In her bibliography, Incidents in the life of a Salve Girl, Harriet Ann Jacobs appropriates the autobiographical "I" in order to tell her own story of slavery and talk back to the dominant culture that enslaves her. Through analysis and explication of the text, this thesis examines Jacobs' rhetorical and psyshological evolution from slave to self as she struggles against patriarchal power that would rob her of her identity as well as her freedom. Included in the discussion is an analysis of the concept of self in western plilosophy, an overview of american autobiography prior to the publication of Jacobs' narrative, a discussion of the history of the slave narrative as a genre, and a discussion of the history of Jacobs' narrative.

This thesis considers past autobiographical theory and questions whether it addresses the autobiography of the female writer. Autobiographies of Harriet Jacobs, Margaret Sanger, and Maxine Hong Kingston are examined to reveal their polyvocality, use of the autobiographical "I", and rhetorical strategies maintained in order to create a close relationship with the reader. Particular attention is paid to Mikhail Bakhtin's theory of dialogism and Sidonie Smith's autobiographical "I."

This dissertation addresses forgiveness as a philosophical matter, understanding that whenever forgiveness happens (or even when it is talked about) unnoticed theories of selfhood and time are at play. To bring these unobserved models of time and the self to the fore, this study explores a series of commonalities and divergences in some selected works by Augustine, Kierkegaard, and Arendt. In these texts, forgiveness is understood as the gathering of a self that is scattered in time (Augustine), as present participation in an earlier redemptive moment (Kierkegaard), or as an event that resists the otherwise rectilinear, death-oriented course of human life (Arendt).Why has forgiveness been mostly ignored in Western philosophy? What does this omission reveal about Western thought? Contemporary authors have argued for the (imperative) need to (re)think what forgiveness is, the conditions under which it (supposedly) occurs, and its relation to justice, since the inexpiable events of the past and present centuries maintain forgiveness an unresolved question. This study rests on a fundamental intuition: that for forgiveness to pass in history nothing must be passed from the one who forgives to the one who is forgiven. To support this claim, I undertake close readings of Augustine’s Confessions, Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, and Arendt’s The Human Condition. In these works, forgiveness is understood as a paradox —it must be contained to be given (Augustine), granted-yet-not-granted (Kierkegaard), and forgotten the moment it is given, as if never given at all (Arendt). Can forgiveness be thought of as a hidden existential capacity, and not as a magnanimous display of mercy? Can we imagine forgiveness as undoing the transgression we see, and secretly engaging with the invisible?

Writers of early American texts frequently express astonishment at the abundance of swarming things found in nature, from rustling clouds of insects to ponds teeming with fish to forests of countless trees. They report feeling overwhelmed, fascinated, and threatened by the dynamic, formless grouping of the swarm, in which the distinction between part and whole is lost in a blur of motion. In this dissertation, I trace these experiences of swarming across religious tracts, natural histories, philosophy texts, and historical fiction to argue that the swarm is crucial for understanding early American ways of relating to the environment. Scholars of the colonial period have long maintained that settlers viewed the American continent as a vast and empty land, available for settlement and resource extraction, and that the settler mind sought to manage the perceived chaos of their new surroundings through the application of European systems of thought and order. I argue, however, that the experience of the swarm indicates another kind of environmental relation, one in which the viewer and the natural world become ecologically entangled. In this entanglement, settlers found their preconceived ideas challenged, forcing them to revise or generate anew their theories of the world. While these ecological experiences of the natural world appear in texts by the settler writers Jonathan Edwards, Hector St. John Crèvecoeur, William Bartram, and James Fenimore Cooper, the ideas that develop through the swarm are influenced by or overlap with the epistemologies of the Native American peoples who inhabited the lands these settlers occupied. The project also addresses Indigenous modes of environmental relation and philosophies through Haudenosaunee cosmologies, Maskoke origins stories, and the work of the Tuscarora writer David Cusick. Overall, this dissertation offers an epistemological history of the colonial period that not only revises long- accepted characterizations of the settler mindset but that also takes seriously the histories of Indigenous philosophies as early American intellectual movements. In detailing experiences in which the mind and the natural world are not in fact separate entities, my work presents alternative modes of environmental relation and offers suggestions to today’s urgent need to rethink our orientation toward the natural world.

