En los manuales de historia de la música suele comúnmente ubicarse a Rousseau, sin mayor distinción, entre aquellos teóricos que colocan a la música en relación con la sensación o con el mero placer de los sentidos. Se cita continuamente una famosa frase de su Diccionario de música de 1767 –que se utiliza indistintamente como definición–, según la cual la música es el “Arte de combinar los sonidos de una manera agradable al oído” (artículo “música”, 281) y con ello parece jugarse el destino de la rica concepción musical de Rousseau: la música, sobre todo si la concebimos bajo la distinción posterior que ofrece Kant en la jerarquía de las artes del §51 de su Crítica de la facultad de juzgar (1790), sería solo un arte menor, en la medida en que no alcanza las esferas sentimental ni mucho menos intelectual del ser humano. La música con las justas alcanzaría –aunque de manera agradable, cosa que estaría a su favor– el placer sensorial, hedonista. Con esto, mostramos desconocimiento, olvidamos o pasamos por alto muy rápido otras sentencias de Rousseau más importantes, como la siguiente: “Así como la pintura no es el arte de combinar colores de manera agradable a la vista, tampoco la música es el arte de combinar sonidos de una manera agradable al oído. Si se redujeran a esto, tanto la una como la otra formarían parte de las ciencias naturales y no de las bellas artes” (Ensayo, XIII, 104; cursivas nuestras). / Tesis

