Much legal literature on constitutional change in New Zealand presumes that the NZ state has been transformed from a dependent British colony into an independent, liberal nation-state. However, this nationalist narrative is a recent development, and is only one of three narratives of constitutional change, the other two being a 'Britannic' (or pan-British) narrative and a Maori narrative. All three suggest and justify a particular form of the NZ state. All three give an incomplete picture of NZ's constitutional history, separating 'law' from its various contexts. This thesis focuses mostly on the nationalist narrative, how it emerged and how the liberal nation-state became the only acceptable form for the NZ state to take. It attempts to provide a more nuanced approach to constitutional history. This is done by a broad examination of a number of subject areas: constitutional historiography, the economy, citizenship, NZ's relationship with the Privy Council, the Crown, and various constitutional developments (in particular, proposals for bills of rights) in the periods 1950-1970 and 1970-2005, and placing legal signposts in economic, historical and political context. Greater contextualisation suggests that asserting that the NZ nation-state is inevitable is a response to the fragility of NZ's present, brought on by the collapse of empire, the emergence of a community of nation-states, and domestic change. The emergence of the liberal constitutional nation-state in NZ is better seen as the contingent product of both various structures (international, British and domestic) and choices made by New Zealanders themselves. To treat this transformation as inevitable ignores that there were other alternatives possible. Moreover, it is wrong to see changes in NZ's constitutional arrangements as a shift from dependency to liberty: rather, there has been a reconfiguration of constraints and enablements.

This dissertation is about the political rights in the Turkish Constitutional system. It critically analyses the Turkish Constitution and the case-law of the Constitutional Court concerning the political rights. In this analysis, I will use a liberal framework which is based on the constitutional principles of political neutrality and the rule of law. These liberal principles provide the necessary setting in which the political rights are protected. It is widely believed that the official ideology of Turkish Constitution has much in common with liberal ideas, and indeed it aimed at establishing a liberal democracy. My study refutes this argument. The main argument of this thesis, on the contrary, is that the official ideology of the Turkish Constitution, namely Kemalism, is not compatible with the liberal principles of political neutrality and the rule of law. As such Kemalism, together with the strong state tradition in Turkish political culture, constitutes the most serious obstacle to the protection of liberal political rights. The dissertation consists of two parts. While Part I sets out the theoretical framework of political rights. Part II tries to analyse the Turkish Constitution in the light both of this theoretical background and of Kemalist principles. A particular chapter in the second part is devoted to the critical evaluation of the decisions given by the Turkish Constitutional Court. It is argued that the Court's approach to political rights is determined by the official ideology of the Constitution. In other words, it is an ideology-based, not a rights-based, approach. This study concludes that the Turkish Constitutional system has to undergo some institutional and structural changes, and radical paradigm shifts in order to remove the obstacles to the implementation of political rights. The Court in particular must adopt the rights-based approach to political rights. At the heart of all these changes and paradigm shifts, I argue, lies the self-awareness and authenticity which may be achieved through a journey to selfhood.

Making a new constitution has always been an issue in Turkey's political agenda since the 1982 Constitution came into power as a result of a coup d'état. The Constitution has been amended several times during thirty-three years, yet the authoritarian spirit of the Constitution remained unchanged. Therefore, the 1982 Constitution is considered as an impediment to achieve a truly democratic order. The new constitution is considered as a solution to the equal citizenship problems of the citizens from different ethnic and religious communities. These communities have suffered from the restrictive provisions of the 1982 Constitution such as compulsory religious classes, centralist local administration, ethnicity based citizenship definition, and the monist structure of the Directorate of Religious Affairs. These provisions prevented the citizens from different ethnic and religious backgrounds from enjoying their citizenship equally. Following the 2011 general elections, all the parties in the Parliament agreed on making a new constitution and established a Constitutional Reconciliation Commission based on the unanimity and the equal representation of the political parties. The Commission also adopted the participatory models, for the new constitution-making process for the first time. In accordance with the participatory models, the Commission organised a public consultation process to collect the public views as much as possible. Civil society organisations representing the various segments of society mobilised and participated in the process to a large extent. Ethnic and religious communities also showed a great interest to the new constitution-making process in an unprecedented scale because for the first time in Turkey's history, they were officially invited by the state to contribute to an important decision-making process. This study aims to discover the activities, demands and the influence of the ethnic and religious communities in the new constitution-making process. The participatory constitution-making model was practiced for the first time in Turkey. Moreover, the participation of ethnic and religious communities makes this occasion a very unique experience which needs to be examined carefully. In order to understand the minority participation, in-depth interviews were conducted with the Commission members and the representatives of the participating communities. Also, the proposals of the political parties and the reports of the participating communities were examined. More importantly, the proceedings of the hearing and the drafting sessions were analysed to understand the influence of these communities on the process as a whole. The issues regarding the problems of the ethnic and religious communities were the most controversial ones in the drafting process. As a matter of fact, these issues overlapped the 'red lines' of the parties and eventually halted the process. When examining the proceedings of the drafting process, the demands and the problems of the ethnic and religious communities found a very limited place in the discussions of the parties. In this respect, it was observed that the traditional attitude of the state towards the ethnic and religious communities was reproduced in the drafting process. Proposing a constitutional solution for these demands was the only way to make the new constitution to be truly 'new'. However, such an important process was ruined due the political contention between parties.

