Entre as cinco provas da existência de Deus que Tomás de Aquino apresentou na Summa Theologiae, sobressai a chamada “primeira via”, considerada pelo autor como a “mais manifesta”. Esta dissertação formaliza-a em lógica quantificacional, explicitando cada uma das inferências a fim de julgar sua validade e correção. Depois de explicadas as teses metafísicas que constituem o cenário da discussão — como a doutrina aristotélica das quatro causas e as distinções entre substância e acidente, ato e potência —, são examinadas as objeções de Anthony Kenny (1969) e as sugestões interpretativas de John Wippel (2000) em defesa do raciocínio de Tomás. Mostra-se que a primeira parte, que procura demonstrar a irreflexividade do movimento, é um argumento válido, mas incorreto, por conter uma premissa falsa: aquela que afirma sem restrições a atualidade do movente. Já a segunda parte, o argumento contra o regresso infinito, contém uma ambiguidade que o deixa diante de duas alternativas: ou se trata de uma petição de princípio ou de uma falácia de equivocidade. Dado o fracasso material e formal da prova, é proposta finalmente uma abordagem não-dedutiva do problema. / Among the five proofs of God’s existence presented by Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae, the so-called "first way" stands out, for being considered by the author as the "most obvious" one. This dissertation formalizes it in quantificational logic, explaining each of the inferences in order to assess its validity and soundness. After explaining the metaphysical theses that provide the backdrop for the discussion — as the doctrine of the four Aristotelian causes and the distinctions between substance and accident, act and potency — it considers the objections of Anthony Kenny (1969) and interpretive suggestions of John Wippel (2000) in defense of Thomas’ reasoning. It is shown that the first part, which seeks to demonstrate the non-reflexivity of movement, is a valid argument, but unsound, because it contains a false premise: the one that states the mover’s actuality without restrictions. The second part, the argument against the infinite regress, contains an ambiguity that leaves you faced with two alternatives: either it begs the question or it is a fallacy of equivocation. Given the material and formal failure of the proof, a non-deductive approach to the problem is finally proposed.

Orientador: Francisco Benjamin Souza Netto / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-06T22:33:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 PereiraJunior_Getulio_M.pdf: 2475281 bytes, checksum: f41e2ed64411fed287e68d1717aa2593 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Resumo: Nosso trabalho consiste em uma tradução dos capítulos 1-4 do Livro I do Comentário de Tomás de Aquino ao De Anima de Aristóteles. A tradução é acompanhada de uma breve introdução ao texto. Nela apresentamos um pouco da trajetória tanto do texto de Aristóteles como do comentário feito por Tomás de Aquino. Por fim, apresentamos na introdução um breve resumo dos temas tratados nos quatro capítulos traduzidos, bem como procuramos destacar aspectos que julgamos relevantes em relação ao texto / Abstract: Our work consists in a translation of chapters 1-4 of Book I of the Thomas Aquinas's Commentary on Aristotle's De anima. The translation is followed of one brief introduction to the texto In it we in such a way present a little of the trajectory of the text of Aristotle as of the commentary made for Thomas Aquinas. Finally, we present in the introduction a brief summary of the subjects treated in the four translated chapters, as well as we look for to detach aspects that we judge pertinent in relation to the text / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia

Este trabalho sustenta que o teólogo cristão do início do século VI conhecido como Pseudo Dionísio Areopagita exerce profunda influência no pensamento do teólogo e filósofo medieval Tomás de Aquino (1225-1274). Essa influência se dá principalmente em dois temas fundamentais da filosofia tomasiana: negatividade e participação. Negatividade diz respeito ao caráter de mistério que envolve as essências mais íntimas dos seres desde a natureza visível e o homem até o princípio de todas as coisas, Deus e que, portanto, não são plenamente compreensíveis para o entendimento humano. Participação se refere ao fato de que, por outro lado, o mundo participa do ser de Deus e, por isso, revela traços do divino, ainda que de modo deficiente e remoto. Dada essa influência de Dionísio, Tomás de Aquino não pode ser considerado um pensador racionalista, com respostas definitivas para todos os problemas da existência, como costuma ser visto por epígonos o que constitui uma deturpação do pensamento tomasiano, marcado pela consciência da insuficiência da razão. Para Tomás, não é possível aos homens ter clareza absoluta sobre qualquer assunto, daí, por exemplo, a necessidade de eles se conduzirem segundo a clássica doutrina cristã da prudência a virtude de agir corretamente, com base no límpido conhecimento da situação presente. Tendo em vista a negatividade e a participação, para o acesso às realidades mais profundas impõe-se o uso de metáforas, alegorias e símbolos, capazes de algum modo de se aproximar do que, afinal, é incognoscível. No que se refere ao conhecimento de Deus, a via de acesso é a mística entendida como uma experiência com o Absoluto que se dá num plano além da razão, e não aquém , uma vez que todo discurso racional, afinal, fala mais do homem do que de Deus. Como conclusão, este trabalho propõe que o pensamento negativo do Pseudo Dionísio Areopagita e de Tomás de Aquino precisa ser mais conhecido também por educadores, pois ele permite uma visão diferente da realidade, uma visão menos lógico-racionalista que tantos problemas tem trazido à sociedade contemporânea e mais sensível, lúdica e profunda, portanto, mais humana. No anexo, é apresentada a tradução, direta do original grego, do livro Da teologia mística, do Pseudo Dionísio Areopagita. / This dissertation argues that the Christian theologian of the early sixth century known as Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite exerts profound influence on the thought of medieval theologian and philosopher Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). This influence is mainly on two major topics of Aquinas philosophy: negativity and participation. Negativity means the character of mystery that involves the most intimate essence of beings from the natural world and man to the cause of all things, God and therefore not fully comprehensible to human understanding. Participation refers to the fact that, on the other hand, the world participates in the being of God and, therefore, shows traces of the divine, even in a poor and remote way. Given the influence of Dionysius, Aquinas can not be regarded as a rationalist thinker, with definitive answers to all problems of existence, as is often seen by followers which is a perversion of Aquinass thought, marked by awareness of the insufficiency of reason. For Aquinas, it is not possible for men to have absolute clarity on any issue, then, for example, requiring them to conduct themselves according to the classical Christian doctrine of prudence the virtue of doing right, based on clear understanding of the current situation. Given the negativity and participation, accessing deeper realities requires the use of metaphors, allegories and symbols, which are able somehow to get closer to that, after all, is unknowable. With regard to knowledge of God, the way of access is the mystique understood as an experience of the Absolute that is given beyond reason, and not short , since all rational discourse, after all, speaks more about man than about God. In conclusion, this study suggests that the negative thought of Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite and Thomas Aquinas should be more well known by educators, because it allows a different view of reality, less logical-rationalist that has brought many problems to contemporary society and more sensitive, playful and profound, therefore, more human. The annex includes a translation directly from the original Greek of The mystical theology, by Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite.

Cette thèse poursuit une étude de l’ontologie de Dietrich de Freiberg, à la lumière du débat arabo-latine autour de la « distinction réelle » entre l’être et l’essence. L’enjeu principal est de montrer comment la doctrine du maître allemand, défendant vigoureusement les principes de l’ontologie aristotélico-averroïste, s’offre comme alternative aux doctrines ancrées sur la thèse de la distinction réelle de la fin du XIIIème siècle, à l’Université de Paris. La première partie analyse le contexte historique et doctrinal dans lequel s’inscrit la réflexion de Dietrich : d’abord, la critique averroïste à la conception « avicennienne » de l’étant aristotélicien, et ensuite, le premier jalon de la dispute latine, constitué par la critique de Siger de Brabant aux défenseurs de la distinction réelle (parmi eux, Thomas d’Aquin). La deuxième partie étudie, en premier lieu, un des arguments centraux dans la discussion, à savoir, l’argument de l’« intellectus essentiae », et s’occupe ensuite de l’examen de son refus de la part de Dietrich. Finalement, la troisième partie considère l’ontologie de Dietrich dans ses traits fondamentaux, à la lumière de sa vision critique envers les thèses centrales des défenseurs de la distinction réelle. / This thesis pursues a study of Dietrich of Freiberg’s ontology, in the light of the Arabian-Latin debate about “real distinction” between existence and essence. The main concern is to show how the doctrine of the german master, defending strongly the principles of the Aristotelian-Averroïst ontology, offers itself as an alternative to the doctrines fixed on the thesis of real distinction at the end of the XIIIth century, at the University of Paris. The first part analyzes the historic and doctrinal background in which the reflection of Dietrich is placed: first, Averroes’ criticism to Avicenna’s conception of Aristotelian being, and then, the first milestone of the Latin quarrel, constituted by Siger’s criticism to the defenders of the real distinction (among them, Thomas Aquinas). The second part examines, first of all, one of the central arguments in the discussion, namely, the “intellectus essentiae” argument, and then deals with the examination of Dietrich’s refusal of it. Finally, the third part considers the ontology of Dietrich in its fundamental features, in the light of its critical vision regarding the main theses of the defenders of real distinction.

