Writers of early American texts frequently express astonishment at the abundance of swarming things found in nature, from rustling clouds of insects to ponds teeming with fish to forests of countless trees. They report feeling overwhelmed, fascinated, and threatened by the dynamic, formless grouping of the swarm, in which the distinction between part and whole is lost in a blur of motion. In this dissertation, I trace these experiences of swarming across religious tracts, natural histories, philosophy texts, and historical fiction to argue that the swarm is crucial for understanding early American ways of relating to the environment. Scholars of the colonial period have long maintained that settlers viewed the American continent as a vast and empty land, available for settlement and resource extraction, and that the settler mind sought to manage the perceived chaos of their new surroundings through the application of European systems of thought and order. I argue, however, that the experience of the swarm indicates another kind of environmental relation, one in which the viewer and the natural world become ecologically entangled. In this entanglement, settlers found their preconceived ideas challenged, forcing them to revise or generate anew their theories of the world. While these ecological experiences of the natural world appear in texts by the settler writers Jonathan Edwards, Hector St. John Crèvecoeur, William Bartram, and James Fenimore Cooper, the ideas that develop through the swarm are influenced by or overlap with the epistemologies of the Native American peoples who inhabited the lands these settlers occupied. The project also addresses Indigenous modes of environmental relation and philosophies through Haudenosaunee cosmologies, Maskoke origins stories, and the work of the Tuscarora writer David Cusick. Overall, this dissertation offers an epistemological history of the colonial period that not only revises long- accepted characterizations of the settler mindset but that also takes seriously the histories of Indigenous philosophies as early American intellectual movements. In detailing experiences in which the mind and the natural world are not in fact separate entities, my work presents alternative modes of environmental relation and offers suggestions to today’s urgent need to rethink our orientation toward the natural world.

Napoleon’s defeat in 1813 generates a number of explanations from historians regarding why he lost this epic campaign which ultimately resulted in France losing control over the German states. Scholars discussing the French marshalate of the Napoleonic era frequently assert that these generals could not win battles without the emperor present. Accustomed to assuming a subordinate role under Bonaparte’s direct supervision, these commanders faltered when deprived of the strong hand of the master. This thesis contributes to this historiographical argument by positing that the pre-professional nature of Napoleon’s marshalate precluded them from adapting to the evolving nature of warfare during the First French Empire. Emerging from non-military backgrounds and deriving their capabilities solely from practical experience, the marshals failed to succeed at endeavors outside of their capacity. An examination of the military administration of the Old Regime, the effects of the French Revolution on the French generalate, and the circumstances under which Bonaparte labored when creating the imperial marshalate demonstrates that issues systemic to the French high command contributed to French defeat in 1813. This thesis also provides evidence that Napoleon understood this problem and attempted to better prepare his marshals for independent command by instructing them in his way of war during the 1813 campaign.

Cette version de la thèse a été tronquée des certains éléments protégés par le droit d’auteur. Une version plus complète est disponible en ligne pour les membres de la communauté de l’Université de Montréal et peut aussi être consultée dans une des bibliothèques UdeM. / Si Norman McLaren (1914-1987) œuvre principalement dans le domaine onirique de l’animation, David Cronenberg (1943-), parfois surnommé « The Baron of Blood », réalise des films de fiction appartenant à un genre singulier qu’il a lui-même développé, celui de « l’horreur intérieure ». Que peuvent donc partager ces deux cinéastes aux univers a priori si distincts ? Chacun a construit une relation à long terme avec un compositeur : Maurice Blackburn (1914-1988) pour