This thesis is engaged in the theme of natural law, especially in sources of natural law - in theories, which are labelled as "classic". The thesis focuses on these theories (Aristotle, stoicism, Thomas Aquinas) and their common points, which are proper to these theories. That is the object of this thesis. These points present the essence of natural law. The first part explains problem of the term "natural law". The second part deals with the classic theories. The third chapter summarises findings of the second part. The fourth part is devoted to the similarity between the classic theories and the modern (enlightenment) theories. This chapter is devoted to the connection between natural law and positive law too.

A presente dissertação investiga a interpretação de Tomás de Aquino ao problema dos futuros contingentes, relativo ao capítulo 9 do tratado De Interpretatione, de Aristóteles. O objetivo central é explicar qual a função do termo "determinate" na interpretação de Tomás. Para isso, reconstrói a noção aristotélica de proposição como uma atividade enunciativa, assim como investiga o Livro Gama da Metafísica, o qual defende os princípios de não contradição e terceiro excluído. Nesse percurso, chama a atenção para o fato de que, do ponto de vista da proposição, as formulações sintáticas dos princípios metafísicos são primeiras em relação às semânticas. Com isso, pretende identificar uma distinção entre as condições de sentido de uma proposição e a atribuição de um valor verdade e, através de tal distinção, propõe uma leitura para a solução de Tomás de Aquino ao problema referido. Conclui que a oposição contraditória como exclusiva e exaustiva é uma tese logicamente anterior à caracterização da proposição como bivalente ou determinadamente verdadeira ou falsa. / This dissertation investigates the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas to the problem of future contingents, concerning the chapter 9 of Aristotle's De Interpretatione. The main goal is to explain what is the function of the term "determinate" on Aquinas's interpretation. For that reason, the dissertation intends to reconstruct Aristotle's notion of proposition as an enunciating activity, as well as to investigate the Book Gamma of Metaphysics, which defends the principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle. During that reasoning, it turns the attention to the fact that, from the proposition's point of view, the syntactic formulations of the metaphysical principles are prior to the semantic ones. Thereby, it claims to identify a distinction between the sense conditions of a proposition and the attribution of a truth value and, as a result of that distinction, it proposes a reading of Aquinas's solution to the abovementioned problem. It concludes that the contradictory opposition as excluding and exhausting is a thesis logically prior to the characterization of a proposition as bivalent or determinately true or false.

Esta dissertação tem por tema o conceito de “bem comum”, tal como é compreendido por Tomás de Aquino em sua obra magna, a Suma Teológica. Teve-se por objetivo analisar as relações deste conceito tanto com a teologia quanto com o direito canônico do séc. XIII, saberes que embasam e legitimam as discussões sobre o bem comum na sociedade medieval. Também objetivou-se articular as reflexões de Tomás de Aquino ao desenvolvimento da Inquisição na Idade Média central. No primeiro capítulo, foi analisado como este conceito é entendido pelo teólogo e como está localizado na Suma, em outras palavras, quais são as outras reflexões que orbitam ao redor da questão do “bem comum” para Tomás. Nesse sentido, para entender as reflexões teológicas e jurídicas que embasam a concepção tomista de bem comum no séc. XIII, com o auxílio da metodologia da história intelectual, foi possível fazer um mapeamento na obra para verificar quais são as referências de autoridade (auctoritas) para o teólogo, sendo possível questionar: quem Tomás de Aquino cita ao falar sobre este conceito? Assim, filiando o Aquinate a uma tradição intelectual que remonta tanto a Agostinho quanto a Aristóteles, foi possível verificar qual é a inovação deste teólogo no debate em relação aos seus antecessores. No segundo capítulo, foi possível compreender que o conceito de bem comum está intimamente ligado às discussões de Tomás a respeito do pecado, da heresia, do lugar do herege na sociedade e sobre como e porquê ele deve ser exterminado da civitas. Situando a posição de Tomás a respeito do bem comum ao estabelecimento progressivo da Inquisição na Idade Média central, foi possível perguntar: Tomás de Aquino representa a Igreja na segunda metade do séc. XIII? Tal questionamento revelou que Tomás não é um representante unilateral da reforma que a Cristandade empreende no período. No último capítulo, o conceito de bem comum, conforme Tomás de Aquino, também foi associado ao desenvolvimento de uma sociedade perseguidora no séc. XIII, o que permitiu tanto refletir sobre uma “nova” espiritualidade que entra em vigor com a atuação dos mendicantes na civitas quanto, a partir de um exercício de antropologia escolástica, ver como Tomás, a exemplo dos seus pares, enxergava a comunidade cristã na qual estava inserido. Através