goodman’s brand of fictionalism (i.e. that we glean understandings in the arts and sciences from fictions in the form of non-literal truth) and concentrate on unpacking the concept of fiction. I argue that representations (narratives of all sorts including models) are made of both fictional elements and faceted elements (with the exception of the possible or impossible ideal version e.g. God’s, which, would include only facets). Understandings are not gleaned from fictions but rather from faceted elements so ordered as to create understanding and usually leading to predictions, explanations, and manipulations. I define facets as ordered features whereas fictions (the genre) are groupings of disordered features. Full fiction is, therefore, by definition the expression of nothing or with respect to ideal languages (mathematics), the expression of contradiction. Representations are primitives and both fictions and facets are parts of them. Narratives are thus fictional by degree. Narratives which are highly fictional are of value (often playful) but they still always contain at least one facet. Ultimately all representational activity should be regarded as irreal i.e. incomplete although sometimes connected to reality and caught between a perfectly faceted realist description and complete fiction.

Cette thèse vise à suggérer l’existence d’un partage d’une théorie poétique commune entre l’école d’Aristote d’une part et le grammairien Aristarque de Samothrace d’autre part. À partir d’un examen des textes et des fragments de la critique littéraire hellénistique, deux aspects fondamentaux de la poétique péripatéticienne font l’objet d’une comparaison avec Aristarque, soit : 1) la prise de position interprétative qui tient compte de la nature fictionnelle du discours poétique et le soustrait aux critères de vérité traditionnellement imposés par les lecteurs anciens, notamment à l’intérieur de la tradition allégorique ; et 2) la reconnaissance de l’autonomie relative du contenu de l’œuvre poétique face à l’auteur, particulièrement dans le rapport qu’entretient ce dernier avec ses personnages. / This thesis sets out to examine two points of contact in the poetics of the Peripatetics and Aristarchus, namely : 1) the exegetical attitude that takes account of the fictionality of poetry, thus exempting it from the constraints of truthfulness that ancient readers traditionally imposed on it, especially within the allegorical tradition; 2) the perception of the content of a work of poetry as being autonomous from its author, especially with regard to the relation between the poet and his characters. / Thèse réalisée en cotutelle avec l'Université Paris IV-Sorbonne

Le sujet visé par cette dissertation est la logique ordinale de Turing. Nous nous référons au texte original de Turing «Systems of logic based on ordinals» (Turing [1939]), la thèse que Turing rédigea à Princeton sous la direction du professeur Alonzo Church. Le principe d’une logique ordinale consiste à surmonter localement l’incomplétude gödelienne pour l’arithmétique par le biais de progressions d’axiomes récursivement consistantes. Étant donné son importance considérable pour la théorie de la calculabilité et les fondements des mathématiques, cette recherche méconnue de Turing mérite une attention particulière. Nous retraçons ici le projet d’une logique ordinale, de ses origines dans le théorème d’incomplétude de Gödel jusqu'à ses avancées dans les développements de la théorie de la calculabilité. Nous concluons par une discussion philosophique sur les fondements des mathématiques en fonction d’un point de vue finitiste. / The main subject of this dissertation is Turing’s ordinal logic, i.e. Turing’s attempt to locally overcome Gödel’s incompleteness by means of transfinite recursive progressions. We shall refer to the original 1939 text «Systems of logic based on ordinals» which is, in fact, Turing’s Ph.D thesis at Princeton University under the direction of Professor Alonzo Church. Considering its importance for the theory of computability and the foundations of mathematics, Turing’s paper certainly didn’t get enough attention in the literature. Therefore, we want to retrace Turing’s project of an ordinal logic from its very foundation in Gödel’s incompleteness theorem to its further development in calculability theory. A discussion on the foundations of mathematics from a computational point of view will conclude this memoir.

I address claims of offence of feelings, religious freedom and language rights, which are all ‎justified by the intrinsic interest individuals attach to their culture. I call them ‘claims from ‎cultural identity’. I develop a conception of substantive equality, understood as distributive ‎justice and underpinned by dignity, for regulating claims from cultural identity in the legal ‎system of multicultural states. I call it Equality of Cultural Identity. ‎ It is a ‘complex equality’ model, which takes cultural identity to be a sphere in ‎peoples’ lives. Unlike majority members, cultural minority members are usually under ‎constant pressure to compromise their cultural identity and assimilate in the majority ‎culture to succeed in other spheres of their lives like education and career. In accordance ‎with Walzer’s theory of Spheres of Justice, I propose a regulative principle to determine ‎the extent of cultural protection minority members deserve, according to which the ‎influence of other spheres of their lives on their sphere of cultural identity should as ‎minimal as possible. ‎ I apply this principle to claims of offence to feeling, which I re-conceptualize as ‎claims from integrity of cultural identity. I suggest the vulnerable identity principle: The ‎more vulnerable a person’s cultural identity, the stronger her claim from integrity of ‎cultural identity. This principle enhances a just distribution of symbolic goods between ‎majority and minority members, is based on objective evaluation standards, and avoids ‎legal moralism. Thus, it overcomes the major liberal worries about regulating speech. ‎ With respect to the language rights and religious freedom, I comparatively analyze ‎them qua cultural rights. I argue that the right to religious freedom, which is generously ‎interpreted by courts, bears all of the allegedly unique features of language rights that are ‎used to support their restrained judicial interpretation. Thus, the existing arguments for ‎their restrained interpretation are not valid. I identify a novel argument for their restrained ‎interpretation, which is that they impose a cultural burden on majority members, but ‎drawing on my conception of equality, I argue that it is not sound as the burden they ‎impose is not great.‎

