Roman épistolaire célébré par son siècle, Julie ou La Nouvelle Héloïse (1762) offre une réflexion d’une criante actualité. Par le déploiement d’une érotique placée sous l’égide de la connaissance, Rousseau voit dans l’amour le couronnement de sa réflexion politique et morale, articulée autour de la question des rapports, conformément à l’ouvrage fondamental mais non premier du système, à savoir l’Emile. Il y va en effet, dans La Nouvelle Héloïse, de la confrontation brutale de l’amour à des circonstances mondaines qui le contrarient sans pouvoir l’éteindre. Au sein de cette lutte, Julie cristallise le combat mené par la vertu au nom d’une passion qui, bien que conforme à la nature, ne peut se maintenir dans le monde sans impliquer indéfectiblement sa propre contrariété. Il s’agit alors tout autant de la mise en lumière des difficultés propres au système, que du jaillissement d’une érotique complexe au sein de laquelle le langage, vecteur de la temporalité à l’œuvre dans l’amour, devient la forme par laquelle le sentiment s’actualise tout au long d’une véritable phénoménologie morale, admirablement composée, qui suit les amants de la naissance de leurs feux à la mort de l’héroïne. En se présentant comme simple éditeur des lettres qu’il a rédigées depuis le pays de ses chimères, celui que Kant désignait comme le Newton du monde moral déplace la question de l’authenticité de la correspondance et permet ainsi à la passion amoureuse d’accéder pleinement à l’universalité vers laquelle elle ouvre, tout en révélant la conquête de l’identité qu’elle opère, au sein de la contradiction déchirante entre intérêt particulier et intérêt collectif. / An epistolary novel celebrated during its century, Julie, or the New Heloise (1762) offers a resoundingly topical reflection. By using erotica under the aegis of knowledge, Rousseau sees in love the peak of his political and moral reflection, articulated around the question of interactions, conforming to the fundamental albeit not the first piece of his system, i.e. Emile. In The New Heloise, there is a brutal confrontation between love and social circumstances that contradict the former without being able to extinguish it. In the core of this confrontation, Julie crystallises the fight brought by virtue of a passion that, albeit in conformity with nature, cannot remain in the world without unfailingly resulting in its own contradiction. The inherent difficulties in the system are thus touched upon as much the emergence of a complex erotica at the core of which language, vector of the temporality that operates within love, becomes the form by which feeling is actualised throughout an admirably composed moral phenomenology which follows the lovers from the birth of their passion to the death of the heroine. By presenting himself simply as the editor of the letters that he wrote from the depths of his fantasies, the one who Kant designated as the Newton of the moral world changes the question of the correspondence’s authenticity, and thus allows romantic passion to fully reach the universality towards which it opens, all while revealing the conquest for identity that it enables, in the heart of the harrowing contradiction between individual and collective interest.

Is there a relationship between science and happiness and, if so, what is it? Clearly, since the Enlightenment, science has increased life expectancy and bodily comfort. Is this happiness, or do humans long for something more? To examine these questions, I investigate the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Specifically, I focus on the Discourses and the Emile, as he states in the Confessions that these works form a whole statement concerning the natural goodness of man. I agree with the literature that finds happiness, for Rousseau, is a sentiment one experiences when their faculties correspond to their desires, as this produces wholeness. In this dissertation, I find a form of modern science is necessary for humans to experience higher forms of happiness. This form of science is rooted in utility of the individual. To fully explain this finding, I begin with Rousseau's concept of being. By nature, our being experiences a low form of wholeness. I show Rousseau's investigation of being exposes a catch-22 situation for developing it to experience higher forms of wholeness. While freedom allows us to develop reason and judgment, we need reason and judgment to properly direct our freedom to perfect our individual being. I then show how three different types of tutors and educators, which include a scientific education, are directed by the single goal of maintaining wholeness in Emile's being so he can achieve the happiness of romantic love. Finally, I find that Emile's scientific education is an elaboration of the First Discourse and that his relationship with science, even from birth, plays a critical role for achieving romantic love in the future.