da criação de uma categoria conceitual, a civitas christiana, foi possível entender que – pelo menos para Tomás de Aquino –, apesar da perseguição institucional empreendida, o lugar do herege na Idade Média não é fora da sociedade cristã, mas ao contrário, tendo funções a desempenhar nessa communitas, seu lugar é dentro dela. / The subject of this dissertation is the concept of “common good”, as understood by Thomas Aquinas in his magna opera, the Summa Theologica. One goal was to analyze the relationship of this concept with both the theology and in canon law of the XIIIth, knowledge that support and legitimize discussions of the common good in medieval society. Also aimed to articulate the thoughts of Thomas Aquinas to the development of the Inquisition in the Central Middle Ages. In the first chapter, was intended to analyze how this concept is understood by the theologian and as it is located in the document, in another way, what are the other reflections that orbiting the question of “common good” for Aquinas. In this sense, in order to understand the theological and juridical considerations underpinning the Thomist conception of the common good in XIIIth century with the help of the methodology of intellectual history, it was possible to map the work in order to verify what are the authority of references (auctoritas) to the theologian and, therefore, to question: who Aquinas quotes when talking about this concept? Wherefore, affiliating Aquinas to an intellectual tradition that dates back as far as Aristotle to Augustine, it was possible to find what is the innovation of this theologian in the debate over its predecessors. In the second chapter, from these issues, it was possible to understand that the concept of common good is closely linked to Aquinas’s discussions about sin, heresy, heretic’s place in society and how and why it should be destroyer from the civitas. Situating Aquinas’s position on the common good to the progressive establishment of the Inquisition in the Middle Ages central, it was questioned: Is Thomas Aquinas representative of Church in the second half of XIIIth century? Such questioning illustrated that Thomas is not an unilateral representative of reform that Christianity undertakes the period. In the last chapter, the concept of the common good, according Thomas Aquinas, was also associated with the development of a persecuting society in the XIIIth, which allowed both reflect about a “new” spirituality which takes effect with the activities of mendicants in the civitas as well as an exercise in scholastic anthropology, see how Aquinas, like its peers, understand the Christian community in which he was inserted. By creating a conceptual category, the civitas christiana, was possible to understand that – at least for Aquinas –, despite the undertaken institutional persecution, the place of the heretic in the Middle Ages is not “out” of Christian society, it’s the opposite, having duties in this communitas, their place is in it.

A presente dissertação investiga a interpretação de Tomás de Aquino ao problema dos futuros contingentes, relativo ao capítulo 9 do tratado De Interpretatione, de Aristóteles. O objetivo central é explicar qual a função do termo "determinate" na interpretação de Tomás. Para isso, reconstrói a noção aristotélica de proposição como uma atividade enunciativa, assim como investiga o Livro Gama da Metafísica, o qual defende os princípios de não contradição e terceiro excluído. Nesse percurso, chama a atenção para o fato de que, do ponto de vista da proposição, as formulações sintáticas dos princípios metafísicos são primeiras em relação às semânticas. Com isso, pretende identificar uma distinção entre as condições de sentido de uma proposição e a atribuição de um valor verdade e, através de tal distinção, propõe uma leitura para a solução de Tomás de Aquino ao problema referido. Conclui que a oposição contraditória como exclusiva e exaustiva é uma tese logicamente anterior à caracterização da proposição como bivalente ou determinadamente verdadeira ou falsa. / This dissertation investigates the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas to the problem of future contingents, concerning the chapter 9 of Aristotle's De Interpretatione. The main goal is to explain what is the function of the term "determinate" on Aquinas's interpretation. For that reason, the dissertation intends to reconstruct Aristotle's notion of proposition as an enunciating activity, as well as to investigate the Book Gamma of Metaphysics, which defends the principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle. During that reasoning, it turns the attention to the fact that, from the proposition's point of view, the syntactic formulations of the metaphysical principles are prior to the semantic ones. Thereby, it claims to identify a distinction between the sense conditions of a proposition and the attribution of a truth value and, as a result of that distinction, it proposes a reading of Aquinas's solution to the abovementioned problem. It concludes that the contradictory opposition as excluding and exhausting is a thesis logically prior to the characterization of a proposition as bivalent or determinately true or false.

