The best interest test is the legal mechanism which governs decision making on behalf of adults who lack the capacity to make their own health care treatment decisions. The test has attracted considerable criticism from health professionals, academics, judges and lawyers for being ill-defined and non-specific. The question of what is meant by 'best interests' remains largely unanswered. As a consequence, the test gives medical and legal decision makers considerable discretion to apply their personal value judgements within supposedly value-free philosophical frameworks - unreasoned and opaque decision making processes are the inevitable result. Because of the dominance of supposedly value-free philosophical frameworks, the place of values in decision making is not always fully understood. Reasoning is not possible without values, which stem from our emotions and passions, our upbringing, our religion, our cultures, our processes of socialisation and from our life experiences. Values help us make sense of our daily lives. I argue that law - like any other social institution - is essentially a human, values based construct. I put forward a theory of values-based law which argues for the recognition that laws, rules and conventions are based on, and contain, individual values. Currently, medical and legal decision makers justify grave decisions on behalf of society's most vulnerable citizens without revealing, or even acknowledging the values which drive and inform their decisions. Any opportunities to scrutinise or debate the values driving decisions are lost. Ultimately, values-based law argues that values underlying best interest determinations must be exposed to facilitate honest, transparent and fulsome decision making on behalf of adults who lack capacity. By applying the theory of values-based law, supposedly value-free decision making processes are exposed as insufficient to facilitate fulsome, honest and transparent legal reasoning.

The best interest test is the legal mechanism which governs decision making on behalf of adults who lack the capacity to make their own health care treatment decisions. The test has attracted considerable criticism from health professionals, academics, judges and lawyers for being ill-defined and non-specific. The question of what is meant by 'best interests' remains largely unanswered. As a consequence, the test gives medical and legal decision makers considerable discretion to apply their personal value judgements within supposedly value-free philosophical frameworks - unreasoned and opaque decision making processes are the inevitable result. Because of the dominance of supposedly value-free philosophical frameworks, the place of values in decision making is not always fully understood. Reasoning is not possible without values, which stem from our emotions and passions, our upbringing, our religion, our cultures, our processes of socialisation and from our life experiences. Values help us make sense of our daily lives. I argue that law - like any other social institution - is essentially a human, values based construct. I put forward a theory of values-based law which argues for the recognition that laws, rules and conventions are based on, and contain, individual values. Currently, medical and legal decision makers justify grave decisions on behalf of society's most vulnerable citizens without revealing, or even acknowledging the values which drive and inform their decisions. Any opportunities to scrutinise or debate the values driving decisions are lost. Ultimately, values-based law argues that values underlying best interest determinations must be exposed to facilitate honest, transparent and fulsome decision making on behalf of adults who lack capacity. By applying the theory of values-based law, supposedly value-free decision making processes are exposed as insufficient to facilitate fulsome, honest and transparent legal reasoning.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Erlangen.

This project outlines, through a discussion of Jean-Paul Sartre's theory of sadistic and masochistic manifestations of embodiment as forms of bad faith, relationships to clothing, especially those conditioned by the fashion industry. Through an analysis of the concept of a disguise, I argue that the fashion industry encourages consumers to play what I call a game of fashion. This game involves hiding from one's freedom through self-deception while interacting with seemingly replaceable others. Clothing enables one to engage in a two-fold disguise - hiding one's freedom from oneself and evading intersubjective relations with others. In bad faith, one wears the self falsely while immersing oneself in a game of false interactions with others. Bad faith is a two-fold assault on the self and the basic make-up of social life. Within the contemporary milieu of Western consumer society, fashion is a ready accessory for the performance of bad faith. This study is an examination of such phenomena. A contemporary attitude toward clothing, or fashion, is that particular garments are able to "remake" the self - as if what adorns the body were all there is - and that it can hide the self through such adornment because the "real self" supposedly exists elsewhere. This perspective on fashion, and by extension, the body, depends on a Cartesian severing of mind and body - the exact attitude that informs bad faith. These two approaches to fashion are examples of assertions of the self as a material thing on one hand and the assertion of the self as a complete transcendence on the other. Both are forms of bad faith. Instead of thinking of fashion as a mask beneath which there is either nothing or the body beyond which there is the real transcendent self, I argue for thinking of clothing as a veil where the garment naturally conceals through acts of revelation, but what is concealed and what is revealed are never complete. Such a conception involves maintaining a distinction between public and private, while acknowledging there being something beneath that could be known and, through the cultivation of intersubjective relations, offer a richer understanding of the ways in which clothing affects intimate relationships. / Philosophy