Tableau d'honneur de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales, 2017-2018 / Ce mémoire affronte le problème de l'unité de la pensée de Rousseau, en particulier dans son versant politique. Il met en évidence la place centrale qu'occupe, dans sa philosophie, la thèse de la bonté naturelle de l'homme, et défend l'idée que les grandes articulations du Contrat social en sont des ramifications. Pour ce faire, il montre d'abord que les principes du droit politique représentent pour Rousseau la solution à un problème inhérent à la condition sociale de l'homme, problème développé dans le Discours sur l'inégalité. Les deux premiers chapitres du mémoire sont pour cette raison consacrés entièrement à une étude du second discours, où Rousseau pose le principe de la bonté naturelle de l'homme, puis décrit la façon dont celle-ci s'altère et finit par se corrompre dans la vie sociale. Les troisième et quatrième chapitres, quant à eux, contiennent une étude minutieuse du Contrat social, qui met d'une part en lumière le lien de continuité unissant l'ouvrage au Discours sur l'inégalité, et qui, d'autre part, démontre que ses tensions doctrinales résultent justement de son rattachement à la thèse de la bonté naturelle de l'homme.

La pensée politique de Jean-Jacques Rousseau a suscité nombre d'interprétations contradictoires. Cependant, ce qu'ont en commun ces interprétations, c'est de se fonder sur le Contrat social et, trop souvent, de s'y limiter. Il est bien sûr inévitable de s'attarder surtout à cette œuvre maîtresse de la philosophie politique de Rousseau. Mais de s'y limiter, croyons-nous, mène parfois à des contresens. C'est pourquoi nous prenons ici un chemin différent : celui de la Lettre à d'Alembert. Ce texte, secondaire sans doute, a l'avantage de nous montrer Rousseau réfléchissant à un problème politique concret: l'établissement d'un théâtre à Genève. Ce faisant, nous pouvons voir quel usage Rousseau lui-même envisageait pour les principes établis dans le Contrat social. Ainsi pouvons-nous constater que le politique, loin d'être la quête utopique de la légitimité pure définie par le pacte social, n'est peut-être pour Rousseau que la difficile articulation des données historiques concrètes à une forme plus ou moins corrompue de cette légitimité sans faille du Contrat social.

Thomas Carlyle’s History of Friedrich II. of Prussia, called Frederick the Great was published in six volumes between 1858 and 1865 and was his last major work. Carlyle had a specific purpose in mind when he began writing Frederick. He believed that contemporary events had left Europe in disarray and the British nation fragmented. In his view, the nation needed to function as a family unit, with the older, more experienced members of the group instructing and educating the young. Carlyle’s attempt to address the situation with the publication of his Latter-Day Pamphlets in 1850 had failed, largely due to their aggressive tone. He adopted an entirely different approach when it came to writing Frederick. Chapter one explores Carlyle’s vacillation over his choice of Frederick as a suitable subject for his history and investigates his soul-searching over whether or not to proceed with the project. It examines the three-way relationship which Carlyle created between himself, Frederick and the reader and explores the various language techniques that Carlyle used to create and maintain this relationship. In chapter two, Carlyle’s style of writing in Frederick is investigated. It argues that Carlyle was engaged in the act of storytelling and explores the various literary techniques that he used to achieve this. Chapter three consists of an in-depth examination of Carlyle’s use of oral techniques in Frederick, investigating the variety of oral devices he employed in order to ‘speak’ to his readers and create a unified readership. Chapters four and five focus on Carlyle’s research methods. They examine the texts which Carlyle used for his research—original manuscripts, printed texts, letters, histories and biographies—investigating how these were incorporated into Frederick and evaluating whether or not Carlyle was true to his source material. Carlyle’s two trips to Germany in order to research material are also investigated. In Chapters six and seven, the contemporary reception of Frederick is explored. Chapter six focuses on the reaction to the first two volumes which were published together in 1858, whilst chapter seven investigates the response to the later volumes, exploring the ways in which the completed work influenced the public’s perception of Carlyle as a historian and ending by examining both Carlyle’s and Frederick’s places in posterity. Despite Carlyle’s labours on Frederick it never received the acclaim of his earlier productions but was regarded by many as a marker which signalled the end of Carlyle’s long and illustrious literary career.