Cette étude souhaite contribuer à une meilleure connaissance et compréhension de l’idée de simplicité divine, qui signifie l’absence en Dieu de toute composition. Pièce centrale de la pensée théologique médiévale, elle fut redécouverte il y a 35 ans par des philosophes de tendance analytique, qui en contestèrent la cohérence. Elle est depuis lors l’objet d’un débat philosophique fourni, mais le détour par l’histoire de la philosophie est nécessaire pour dégager le réseau de concepts, d’arguments et de problèmes qui lui donne sens. Après avoir étudié la première élaboration de cette idée dans les textes antiques et patristiques, puis son traitement par Pierre Lombard à la veille du IVe concile de Latran de 1215, qui intègre pour la première fois la simplicité divine dans une profession de foi authentique du magistère, nous nous concentrons sur les œuvres de Bonaventure de Bagnoregio et de Thomas d’Aquin, qui accordent à cet attribut divin un rôle fondateur dans leur étude du mystère de Dieu. L’idée de simplicité divine s’y trouve sans cesse prise dans la dialectique de la ressemblance et de la dissemblance entre Créateur et créature. Tandis que Thomas associe de façon unilatérale la simplicité absolue à la transcendance de l’incréé, Bonaventure propose également des similitudes créées de la simplicité divine qui en favorisent l’intuition. Loin d’apparaître comme incohérente, l’idée de simplicité divine est un outil puissant pour ouvrir notre intelligence à un plan de réalité supérieur, certes mystérieux, mais néanmoins lumineux. / This study seeks to contribute to a better understanding and comprehension of the idea of divine simplicity, which means the absence in God of any composition. Cornerstone of medieval theological thinking, divine simplicity was rediscovered 35 years ago by philosophers of analytical leanings, who challenged its coherence. It has since formed the subject of abundant philosophical debate, however, the detour via the history of philosophy is necessary in order to draw out the network of concepts, arguments and issues, from where divine simplicity derives its meaning. After the study of the first development of this idea in ancient and patristic texts, and its treatment by Peter Lombard on the eve of the 4th Council of Lateran in 1215, which integrates for the first time divine simplicity in a genuin profession of faith of the magisterium, we shall focus on the works of Bonaventure of Bagnoregio and Thomas Aquinas, who grant this divine attribute a founding role in the study of the mystery of God. The idea of divine simplicity keeps being comprised in the dialectics of similarity and dissimilarity between Creator and creature. While Aquinas associates in an unilateral way absolute simplicity and transcendence of the uncreated, Bonaventure offers also created resemblances of divine simplicity which favour its intuition. Far from appearing incoherent, the idea of divine simplicity is a powerful means to open our minds to a level of superior reality, indeed mysterious, but nevertheless radiant.