le premier, Howard Shore (1946-) pour le second. Mais si les univers des deux réalisateurs ont été maintes fois investigués, l’apport de leurs compositeurs respectifs demeure peu examiné. Or, d’un univers à l’autre, la musique semble jouer un rôle de toute première importance, chacun des compositeurs étant impliqué très tôt dans le processus cinématographique. Cette implication précoce dans la création collective est indicatrice de la place et du rôle centraux qu’occupent Blackburn et Shore et leur musique au sein de l’œuvre de McLaren, d’une part, et de Cronenberg, de l’autre. De la sorte, les partitions semblent ne pouvoir être considérées comme une simple illustration sonore des films, mais comme une composante tout à fait fondamentale, relançant dès lors la question du rôle de la musique au cinéma : comment le définir ? En outre, au fil de la rencontre continue sur plusieurs films, musique et cinéma en sont venus à un entrelacement tel qu’un style singulier de musicalisation des images se serait développé : quels sont les traits qui définissent ce style ? D’une collaboration à l’autre, cette thèse cherche à établir une poïétique de la création musico-filmique ; elle cherche à décrire et à comprendre les processus créateurs filmique et musical qui déterminent la composition d’une musique de film et, plus encore, une musicalité de tout le complexe audio-visuel. À travers des portraits examinant la pratique et le discours des créateurs et quatre analyses de bandes sonores (A Phantasy de Norman McLaren, Jour après jour de Clément Perron, Crash et A Dangerous Method de David Cronenberg), des liens se tissent peu à peu entre les pensées et les pratiques des deux compositeurs qui développent des stratégies similaires et originales face aux problèmes que leur posent les œuvres de McLaren (l’indissociabilité de la musique et de l’image) et de Cronenberg (la « transformation de l’esthétique humaine »). D’un binôme à l’autre, le cinéma se transforme en un laboratoire musico-filmique où chacun élabore une « méthode dangereuse » qui force l’analyste à explorer de nouvelles avenues méthodologiques. / Norman McLaren’s (1914-1987) animation work evokes a primarily dream-like world. David Cronenberg (1943-), also sometimes known as the “Baron of Blood,” makes fiction films that belong to a singular genre he developed: the “inner horror.” So what can these two filmmakers possibly have in common? They both built a long-term relationship with composers: Maurice Blackburn (1914-1988) for the former and Howard Shore (1946-) for the latter. Though the distinct approaches of these two directors have been widely studied, the weight of the contributions of their respective composers remains largely unmeasured. And this, despite the fact that music seems to play a primary role in these two directors’ process since, in each instance, the composer is involved very early on. This unusually early involvement of the composer, and the ongoing collaboration it entails, are indicative of the central place and role held by Blackburn and Shore’s music in McLaren’s work on the one hand, and Cronenberg’s on the other. This considered, their scores must no longer be seen as direct sound illustration of the films, but rather as essential components of the films, even though such a stance forces us to rethink how we define the role of music in film. Furthermore, from film to film, music and cinema become so intertwined that a singular style of musicalization of the image develops, begging the question: what are the characteristics of this style? From one collaboration to the other, this thesis seeks to establish a poietic of film-music creation; it looks to describe the cinematic and musical creative processes that determine the composition of film music and, beyond that, the musicality of the entire audio-visual complex. Through portraits that investigate the practice and discourse of creators and through the analysis of four soundtracks (A Phantasy by Norman McLaren, Day After Day by Clément Perron, Crash and A Dangerous Method by David Cronenberg), the thoughts and practices of the two composers, who develop similar innovative strategies to solve the problems posed by the works of McLaren (the inseparability of music and image) and Cronenberg (the “transformation of human aesthetics”), are gradually connected. From one duo to another, cinema becomes a musical and cinematic laboratory where each develops a “dangerous method” which forces the analyst to explore new methodological avenues.