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En los manuales de historia de la música suele comúnmente ubicarse a Rousseau, sin mayor distinción, entre aquellos teóricos que colocan a la música en relación con la sensación o con el mero placer de los sentidos. Se cita continuamente una famosa frase de su Diccionario de música de 1767 –que se utiliza indistintamente como definición–, según la cual la música es el “Arte de combinar los sonidos de una manera agradable al oído” (artículo “música”, 281) y con ello parece jugarse el destino de la rica concepción musical de Rousseau: la música, sobre todo si la concebimos bajo la distinción posterior que ofrece Kant en la jerarquía de las artes del §51 de su Crítica de la facultad de juzgar (1790), sería solo un arte menor, en la medida en que no alcanza las esferas sentimental ni mucho menos intelectual del ser humano. La música con las justas alcanzaría –aunque de manera agradable, cosa que estaría a su favor– el placer sensorial, hedonista. Con esto, mostramos desconocimiento, olvidamos o pasamos por alto muy rápido otras sentencias de Rousseau más importantes, como la siguiente: “Así como la pintura no es el arte de combinar colores de manera agradable a la vista, tampoco la música es el arte de combinar sonidos de una manera agradable al oído. Si se redujeran a esto, tanto la una como la otra formarían parte de las ciencias naturales y no de las bellas artes” (Ensayo, XIII, 104; cursivas nuestras). / Tesis

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Edward Pereira Rodrigues Junior.pdf: 390055 bytes, checksum: 4fd2708e1f6ba848792d9272f2bd945a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-05-29 / The goal of this work is to reflect about the sociability problem in Jean-Jacques Rousseau. For the jurisconsults of school of the natural right, as well as for Locke, the sociability is a characteristic trace of the human nature. Thus, it can understand easily that, being the naturally sociable man, he stipulates without difficulty the organization of the political body, when this seems to you convenient. In Hobbes, the situation is different, because the civil society is resultant of the peace and safety wish and particularly of the fear of the violent death in a war state in which the human company expresses through an innate belligerent and natural inclination. Rousseau, as well as Hobbes, denies the natural sociability, but on the other side of the author of Leviathan, considers that, in the state of original nature, the man lives in the more complete loneliness and independence, once, when not finding in your absolutely impassable middle obstacles, it satisfies fully their needs, because these are simple and of order purely physical and biological. In this perfect balance state between wishes and needs, the natural man, only led by the instinct, does feel need to their fellow creatures help, until new circumstances modify the balance of your environment, awaking him new needs. Inclusively, they are these new needs that provoke the union among men. In this idea, however, there is something of generous for with human nature, because to when admitting the possibility of benefit us of our union, Rousseau affirms that the man is by nature good, and that is possible to cohabit under the auspices of this natural kindness / O objetivo deste trabalho é refletir sobre o problema da sociabilidade em Jean Jacques Rousseau. Para os Jurisconsultos da escola do direito natural, assim como para Locke, a sociabilidade é um traço característico da natureza humana. Desta forma, se pode entender facilmente que, sendo o homem naturalmente sociável, ele convenciona sem dificuldade a organização do corpo político, quando isto lhe parece conveniente. Em Hobbes, a situação é diferente, pois a sociedade civil é resultante do desejo de paz e segurança e particularmente do medo da morte violenta num estado de guerra em que a convivência humana se expressa através de uma inclinação beligerante inata e natural. Rousseau, assim como Hobbes, nega a sociabilidade natural, mas, ao contrário do autor do Leviatã , considera que, no estado de natureza originário, o homem vive na mais completa solidão e independência, uma vez que, ao não encontrar em seu meio obstáculos absolutamente intransponíveis, satisfaz plenamente suas necessidades, pois estas são simples e de ordem puramente física e biológica. Nesse estado de perfeito equilíbrio entre desejos e necessidades, o homem natural, conduzido somente pelo instinto, não sente necessidade do auxílio dos seus semelhantes, até que circunstâncias novas modifiquem o equilíbrio de seu ambiente, despertando-lhe novas necessidades. Inclusive, são estas novas necessidades que provocam a união entre os homens. Nesta idéia, porém, há algo de generoso, pois ao admitir a possibilidade de nos beneficiarmos de nossa união, Rousseau afirma que o homem é por natureza bom, e que é possível conviver sob os auspícios dessa bondade natural

