Contemporary South Africa prides itself on having a Bill of Rights. For 84 years (1910 to 1994) public administration regulated the general welfare and lives of inhabitants in the finest detail, while being subject to almost only the whims and political objectives of the governing authority. On 27 April 1994 the 1993 Constitution introduced a constitutional obligation and radical change to the manner in which public administration must be exercised. Today, still an infant in experience relating to a bill of rights, public administration must be exercised with the Bill of Rights as an integral part of this inhabitant / governing authority interaction. The primary aim of this study is to attempt to describe the manner in which public administration was exercised, firstly, during constitutional dispensations prior to 1994 and, secondly, since public administration became subject to constitutionally entrenched fundamental rights. The empirical investigation is aimed at exploring and analysing the extent to which public administration has realised the constitutional obligation in practice. The results of the empirical investigation highlighted, primarily, that the majority of the officials that participated in the survey do not know of the Bill of Rights, and that half of those who do know of the Bill have little knowledge of its provisions. More than half of the respondents lack awareness of section 195 of the 1996 Constitution, which states that public administration must be governed by democratic principles enshrined in the Constitution. Barely one tenth of respondents were informed of the significance of the Bill and its role regarding public administration. The majority of respondents have not of their own accord studied the Bill and the Bill does not have the desired effect on the manner in which public administration is exercised. Two thirds of respondents have mixed perceptions as to whether to serve the interests of inhabitants above the political objectives of the governing authority and less than a quarter of respondents give recognition to the Bill when rendering public services. It seems as if South African public administration has a long way to go in adhering to its constitutional obligation in practice. / Public Administration / D. Litt et Phil.(Public Administration)

World-wide, the nature, purpose and existence of private education has evoked intense interest and controversial debate. For many, private education presents a legal-moral dilemma. On the one hand, it is recognised as a fundamental right in terms of freedom of association, religion and culture. On the other, it raises perplexing moral and philosophical issues about social exclusivity, selectivity and elitism. Notwithstanding the equally compelling legal, social, economic, educational and political arguments for and against private education, private schools in South Africa, which are increasing in number, continue to form an essential and permanent part of the education system. Private education is a complex subject which can be researched from a myriad of perspectives. This study is essentially a legal enquiry into the legal status of private schools in South Africa within the new democratic constitutional dispensation and how the law affects the organisation, governance and management of private schools. To this end, the study is confined to a discussion on legal aspects relating to private school governance, public funding of private schools, teachers' appointments and discipline, student admission and discipline and religious freedom. In discussing the legal context of such topics, a number of issues emerged concerning the complex nature and diversity of private schools, the relationship between the State and the private school sector, the right of private schools to exist and the implications of the bill of rights for private schools. Furthermore, the study raises challenging questions about the issues of choice, autonomy, religious freedom and diversity, which lie at the heart of the establishment and maintenance of private schools in a democratic society. Finally, one of the difficulties of conducting such a study is that South African law is complex and changing, and it is still in a state of evolution, given the recentness of the Constitution and the bill of rights. This means that while some legal issues pertaining to private schools are fairly well settled, for the most part it is not possible to provide a comprehensive or definitive statement about complex and often highly sensitive issues but merely to pose various legal-education questions and problems for consideration. In time, many of the issues raised will no doubt be settled by the courts / Educational Leadership and Management / D.Ed. (Educational Management

attitudes amongst the members of different races towards the implementation of affirmative action in the Correctional Services Department of South Africa. A literature study on affirmative action was completed and thereafter a questionnaire was developed. An emperical study was done by questionnaire on the determination of perceptions and attitudes of members of the South African Correctional Services Department towards the application of Affirmative Action policies. serious problems if not correctly managed. It was established that the success in any affirmative action strategy rests on the understanding and acceptance of cultural diversity as manifested in perceptions and attitudes. Management information systems needs to be effective and efficient at all times. Changing perceptions and attitudes increased passion and job satisfaction. Recommendations are made for further research on aspects highlighted by the findings. / Penology / M.A. (Penology)

The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 provides an elaborate dispute resolution system which seeks to resolve disputes in a speedy and cost-effective manner. However, this system is faced with a number of challenges. The application of common law and administrative law causes tension between the Labour Court and civil courts. It creates uncertainty in the development of our labour law jurisprudence and also leads to the problem of forum shopping. These problems in effect undermine the objectives of the Act. This dissertation analyzes problems in the LRA and other legislations leading to forum shopping. It also analyses the view of the courts on this problem and further expounds a number of possible solutions. The analysis revolves mainly around an observation of South African literature and case law. / Mercantile Law / LL.M.