Isaac Van Zandt and his son Khleber Miller Van Zandt were instrumental figures in the growth of Texas and the development of the town of Fort Worth, Texas. Isaac Van Zandt was one of the main members of the delegation from Texas to the United States who negotiated for annexation. He also played a major part in the Texas Constitutional Convention of 1845 and made a run for governor before his death in 1847. His son, Khleber Miller Van Zandt was a Confederate soldier and businessman who saw something in the outpost of Fort Worth that was worth developing. Along with an influential group of other businessmen he was a part of every major development that occurred in Fort Worth until his death in 1930. Both Van Zandts' roles are discussed and the importance of their actions is brought to light.

Napoleon’s defeat in 1813 generates a number of explanations from historians regarding why he lost this epic campaign which ultimately resulted in France losing control over the German states. Scholars discussing the French marshalate of the Napoleonic era frequently assert that these generals could not win battles without the emperor present. Accustomed to assuming a subordinate role under Bonaparte’s direct supervision, these commanders faltered when deprived of the strong hand of the master. This thesis contributes to this historiographical argument by positing that the pre-professional nature of Napoleon’s marshalate precluded them from adapting to the evolving nature of warfare during the First French Empire. Emerging from non-military backgrounds and deriving their capabilities solely from practical experience, the marshals failed to succeed at endeavors outside of their capacity. An examination of the military administration of the Old Regime, the effects of the French Revolution on the French generalate, and the circumstances under which Bonaparte labored when creating the imperial marshalate demonstrates that issues systemic to the French high command contributed to French defeat in 1813. This thesis also provides evidence that Napoleon understood this problem and attempted to better prepare his marshals for independent command by instructing them in his way of war during the 1813 campaign.

Cette version de la thèse a été tronquée des certains éléments protégés par le droit d’auteur. Une version plus complète est disponible en ligne pour les membres de la communauté de l’Université de Montréal et peut aussi être consultée dans une des bibliothèques UdeM. / Si Norman McLaren (1914-1987) œuvre principalement dans le domaine onirique de l’animation, David Cronenberg (1943-), parfois surnommé « The Baron of Blood », réalise des films de fiction appartenant à un genre singulier qu’il a lui-même développé, celui de « l’horreur intérieure ». Que peuvent donc partager ces deux cinéastes aux univers a priori si distincts ? Chacun a construit une relation à long terme avec un compositeur : Maurice Blackburn (1914-1988) pour le premier, Howard Shore (1946-) pour le second. Mais si les univers des deux réalisateurs ont été maintes fois investigués, l’apport de leurs compositeurs respectifs demeure peu examiné. Or, d’un univers à l’autre, la musique semble jouer un rôle de toute première importance, chacun des compositeurs étant impliqué très tôt dans le processus cinématographique. Cette implication précoce dans la création collective est indicatrice de la place et du rôle centraux qu’occupent Blackburn et Shore et leur musique au sein de l’œuvre de McLaren, d’une part, et de Cronenberg, de l’autre. De la sorte, les partitions semblent ne pouvoir être considérées comme une simple illustration sonore des films, mais comme une composante tout à fait fondamentale, relançant dès lors la question du rôle de la musique au cinéma : comment le définir ? En outre, au fil de la rencontre continue sur plusieurs films, musique et cinéma en sont venus à un entrelacement tel qu’un style singulier de musicalisation des images se serait développé : quels sont les traits qui définissent ce style ? D’une collaboration à l’autre, cette thèse cherche à établir une poïétique de la création musico-filmique ; elle cherche à décrire et à comprendre les processus créateurs filmique et musical qui déterminent la composition d’une musique de film et, plus encore, une musicalité de tout le complexe audio-visuel. À travers des portraits examinant la pratique et le discours des créateurs et quatre analyses de bandes sonores (A Phantasy de Norman McLaren, Jour après jour de Clément Perron, Crash et A Dangerous Method de David Cronenberg), des liens se tissent peu à peu entre les pensées et les pratiques des deux compositeurs qui développent des stratégies similaires et originales face aux problèmes que leur posent les œuvres de McLaren (l’indissociabilité de la musique et de l’image) et de Cronenberg (la « transformation de l’esthétique humaine »). D’un binôme à l’autre, le cinéma se transforme en un laboratoire musico-filmique où chacun élabore une « méthode dangereuse » qui force l’analyste à explorer de nouvelles avenues méthodologiques. / Norman McLaren’s (1914-1987) animation work evokes a primarily dream-like world. David Cronenberg (1943-), also sometimes known as the “Baron of Blood,” makes fiction films that belong to a singular genre he developed: the “inner horror.” So what can these two filmmakers possibly have in common? They both built a long-term relationship with composers: Maurice Blackburn (1914-1988) for the former and Howard Shore (1946-) for the latter. Though the distinct approaches of these two directors have been widely studied, the weight of the contributions of their respective composers remains largely unmeasured. And this, despite the fact that music seems to play a primary role in these two directors’ process since, in each instance, the composer is involved very early on. This unusually early involvement of the composer, and the ongoing collaboration it entails, are indicative of the central place and role held by Blackburn and Shore’s music in McLaren’s work on the one hand, and Cronenberg’s on the other. This considered, their scores must no longer be seen as direct sound illustration of the films, but rather as essential components of the films, even though such a stance forces us to rethink how we define the role of music in film. Furthermore, from film to film, music and cinema become so intertwined that a singular style of musicalization of the image develops, begging the question: what are the characteristics of this style? From one collaboration to the other, this thesis seeks to establish a poietic of film-music creation; it looks to describe the cinematic and musical creative processes that determine the composition of film music and, beyond that, the musicality of the entire audio-visual complex. Through portraits that investigate the practice and discourse of creators and through the analysis of four soundtracks (A Phantasy by Norman McLaren, Day After Day by Clément Perron, Crash and A Dangerous Method by David Cronenberg), the thoughts and practices of the two composers, who develop similar innovative strategies to solve the problems posed by the works of McLaren (the inseparability of music and image) and Cronenberg (the “transformation of human aesthetics”), are gradually connected. From one duo to another, cinema becomes a musical and cinematic laboratory where each develops a “dangerous method” which forces the analyst to explore new methodological avenues.