Le primat de la relation est une caractéristique fondamentale des philosophies contemporaines comme des évolutions récentes de la théologie : le but de cette étude est de retracer les développements de la notion de relation jusqu’aux grandes synthèses théologiques du 13è siècle, afin d’évaluer les fondements historiques et la légitimité conceptuelle des relationalismes contemporains. Après avoir étudié la naissance d’une ontologie des êtres relatifs chez Platon et Aristote, ainsi qu’à travers les ambiguïtés de leurs transmissions, nous montrons comment les théologiens de l’Antiquité ont exploité ces fondements philosophiques, autour des modèles de « l’attribution différenciée » chez Augustin et de « l’accidentalité différenciée » chez Boèce. Au 12è siècle, ces modèles antiques ont à leur tour donné lieu à un changement de paradigme, au sujet de la predicatio in divinis, de Gilbert de Poitiers jusqu’à Pierre Lombard. Nous centrons alors notre étude sur les synthèses sententiaires d’Albert le Grand et de Thomas d’Aquin, qui exploitent l’un et l’autre la notion comme l’élément clef d’une description unitaire et structurée de l’édifice théologique. Albert emploie une notion typiquement aristotélicienne de la relation comme instrument pour édifier une théologie cohérente et rationnelle ; Thomas développe ces intuitions albertiennes et met en œuvre une vue ordonnée du Monde dans ses rapports avec Dieu, dont la condition, contrairement à de nombreuses lectures thomistes, est la stricte accidentalité de l’être relatif. A l’issue de ce parcours historique, on aura donc mis en évidence la tentation platonisante qui constitue la source conceptuelle des relationalismes contemporains. / The primacy of relation is a fundamental characteristic of contemporary philosophies as well as recent evolutions of Christian theology: the goal of this study is to describe the first developments of the notion of relation up to the great theological synthesis of the 13th century, in order to evaluate the historical foundations and the conceptual validity of the contemporary “relationalisms”. After studying the birth of the ontology of relative beings by Plato and Aristotle, as well as through the ambiguities of their transmissions, we show how the theologians of Antiquity exploited those philosophical sources using two models: the “differentiated attribution” with Augustine, and the “differentiated accidentality” with Boethius. During the 12th century, those two antique models became in their turns the origin of a change of paradigm on the problem of predicatio in divinis, from Gilbert of Poitiers to Peter Lombard. We then center our study on the sentential synthesis of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, who both exploited the notion of relation as a key-element of a united and well-structured description of their theological thought. Albert uses a typical Aristotelian notion of relation as a tool for building a coherent and rational theology; Thomas develops those albertian intuitions and organizes a well-ordered view of the World in its relations to God, whose condition, contrary to many thomistic interpretations, is a strictly accidental conception of the relative beings. At the end of this historical path, we will then have shown the Platonist temptation which constitutes the conceptual source of the contemporary “relationalisms”.

Ce travail examine et analyse les positions d'Avicenne, Thomas d'Aquin et Duns Scot concernant la connaissance des notions premières, à la lumière de leurs arguments pour cette position et de leurs autres engagements théoriques, en particulier aristotéliciens. Chacun à sa façon, ces philosophes affirment que l'étant ou l'existant est ce premier concept. Ils lui donnent une primauté logique, au sens où l'étant est présupposé par nos autres concepts. Ils lui donnent aussi une primauté cognitive, au sens où il est le premier objet à être conçu par l'intellect. / This work reviews and analyzes a view shared by Avicenna, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus concerning the primary notions, examining their arguments in the light of their other philosophical commitments, especially Aristotelian ones. Each in their own way, these philosophers claim that being is this primary notion. Being has a twofold priority. In the logical order, being is presupposed by all other notions. In the cognitive order, being is the first conceived by the intellect.