This thesis investigates whether institutional journalism should receive special treatment at the hands of the law. Special treatment encompasses the affording of benefits to and the imposition of liabilities on journalistic institutions and the individuals who work for them. The arguments against special treatment are pragmatic and theoretical: pragmatic arguments emphasise, inter alia, the difficulty of providing a definition of journalism, and theoretical arguments emphasise the difficulty in explaining why special treatment can be coherent. The former can be addressed by describing how special treatment is already afforded to institutional journalism, both liabilities and benefits, to individuals and institutions, and showing that some of the problems foreseen by the pragmatic arguments have not proved as difficult as they appear. The arguments that special treatment is incoherent can be addressed by arguing that the credibility and assessability of institutional journalism still provide a prima facie rationale for special treatment irrespective of the rise of public speech on the Internet, when combined with the integral nature of journalism to democracy. Two basic arguments are advanced why this is so. The first, the free speech values argument, is a consequentialist account that holds that special treatment is appropriate when (or because) institutional journalism contributes to free speech values. It is attractive, but presents difficulties, both when considered in the abstract and when applied to the free speech value of democracy. The second, a rights-based argument, based on the notion that freedoms of speech and of the Press are distinguishable, can be based on either on Dworkin’s theory of rights as trumps or Raz’s theory of rights as interests. Raz’s account is preferable, as it complements the free speech values thesis in explaining the coherence of special treatment.

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Section 25(2) of the 1996 Constitution states that property may only be expropriated for a public purpose or in the public interest and compensation must be paid. This dissertation analyses the public purpose and public interest requirement in light of recent court decisions, especially with regard to third party transfer of expropriated property for economic development purposes. The public purpose requirement is explained in terms of pre-constitutional case law to create a context in which to understand the public purpose and public interest in terms of the 1996 Constitution. This leads to a discussion of whether third party transfers for economic development purposes are generally for a public purpose or in the public interest. The legitimacy of the purpose of both the expropriation and the transfer of property to third parties in order to realise the purpose is considered. Conclusions from a discussion of foreign case law dealing with the same question are used to analyse the South African cases where third party transfers for economic development have been addressed. Based on the overview of foreign case law and the critical analysis of South African cases, the dissertation sets out guidelines that should be taken into account when this question comes up again in future. The dissertation also considers whether an expropriation can be set aside if alternative means, other than expropriating the property, are available that would also promote the purpose for which the property was expropriated. Recent decisions suggest that alternative and less invasive measures are irrelevant when the expropriation is clearly for a public purpose. However, the dissertation argues that less invasive means should be considered in cases where it is not immediately clear that the expropriation is for a valid public purpose or in the public interest, such as in the case of a third party transfer for economic development. The role of the public purpose post-expropriation is considered with reference to purposes that are not realised or are abandoned and subsequently changed. In this regard the dissertation considers whether the state is allowed to change the purpose for which the property was expropriated, and also under which circumstances the previous owner would be entitled to reclaim the expropriated property when the public purpose that justifies the expropriation falls away. It is contended that the purpose can be changed, but that the new purpose must also comply with the constitutional requirements. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Artikel 25(2) van die Grondwet van 1996 vereis dat `n onteining slegs vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang mag plaasvind, en dat vergoeding betaalbaar is. In die proefskrif word die openbare doel en openbare belang geanaliseer in die lig van onlangse regspraak wat veral verband hou met die onteining van grond wat oorgedra word aan derde partye vir doeleindes van ekonomiese ontwikkeling. Die openbare doel vereiste word geanaliseer in die lig van respraak voor die aanvang van die grondwetlike bedeling om beide die openbare doel en openbare belang in terme van die Grondwet van 1996 te verstaan. Op grond van hierdie bespreking word die vraag ondersoek of die onteiening van grond vir ekonomiese ontwikkeling en die oordrag daarvan aan derde partye vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang is. Gevolgtrekkings uit `n oorsig van buitelandse respraak waarin dieselfde vraag reeds behandel is dien as maatstaf vir die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak oor die vraag te evalueer. Op grond van die kritiese analise van die buitelandse regspraak word sekere aanbevelings gemaak wat in ag geneem behoort te word indien so `n vraag weer na vore kom. Die vraag of `n onteiening ter syde gestel kan word omdat daar `n alternatiewe, minder ingrypende manier is om die openbare doel te bereik word ook in die proefskrif aangespreek. In onlangse regspraak word aangedui dat die beskikbaarheid van ander, minder ingrypende maniere irrelevant is as die onteiening vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang geskied. Daar word hier aangevoer dat die beskikbaarheid van alternatiewe metodes in ag geneem behoort te word in gevalle waar dit onduidelik is of die onteining vir `n openbare doel of in die openbare belang geskied, soos in die geval van oordrag van grond aan derde partye vir ekonomiese ontwikkelingsdoeleindes. Ter aansluiting by die vraag of die onteining van grond vir oordrag aan derdes vir ekonomiese ontwikkeling geldig is, word die funksie van die openbare doel na onteiening ook ondersoek. Die vraag is of die staat geregtig is om die doel waarvoor die eiendom onteien is na afloop van die onteiening te verander. Die vraag in watter gevalle die vorige eienaar van die grond teruggawe van die grond kan eis word ook aangespreek. Daar word aangevoer dat die staat die doel waarvoor die eiendom benut word kan verander, maar dat die nuwe doel ook moet voldoen aan die grondwetlike vereistes. / South African Research Chair in Property Law, sponsored by the Department of Science and Technology, administered by the National Research Foundation and hosted by Stellenbosch University / Cuicci bursary fund / Faculty of Law Stellenbosch University