Hervé de Nédellec o.p. joua un rôle de premier plan dans la défense du patrimoine doctrinal de Thomas d’Aquin contre les effets des condamnations de la fin du XIIIe siècle et du début du XIVe siècle. Il a néanmoins défendu une position sur la distinction entre l’être et l’essence divergeant sensiblement de la distinction thomasienne, alors que cet élément se présente comme central à la pensée de l’illustre dominicain. Cette étude vérifie cette divergence et en rend compte, considérant le contexte historique et le rôle assumé par Hervé dans la défense de la pensée de son confrère. Allen (1958) caractérise la perspective hervéenne par son essentialisme et son approche sémantique, ainsi que par le rejet de la distinction réelle (Gilles de Rome et Thomas d’Aquin) et de la distinction intentionnelle (Henri de Gand). Il évoque par ailleurs l’influence de Godefroid de Fontaines, de Siger de Brabant et d’Averroès au regard de la distinction entre l’être et l’essence selon le mode de signifier retenue par Hervé. Ces observations se voient ici confirmées par l’exposé et la comparaison des principes ontologiques assumés par les différentes positions. Il est par le fait même rendu manifeste que Siger de Brabant, Godefroid de Fontaines, Hervé de Nédellec et encore Dietrich de Freiberg, tenants de la distinction sémantique, rejettent les positions adverses en raison de mêmes éléments qu’ils critiquent de celles-ci. La communauté doctrinale entre la distinction selon le mode de signifier et la théorie modiste ainsi que leur source commune dans le Commentaire à la Métaphysique d’Averroès sont par ailleurs mises au jour. Les modistes distinguent le signifié principal et les propriétés concernant (circa) le signifié principal. Dans la perspective sémantique, l’essence, l’étant et l’être sont conçus comme des propriétés concernant le signifié principal à la manière des propriétés circa de la grammaire spéculative. À l’instar des propriétés circa, « essence », « étant » et « être » diffèrent non parce qu’ils signifient différentes déterminations, mais au sens où ils signifient une même chose de différentes façons. L’analyse des objections soulevées par les tenants de la distinction sémantique et des éléments constitutifs de leur position fournit des outils nouveaux pour apprécier la distinction entre l’être et l’essence chez Thomas d’Aquin. Celle-ci se révèle procéder d’un cadre théorique inconciliable avec celui adopté par Hervé de Nédellec. Nous faisons ici valoir que cette liberté doctrinale d’Hervé de Nédellec s’explique par cela que la distinction entre l’être et l’essence n’était pas constitutive du fonds thomasien concerné par les ordonnances d’enseignement dominicaines de la fin du XIIIe siècle et du début du XIVe siècle, notamment puisqu’elle n’a pas été ciblée par les condamnations doctrinales ecclésiales ni par le correctoire de Guillaume de la Mare. / Hervaeus Natalis o.p. played a leading role in defending the doctrinal heritage of Thomas Aquinas against the effects of the condemnations of the end of the 13th and beginning of the 14th centuries. Nevertheless, he would have supported a position on the distinction between being and essence which is irreconcilable with the Thomasian distinction, even though this element is central to the thought of the illustrious Dominican. The present study verifies this discrepancy and give an account of it, considering the historical context and the role assumed by Hervaeus in the defence of the thought of his confrere. Allen (1958) characterizes the Hervean perspective by its essentialism and its semantic approach, as well as by the rejection of the real distinction (Giles of Rome and Aquinas) and the intentional distinction (Henri of Ghent). He also evokes the influence of Godfrey of Fontaines, Siger of Brabant and Averroes with regard to the distinction between being (esse) and essence according to the mode of signifying adopted by Hervaeus. These claims are here confirmed by the exposition and comparison of the ontological principles assumed by the different stances. By the same token, it is made clear that Siger of Brabant, Godefroid of Fontaines, Hervaeus Natalis and also Dietrich of Freiberg, the proponents of the semantic distinction, reject the opposing positions on the basis of the same elements that they criticize in them. The doctrinal community between the distinction according to the mode of signifying and the Modist theory, as well as their common source in the Commentary on the Metaphysics of Averroes are also brought to light. The Modists distinguish between the object signified and the properties concerning (circa) the object signified. In the semantic perspective, essence, ens and esse are conceived as properties concerning the object signified in the manner of the circa properties of speculative grammar. Like the circa properties, “essence”, “ens” and “esse” do not differ because they signify different determinations, but they differ in the sense that they signify the same thing in different ways. The analysis of the objections raised by the proponents of the semantic distinction and of the constitutive elements of their position provides new tools for appreciating the distinction between being (esse) and essence in Aquinas. It proves to proceed from a theoretical framework that is irreconcilable with that adopted by Hervaeus. We argue here that this doctrinal freedom of Hervaeus is explained by the fact that the distinction between being (esse) and essence was not constitutive of the Thomasian fund concerned by the Dominican teaching ordinances of the end of the 13th and beginning of the 14th centuries, especially since it was not targeted by the ecclesial doctrinal condemnations nor by the correctory of William de la Mare.

