En essä om animerad film och erfarenheter från Gaza. Tankar kring lärande seende och rörelser.

列建國迄今四十五年以來，甚至更早以前，巴勒 直是中東和平未能達成 之關鍵之一，而中東的戰略地 _和平與世界和平息息相關。因此為著世界 和平，巴勒 o妥善的解決。巴勒斯坦問題除了直接關係猶太人及巴 鴷□ 撉□唭B國家而言都休戚相關。本文旨在自巴勒斯 □-巴解--的立場出發 ，將其外交政策之轉折做為研究 珓炯e穿整個決策過程。首先本文對巴勒 斯坦問題之源 齱A其中並闡述當今之巴勒斯坦問題與巴人建國權利問 C而 巴解正是領導巴人爭取建國權利的組織。本文接著 峖芋B發展、及其內部 結構做一描述。巴解在一九六四 |年獲得阿拉伯國家承認其為巴人唯一合 法代表，其由 ㄗt組成，因派系間缺乏共識，因此組織本身的生存為 e之 先決問題，加上巴解並無固定據點，又無固定財政 坌O其組織分裂性之外 的一大特徵。在此種特性下，巴 甈F策，實則為當時所處內外環境情勢之 反映。本文先 鴾皒悁菑@九六四年以來對外政策的發展做一回顧，次 筍 □衧偶g緯，找出八０年代之中，巴解在外交政策上 禸銵C同時並自國際 環境、國內環境及決策機器本身等 @改變之原因。另外再進一步探討目前 情勢中可能使巴 o生變化的因素。本文雖擇題為研究巴解外交政策於八 M 實則藉對此轉變關鍵之探討，發現巴解所處內外環境 颩y跡為本文另一重 點。而預測巴解未來外交政策之可 筒Z問題之解決提出建議方案，則是本 文希望做出的貢獻。

This thesis aims to analyze Islamic rhetoric of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its underlying objectives and reasons by examining policies, speeches and declarations of the PLO, Fateh and Yasser Arafat. It is widely accepted that the PLO functiones according to secular rules / perceives Israel, Palestine and the Israeli-Palestinian question on Palestinian nationalist and Third worldist grounds. However in spite of its secular functioning and goals, the PLO since its inception has referred to Islamic rhetoric on natinal struggle of Palestine&rsquo / s liberation. Henceforth it is argued that the PLO has chosen a pragmatist and instrumentalist language in referring to Islamic symbols and discourses. Islamic rhetoric of the PLO has aimed primarily to mobilize the Palestinians for national goals and to legitimize the PLO against rising power of political Islam headed by Hamas. Furthermore the thesis also demonstrates that the PLO&rsquo / s Islamic rhetoric was affected by Palestinian society&rsquo / s shift along Islamic lines and Islamic component of Palestinian nationalism and culture. The PLO seemed to intensify its resort to Islamic rhetoric with every crisis that decreased the PLO&rsquo / s authority and power. It is concluded that content of the PLO&rsquo / s pragmatic Islamic rhetoric was never related with making Islam as normative and legal basis of Palestinian society, rather it was related with mobilization and legitimating.