En 1951, le droit international des réfugiés voyait le jour avec la Convention relative au statut des réfugiés. Cette convention ainsi que son Protocole stipulent la définition contemporaine de cette notion et les obligations de l'État d'accueil à l’égard des réfugiés mais y prévoit aussi une exception. En effet, les rédacteurs de la Convention de 1951, percevant que certains bourreaux tenteraient d'user de ce mécanisme pour échapper à des poursuites en trouvant refuge à l'étranger, y ont intégré une dérogation à la définition de réfugié qui a pris la forme d’une clause d'exclusion. Celle-ci permet à tout État ayant adhéré à cet instrument de refuser d'accueillir sur son territoire les individus à l'origine des plus grands crimes internationaux et nationaux. Le Canada, en ratifiant la Convention de 1951 et son Protocole en 1969, a incorporé dans sa législation nationale cette clause d'exclusion dans l'article 98 de la Loi sur l'immigration et la protection des réfugiés. Le présent mémoire porte sur l'application de cette clause d'exclusion en droit canadien. Nous proposons une analyse de l'application de cette disposition en droit interne. L’objectif général est de montrer que les cours de justice favorisent une interprétation trop large de la clause d’exclusion, dénaturant ainsi son statut de règle d’exception. En effet, cette interprétation jurisprudentielle a pour conséquence d’attribuer un poids prépondérant à la sécurité nationale aux dépens du caractère humanitaire qui imprègne le droit d’asile depuis ses origines. / International refugee law emerged in 1951 with the adoption of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. This instrument, along with its Protocol, defined the contemporary notion of “refugee” and established the rights of these individuals as well as State obligations towards them. However, this international protection was not absolute. Suspecting that many oppressors would attempt to use this mechanism to escape prosecution by finding refuge abroad, the authors of the 1951 Convention introduced a derogation to the definition of refugee by way of the exclusion clause. As such, this article allows States to refuse to extend refugee protection to individuals responsible for the most serious international and national crimes. Canada, which ratified the 1951 Convention and its 1969 Protocol, incorporated the exclusion clause in its national legislation through article 98 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. The present thesis wishes to examine the application of this exclusion clause in Canadian law. In doing so, we will analyze the understanding of this provision in domestic law. Our objective is to demonstrate that our judicial courts favor a large interpretation of this clause, thus straying from its exceptional nature. This approach results in overweighing the importance of national security against the humanitarian nature of the refugee protection system.

Harming the dignity of the learner; refusing to hear his side of the story; neglecting to help him retrieve his stolen property : such are the unfortunate occurrences at many South African schools, and such are the experiences that have led to this research. Dedicated educators sometimes default, leaving their wronged learners out m the cold. The questions are therefore: • What causes this conduct of educators and why does it recur? • Is it ignorance of their legal position? • Is it insensitivity to common law principles and statutory provisions? • Is it sheer carelessness? Mindful of the introduction of the South African Constitution Act 108 of 1996, wh1ch contains the long-awaited Bill of Fundamental Rights, this study has been undertaken to give an educational-juridical perspective of the educator-learner relationship 1n South African public schools by means of a literature study and an elementary legal comparative study. Various legal terms which influence the educator-learner relationship significantly are defined. In conjunction with the private law status of the learner, the position of the learner within the school system, and the fundamental rights of the learner in the context of the administration of justice are identified and dealt with in so far as they have any bearing on the educator-learner relationship, Moreover, the legal determinants of the educator-learner relationship and the educator's duty of care are pinpointed to determine their significance in an accountable, responsive and open educator-learner relationship, A comparative school law perspective of the sources of school law, the duties and responsibilities of educators, the fundamental rights and legal obligations of the learner, the educator's duty of care, discipline and legal liability in England and Wales, Canada, Japan, and South Africa is presented in terms of similarities and differences, Attention is paid to the necessity of informing educators and learners concerning their respective rights and duties, in order to develop accountable, responsive and open educator-learner relationships in South African schools, / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, 2000