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This thesis is an investigation into the nature of the 'postmodern' narrative strategies and fictional methods in the work of two British Catholic writers. The work of David Lodge and Muriel Spark is here taken as an example ofthe 'Catholic novel'. In order to determine ifthe overlap ofpostmodern. and Christian-influenced narrative strategies constitutes more than a convergence or coincidence of formal concerns, narrative form in these novels is analyzed in the light of neo-Tho mist and Tho mist aesthetics, a traditional Catholic Christian theory of the arts. The 'postmodern' in these 'Christian' texts becomes largely a coincidence of terminology. Narrative forms which can be classified as 'postmodern' can also be categorized using the terminology of Thomas Aquinas. The apparent similarities betray radically divergent metaphysical presuppositions, however. The nature of the Catholic 'difference' lies in the way postmodern forms are used to challenge the metaphysical bases of those forms. / English Studies / M.A. (English)

This thesis is an investigation into the nature of the 'postmodern' narrative strategies and fictional methods in the work of two British Catholic writers. The work of David Lodge and Muriel Spark is here taken as an example ofthe 'Catholic novel'. In order to determine ifthe overlap ofpostmodern. and Christian-influenced narrative strategies constitutes more than a convergence or coincidence of formal concerns, narrative form in these novels is analyzed in the light of neo-Tho mist and Tho mist aesthetics, a traditional Catholic Christian theory of the arts. The 'postmodern' in these 'Christian' texts becomes largely a coincidence of terminology. Narrative forms which can be classified as 'postmodern' can also be categorized using the terminology of Thomas Aquinas. The apparent similarities betray radically divergent metaphysical presuppositions, however. The nature of the Catholic 'difference' lies in the way postmodern forms are used to challenge the metaphysical bases of those forms. / English Studies / M.A. (English)

Cette thèse traite de la doctrine catégorielle, de l’ontologie et de la théorie de la connaissance de Dietrich de Freiberg dans le De origine rerum praedicamentalium. L’enjeu principal est d’étudier la fonction constitutive que l’intellect opère sur catégories et sur l’étant en tant que tel. La première partie replace le traité dans le contexte historique des débats à l’université de Paris à la fin du XIIIe siècle touchant au statut des catégories et à la manière d’ordonner les genres réels de l’étant. Elle confronte la dérivation essentielle des prédicaments chez Dietrich aux modèles de systématisation élaborées par ses prédécesseurs, tels qu’Albert le Grand, Thomas d’Aquin, Henri de Gand. La deuxième partie s’attache aux objets constitués par l’intellect : l’Un comme principe du nombre et de la division, la relation et le temps. La dernière partie enquête la modalité sur laquelle l’intellect opère cette activité sur l’étant et montre en définitive que le sujet de la métaphysique, l’être quiditatif des étants, se situe à la croisée de la logique et du réel / This thesis deals with Dietrich of Freiberg’s doctrine of categories, ontology and theory of knowledge, as present in the treatise De origine rerum praedicamentalium. The primary aim is to examine the constitutive function the intellect exercises on the categories and being as being. The first part of this thesis replaces the treatise in the historical background of the late 13th century debates from the University of Paris regarding the nature of categories and the manner of organizing the real genera of being. It compares Dietrich’s deduction of the categories with the systematization of some of his predecessors such as Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent. The second part of the thesis deals with the objects caused by the intellect: the One as principle of number and division, relation and time. The last part investigates the manner in which the intellect exercises its constitutive power on being and demonstrates in the final analysis that the subject of metaphysics, the quiditative being of things, is placed at the intersection of logic and reality