Submitted by Edisangela Bastos (edisangela@ufpa.br) on 2018-04-11T13:29:24Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Tese_AlgunsAspectosConceito.pdf: 13665994 bytes, checksum: 2dbc6250659175c663bb74251326a2fe (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Edisangela Bastos (edisangela@ufpa.br) on 2018-05-04T13:27:10Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Tese_AlgunsAspectosConceito.pdf: 13665994 bytes, checksum: 2dbc6250659175c663bb74251326a2fe (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-04T13:27:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Tese_AlgunsAspectosConceito.pdf: 13665994 bytes, checksum: 2dbc6250659175c663bb74251326a2fe (MD5) Previous issue date: 2000-03-21 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O nosso trabalho, pressupondo que existe um conceito de razão consolidado pelo movimento iluminista que fez com que o século XVIII se auto-denominasse "século da razão", "século da filosofia", etc., pretende investigá-lo. Nossa análise vincula-se à vertente francesa considerada a mais representativa do período, e elegemos Voltaire, por ser ele um dos mais acerbas defensores do uso esclarecido e livre da razão. A definição do caráter dessa racionalidade é quase sempre escamoteada, não chegando nem mesmo a ser tratada pela maioria dos estudiosos da época. O que freqüentemente eles procuram ressaltar a respeito desse século é que ele é impregnado por uma fé na razão, na capacidade intelectiva do homem que, somente através dela pode conseguir sua auto-libertação. Aceitando esta caracterização da filosofia das luzes, preocupamo-nos com um problema premente: de que razão se trata? Pois estamos conscientes de que a palavra "razão" há muito tempo deixou de ser um conceito simples e univoco. Basta percorrer a História da filosofia para constatar as mudanças de sentido que o termo "razão" sofreu no transcurso de sua existência. Se o século XVIII reivindica para si a adjetivação de "século da razão", "século das luzes," cabe-nos indagar: Qual a procedência desta racionalidade? Onde podemos encontrar o traço característico e distintivo desta designação? Como entender o sentido desta iluminação? Ao discutir essas questões, pretendemos sustentar que a razão, tal como foi concebida por Voltaire, era um pensamento de base empírico-experimental cujas origens não se encontram sobremodo no cartesianismo, mas na Física newtoniana e na Filosofia de Locke. Para elucidarmos o caráter da razão em Voltaire, analisamos criteriosamente sua obra fragmentária e procedemos como quem monta um quebra-cabeça, encaixando peça por peça, de modo a encontrar um fio condutor ou elementos que indicassem uma certa coesão de idéias. Não pretendemos, nos limites estreitos deste trabalho, esgotar todas as nuanças que a razão assumiu no seu pensamento, mas apenas indicar alguns de seus traços, orientações e apresentar alguns temas imbricados neste conceito. Como Voltaire é complexo e sua obra, imensa, tivemos que eleger algumas de suas obras que consideramos mais relevantes para o nosso estudo, como: o Tratado de metafísica., O filósofo ignorante, as Cartas filosóficas, o Dicionário filosófico, os Elementos da filosofia de Newton, o Tratado sobre a Tolerância e outras obras menores cujas referências serão registradas em notas de pé de página. Não nos esquecemos de consultar seus romances e contos, como Cândido, Micrômegas, e poemas de natureza mais filosófica, como Sobre o desastre de Lisboa, Sobre a lei natural, Discurso em verso sobre o homem. Mas o estudo de sua correspondência foi fundamental para elucidarmos certos aspectos de seu pensamento que não estavam muito bem delineados em suas obras. Gostaríamos de fazer uma última observação sobre as citações transcritas de obras que foram escritas nas línguas francesa ou inglesa. No corpo do trabalho, procuramos apresentar uma tradução própria ou de algum tradutor abalizado, que será identificado nas referências bibliográficas.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Edward Pereira Rodrigues Junior.pdf: 390055 bytes, checksum: 4fd2708e1f6ba848792d9272f2bd945a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-05-29 / The goal of this work is to reflect about the sociability problem in Jean-Jacques Rousseau. For the jurisconsults of school of the natural right, as well as for Locke, the sociability is a characteristic trace of the human nature. Thus, it can understand easily that, being the naturally sociable man, he stipulates without difficulty the organization of the political body, when this seems to you convenient. In Hobbes, the situation is different, because the civil society is resultant of the peace and safety wish and particularly of the fear of the violent death in a war state in which the human company expresses through an innate belligerent and natural inclination. Rousseau, as well as Hobbes, denies the natural sociability, but on the other side of the author of Leviathan, considers that, in the state of original nature, the man lives in the more complete loneliness and independence, once, when not finding in your absolutely impassable middle obstacles, it satisfies fully their needs, because these are simple and of order purely physical and biological. In this perfect balance state between wishes and needs, the natural man, only led by the instinct, does feel need to their fellow creatures help, until new circumstances modify the balance of your environment, awaking him new needs. Inclusively, they are these new needs that provoke the union among men. In this idea, however, there is something of generous for with human nature, because to when admitting the possibility of benefit us of our union, Rousseau affirms that the man is by nature good, and that is possible to cohabit under the auspices of this natural kindness / O objetivo deste trabalho é refletir sobre o problema da sociabilidade em Jean Jacques Rousseau. Para os Jurisconsultos da escola do direito natural, assim como para Locke, a sociabilidade é um traço característico da natureza humana. Desta forma, se pode entender facilmente que, sendo o homem naturalmente sociável, ele convenciona sem dificuldade a organização do corpo político, quando isto lhe parece conveniente. Em Hobbes, a situação é diferente, pois a sociedade civil é resultante do desejo de paz e segurança e particularmente do medo da morte violenta num estado de guerra em que a convivência humana se expressa através de uma inclinação beligerante inata e natural. Rousseau, assim como Hobbes, nega a sociabilidade natural, mas, ao contrário do autor do Leviatã , considera que, no estado de natureza originário, o homem vive na mais completa solidão e independência, uma vez que, ao não encontrar em seu meio obstáculos absolutamente intransponíveis, satisfaz plenamente suas necessidades, pois estas são simples e de ordem puramente física e biológica. Nesse estado de perfeito equilíbrio entre desejos e necessidades, o homem natural, conduzido somente pelo instinto, não sente necessidade do auxílio dos seus semelhantes, até que circunstâncias novas modifiquem o equilíbrio de seu ambiente, despertando-lhe novas necessidades. Inclusive, são estas novas necessidades que provocam a união entre os homens. Nesta idéia, porém, há algo de generoso, pois ao admitir a possibilidade de nos beneficiarmos de nossa união, Rousseau afirma que o homem é por natureza bom, e que é possível conviver sob os auspícios dessa bondade natural