PONTE , Carlos Roger Sales da . Sobre os conceitos de indivíduo em Sören Kierkegaard e de pessoa em Carl Rogers: semelhanças e diferenças . 2010. 119 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Psicologia) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Departamento de Psicologia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Psicologia, Fortaleza-CE, 2010. / Submitted by moises gomes (celtinha_malvado@hotmail.com) on 2011-12-07T18:28:49Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_dis_CRSDPonte.PDF: 785994 bytes, checksum: 43007e0aef45ddb8ddabd44c5772fc19 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Josineide Góis(josineide@ufc.br) on 2012-01-09T15:10:11Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_dis_CRSDPonte.PDF: 785994 bytes, checksum: 43007e0aef45ddb8ddabd44c5772fc19 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-01-09T15:10:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_dis_CRSDPonte.PDF: 785994 bytes, checksum: 43007e0aef45ddb8ddabd44c5772fc19 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / From a epistemological reading of some writings of the American psychologist, Carl R. Rogers, in which he declares “theoretical affinities” with the thought of the Danish philosopher, Sören Kierkegaard, the biggest objective of this study is to collate the concepts of “Individual”, delineated by Kierkegaard, and the concept of “Person”, formulated by Rogers, in its similarities and differences. Contributing to the constitution of one more face of the Person-Centrered Approaching epistemology (created and developed by Rogers), is also intention of this research, to approximate these concepts taking as support the hypothesis of that the supposed kierkegaardian influence in Roger’s production is not so significant as he (Rogers) and, over all, his commentators, wants to make to believe. Being Kierkegaard in a philosophical and epistemological dimension of a pietistic and anguished Christianity, where its biggest goal was to show the true “Christian-to-be”, and also that the “Individual” is that one who chooses to exist subjectively in a tensioned relation with God, hardly could his philosophy stand as another so heterogeneous context as it was the case of Humanist North America Psychology, where Rogers had space and that considered the “Person” as a “reliable worthy organism” that keeps in itself the potentialities of constructing itself in all its spheres and in direction to an authentic existence and congruence. Approaching the concepts of “Individual” and “Person” in its similarities and differences, describing until where the influence of Kierkegaard in the rogerian thought is veridical, it is intended to show the place in fact of the kierkegaardian philosophy in the construction of the psychology centered in the person effected by Rogers. / A partir de uma leitura epistemológica de vários escritos do psicólogo estadunidense, Carl R. Rogers, em que ele declara “afinidades” teóricas com o pensamento do filósofo dinamarquês, Sören Kierkegaard, o objetivo maior deste estudo é confrontar os conceitos de “Indivíduo”, delineado por Kierkegaard, e o conceito de “Pessoa”, formulado por Rogers, em suas similaridades e diferenças. Contribuindo na constituição de mais uma faceta da epistemologia da Abordagem Centrada na Pessoa (criada e desenvolvida por Rogers), é também intenção desta pesquisa, aproximar estes conceitos apoiando-se na hipótese de que a suposta influência kierkegaardiana na obra de Rogers não é tão significativa como ele (Rogers) e, sobretudo, seus comentadores, querem fazer crer. Estando Kierkegaard numa dimensão filosófica e epistemológica de um cristianismo pietista e angustiado, em que sua meta maior era mostrar o verdadeiro “devir cristão”, e que o “Indivíduo” é aquele que escolhe existir ligado subjetivamente numa relação tensionada com Deus, dificilmente poderia sua filosofia servir de base em outro contexto tão heterogêneo como era o da psicologia humanista norte-americana, onde Rogers tinha seu espaço e que considerava a “Pessoa” como um “organismo digno de confiança” que guarda em si mesma as potencialidades de se construir em todas as suas esferas e em direção a uma existência congruente e autêntica. Aproximando os conceitos de “Indivíduo” e de “Pessoa” em suas semelhanças e diferenças, descrevendo até onde a influência de Kierkegaard no pensamento rogeriano é verídica, pretende-se mostrar o lugar de fato da filosofia kierkegaardiana na construção da psicologia centrada na pessoa efetuada por Rogers.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 1716.pdf: 531315 bytes, checksum: 80ad12e3b9add2d71c45a8170d033728 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-02-27 / In the Destruction of Reason, from 1953, Georg Lukács plays several thinkers as philosophics idealizers of german way to Hitler. This work has as purpose to show such reading as a mistake. Another moment, through a deviation about the Hungarian author s trajectory, shows also that there is a transformation in the writing style after his convertion on the communist party in 1918, wich emphasires mainly after the thirties, in it s soviet period. On the other hand, shows also that during Lukács last years there is an effort to revise mistakes of the past / Em A Destruição da Razão, de 1953, Georg Lukács interpreta diversos pensadores como idealizadores filosóficos do caminho alemão até Hitler. Este trabalho tem por objetivo mostrar tal leitura como um equívoco. Noutro momento, através de uma digressão sobre a trajetória do autor húngaro, mostra também que há uma transformação no estilo da escrita após sua conversão ao partido comunista em 1918, que se acentua principalmente após os anos 30, em seu período soviético. Por outro lado, mostra também que nos últimos anos de vida de Lukács há um esforço para corrigir os erros do passado