Submitted by LUCIANA SAAB null (lcn.saab@gmail.com) on 2016-09-21T20:31:08Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTAÇÃO ANVERSO LUCIANA SAAB.pdf: 1483729 bytes, checksum: a711e48980c086f15ceb25c3334a7e5c (MD5) / Rejected by Juliano Benedito Ferreira (julianoferreira@reitoria.unesp.br), reason: Solicitamos que realize uma nova submissão seguindo a orientação abaixo: O arquivo submetido não contém o certificado de aprovação. Corrija esta informação e realize uma nova submissão contendo o arquivo correto. Agradecemos a compreensão. on 2016-09-27T12:33:50Z (GMT) / Submitted by LUCIANA SAAB null (lcn.saab@gmail.com) on 2016-09-30T17:44:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DISSERTAÇÃO ANVERSO LUCIANA SAAB.pdf: 1484031 bytes, checksum: cd04f99fa27da37b352ad2b4437d3f25 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Paula Grisoto (grisotoana@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2016-09-30T19:46:39Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 saab_l_me_mar.pdf: 1484031 bytes, checksum: cd04f99fa27da37b352ad2b4437d3f25 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-09-30T19:46:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 saab_l_me_mar.pdf: 1484031 bytes, checksum: cd04f99fa27da37b352ad2b4437d3f25 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-08-26 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Este trabalho retoma a assinatura dos Acordos de Oslo entre israelenses e palestinos em setembro de 1993 a partir do entendimento de que os termos necessários para a resolução do conflito histórico não são discutidos no processo de paz. No decorrer da análise do texto do primeiro documento a ser assinado, a Declaração de Princípios (DOP), percebe-se que o conteúdo da proposta de paz e a fórmula de negociações bilaterais adotada não propõem uma alteração da assimetria de poder existente entre palestinos da OLP e o Estado de Israel, o que torna o processo desigual e extremamente favorável à continuação da ocupação militar israelense sobre os territórios da Faixa de Gaza e da Cisjordânia. O trabalho, portanto, foca sua análise no processo de negociação anterior à assinatura da DOP e no contexto político e econômico dos responsáveis por Oslo para estabelecer quais foram os interesses envolvidos em fechar um acordo e de que maneira eles influenciaram a redação dos termos da declaração. Durante a pesquisa, notamos que os Acordos de Oslo beneficiaram exclusivamente os atores envolvidos nas negociações secretas na Noruega, a OLP e israelenses do partido trabalhista, o que nos permite afirmar que o processo de paz não foi representativo dos diversos setores políticos palestinos e israelenses. O estudo também revela que a proposta de paz oferecida aos palestinos em Oslo é uma formulação israelense que remete ao início do processo de paz no Oriente Médio no ano de 1978, cujo principal objetivo foi a normalização das relações diplomáticas entre israelenses e os Estados árabes vizinhos. Assim, as condições negociadas na ocasião de Oslo partiram de um antigo pressuposto de que a paz regional não pressupõe a criação do Estado palestino, mas apenas o direito de autorrepresentação dos residentes dos territórios ocupados. Essas condições foram aceitas pela liderança de Yasser Arafat como estratégia para obter prestígio político e retornar ao território da Palestina. Concluímos, portanto, que o processo de paz de Oslo não se tratou de uma legítima iniciativa para estabelecer a paz de maneira justa e igualitária na região, conforme divulgado por Israel e pelos Estados Unidos, mas de um acordo entre o partido trabalhista e os palestinos da OLP, elaborado de uma maneira que possibilitou a expansão territorial israelense sobre Gaza e Cisjordânia, desconsiderou a questão dos refugiados e não reconheceu o direito à autodeterminação nacional palestina. / This paper refers to the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians in September 1993 from the understanding that the necessary terms in order to solve the historical conflict are not discussed in the peace process. The reading of the first document to be signed, the Declaration of Principles (DOP), reveals that the contents of the peace proposal and the bilateral negotiations formula do not alter the existing asymmetry of power between Palestinians from the PLO and the State of Israel, which makes the uneven process extremely favorable to the continuation of the Israeli military occupation over the territories of Gaza and the West Bank. The paper therefore focuses its analysis on the negotiation process previous to the signing of the DOP and the political and economic context of those responsible for Oslo, in order to establish what were the interests involved and how they influenced the drafting of the terms of the Declaration. During the research, it becomes clear that the Oslo agreements only benefited the actors involved in secret negotiations in Norway, namely the PLO and Israeli Labor Party, which allows us to state that the peace process was not representative of the various Palestinian and Israeli political sectors. The study also reveals that the peace proposal made to the Palestinians in Oslo is an Israeli formulation, that refers back to the beginning of the peace process in the Middle East in 1978, whose main goal was the normalization of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Arab neighboring states . Thus, the conditions discussed in Oslo were based on an old assumption that regional peace does not imply in the creation of a Palestinian state, but only the right to self-representation of the Palestinian residents in the occupied territories. These conditions were accepted by Yasser Arafat as a strategy to gain political prestige and return to the territory of Palestine. We conclude therefore that the Oslo peace process was not a legitimate initiative to establish a fair and equal peace in the region, as claimed by Israel and the United States, but an agreement made between the Israeli Labour Party and the PLO, drafted to enabled the Israeli territorial expansion over the West Bank and Gaza, to dismiss the question of refugees and not recognize the Palestinian’s right to national self-determination.

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La question moyenne-orientale est dans l'actualité depuis 1948. C'est en cette année que se crée l'Etat d'Israël sur les décombres du mandat britannique en Palestine. Dès le commencement, la guerre va commencer à fixer les frontières entre Israël et ses voisins arabes. Cependant, après 1967, une nouvelle question va apparaître, celle des relations avec les Territoires occupés. En conséquence, l'Etat d'Israël aura deux questions frontalières à gérer : la question interétatique classique et la question interne avec les Palestiniens. Cette recherche tente de démontrer les voies employées par les différents acteurs régionaux et internationaux pour trouver une solution à cette question juridique qui cause l'instabilité régionale. On s'appuiera sur le droit, l'Histoire, la science politique (en particulier, l'étude des idéologies sioniste et arabiste) et les relations internationales pour trouver une cohérence aux réussites et aux échecs qui ont émaillé l'histoire du Moyen-Orient depuis 1948 et le fait qu'Israël n'ait encore que deux frontières internationalement reconnues, une avec l'Egypte et l'autre avec le royaume de Jordanie.