This project offers a unique contribution to the scholarship on Jean-Paul Sartre's concept of bad faith by providing a sustained exploration of bad faith in the context of contemporary tourism. More specifically, I explore the bad faith of what I call "checklist tourism," which defines the tourist trip as a rapid succession of visits from one "must-see" site to the next, snapping photos and collecting souvenirs along the way. I argue that checklist tourism offers a safe and comfortable structure for travel that protects tourists against Sartrean anguish--that is, the experience of alienation, fear, freedom, and responsibility--that travel can sometimes evoke. This analysis contributes to the literature on bad faith in three main ways. First, I provide an extended analysis of the Sartrean spirit of seriousness, highlighting part of this concept that has thus far been underdeveloped in the scholarship. I argue that checklist tourism manifests the spirit of seriousness, which accepts the obligation of "must-see" sites and belief in the transcendent value of the material objects seen on the tour. Second, I explore the embodied bad faith of the possession and appropriation of the material world (rather than studying the possession of people, as most scholars have done), arguing that the tourist attempts to appropriate tourist sites through bodily engagement with them. Third, I develop a theory of play as authenticity, and I offer a systematic investigation of it as a rejection of the ontological bad faith project to be self-identical (i.e. to be God), and a reflective conversion to self-recovery. I then explore the character of the "post-tourist," which has been developing in the tourism literature and which represents a way of touring that rejects the seriousness of the "must-see" sites in favor of an attitude of levity, spontaneity, and playfulness. / Philosophy

abstract: This dissertation theorizes Bad Faith Rhetorics, or, rhetorical gestures that work to derail, block, or otherwise stymy knowledge-building efforts. This work explores the ways that interventions against existing social hierarchies (i.e., feminist and antiracist interventions) build knowledge (that is, are epistemologically active), and the ways that bad faith rhetorics derail such interventions. This dissertation demonstrates how bad faith rhetorics function to defend the status quo, with its social stratification by race, gender, class, and other intersectional axes of identity. Bad faith argumentative maneuvers are abundant in online environments. Consequently, this dissertation offers two case studies of the comment sections of two TED Talks: Mellody Hobson’s “Color Blind or Color Brave?” and Juno Mac’s “The Laws that Sex Workers Really Want.” The central analyses deploy online ethnographic field methods and close reading to characterize bad faith rhetorical responses and to identify 1.) trends in such responses, 2.) the net effects on other conversational participants, and 3.) bad faith rhetoric mitigation strategies. This work engages Sartre’s work on Bad Faith, rhetoric scholarship on the knowledge-building affordances of argument, public sphere theory, critical race studies, and feminist scholarship. This dissertation’s theorization and case studies illustrate the pitfalls of specific counterproductive argumentative tactics that block progress toward more equitable ways of being (bad faith rhetorics), and makes several preliminary recommendations for mitigating such moves. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation English 2019

Ao desenvolver nO Segundo Sexo análise existencialista sobre a condição da mulher ocidental, isto é, de sua formação, situação e caráter, Simone de Beauvoir parte de uma leitura ética das relações intersubjetivas que historicamente permitiram a constituição de códigos de feminilidade e que condicionam o estado atual da educação e dos costumes. Mais precisamente, a análise da autora sobre a mulher deve ocorrer a partir de compreensão dialética de sua condição histórica ou compreensão ética da ação do sujeito, entendido como Para-si, liberdade radical e incondicionada que se realiza precisamente por meio da ação de autoconstituição. Com efeito, a filosofia existencialista consiste numa filosofia do processo de subjetivação do sujeito, ou seja, processo existencial de constituição do próprio sujeito por meio de escolhas feitas pela liberdade vivida nas situações históricas. Assim, o que define de maneira singular a condição da mulher é o fato de que afirmar-se como sujeito contraria as exigências de sua situação. Aceitar-se, no entanto, como Outro é negar a reivindicação fundamental do sujeito que ela é e resulta na prática de condutas enredadas pela má-fé, isto é, práticas que visam dissimular a servidão em liberdade. Por consequência, com o esforço de pôr-se como Sujeito, que é sempre ético, existe também a tentação de constituir-se como objeto por meio da fixação do ser. É essa ambiguidade constituinte de todo existente que se traduz de forma específica na constituição do feminino quando na sociedade patriarcal se pretende que o homem responsabilize-se por justificar sua existência, de modo que não cabe a ela inventar seus próprios fins, mas aceitar o destino que lhe é dado de fora e que se caracteriza pela negação da liberdade. Desse modo, nosso propósito é compreender como a construção histórica do feminino se dá mediante a constituição de uma subjetividade que pretende se negar e ser negada enquanto tal e que, portanto, só pode dar-se no regime da má-fé / In developing of The Second Sex existencialist analysis about western womans condition, namely her formation, situation and character, Simone de Beauvoir leave of an ethical reading of intersubjective relations that historically enabled the establishment of codes of femininity and on which the current state of education and morals. More precisely, the analysis of the authoress about the woman must occur from dialectical understanding of her historical condition or ethical understanding of the action of the subject, understood as For-itself, radical and unconditional freedom that is realized precisely through the action of self-constitution. Indeed, the existentialist philosophy is a philosophy of subjectivity of the subject process, i.e., existential process of constitution of the subject through choices made for freedom lived on historical situations. So what defines a singular manner the status of women is the fact that assert itself as subject contradicts the requirements of her situation. Accept themselves, however, as another is to deny the fundamental claim of the subject that she is and results in the practice of entangled by bad-faith conduct, i.e. practices to conceal the bondage free. Consequently, with the effort to put yourself as a subject, which is always ethical, there is also the temptation to constitute itself as an object by setting the be. It is that constituent of all existing ambiguity which translates specifically in the constitution of the feminine in a patriarchal society where it is intended that man Blame yourself to justify their existence, so it is not for her to invent their own purposes, but accept fate given to it from the outside and that is characterized by denial of freedom. Thus, our purpose is to understand how the historical construction of female occurs by the formation of a subjectivity that intends to deny and be denied as such and therefore can only give up the scheme of bad faith