A partir de 1919, Heidegger élabore plusieurs projets temporels grâce à une phénoménologie herméneutique caractérisée par la fonction méthodique de l’indication formelle, dont la dernière communication date de 1930. Dans ces projets, on trouve à plusieurs reprises la notion de répétition. Plusieurs commentateurs considèrent Kierkegaard comme source de la répétition heideggérienne tandis que d’autres se réfèrent à Nietzsche. Heidegger emploie le terme Wiederholung, Kierkegaard la notion Gjentagelse, et Nietzsche les notions Wiederkehr, Wiederkunft et Wiederholung. L’expression précise « répétition du possible » se trouve dans certaines œuvres des trois penseurs, et s’insère dans des projets temporels différents. La possibilité, en dehors de sa signification modale, décrit depuis Aristote un caractère de l’étant, en corrélation avec le phénomène fondamental qu’est le mouvement. Tant Kierkegaard que Nietzsche, et par la suite Heidegger, ont abordé la question de la mobilité comme thème fondamental dans leurs recherches, pour promouvoir la possibilité en tant que possibilité. Chez les trois penseurs, répétition n’est pas itération, ni retour de la même facticité empirique, mais répétition de la possibilité. Par l’expression « répétition du possible », il s’agit de décrire un mouvement temporel, accordant un sens spécifique au passé, et même à l’histoire. Ce mouvement temporel non objectivable, précède nécessairement le temps uniforme linéaire qui a déterminé la conception classique du temps depuis Aristote. Nécessairement mien, et à la fois continu et discontinu, ce mouvement qui, par son essence ne se manifeste que rarement, tient ensemble passé et futur autour de l’instant privilégié. L’instant, lié à la possibilité d’une décision qui ne se réfère pas à l’attente devant la réalisation des possibilités quotidiennes, a pour enjeu l’entièreté de la vie, visant la transformation de la vie et la constitution de l’homme. De cette manière dans différents projets chez les trois penseurs, la répétition et l’instant font entrer en jeu la question de la liberté. La conceptualité, ce qui revient à dire, la méthode de cette pensée temporelle, s’avèrent tellement importante, de sorte que cette pensée devient accessible grâce à une communication « indirecte » qui demande une contribution essentielle du lecteur. Le travail envisage l’affinité des trois penseurs tant à travers le caractère indirect de la communication de la temporalité que la tâche d’assumer le passé. / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Advances in technologies of voice profiling shed new light on questions of listening and its entanglement with antiblackness as a structuring paradigm of modernity. To contest current conceptions of listening with regards to the question of race and antiblackness while also shining light on the potentials offered by blackness, this dissertation engages listening at three distinct sites that are entangled with this modern question of voice profiling AI. In the process, this dissertation elaborates on the ethical stakes involved in listening itself. Chapter 1 excavates the way in which the ears of enslaved Black lives were ritualized. It centers an analysis of the role of the punishment of ear cropping and how this performed both a claim over slaves’ belonging and an inhibition on their freedom. Scholarship from Hebrew law aids in uncovering the meaning of the specific form of punishment. The chapter concludes by comparing the conception of slaves’ ears to Black artistic expressions such as Harriet Jacobs’s various methods of narration in Incidents of a Slave Girl and Blind Tom Wiggins’ unique use of clusters and graphic notation in Battle of Manassas, so as to demonstrate their methods of resistance and refusal to a claimed all-encompassing regime of listening. Chapter 2 engages modern notions of sound and listening. The way in which sound is theorized and engaged in modern digital technologies is entangled with the conception of what listening is and what it entails. Hermann von Helmholtz provides an axis after which sound and listening, as well as the relation between an inner world of perceptions and an outer world of sensations, has to be engaged as a question of listening as entangled in societal questions. The chapter critically elaborates alongside questions of categorical distinction in sound, such as the use of skull shapes as referents for AI listening, instrument classification systems, and the general question of the form of sound, or sound as object. The concluding Chapter 3 discusses, alongside Sylvia Wynter’s work and Roscoe Mitchell’s piece S II Examples (date) the kinds of questions we must pose in the development of modern AI listening technologies to move past antiblackness. Immanuel Kant’s theorizing of race and his influence on Johann Friedrich Blumenbach’s classification of skulls relate tomodern voice profiling AI technology directly through the question of using cranial shapes. Wynter’s work challenges both a turn to varieties that do not allow the addressing of structural antiblackness, and a continuation of claims to proper knowledge on the basis of antiblackness. Ultimately, Wynter aids us in hearing Mitchell’s continual shapeshifting practice on the saxophone as a proposal towards a refiguring of our conception of sound, listening, and us.