This thesis is a comparative study of 'political questions' and non-justiciability in US federal and English public law. Chapter 1 examines the problem of political questions in light of the judicial function in Anglo-American law, distinguishing jurisdiction from justiciability and elaborating the problem presented by the existence of non-justiciable 'political' questions, thereby providing the backdrop to the rest of the study. Chapter 2 traces the development of thinking on, elucidating several competing conceptions of, political questions in the US until the turn in Baker v Carr (1962), while Chapter 3 traces the fortunes of the US political question doctrine - its decline in practice, subjection to attack in the academic literature and more recently its possible resurgence - subsequent to this turn. In Chapter 4 I turn my attention to English law, examining the shift that has taken place in judicial review and the emergence of 'non-justiciability' as an organising principle in English public law. In Chapter 5 I outline a number of doctrinal currents and counter-currents in respect of non-justiciability in English law that are broadly similar to those in respect of debates concerning political questions in the US. Finally, in Chapter 6 I engage in a comparative analysis of political questions in the US and non-justiciability in English public law, arguing that these devices are functionally similar but conceptually different on account of important differences in the constitutional landscape and that debates about each, although ostensibly conducted in terms of constitutional principles, most notably the rule of law and the separation of powers, in fact mask deeper disagreements over constitutionalism, specifically (a more) legal as opposed to (a more) political constitutionalism.

L’objet de cette thèse est de rendre compte du lien de l’Etat et de la force armée par l’activité qui consiste à faire la guerre, c’est-à-dire la fonction militaire, en privilégiant l’approche des théories politico-sociales et juridiques de l’Etat. Cette fonction fait partie de l’activité générale de l’Etat et il revient à l’autorité militaire de la mettre en oeuvre. Afin de rendre compte des modalités de son exercice, elle devra faire l’objet à la fois d’une analyse intra-fonctionnelle, c’est-à-dire une étude exclusivement consacrée à la fonction militaire, et d’une analyse inter-fonctionnelle dans sa relation avec les fonctions de législation et d’exécution. La fonction militaire n’est pas une fonction autonome. Elle est l’une des fonctions exercées par le pouvoir exécutif. Toute la particularité de cette fonction militaire est d’être réalisée, non pas par un organe militaire qui serait chargé spécialement de cette tâche ̶ son existence a toujours été repoussée ̶ mais par le pouvoir politique dont le pouvoir s’exerce en vertu d’une autorité décisionnelle articulée à l’autorité technique d’exécution du commandement militaire. Tout l’enjeu est d’éviter la constitution d’un organe militaire pouvant se muer en un pouvoir militaire, risque guettant d’ailleurs aussi bien l’autorité politique que l’instance militaire. / The subject of this thesis is to examine the link between the State and armed force, a link which embodied by war-faring activity, in other words by military function, while focusing on an approach to sociopolitical and legal theories of the State. Military function is part of the general activity of the State and it is up to the military authority to exercise this function. In order to deal with the ways and means this function is exercised, it will be subject to intra-functional analysis (i.e. a study centered solely on the military function) as well as inter-functional analysis (i.e. a study of the military function in relation to the executive and legislative functions). Military function is not autonomous. It is one of the functions carried out by the executive power. The military function is unique in that it is not carried out by a military organ which is responsible for this specific task ̶ the existence of such an organ has always been refused ̶ but by a political power based on a decisional authority hinging on a technical authority carrying out military command. What is at stake is to avoid the setting up of a military organ capable of evolving into a military power, a risk which threatens both the political authority as well as the military authority itself.