Percorrendo um pensamento em que a ontologia, assistida pela fenomenologia, fornece inteligibilidade suficiente para a elaboração de uma ética existencialista, este trabalho pretende demonstrar como a acepção sartriana acerca da subjetividade é indissociável, para ser devidamente compreendida, do fenômeno por ele intitulado como má-fé. Essa demonstração busca evidenciar ainda como a empreitada sartriana em descrever a realidade humana como ser-Para-si, cuja existência precede a essência exaustivamente analisada na obra de que mais nos servimos (O Ser o Nada) opera uma reconfiguração no significado das noções comumente empregadas nas tentativas filosóficas de explicar a subjetividade, a saber: cogito, Eu, indivíduo, pessoa, identidade, si e sujeito. Assim, investigamos em que medida a noção particularmente sartriana de subjetividade necessariamente comporta o fenômeno da má-fé, numa consonância tal que a compreensão de ambos é reciprocamente iluminada. E se assim é, por fim, averiguamos a possibilidade (ou não) da existência autêntica, avesso da má-fé, para concluirmos com a imperiosidade do impasse que aí se instala. / Tracing the thought in which ontology, supplied by phenomenology, offers enough intelligibility for the construction of an existentialist ethics though not entering there this work aims to demonstrate how Sartrean sense of subjectivity is inseparable, to be full understood, from the phenomenon he entitles as bad-faith. This demonstration aims also to make evident how Sartre´s efforts to describe human reality as being-For-itself, whose existence precedes its essence exhaustingly analyzed in the work we based ourselves most (Being and Nothingness) functions a reconfiguration in the meaning of notions commonly used in the philosophical attempts to explain subjectivity, that is, cogito, I, individual, person, identity, self and subject. This way, we investigate to what extent Sartrean particularly notion of subjectivity necessarily holds the phenomenon of bad-faith, in such a consonance that mutually elucidates the understanding of each other. And if that is so, we finally inquired the possibility (or not) of the authentic existence, the reverse of bad-faith, to conclude with the predominance of the impasse that settles down there.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This work aims to reconstruct and discuss the general concepts of bad faith and existential psychoanalysis in phenomenological ontology of Jean-Paul Sartre, presented in his Being and Nothingness (1943). The two terms arise in the wake of ontological and phenomenological description of human reality undertaken by the French philosopher, in which he defines human reality as basically consisting of ontological freedom and lack of identity. Instead of being, the human is characterized by its making, and this is its most fundamental characteristic. Defined as a movement, the human condition is addressed precisely the realization of identity that, like a mirage on the horizon, is ontologically forbidden and therefore unattainable. This tendency to perform an impossible identity added to the definition of self as one to engender within an individual human reality, the experience of distress. And this anxiety motivates the bad faith, triple phenomenon lies, belief and conduct. A forgery of human reality consists of simultaneous corruption of belief and commitment of conduct. Through bad faith deceives the human individual is a reality and establishes individual apologies and excuses in an attempt to rebut the anguish of their horizon of experience. In the process, you lose access to the authentic human reality, plunging the entire error in thinking and living. In the interest of purifying the human reality of this atmosphere of error and deception, Sartre develops a method called existential psychoanalysis. With a course similar to that of traditional psychoanalysis, existential psychoanalysis operates in conjunction with the phenomenological ontology and provides an authentic picture of a human person, beyond the comprehension of bad faith. The assumption of genuine freedom, however, is the jurisdiction of individual responsibility. / A presente dissertação tem como objetivo geral reconstruir e discutir as noções de má-fé e psicanálise existencial na ontologia fenomenológica de Jean-Paul Sartre, apresentada em seu O Ser e o Nada (1943). As duas noções surgem na esteira da descrição ontológica e fenomenológica da realidade humana empreendida pelo filósofo francês, na qual ele define a realidade humana como sendo fundamentalmente constituída de liberdade ontológica, isto é, falta de identidade. Ao invés de ser, o humano se caracteriza por seu fazer, e esta é sua característica mais fundamental. Definida como movimento, a condição humana dirige-se justamente a realização da identidade que, como uma miragem no horizonte, é ontologicamente proibida e, portanto, inalcançável. Essa tendência à realização de uma identidade impossível somada à definição do próprio ser como um fazer engendra, no seio de uma realidade humana individual, a experiência da angústia. E essa angústia motiva a má-fé, fenômeno triplo de mentira, crença e conduta. Uma falsificação da realidade humana constituída por simultânea corrupção do crer e comprometimento da conduta. Através da má-fé o indivíduo humano engana-se e instaura uma realidade individual de desculpas e pretextos no intento de elidir a angústia de seu horizonte de experiências. No processo, perde-se o acesso autêntico à realidade humana, mergulhando no erro todo o pensar e o viver. Com o interesse de depurar a realidade humana dessa atmosfera de erro e mentira, Sartre elabora um método que chama de psicanálise existencial. Com um proceder semelhante ao da psicanálise tradicional, a psicanálise existencial opera em conjunto com a ontologia fenomenológica e oferece uma imagem autêntica de uma pessoa humana, para além da compreensão de má-fé. A assunção autêntica da liberdade, porém, é da jurisdição da responsabilidade individual. Palavras-chave: Má-Fé, Psicanálise Existencial, Liberdade, Autenticidade.