I address claims of offence of feelings, religious freedom and language rights, which are all ‎justified by the intrinsic interest individuals attach to their culture. I call them ‘claims from ‎cultural identity’. I develop a conception of substantive equality, understood as distributive ‎justice and underpinned by dignity, for regulating claims from cultural identity in the legal ‎system of multicultural states. I call it Equality of Cultural Identity. ‎ It is a ‘complex equality’ model, which takes cultural identity to be a sphere in ‎peoples’ lives. Unlike majority members, cultural minority members are usually under ‎constant pressure to compromise their cultural identity and assimilate in the majority ‎culture to succeed in other spheres of their lives like education and career. In accordance ‎with Walzer’s theory of Spheres of Justice, I propose a regulative principle to determine ‎the extent of cultural protection minority members deserve, according to which the ‎influence of other spheres of their lives on their sphere of cultural identity should as ‎minimal as possible. ‎ I apply this principle to claims of offence to feeling, which I re-conceptualize as ‎claims from integrity of cultural identity. I suggest the vulnerable identity principle: The ‎more vulnerable a person’s cultural identity, the stronger her claim from integrity of ‎cultural identity. This principle enhances a just distribution of symbolic goods between ‎majority and minority members, is based on objective evaluation standards, and avoids ‎legal moralism. Thus, it overcomes the major liberal worries about regulating speech. ‎ With respect to the language rights and religious freedom, I comparatively analyze ‎them qua cultural rights. I argue that the right to religious freedom, which is generously ‎interpreted by courts, bears all of the allegedly unique features of language rights that are ‎used to support their restrained judicial interpretation. Thus, the existing arguments for ‎their restrained interpretation are not valid. I identify a novel argument for their restrained ‎interpretation, which is that they impose a cultural burden on majority members, but ‎drawing on my conception of equality, I argue that it is not sound as the burden they ‎impose is not great.‎

Les pensées herméneutiques de Gadamer et de Ricœur reconnaissent toutes deux une importance centrale, mais trop peu remarquée, au phénomène de la traduction. Elles lui attribuent même une valeur de modèle philosophique, mais l’abordent dans des perspectives différentes. Notre mémoire tâchera de présenter ces deux conceptions de la traduction et d’insister autant sur leurs similitudes que sur leurs divergences. Nous verrons que si pour Gadamer, la traduction sert surtout à mettre en évidence l’universalité de l’élément langagier, Ricœur s’intéresse, pour sa part, davantage à ses implications éthiques, qui restent seulement implicites dans la pensée gadamérienne. / The hermeneutic thoughts of Gadamer and Ricœur both recognize a great importance, albeit somewhat discretely, to the issue of translation. They view it as a philosophical model of value, but treat it from rather different perspectives. Our study will present these two views of translation, insisting on both their similarities and differences. We will see that if for Gadamer, translation is used mostly to emphasise the universality of the linguistic element, Ricœur is mostly interested in its ethical implications, which remain only implicit in Gadamer’s thought.

Ce mémoire cherche à évaluer la culpabilité de Socrate face à l’échec et à la corruption d’Alcibiade, telle que la question se pose dans le Banquet de Platon. Il comprend quatre chapitres. Le premier démontre que le cadre dramatique lui-même fait occuper une place centrale à la vie et au déclin d’Alcibiade et au problème de la responsabilité de Socrate face aux accusations de corruption de la jeunesse qui ont pesé sur lui. Le deuxième chapitre interprète le discours d’Alcibiade comme une tentative de disculpation qui repose sur une critique acerbe du comportement de Socrate. Il se serait détourné de Socrate et de ses enseignements en raison de son ironie, de son arrogance et de son indifférence – de son hybris. Le troisième chapitre étudie le discours de Socrate sur l’accession à la beauté intelligible. Il expose la nature particulière de son éros, qui repose sur l’ironie et l’inversion des rôles comme moyens d’exhorter à la philosophie. Le quatrième chapitre pose la question de l’efficacité de ce type de pédagogie et de la responsabilité du philosophe vis-à-vis de ses disciples. L’étude conclut que l’amour et l’ironie de Socrate sont essentiellement des moyens d’inviter l’autre à se remettre lui-même en question et à prendre soin de son âme. Socrate n’est donc pas coupable d’avoir corrompu Alcibiade. La faute est entièrement celle du jeune homme. Il s’est montré incapable, par égocentrisme et fierté excessive, de réagir correctement à l’énigme posée par le comportement érotique de Socrate. / This essay on Plato’s Symposium assesses to what extent Socrates could be held guilty for Alcibiades’ failure and corruption. The first of the four chapters shows that Alcibiades’ life and decline and the accusation against Socrates of youth corruption are central to the dramatic structure. The second chapter interprets Alcibiades’ speech as a sharp criticism of Socrates’ behaviour meant to exculpate himself. Alcibiades justifies his walking away from Socrates and his teachings on the basis of the philosopher’s irony, arrogance and indifference – his hybris. The third chapter looks at Socrates’ speech, which sets out the path to the highest form of Beauty. It explores the particular nature of his eros, which relies especially on irony and role inversion to induce philosophical thinking. The fourth chapter asks how effective this kind of pedagogy is, and what is the responsibility of the philosopher to his students. It is concluded that Socratic love and irony are essentially to be conceived of as means of inciting followers to put themselves into question and take greater care of their souls. Socrates is thus not guilty of corrupting the young man. The fault is entirely Alcibiades’. His pride and selfishness are what prevented him from meeting the challenge that Socrates’ erotic behavior put before him.