La loi organique relative à la question prioritaire de constitutionnalité prévoit qu’en principe, une disposition législative peut être examinée par le Conseil constitutionnel si elle n’a pas été déjà déclarée conforme dans une précédente décision. Mais, par exception, l’existence d’un changement de circonstances peut néanmoins justifier son réexamen. A l’instar de toute décision de justice, un jugement rendu en application de l’article 61 ou 61-1 de la Constitution demeure circonstancié. Il paraît, dès lors, nécessaire de permettre à tout justiciable de remettre en cause de ce qui a été précédemment jugé. Toutefois, ce contrôle vise des lois déjà en application et ayant produit des effets. Il constitue, alors, un facteur non-négligeable d’insécurité juridique.C’est donc un véritable numéro d’équilibriste auquel le Conseil constitutionnel s’adonne depuis presque sept ans. D’un côté, poser une QPC constitue un véritable droit pour le justiciable dont l’effectivité tient aux possibilités réelles d’accès au prétoire du juge constitutionnel. D’un autre côté, la juridiction a le devoir de préserver les situations juridiques existantes ainsi que les droits légalement acquis. L’âge de raison étant atteint, cette étude a vocation à exposer et analyser l’attitude du juge, mais également à proposer quelques ajustements nécessaires au développement d’une justice constitutionnelle de qualité. / According to the organic law relating to the « question prioritaire de constitutionnalité » (QPC), a law may essentially be reviewed by the constitutional council, if it hasn’t already been validated in a former court decision. But exceptionally, a court review may be justified by a change circumstances. Just like every court decision, a court ruling based on both articles 61 or 61-1 of the Constitution must be detailed. Thus, it appears to be necessary to make possible for every litigant to question what had already been ruled. However, this judicial control is about laws that already entered into force and took effect. Indeed, it may represent a significant cause of legal insecurity.Then, the constitutional judge has been spending seven years balancing those issues. On one hand, the possibility to submit a QPC is a real right for the litigant, which efficacy is made possible by an effective access to the constitutional court. On the other hand, the court has to preserve all existing legal situations and acquired rights. Now that the age of reason has been reached, this study is aimed at showing and analysing the behaviour of the judge, and also proposing some adjustments necessary to the development of a quality constitutional justice.

Le changement de circonstances est un instrument permettant au Conseil constitutionnel d'affermir l'autorité de ses décisions, tant par le dialogue, que par la cohérence. En tant qu'instrument d'autorité par le dialogue, la notion fait écho à la jurisprudence administrative du Conseil d'Etat. Le Conseil constitutionnel a transposé cette technique au contentieux constitutionnel, ce qui a pour effet de renforcer son caractère juridictionnel. Mais cette réception s'est faite progressivement, évolution consacrée par le législateur organique en 2009. La recherche d'une autorité par le dialogue se manifeste également dans la conception du phénomène du changement de circonstances. Une conception à la fois extensive des circonstances et restrictive du changement. La prise en compte de la notion permet aussi d'affermir l'autorité des décisions du Conseil constitutionnel par la cohérence. C'est d'abord la jurisprudence du Conseil qui gagne en cohérence, en ce que la notion a une fonction de dérogation, mais aussi de justification. Ce sont aussi les normes qui gagnent en cohérence, puisque le changement de circonstances de droit conduit à la cohérence des normes à leur environnement juridique, tandis que le changement de circonstances de fait, qui trouve sa justification dans le besoin d'adaptation du droit à son contexte factuel, renforce le caractère concret du contrôle de constitutionnalité, et renforce la participation du Conseil constitutionnel à la fonction législative. / No English summary available.