Une bourse d'études du Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines (CRSH) a été accordée à l'auteur pour la réalisation de ce projet de recherche. / Suite à l’étude de la genèse de deux régimes occupant une place fondamentale en droit du travail québécois, soit le régime public de réparation des lésions professionnelles institué par la Loi sur les accidents du travail et les maladies professionnelles, et l’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable, issue du droit à l’égalité consacré à l’article 10 de la Charte québécoise, ce mémoire s’intéresse au déploiement du conflit normatif et du conflit juridictionnel découlant de l’évolution en parallèle de ces deux sources d’obligations pour les employeurs, dont l’objet est la réintégration et le maintien du lien d’emploi du salarié atteint d’un handicap. Cette étude propose ensuite d’explorer les conséquences juridiques de la solution retenue par la Cour d’appel du Québec, dans l’arrêt Caron rendu en juin 2015, laquelle décide de juxtaposer une obligation d’accommodement raisonnable au régime public de réparation des lésions professionnelles. Ainsi, ce mémoire met en évidence les conséquences en droit constitutionnel canadien et quasi constitutionnel québécois de la démarche utilisée dans l’arrêt Caron et des résultats auxquels elle a conduit, en recentrant la place du droit à l’égalité en droit public et en discutant de ses impacts sur la séparation des pouvoirs. En outre, ce revirement jurisprudentiel engendre maintes difficultés au regard de la particularité du droit administratif, plus spécifiquement quant au rôle et aux pouvoirs limités de la C.N.E.S.S.T. et du T.A.T.-D.S.S.T. Enfin, cette analyse fait ressortir que la solution retenue par la Cour d’appel porte atteinte à l’équilibre que s’efforce de maintenir ce régime public reposant sur un important compromis social. / Following the review of the genesis of two fundamental regimes in Quebec labour law, the public system that provides repairs to injured workers, established by the Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases, and the duty to provide reasonable accommodation arising from the right to equality under section 10 of the Quebec Charter, this thesis focuses on the development of the normative conflict and the jurisdictional conflict stemming from the parallel evolution of these two sources of obligations for employers. Both of these are based on the reinstatement of disabled workers and the continuation of their employment relationship. This study proposes to explore the legal consequences of the solution adopted by the Quebec Court of Appeal in Caron’s case, dated June 2015, in which the Court decided to overlay the employer’s duty to accommodate onto the Workers’ Compensation public system. Thus, emphasizing on the role that the right to equality plays in public law and discussing its impact on the separation of powers, this thesis shows the consequences from the approach used in the Caron judgment and its particular results through Canadian constitutional and Quebec quasi-constitutional principles. Furthermore, this significant change gives rise to many difficulties regarding the particularities of administrative law, and more specifically, the role and the limited powers of C.N.E.S.S.T. and T.A.T.-D.S.S.T. Finally, this analysis highlights that the solution held by the Court of Appeal infringes on the balance attempted by the public system based on an important social compromise.

Dans Suresh c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration) (2002), la Cour suprême du Canada en vient à la conclusion que les principes de justice fondamentale prévus à l'm1icle 7 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés autorisent, dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, l'expulsion d'une personne vers la torture. La Cour nous indique que l'identification des principes de justice fondamentale doit se fonder sur une démarche contextuelle et sur un consensus dans la société canadienne. Le fondement factuel dans le raisonnement de la Cour est pourtant inexistant. Elle ne traite ni du contexte en matière d'immigration, ni du contexte en matière de sécurité nationale entourant cette décision. La Cour prescrit un haut degré de retenue pour le contrôle judiciaire de la décision du Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration d'expulser une personne vers la torture. Cette retenue explique en partie le traitement déficient des faits. La Cour conclut qu'il y aurait un consensus dans la société canadienne sur le principe de justice fondamentale qui autorise l'expulsion d'une personne vers la torture sans fournir la preuve de ce fait social. L'absence de traitement des faits et de la preuve affecte la légitimité – la force persuasive - de la décision de la Cour suprême dans Suresh. / In Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2002), the Supreme Court of Canada concludes that the principles of fundamental justice in section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom allow, in exceptional circumstances, to deport a person facing a risk of torture. The Court writes that principles of fundamental justice must be determined by a contextual approach and based on a significant societal consensus. There is however no factual basis in the Court's reasoning. There is no discussion of the immigration context or the national security context surrounding this decision. The Court chooses a highly deferencial standard of review for the judicial review in administrative law of the Citizenship and Immigration Minister's decision to deport a person facing a risk of torture. This choice partly explains the deficient treatment of facts in the Court's decision. The Court concludes that there is a societal consensus on the principles of fundamental justice allowing deportation of a person facing a risk of torture without providing any evidence of this societal facto The absence of a proper examination of the facts and the evidence at the basis of conclusions in Suresh, reduces the legitimacy – the persuasiveness – of the Court's decision.