Submitted by Cleide Dantas (cleidedantas@ufpa.br) on 2014-10-10T12:27:38Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) Dissertacao_SentimentoSubjetividadeRousseau.pdf: 808046 bytes, checksum: 89d1c76b65db755b76b6343794b32016 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Rosa Silva (arosa@ufpa.br) on 2014-10-10T12:41:20Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) Dissertacao_SentimentoSubjetividadeRousseau.pdf: 808046 bytes, checksum: 89d1c76b65db755b76b6343794b32016 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-10-10T12:41:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) Dissertacao_SentimentoSubjetividadeRousseau.pdf: 808046 bytes, checksum: 89d1c76b65db755b76b6343794b32016 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / O objetivo desta dissertação é estabelecer as relações existentes entre Rousseau, Kant e os primeiros românticos alemães. A partir da perspectiva estabelecida pela Terceira Crítica, de Kant, nos voltaremos para as obras de Rousseau e do Romantismo (particularmente, as de Novalis e Schlegel) para extrair delas dois conceitos fundamentais, o de sentimento e o de subjetividade. Acreditamos, assim, poder esclarecer, por meio das próprias obras de Rousseau e dos primeiros românticos, o autêntico significado das noções de sentimento e de subjetividade, de modo a não só recuperar o verdadeiro valor filosófico de tais obras, mas, sobretudo, para mostrar o uso consciente delas na determinação de suas posturas frente ao pretenso “racionalismo” dominante no pensamento moderno. / The objective of this thesis is to establish the relationship between Rousseau, Kant and the early German Romantics. From the perspective established by the Third Critique, Kant, we will turn to the works of Rousseau and Romanticism( particularly those of Novalis and Schlegel) to extract these two fundamental concepts, and the feeling of subjectivity. We believe, therefore, to elucidate, through their own works of Rousseau and the early romantics, the true meaning of the notions of sentiment and subjectivity in order to not only recover the true value of such philosophical works, but mainly to show the conscious use of them in determining their positions against the alleged “rationalism” dominant in modern thought.

Rousseau and Kant were philosophers of freedom. Both believed freedom was the essence of humanity, and both believed that "freedom is self-legislation." This thesis examines what they understood to be self-legislation. According to Rousseau natural freedom was lost with the establishment of society. Society is an "unnatural" order and the true basis of society is simply convention. Man is free only if he is subject to laws of his own making, or at least to those laws to which he has consented. The ideal state, according to Rousseau, is the republic based on laws that have been created and adopted by each members of the community. It is in this sense of freedom, for Rousseau, is self-legislation. Kant believed the important issue was demonstrating the metaphysical possibility of freedom, not the reconstruction of society. Kant argued that freedom could be demonstrated, and morality reaffirmed, by focusing on the 11 ought" of reason. The 11 ought 11 transcends the physical world and was a pure law of reason. It is not subject to the physical laws of causality. Man has the ability to act according to this law of reason. Man is transcending the physical realm, and the physical laws of nature, whenever he makes a moral decision based on what he 11 ought 11 to do, or whenever he puts duty before his physical desire. This, Kant argues, is self-legislation, and only here may man hope to be free.