L'interprétation constitutionnelle est une question récurrente dans le monde moderne. Le droit étant sujet à interprétation de la part de tout un chacun (juges, doctrine, simples citoyens), au point que «Juristes et simples citoyens acceptent et affirment (ou mettent en doute et refusent) des propositions sur ce que «dit le droit» de leur nation ou de leur État» (Ronald Dworkin). La question se pose de savoir qui, parmi ces différents acteurs, est le plus légitime pour affirmer une interprétation finaliste du droit s'imposant à tous. Au centre de cette interrogation, se trouve le juge constitutionnel, interprète habilité, ses jugements et les critiques visant ceux-ci. Mais l'interprétation prononcée par ce juge est parfois, voire souvent, mal acceptée, ce qui participe à l'affaiblissement de son autorité dans un système juridique concurrentiel marqué par le pluralisme tant au stade de la procédure de production qu'à celui de l'application du droit. Ainsi, si le juge a le privilège du rôle de juger, il a aussi la nécessaire vocation à être à son tour jugé. Cette nécessité s'explique par le fait que«Tout pouvoir est méchant dès qu'on le laisse faire [mais devient] sage dès qu'il se sent jugé.» (Alain). Dans ce contexte, la question de méthodes et outils utilisés par le juge-interprète devient elle aussi centrale car ceux-ci sont scrutés par tous, souvent au détriment d travail interprétatif complexe de ce juge. Parmi les outils et méthodes d'interprétation utilisés par celui-ci, se trouve l'usage des travaux préparatoires. En tant que supports d'une méthode d'interprétation juridique, ceux-ci posent problème. Au-delà de la question de la définition de la notion de travaux préparatoires, il convient de s'interroger sur le rôle, la force et la valeur de ces derniers dans l'interprétation constitutionnelle. Ainsi, cette thèse se donne pour objectif de tenter, du moins, d'apporter un début de réponse à ce questions, à travers une réflexion d'ensemble sur cette méthode d'interprétation dont le débat remonte, du moins, au Moyen Age. / Constitutional interpretation has become a recurrent issue in modern world. Since the law is subject to interpretation by anyone (judges, doctrine. ordinary citizens), so that "jurists and ordinary citizens accept and affirm (or doubt and refuse) proposals on what the 'law says' of their nation or their state" (Ronald Dworkin), the question is who, among these various actors, is the most legitimate to affirm a finalist interpretation of the law imposing itself on everyone. At the center of this question is the constitutional judge, the empowered interpreter, his judgments and the criticisms raised by the latter. But the judge's interpretation is sometimes. even often, poorly accepte1 which contributes to the weakening of his authority in a competitive legal system marked by pluralism, bath at the stage of the production procedure and al that of the application of the law. Thus, if the judge has the privilege to judge, he also has the necessary vocation to b in turn judged. This necessity is explained by the fact that "Ali power is wicked as long as it can, [but becomes] wise when it feels judged (Alain). In such a context, the question of methods and tools used by the interpreting judge also becomes central because the latter are scrutinized by everyone, often at the expense of the complex interpretative work of the judge. Among these tools and methods c interpretation used by the judge is the use of preparatory work (Hansard). As the basis of a legal interpretation method, the latter become problematic. Beyond the question of the definition of the concept of preparatory work, it should be raised the questions of the role, fore and value of the latter in constitutional interpretation. Thus, this paper aims to try to give an initial answer to these questions, through general reflection on this interpretation method that has been debated, at least, from the Middle Ages.