Comment parler de « la femme » ? En effet, ce thème sollicite bon nombre de discours qui n’appartiennent pas au même domaine scientifique et n’ont pas la même méthode. Quelle science doit donc être employée pour déterminer la hiérarchie des discours qui ont la différence sexuelle pour objet ? Quelle est la place de la philosophie dans la constellation des savoirs que le XIIIème siècle a vu se croiser à l’occasion d’un tel « thème » ? Que ce soit dans les discours universitaires d’Albert le Grand, de Thomas d’Aquin, de Bonaventure ou de Gilles de Rome, il appert que l’objet d’étude qu’est la « femme » est épistémologiquement cohésif. Les autorités comme Aristote, Galien, Avicenne et Averroès sont confrontées à Augustin, Pierre Lombard, Paul de Tarse et aux « Saintes Ecritures ». Est-ce donc à la Révélation de donner les principes des discours sur « la femme », ou bien à la médecine de discriminer ou de prouver les thèses morales et politiques concernant la différence sexuelle ? Chaque auteur semble avoir une réponse qui témoigne de son épistémologie sous-jacente et c’est la cohérence scientifique pour parler de la sexuation et, en définitive, de la femme, qui est visée par ces auteurs du Bas Moyen-Age. / How can we speak about « woman »? Indeed, many discourses refer to this subject without belonging to the same scientific field and without sharing the same methodology. Which science should be selected to determine the hierarchy of the discourse about sexual difference? What part did philosophy play in this subject among the manifold fields of knowledge of the 13th century? In the academical corpus of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, Giles of Rome and many others, the study of woman looks epistemologically cohesive. Authoritative voices such as those of Aristotle, Galen, Avicenna and Averroes are confronted with those of Augustine, P. Lombard, Paul, and with the “Holy Scriptures”. Is it hence up to the Book of Revelation to provide the principles underpinning the discourses on “woman”, or up to medical authorities to distinguish between or prove the moral and political theses on sexual difference? Each author’s answer to this question seems to testify to his underlying epistemology and it is the scientific consistency which characterizes the talk about the gender, and ultimately about the woman, which is targeted by these Late Middle Ages authors.

Philosophical Aspects of Aquinas's Doctrine on the Trinity in Summa Theologiae. The work has the goal to disclose a philosophical background of Aquinas's doctrine on the Trinity in Summa theologiae. The Dogma of the Trinity of Divine Persons is one of the fundamental truths of faith. This fact transcends human reason, yet it is a topic with its position and content, so it was always exciting and theologians tried to cope with this paradoxical claim of a single God in the Three Persons. St. Thomas Aquinas was no exception in this. His scholastic approach uses abundant philosophical material to help him to disclose this reality which exceeds philosophical science as incontrovertible and therefore credible. In his famous work for beginner theologians, he systematically presents his solution based on the analysis of the category of relation. The distinction between being (esse) of relation and its own nature (ratio) will make it possible to distinguish the three Persons in God's only reality. He concludes that divine persons themselves are the relations they represent and that the relations are subsistent. Ultimately, such an understanding of the existence of divine Persons reveals the reason for creation and helps us to understand our salvation, which is according to the Angelic Doctor the ultimate...

Bibliografická citace Otázka přirozené poznatelnosti Boha u Tomáše Akvinského [rukopis] : a její recepce u vybraných současných autorů : diplomová práce / Jiří Řičař ; vedoucí práce: David Bouma. -- Praha, 2016. -- 62 s. Abstract The thesis will be devoted to the possibility of knowing God in philosophical sense. Methodologically disregards the biblical revelation (revelatio) and Christian doctrine. Master student will present appropriate doctrine of Aquinas and tries to find its influences and forms in the works of contemporary philosophers of religion as R. Swinburne, R. Schaeffler and more. The aim of thesis is to express the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas in this area and evaluate its response and changes in the works of certain philosophers. Keywords Thomas Aquinas, Natural Theology, Natural Knowability of God, God's Attributes, Philosophy of Religion, Atheism

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / This is the study of Engelbert of Admont's unique and practical take on Aristotelian political theory post-rediscovery of Aristotle's ethico-political works. Through the methods of reception theory and a comparative analysis of his first major political treatise, De regimine principum, with those of his contemporaries similar political treatises (i.e., St. Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, and Marsilius of Padua) and their use of Aristotelian sources and concepts--e.g. lex animata--I have shown not only Engelbert's more original, unique, and practical approach to political philosophy within the Aristotelian political tradition of the later Middle Ages, but also a more comprehensively eclectic nature of this tradition. Engelbert's political philosophy as espoused in his De regimine principum is thus a watershed in the development of the use of practical political science.