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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
221

Normes et objets du savoir dans les premiers essais leibniziens / Norms and objects of knowledge in Leibniz’s early writings

Picon, Marina 11 December 2015 (has links)
La doctrine leibnizienne de la science repose-t-elle sur une théorie de la connaissance? Après avoir montré, dans des travaux préalables, qu’une telle dépendance ne se rencontre pas dans l’œuvre de la maturité, nous nous intéressons ici aux premiers écrits de Leibniz. La Nova Methodus discendae docendaeque Jurisprudentiae (1667) dresse, suivant l’exemple de Bacon, un inventaire raisonné des disciplines que doit réunir la nouvelle encyclopédie. Comme dans les projets leibniziens ultérieurs, cet inventaire est précédé de la distinction entre types de savoir en fonction des critères logiques selon lesquels les propositions se répartissent entre histoires, observations et théorèmes. Nous nous attachons en particulier à la définition de ceux-ci comme propositions « démontrables ex terminis ». Cette norme de la science étant posée, quels fondements in re Leibniz entend-t-il donner au savoir démonstratif ? Prenant pour fil conducteur sa polémique avec l’humaniste Marius Nizolius, nous étudions sa tentative pour fonder la validité des propositions de vérité éternelle sur des universaux subsistant indépendamment de l’existence des individus. Ce n’est cependant que dans les premiers écrits parisiens (1672-1673) que se dégage sa réponse définitive à ce problème : apparue d’abord comme un autre nom de la signification qu’« exprime » une définition, la notion d’idée y prend consistance en tant qu’archétype subsistant en Dieu. Les principaux traits de la théorie leibnizienne de la science sont ainsi fixés, indépendamment de toute « doctrine de l’entendement ». / Does Leibniz’s doctrine of demonstrative knowledge rest upon a theory of cognition? Having shown in previous articles that such was not the case in his mature works, we now turn to his early writings. The Nova Methodus discendae docendaeque Jurisprudentiae (1667) contains a reasoned inventory of the disciplines that should constitute the new encyclopaedia. As in later projects, Leibniz precedes this inventory with a classification of the types of knowledge based on the logical criteria according to which propositions are divided in histories, observations and theorems. Particular attention is given to the definition of the latter as propositions « demonstrable ex terminis ».This norm of scientific necessity once defined, what real (in re) foundation does Leibniz give to demonstrative knowledge? Following the various threads offered by his polemic against the Italian humanist Marius Nizolius, we study Leibniz’s attempt to ground the validity of propositions of eternal truth on universals subsisting independently of the existence of individuals. But one has to wait until the first Paris writings (1672-1673) to see the emergence of his mature answer to that problem: first conceived after the model of the significatio which a definition « expresses », the notion of idea reaches its latter ontological status as an archetype subsisting in God’s mind. The principal features of Leibniz’s theory of demonstrative knowledge are thus in place, prior to and independently of what he will later call his « doctrine of the understanding ».
222

Ochrana osobnosti z hlediska právní filozofie a platného práva / Protection of personality in scope of legal philosophy and applicable law

Němec, Ronald January 2013 (has links)
PROTECTION OF PERSONALITY IN SCOPE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND APPLICABLE LAW 1. Summary We can see law from two main perspectives. Law is either complex of written regulations, which are prepared by human beings based on some interests or it is a complex of rules, which altough are written, but its nature are originating from higher normative system. First is a present perspective. Current law science is prefering valid law as complex of regulations published in statute book. What is not banned by law, is allowed. Though this law philosophy is leading to instability in society. Every year legislator is making hundreds of amendements and create new laws to cover new circumstances which appear in the society. Despite legislator effort is society further unsatisfied with legal state. Society claims that law is enforceable for those who are able to hire big law firms, which can find neccesary grey areas. Immanuel Kant among the first draw a problem between legality and legitimacy. But it is not only matter of legislator whether he acts legitimately or legally, but as well as of receiver of law norm. Is every legal act of the recepient of the legal order of the Czech Republic legal as legitimate? Legal yes, if in conformity with legal order. But is it even legitimate? And is it moral? For juspositivism is...
223

Embryo Adoption: Implications of Personhood, Marriage, and Parenthood

McMillen, Brooke Marie 14 April 2008 (has links)
Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / One’s personal claims regarding personhood will influence his moral belief regarding embryo adoption. In Chapter One, I consider the personhood of the human embryo. If the human embryo is a person, we are morally obligated to permit the practice of embryo adoption as an ethical means to save human persons. However, for those who do not claim that an embryo is a person at conception, embryo adoption is not a necessary practice because we have no moral obligation to protect them. There are still others who claim that personhood is gained at some point during gestation when certain mental capacities develop. I offer my own claim that consciousness and sentience as well as the potential to be self-conscious mark the beginning of personhood. Embryo adoption raises several questions surrounding the institution of marriage. Due to its untraditional method of procreation, embryo adoption calls into question the role of procreation within marriage. In Chapter Two, I explore the nature of the marriage relationship by offering Lisa Cahill’s definition of marriage which involves both a spiritual and physical dimension, and then I describe the concept of marriage from different perspectives including a social, religious, and a personal perspective. From a personal perspective, I explore the relationship between marriage and friendship. Finally, I describe how the concept of marriage is understood today and explore the advantages to being married as opposed to the advantages of being single. Embryo adoption changes the way we customarily think about procreation within a family because in embryo adoption, couples are seeking an embryo from another union to be implanted into the woman. This prompts some philosophers to argue that embryo adoption violates the marriage relationship. In Chapter Three, I further consider the impact of embryo adoption on the family as an extension of the marital relationship as well as the impact of embryo adoption on the traditional roles of motherhood and fatherhood. I examine motherhood by looking at how some philosophers define motherhood and when these philosophers claim a woman becomes a mother. After considering these issues regarding motherhood, I examine the same issues surrounding fatherhood. Peg Brand, PhD., Chair
224

Counter Revolutionary Programs: Social Catholicism and the Cristeros

Newcomer, Daniel 20 April 2011 (has links)
No description available.

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