Les événements intervenus dans certains pays arabes depuis la fin de l’année 2011 ont montré le manque juridique dans ces pays à l’égard des textes juridiques régissant les droits et leurs garanties constitutionnelles et judiciaires. Ces événements ont montré également la nécessité de renforcer les garanties des droits énoncés dans les textes constitutionnels et le besoin de mettre en place des mécanismes capables d’assurer leur respect par tous. Ceci a poussé plusieurs pays à effectuer des réformes constitutionnelles ou de réécriture de nouvelles constitutions afin de répondre aux revendications populaires. Pour comprendre la situation des droits et leurs garanties dans les constitutions arabes, il convient d’étudier, dans un premier temps, les garanties normatives des droits. L’objectif est d’examiner l’existence constitutionnelle des droits dans les Etats car avant même de s'interroger sur leur contenu et leur garantie effective, il faut déjà s'assurer qu'il s'agit bien de normes juridiques. Le principe de la séparation des pouvoirs, qui est un des piliers de l’Etat de droit, mérite d’être examiné dans les pays arabe comme un élément inséparable des garanties des droits dans la Constitution. Dans un second temps, il convient de mettre en exergue le rôle du juge arabe en matière de protection des droits car la proclamation des droits à elle seule ne saurait suffire à assurer la garantie des droits contre les menaces pesant sur eux, mais, Il faut qu'on lui enjoigne la protection. C'est le juge donc qui a le pouvoir de constater les violations de la règle de droit et le cas échéant, de les sanctionner afin d'assurer le respect du droit. Dans ce cadre, on peut envisager deux types de sanctions juridictionnels, par le juge constitutionnel et par le juge judiciaire / The events that took place recently in some Arab countries since the end of 2011 showed the legal shortcomings in these countries with regard to the legal texts governing the rights and their constitutional and judicial guarantees. These events also showed the need to strengthen the guarantees of the rights set forth in the constitutional texts, the need to develop mechanisms to ensure respect by all. This has prompted several countries to make constitutional reforms or rewrite new constitutions in order to respond to popular demands. To understand the situation of rights and their guarantees in Arab constitutions, it is necessary to study, as a first step, the normative guarantees of rights. The objective is to examine the constitutional existence of the rights in the States because even before questioning their contents and their effective guarantee, one must already make sure that they are indeed legal norms. The principle of the separation of powers, which is one of the pillars of the rule of law, deserves to be examined in the Arab countries as an inseparable element of the guarantees of rights in the Constitution. In a second step, the role of the Arab judge in the protection of rights should be highlighted because the proclamation of rights alone is not enough to guarantee the rights against the threats against them, but let him be protected. It is therefore the judge who has the power to find violations of the rule of law and, if necessary, to punish them in order to ensure respect for the law. In this context, two types of judicial sanctions can be envisaged, by the constitutional judge and the judicial judge

La Constitution de la Roumanie de 1991, élaborée au début d’une période detransition d’un système totalitaire à un système démocratique, a inévitablement dû êtrerévisée. Si elle a défini un cadre juridique démocratique contribuant à la réinstauration et à lastructuration de la démocratie, la révision constitutionnelle intervient dans un cadre deconsolidation démocratique, avec un objectif principal : l’intégration de la Roumanie dans lesstructures euro-Atlantiques.Toutes les modifications apportées par la loi de révision pourraient être interprétées etjustifiées par cet objectif principal, compte tenu du lien entre la dynamique démocratisante etl’intégration dans les structures euro-Atlantiques.Trois finalités du processus de révision se dégagent dans ce contexte : l’institution desfondements constitutionnels de l’intégration euro-Atlantique et de ses effets, l’élargissementdes garanties constitutionnelles et institutionnelles des droits et des libertés fondamentaux etl’optimisation du processus décisionnel. Si les modifications présentées dans la premièrepartie sont directement liées à l’adhésion à l’Union Européenne et à l’OTAN, indispensables,les modifications répondant aux deux autres finalités sont d’influence ou d’inspirationeuropéenne, contribuant à la consolidation de la démocratie. / The Romanian Constitution of 1991, elaborated at the beginning of a period oftransition from a totalitarian system to a democratic one, needs undoubtedly to be revised. Ifthe Constitution defined a juridical democratic frame that contributed to the democraticrevival and settlement the revision of the Constitution responds to a period of democraticconsolidation related to a main objective: the integration in the European and North Atlanticstructures.All the modifications to the law brought on by the revision could be interpreted anddefended in relation to this main objective taking into account the relation between thedynamic of the democratization process and the integration in the European and NorthAtlantic structures.This revision process of the Romanian Constitution has three motivations related directlyto this context: the introduction of constitutional fundaments for the integration into theEuropean and North Atlantic structures and consequences of that integration, broadening theconstitutional and institutional warranties for fundamental rights and liberties and finally, theoptimization of the decision making process. If the revisions introduced in the first part weredirectly connected to the accession into the European Union and NATO, and thus essential,the revisions responding to the two other ends were influenced or based on a European modeland contributed directly to the strengthening of the young Romanian democracy.