Ever since Homer told the tales of magnificent men and called these men heroes, the siren song of heroic achievement has been impossible to resist. By consistently acting in a manner that is above the capacity of normal human beings, a hero becomes a model of emulation and inspiration for ordinary, lesser mortals. This thesis traces the development of normative models of heroic thought and action in the work of Homer, Plato and Rousseau. It argues that models of heroism have evolved according to changing conceptions of the political institutions that comprise a polis and, in turn, notions of citizenship. Homer establishes the heroic ideal and offers an image of Man as Hero. The Homeric hero is a man of transparent action who is never incapacitated because he acts upon his instincts. Unrestrained by doubt, he soars above humanity and performs deeds that assure him of everlasting fame and glory. The Homeric hero is a warrior-prince who lives in the absence of a polis. He rules his community as a patriarch who places his personal quest for glory above the dictates of the common good. The Homeric hero is consequently limited in his ability to act as a model of emulation for those who live in a polis. In an historical period that gave rise to the polis as a desirable and unavoidable aspect of human life, Plato remodels heroic ideals. Thus Plato's ideals of heroism could survive and prosper alongside political structures and institutions guided by the demands of the common good. The philosophical hero exalted in the Platonic dialogues gains true knowledge, which enables him to excel at all activities he undertakes. The philosopher is impelled to channel his vast superiority into the realm of political leadership. Plato recasts the Hero as Citizen, an elite citizen who rules for the benefit of all. Plato's model of heroism, like Homer's, is premised on an anti-egalitarian, hierarchical conception of human worth. In the Social Contract, Rousseau aims to reconcile modern ideals of human equality with Homeric and Platonic hierarchical notions of heroic excellence. The Social Contract attempts to make all citizens equally heroic by insisting that men can only excel when they all participate equally in political sovereignty. Failing to reconcile heroism and equality, however, Rousseau chooses heroism and reverts firstly to aristocratic political formulas before finally abandoning politics altogether as a positive force for humanity. His work nevertheless inspired both a lasting notion of human equality that shaped the modern political landscape and evoked the romantic modern notion of an isolated individual, as epitomised by Rousseau himself, heroically climbing the peaks of human achievement. Rousseau's model of individual heroism effectively completes the cycle and returns the notion of heroism to where it begun with Homer, Man as Hero. The concept of the heroism, traced through these theorists, shows it to be a changing terrain yet consistent in its allure. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--School of History and Politics, 2004.

Reproduction de : Thèse de doctorat : Sciences de l'éducation : Lyon 2 : 2003. / Titre provenant de l'écran-titre. Bibliogr.

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Rousseau's articles on music for Diderot and d'Alembert's Encyclopedie , and to a lesser extent his Dictionnaire de musique, have rarely attracted the scholarly attention they deserve. As a result, the pivotal role that Rousseau played in the early French reception of Rameau's theory of harmony has never been fully appreciated. Far from being a quarrel over musical aesthetics, Rousseau's dispute with Rameau raised fundamental questions about the composer's theory of harmony. Rousseau interrogated the empirical adequacy of Rameau's theory, the soundness of its foundations, the logic of its derivation, and its pretension to universality. Over the course of his criticism, Rousseau came to regard tonal harmony as a historically-induced particularity of Western music to be explained through historical inquiry. In this respect, he anticipates a range of ideas that historians of music theory have associated far more readily with Francois-Joseph Fetis.

Were it necessary to choose two words that could capture the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, these two words would have to be truth and nature for, in his works, this philosopher does more than assert that he, and he alone, possesses truth in its entirety. He equally maintains that his sole desire lies in sharing this truth with human kind, that we might rediscover our true nature, one that we have long ago forgotten. In fact, these very words adorn his tomb in the Pantheon where he was finally brought to rest: "Ici repose l'homme de la nature et de la verite." However, upon closer examination of two of his major works, Emile or on Education and The Social Contract, both published in 1762, a surprising contradiction is brought to light. In these treatises, he makes the child and the people believe that they are free when he is merely using rhetoric to manipulate them. For example, in Emile he gives the following advice to tutors: "Take the opposite course with your pupil; let him always think he is master while you are really master. There is no subjection so complete as that which preserves the forms of freedom; it is thus that the will itself is taken captive." While in The Social Contract he recommends using divine intervention to assure that the people "obey freely, and bear with docility the yoke of public happiness." Is Rousseau simply a gifted sophist who, by hiding the rhetoric he uses, can present himself as a man of truth in order to better form the child and the people to do his bidding? Or, is there a justification for his duplicity? Could it be possible that in some instances duplicity must be used if truth is ever to be attained by all human beings? By examining the rhetoric Rousseau uses in Emile and The Social Contract, this thesis attempts to shed some light on this somewhat troubling contradiction.