PONTE , Carlos Roger Sales da . Sobre os conceitos de indivíduo em Sören Kierkegaard e de pessoa em Carl Rogers: semelhanças e diferenças . 2010. 119 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Psicologia) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Departamento de Psicologia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Psicologia, Fortaleza-CE, 2010. / Submitted by moises gomes (celtinha_malvado@hotmail.com) on 2011-12-07T18:28:49Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_dis_CRSDPonte.PDF: 785994 bytes, checksum: 43007e0aef45ddb8ddabd44c5772fc19 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Josineide Góis(josineide@ufc.br) on 2012-01-09T15:10:11Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_dis_CRSDPonte.PDF: 785994 bytes, checksum: 43007e0aef45ddb8ddabd44c5772fc19 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-01-09T15:10:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_dis_CRSDPonte.PDF: 785994 bytes, checksum: 43007e0aef45ddb8ddabd44c5772fc19 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / From a epistemological reading of some writings of the American psychologist, Carl R. Rogers, in which he declares “theoretical affinities” with the thought of the Danish philosopher, Sören Kierkegaard, the biggest objective of this study is to collate the concepts of “Individual”, delineated by Kierkegaard, and the concept of “Person”, formulated by Rogers, in its similarities and differences. Contributing to the constitution of one more face of the Person-Centrered Approaching epistemology (created and developed by Rogers), is also intention of this research, to approximate these concepts taking as support the hypothesis of that the supposed kierkegaardian influence in Roger’s production is not so significant as he (Rogers) and, over all, his commentators, wants to make to believe. Being Kierkegaard in a philosophical and epistemological dimension of a pietistic and anguished Christianity, where its biggest goal was to show the true “Christian-to-be”, and also that the “Individual” is that one who chooses to exist subjectively in a tensioned relation with God, hardly could his philosophy stand as another so heterogeneous context as it was the case of Humanist North America Psychology, where Rogers had space and that considered the “Person” as a “reliable worthy organism” that keeps in itself the potentialities of constructing itself in all its spheres and in direction to an authentic existence and congruence. Approaching the concepts of “Individual” and “Person” in its similarities and differences, describing until where the influence of Kierkegaard in the rogerian thought is veridical, it is intended to show the place in fact of the kierkegaardian philosophy in the construction of the psychology centered in the person effected by Rogers. / A partir de uma leitura epistemológica de vários escritos do psicólogo estadunidense, Carl R. Rogers, em que ele declara “afinidades” teóricas com o pensamento do filósofo dinamarquês, Sören Kierkegaard, o objetivo maior deste estudo é confrontar os conceitos de “Indivíduo”, delineado por Kierkegaard, e o conceito de “Pessoa”, formulado por Rogers, em suas similaridades e diferenças. Contribuindo na constituição de mais uma faceta da epistemologia da Abordagem Centrada na Pessoa (criada e desenvolvida por Rogers), é também intenção desta pesquisa, aproximar estes conceitos apoiando-se na hipótese de que a suposta influência kierkegaardiana na obra de Rogers não é tão significativa como ele (Rogers) e, sobretudo, seus comentadores, querem fazer crer. Estando Kierkegaard numa dimensão filosófica e epistemológica de um cristianismo pietista e angustiado, em que sua meta maior era mostrar o verdadeiro “devir cristão”, e que o “Indivíduo” é aquele que escolhe existir ligado subjetivamente numa relação tensionada com Deus, dificilmente poderia sua filosofia servir de base em outro contexto tão heterogêneo como era o da psicologia humanista norte-americana, onde Rogers tinha seu espaço e que considerava a “Pessoa” como um “organismo digno de confiança” que guarda em si mesma as potencialidades de se construir em todas as suas esferas e em direção a uma existência congruente e autêntica. Aproximando os conceitos de “Indivíduo” e de “Pessoa” em suas semelhanças e diferenças, descrevendo até onde a influência de Kierkegaard no pensamento rogeriano é verídica, pretende-se mostrar o lugar de fato da filosofia kierkegaardiana na construção da psicologia centrada na pessoa efetuada por Rogers.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 1716.pdf: 531315 bytes, checksum: 80ad12e3b9add2d71c45a8170d033728 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-02-27 / In the Destruction of Reason, from 1953, Georg Lukács plays several thinkers as philosophics idealizers of german way to Hitler. This work has as purpose to show such reading as a mistake. Another moment, through a deviation about the Hungarian author s trajectory, shows also that there is a transformation in the writing style after his convertion on the communist party in 1918, wich emphasires mainly after the thirties, in it s soviet period. On the other hand, shows also that during Lukács last years there is an effort to revise mistakes of the past / Em A Destruição da Razão, de 1953, Georg Lukács interpreta diversos pensadores como idealizadores filosóficos do caminho alemão até Hitler. Este trabalho tem por objetivo mostrar tal leitura como um equívoco. Noutro momento, através de uma digressão sobre a trajetória do autor húngaro, mostra também que há uma transformação no estilo da escrita após sua conversão ao partido comunista em 1918, que se acentua principalmente após os anos 30, em seu período soviético. Por outro lado, mostra também que nos últimos anos de vida de Lukács há um esforço para corrigir os erros do passado