Submitted by Cleide Dantas (cleidedantas@ufpa.br) on 2014-10-10T12:27:38Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) Dissertacao_SentimentoSubjetividadeRousseau.pdf: 808046 bytes, checksum: 89d1c76b65db755b76b6343794b32016 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Rosa Silva (arosa@ufpa.br) on 2014-10-10T12:41:20Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) Dissertacao_SentimentoSubjetividadeRousseau.pdf: 808046 bytes, checksum: 89d1c76b65db755b76b6343794b32016 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-10-10T12:41:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) Dissertacao_SentimentoSubjetividadeRousseau.pdf: 808046 bytes, checksum: 89d1c76b65db755b76b6343794b32016 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / O objetivo desta dissertação é estabelecer as relações existentes entre Rousseau, Kant e os primeiros românticos alemães. A partir da perspectiva estabelecida pela Terceira Crítica, de Kant, nos voltaremos para as obras de Rousseau e do Romantismo (particularmente, as de Novalis e Schlegel) para extrair delas dois conceitos fundamentais, o de sentimento e o de subjetividade. Acreditamos, assim, poder esclarecer, por meio das próprias obras de Rousseau e dos primeiros românticos, o autêntico significado das noções de sentimento e de subjetividade, de modo a não só recuperar o verdadeiro valor filosófico de tais obras, mas, sobretudo, para mostrar o uso consciente delas na determinação de suas posturas frente ao pretenso “racionalismo” dominante no pensamento moderno. / The objective of this thesis is to establish the relationship between Rousseau, Kant and the early German Romantics. From the perspective established by the Third Critique, Kant, we will turn to the works of Rousseau and Romanticism( particularly those of Novalis and Schlegel) to extract these two fundamental concepts, and the feeling of subjectivity. We believe, therefore, to elucidate, through their own works of Rousseau and the early romantics, the true meaning of the notions of sentiment and subjectivity in order to not only recover the true value of such philosophical works, but mainly to show the conscious use of them in determining their positions against the alleged “rationalism” dominant in modern thought.

Rousseau and Kant were philosophers of freedom. Both believed freedom was the essence of humanity, and both believed that "freedom is self-legislation." This thesis examines what they understood to be self-legislation. According to Rousseau natural freedom was lost with the establishment of society. Society is an "unnatural" order and the true basis of society is simply convention. Man is free only if he is subject to laws of his own making, or at least to those laws to which he has consented. The ideal state, according to Rousseau, is the republic based on laws that have been created and adopted by each members of the community. It is in this sense of freedom, for Rousseau, is self-legislation. Kant believed the important issue was demonstrating the metaphysical possibility of freedom, not the reconstruction of society. Kant argued that freedom could be demonstrated, and morality reaffirmed, by focusing on the 11 ought" of reason. The 11 ought 11 transcends the physical world and was a pure law of reason. It is not subject to the physical laws of causality. Man has the ability to act according to this law of reason. Man is transcending the physical realm, and the physical laws of nature, whenever he makes a moral decision based on what he 11 ought 11 to do, or whenever he puts duty before his physical desire. This, Kant argues, is self-legislation, and only here may man hope to be free.