Ao desenvolver nO Segundo Sexo análise existencialista sobre a condição da mulher ocidental, isto é, de sua formação, situação e caráter, Simone de Beauvoir parte de uma leitura ética das relações intersubjetivas que historicamente permitiram a constituição de códigos de feminilidade e que condicionam o estado atual da educação e dos costumes. Mais precisamente, a análise da autora sobre a mulher deve ocorrer a partir de compreensão dialética de sua condição histórica ou compreensão ética da ação do sujeito, entendido como Para-si, liberdade radical e incondicionada que se realiza precisamente por meio da ação de autoconstituição. Com efeito, a filosofia existencialista consiste numa filosofia do processo de subjetivação do sujeito, ou seja, processo existencial de constituição do próprio sujeito por meio de escolhas feitas pela liberdade vivida nas situações históricas. Assim, o que define de maneira singular a condição da mulher é o fato de que afirmar-se como sujeito contraria as exigências de sua situação. Aceitar-se, no entanto, como Outro é negar a reivindicação fundamental do sujeito que ela é e resulta na prática de condutas enredadas pela má-fé, isto é, práticas que visam dissimular a servidão em liberdade. Por consequência, com o esforço de pôr-se como Sujeito, que é sempre ético, existe também a tentação de constituir-se como objeto por meio da fixação do ser. É essa ambiguidade constituinte de todo existente que se traduz de forma específica na constituição do feminino quando na sociedade patriarcal se pretende que o homem responsabilize-se por justificar sua existência, de modo que não cabe a ela inventar seus próprios fins, mas aceitar o destino que lhe é dado de fora e que se caracteriza pela negação da liberdade. Desse modo, nosso propósito é compreender como a construção histórica do feminino se dá mediante a constituição de uma subjetividade que pretende se negar e ser negada enquanto tal e que, portanto, só pode dar-se no regime da má-fé / In developing of The Second Sex existencialist analysis about western womans condition, namely her formation, situation and character, Simone de Beauvoir leave of an ethical reading of intersubjective relations that historically enabled the establishment of codes of femininity and on which the current state of education and morals. More precisely, the analysis of the authoress about the woman must occur from dialectical understanding of her historical condition or ethical understanding of the action of the subject, understood as For-itself, radical and unconditional freedom that is realized precisely through the action of self-constitution. Indeed, the existentialist philosophy is a philosophy of subjectivity of the subject process, i.e., existential process of constitution of the subject through choices made for freedom lived on historical situations. So what defines a singular manner the status of women is the fact that assert itself as subject contradicts the requirements of her situation. Accept themselves, however, as another is to deny the fundamental claim of the subject that she is and results in the practice of entangled by bad-faith conduct, i.e. practices to conceal the bondage free. Consequently, with the effort to put yourself as a subject, which is always ethical, there is also the temptation to constitute itself as an object by setting the be. It is that constituent of all existing ambiguity which translates specifically in the constitution of the feminine in a patriarchal society where it is intended that man Blame yourself to justify their existence, so it is not for her to invent their own purposes, but accept fate given to it from the outside and that is characterized by denial of freedom. Thus, our purpose is to understand how the historical construction of female occurs by the formation of a subjectivity that intends to deny and be denied as such and therefore can only give up the scheme of bad faith