A partir de 1919, Heidegger élabore plusieurs projets temporels grâce à une phénoménologie herméneutique caractérisée par la fonction méthodique de l’indication formelle, dont la dernière communication date de 1930. Dans ces projets, on trouve à plusieurs reprises la notion de répétition. Plusieurs commentateurs considèrent Kierkegaard comme source de la répétition heideggérienne tandis que d’autres se réfèrent à Nietzsche. Heidegger emploie le terme Wiederholung, Kierkegaard la notion Gjentagelse, et Nietzsche les notions Wiederkehr, Wiederkunft et Wiederholung. L’expression précise « répétition du possible » se trouve dans certaines œuvres des trois penseurs, et s’insère dans des projets temporels différents. La possibilité, en dehors de sa signification modale, décrit depuis Aristote un caractère de l’étant, en corrélation avec le phénomène fondamental qu’est le mouvement. Tant Kierkegaard que Nietzsche, et par la suite Heidegger, ont abordé la question de la mobilité comme thème fondamental dans leurs recherches, pour promouvoir la possibilité en tant que possibilité. Chez les trois penseurs, répétition n’est pas itération, ni retour de la même facticité empirique, mais répétition de la possibilité. Par l’expression « répétition du possible », il s’agit de décrire un mouvement temporel, accordant un sens spécifique au passé, et même à l’histoire. Ce mouvement temporel non objectivable, précède nécessairement le temps uniforme linéaire qui a déterminé la conception classique du temps depuis Aristote. Nécessairement mien, et à la fois continu et discontinu, ce mouvement qui, par son essence ne se manifeste que rarement, tient ensemble passé et futur autour de l’instant privilégié. L’instant, lié à la possibilité d’une décision qui ne se réfère pas à l’attente devant la réalisation des possibilités quotidiennes, a pour enjeu l’entièreté de la vie, visant la transformation de la vie et la constitution de l’homme. De cette manière dans différents projets chez les trois penseurs, la répétition et l’instant font entrer en jeu la question de la liberté. La conceptualité, ce qui revient à dire, la méthode de cette pensée temporelle, s’avèrent tellement importante, de sorte que cette pensée devient accessible grâce à une communication « indirecte » qui demande une contribution essentielle du lecteur. Le travail envisage l’affinité des trois penseurs tant à travers le caractère indirect de la communication de la temporalité que la tâche d’assumer le passé. / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished