Submitted by William Justo Figueiro (williamjf) on 2015-07-22T23:22:50Z No. of bitstreams: 1 05d.pdf: 2537097 bytes, checksum: 56c8d8d8120beecf5693e98fb5f2dec4 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-22T23:22:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 05d.pdf: 2537097 bytes, checksum: 56c8d8d8120beecf5693e98fb5f2dec4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / UNISINOS - Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos / A proposta deste trabalho é estudar a problemática que envolve o meio ambiente, encontrando um meio de realmente atribuir eficácia social à esse direito comum a todos os indivíduos, posto que os problemas ambientais vislumbrados ao redor do globo hodiernamente fogem da normalidade, atingindo a todos os seres humanos no âmago do seu Direito Humano ao meio ambiente sadio e ecologicamente equilibrado. Nesse escopo, introduz-se a problemática ambiental, demonstrando a dificuldade atual enfrentada pelo homem referente aos baldios e exibindo a teoria por traz deste verídico drama ambiental que se vivencia, pensado por Garret Hardin – a Tragédia dos Bens Comuns. Ademais, faz-se uma construção acerca do que é esse novo Direito Humano, explicando o seu surgimento por meio da própria evolução histórica da sociedade e a sua consagração enquanto direito consuetudinário internacional de terceira dimensão. Na sequência, abordar-se-á a insuficiência da “positivação” desse Direito para contornar a Tragédia, sendo essa a principal problemática que se buscará responder no texto, partindo da crise paradigmática do positivismo até o surgimento de um novo paradigma, o qual observa a função desempenhada pelo sistema jurídico e, por causa disso, busca outros ferramentais para contornar o problema, como a Análise Econômica do Direito, oriunda do Direito e Economia. Logo, estudar-se-á os instrumentos originários das Ciências Econômicas, particularmente, as ideias edificadas por Arthur Pigou e Ronald Coase para controlar o problema, além de duas metodologias da microeconomia significativamente relevantes para o Direito, quais sejam, a Teoria da Escolha Racional e a Teoria dos Jogos. Por fim, analisar-se-á detalhadamente as contribuições geradas por esses inputs econômicos, desde a monetarização do meio ambiente à criação de incentivos positivos, os quais tendem a ser a “nova” solução para contornar não só o estruturalismo do sistema jurídico, como também o problema ambiental, vez que motiva os agentes sociais a agirem em prol das condutas esverdeadas. Desta feita, mostrar-se-á dois exemplos dessa aplicação, uma no panorama doméstico, envolvendo o tema dos tributos ambientais, e outra no panorama internacional, no que compete aos mercados transacionáveis como aquele elucubrado pelo Protocolo de Kyoto. Para tanto, traça-se um resgate teórico-qualitativo acerca do tema, com intuito de revisar a bibliografia existente, porém, sem o condão de querer esgotá-la. / This thesis aims at studying the problems arising from the environment, trying to establish a method of truly attaching social efficacy to this common right to all individuals, since the environmental problems that have emerged worldwide escape from normality, intrinsically affecting human beings in their human right to a healthy and balanced environment. In this scope, it will be primarily introduced the environmental problems, demonstrating the current difficulty faced by individuals concerning the commons and showing the theory behind this true problem mankind face as Garret Hardin exposed, called The Tragedy of the Commons. Moreover, a historical construction of what this novel human right is will be made, in order to explain its establishment as a customary rule of international law of third dimension. Furthermore, the insufficiency of such “positivation” to fight the Tragedy will be addressed, constituting the main quest of his text, departing from the positivism paradigmatic crisis until the erection of a new paradigm that observes the functional character of law. Due to such view, the necessity of finding in other sciences mechanisms to overcome this current issue, such as incorporating the Economic Analysis of Law methodology, originated form the Law and Economics School will be clarified. Thus, the Economic Science instruments will be studied; chiefly, the Pigouvean and Coasean concepts, and two significant theories for the Law field, which are the Rational Choice and Game Theory. Above and beyond, the detailed contributions generated by these economic inputs will be discussed from the monetization of the environment to the emergency of positive incentives, which tend to be the “new” key to solve both the structural view of the law system and the environmental problem, as it encourages the social agents to act greenly. In this sense, two examples of such application will be shown: one in the domestic system involving environmental taxes, and the other in the international arena, concerning the transactional markets (cap-and-trade) as the one established by the Kyoto Protocol. For such analysis, a theoretical-qualitative research on the matter will be made, intending to review the existing bibliography, but not expecting to exhaust it.

No description available.

Cette thèse contribue à la compréhension des frictions liées aux politiques environnementales et à la manière dont ces frictions affectent la dynamique des industries polluantes ainsi que les agrégats macroéconomiques tels que la productivité. Elle examine également de manière critique comment différents aspects de ces politiques influencent la distribution des entreprises en termes d’emploi, de tailles et d’émissions. Dans le premier chapitre, j’examine les effets à long terme des politiques d’exemption basées sur des seuils dans la réglementation environnementale, qui consistent à exonérer les émetteurs en dessous d’un certain seuil d’émissions. En utilisant des données sur la pollution provenant de divers établissements participant au programme de plafonnement et d’échange de la Californie, j’ai découvert que 40% des entreprises bénéficient de cette exemption, avec une concentration notable autour du seuil, en particulier parmi les nouveaux entrants. Pour comprendre les implications plus larges, j’ai développé un modèle dynamique industriel qui prend en compte des entreprises hétérogènes et un système de tarification du carbone avec des exemptions spécifiques au seuil. En simulant le programme californien de plafonnement et d’échange, j’ai constaté que la suppression de l’exemption conduit à une augmentation de 0,05% de la production en raison du déplacement des ressources vers des entreprises plus productives. Pour mesurer l’impact de la politique d’exemption sur l’allocation des ressources, j’ai analysé la dispersion de la productivité totale des facteurs basée sur les revenus (TFPR) au niveau de l’entreprise. L’analyse a révélé que la volatilité de la TFPR est influencée par la dispersion entre les catégories d’entreprises. Les entreprises ayant une productivité intermédiaire et regroupées autour du seuil ont une moyenne et une dispersion de TFPR plus élevées comparées aux grandes entreprises productives qui supportent les coûts des émissions. Dans le deuxième chapitre, j’examine les implications macroéconomiques de l’utilisation complémentaire des instruments de tarification traditionnels avec les Crédits de Compensation (OCs), dont le prix est négocié par les entités couvertes auprès des entreprises non couvertes. Ce processus de négociation peut entraîner un coût marginal d’émission différent par rapport aux instruments de tarification traditionnels. En utilisant les données des entreprises sur les émissions et les modalités de conformité du programme de plafonnement et d’échange de la Californie, j’ai montré trois faits. Premièrement, l’utilisation des OCs augmente avec la taille des émissions des entreprises ; la proportion des entreprises se conformant aux OCs et la proportion des émissions compensées augmentent avec les groupes de quintiles d’émissions. Ainsi, les OCs agissent comme une réduction implicite de la taxe carbone pour les grands émetteurs. Deuxièment, les entreprises établies se conforment plus intensivement aux OCs par rapport aux nouveaux entrants et aux entreprises sortantes. Enfin, le taux de retrait des OCs disponibles diminue progressivement après la réglementation. Pour expliquer ces résultats, j’étends et calibre un modèle de dynamique industrielle incorporant un système de plafonnement et d’échange où les entreprises choisissent entre les permis traditionnels et les OCs, considérés comme des substituts parfaits, le prix de ces derniers étant obtenu par un protocole de négociation de Nash. Je montre quantitativement que compléter le plafonnement et l’échange (enchères) avec des OCs peut affecter positivement les résultats environnementaux et entraîner un gain de bien-être positif (0,021%), bien qu’à un coût léger pour les résultats économiques tels que la productivité totale des facteurs (0,002%). L’effet sur le bien-être lorsque la taxe carbone est combinée avec des OCs est plus faible (0,019%) et est accompagné d’une baisse plus importante du taux d’imposition moyen. Qualitativement, j’ai dérivé les conditions dans lesquelles les taux d’imposition au niveau des entreprises et en moyenne varient en fonction de trois allocations de permis : enchères, attribution gratuite et rabais basé sur la production, en lien avec la conformité aux OCs. Le troisième chapitre examine l’impact des incitations fiscales pour les investissements en dépollution sur la part du travail et l’investissement total en dépollution dans les industries manufacturières en Colombie. En utilisant des données au niveau microéconomique, je constate une forte corrélation négative entre l’investissement en dépollution et la part du travail. En revanche, il n’y a pas d’association significative entre l’investissement en capital et la part du travail. Pour comprendre ces observations, j’étends et calibre un cadre de dynamique industrielle incluant des entreprises hétérogènes investissant dans des mesures de contrôle de la pollution. Les expériences politiques montrent que le passage à des incitations pour le contrôle de la pollution avec une déduction fiscale de 20% réduit la part du travail dans l’industrie de 20% en raison de l’augmentation de la part de marché des entreprises intensives en capital. De plus, l’investissement en dépollution augmente de 45% en raison de l’effet d’équilibre général. Les changements dans les instruments fiscaux créent une corrélation négative entre la part du travail des entreprises et l’investissement en dépollution aux niveaux de l’entreprise et de l’agrégat. Une augmentation de la taxe carbone réduit la part du travail dans l’industrie mais augmente l’investissement total en dépollution, car la part de production des entreprises très intensives en facteurs de production augmente, tandis que les entreprises ayant une intensité de travail médiane perdent du terrain. À l’inverse, une augmentation de l’impôt sur les sociétés réduit l’investissement total en dépollution et augmente la part du travail dans l’industrie, reflétant les changements de distribution observés en l’absence de déduction fiscale. Cette étude met en lumière comment les incitations au contrôle de la pollution par des déductions fiscales influencent la distribution conjointe de la part de production et de l’intensité des facteurs des entreprises. Les résultats soulignent la nécessité de concevoir des incitations fiscales équilibrées pour atteindre les objectifs économiques et environnementaux. / This thesis contributes to the understanding of the frictions associated with environmental policies and how these frictions affect the dynamics of polluting industries and their impact on macroeconomic aggregates such as productivity. It also critically examines how different aspects of these policies influence the distribution of firms in terms of employment, firms size and emissions. In the first chapter, I examine the long run effects of threshold-based exemption policies in environmental regulation, which involve exempting emitters below a certain emission threshold. Using pollution data from various establishments under California’s Cap-and-Trade program, I found that 40% of firms benefit from this exemption, with many clustering around the threshold, particularly new entrants. To understand the broader implications, I developed an industry dynamic model that considers heterogeneous firms and a carbon pricing system with threshold-specific exemptions. When simulating California’s Cap-and-Trade, I found that removing the exemption leads to a 0.05% increase in output due to resources shifting towards more productive firms. To measure the impact of the exemption policy on resource allocation, I analyzed the dispersion of Total Factor Productivity Revenue-based (TFPR) at the firm level. The analysis revealed that TFPR volatility is influenced by the dispersion between firm categories, particularly those relative to the exemption threshold. Firms with intermediate productivity, clustered around the threshold, showed higher average and dispersion of TFPR compared to productive firms that bear emission costs. In the second chapter, I quantify the macroeconomic implications of complementing the use of traditional pricing instruments with Offset Credits (OCs), whose price is negotiated by covered entities from non-covered firms. This bargaining process may result in a different marginal emission cost compared to traditional pricing instruments. Using firm data on emissions and compliance modalities from California’s Cap-and-Trade program, I show three facts. First, OC usage increases with firm emission size; the proportion of firms complying with OCs and the proportion of emissions offset increase with emission quintile groups. Thus, OCs act as an implicit carbon tax reduction for large emitters. Second, incumbent firms comply more intensively with OCs compared to new entrants and exiting firms. Lastly, the retirement rate of available OCs drops gradually after the regulation. To explain these findings, I extend and calibrate an industry dynamics model incorporating a cap-and-trade system where firms choose between traditional permits and OCs, viewed as perfect substitutes with the price of the latter obtained through a Nash bargaining protocol. I quantitatively show that complementing cap-and-trade (auction) with OCs can positively affect environmental outcomes and yield a positive welfare gain (0.021%), albeit at a slight cost of total factor productivity (0.002%). The welfare effect when complementing a carbon tax with OCs is smaller (0.019%), accompanied by a larger average tax rate decrease compared to cap-and-trade. Qualitatively, I derived conditions under which firm-level and average tax rates vary depending on three permit allocations: auction, grandfathering, and output-based rebate, in line with the compliance with OCs. The third chapter investigates the impact of tax incentives for investment in abatement on the labor share and aggregate abatement investment in Colombia’s manufacturing industries. Using micro-level data, I find a strong negative correlation between abatement investment and labor share. However, there is no significant association between capital investment and labor share. To understand these facts, I extend and calibrate an industry dynamics framework that includes heterogeneous firms investing in pollution control investments. Policy experiments show that switching to pollution control incentives with a 20% income tax deduction reduces the industry labor share by 20% due to an increase in capital-intensive market share. Additionally, abatement investment rises by 45% due to the general equilibrium effect. Changes in tax instruments create a negative correlation between firms’ labor share and abatement investment at both firm and aggregate levels. An increase in carbon tax reduces the industry labor share but boosts aggregate abatement investment, as the output share of extremely factor-intensive firms grows, while firms around the median labor intensity lose share. Conversely, an increase in corporate tax reduces aggregate abatement investment and raises the industry labor share, mirroring the distribution changes seen with no income tax deduction. This study highlights how pollution control incentives through income tax deductions affect the joint distribution of firms’ output share and factor intensity. The findings emphasize the need for well-designed tax incentives to balance economic and environmental goals.

Die Bepreisung von Treibhausgasemissionen ist eine der am intensivsten diskutierten Strategien zur Mitigation des menschengemachten Klimawandels. Eine CO2-Steuer oder ein Emissionshandel nach dem „Cap and Trade“-Prinzip sind die prominentesten Vorschläge und stehen auch im Zentrum dieser Dissertation. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, näher zu beleuchten, was aus moralischer Sicht für und gegen die Bepreisung von Treibhausgasen spricht. Zu diesem Zweck werden in drei Kapiteln Argumente für die Bepreisung von Treibhausgasen untersucht und in drei weiteren Kapiteln Argumente gegen die Bepreisung von Treibhausgasen diskutiert. Hierbei baue ich auf der existierenden philosophischen Literatur zum Thema auf; bringe jedoch auch neue Argumente in die Debatte ein. Ich komme zu einem gemischten Fazit. Manche Argumente für die Bepreisung von Treibhausgasemissionen halten einer genaueren philosophischen Betrachtung nicht stand (Effizienz, Ausmaß der Freiheitseinschränkungen), aber auch nicht alle Argumente gegen die Bepreisung überzeugen (Kommodifizierung). Auf der anderen Seite ist festzuhalten, dass ein Argument für die Bepreisung schlüssig scheint (Effektivität) und zwei kritische Argumente zumindest in Teilen überzeugen (mangelnde Fairness, Auswirkung auf intrinsische Motivation). Die Dissertation soll wichtige Erkenntnisse für das aus moralischer Sicht optimale Design eines Preises auf Treibhausgasemissionen liefern. Eine endgültige Antwort auf die Frage, ob wir den Weg der Bepreisung von Treibhausgasemissionen relevanten Alternativen vorziehen sollten, kann nur nach einer interdisziplinären Debatte gegeben werden. Zu dieser soll die vorliegende Dissertation ein Beitrag sein. / Pricing greenhouse gas emissions is one of the most intensely discussed strategies to mitigate climate change. Implementing a carbon tax or a ‚cap and trade‘ emissions trading scheme are the two most prominent proposals and the ones that this doctoral thesis focuses upon. Its goal is to contribute to a better understanding of the moral reasons that speak for or against carbon pricing. The first three chapters deal with moral arguments in favor of carbon pricing and the last three chapters with moral arguments against carbon pricing. In doing so, I build on the existing literature, but also develop new arguments. Some of the arguments in favor of carbon pricing turn out to be unconvincing (Least Cost Argument, Liberty Argument), but the same is true for one argument against carbon pricing (Commodification Argument). One of the arguments in favor of carbon pricing proves to be sound (Effectiveness Argument), while two of the arguments against it have at least some credibility (Solidarity Objection, Carbon Pricing and Motivation). This doctoral thesis aims to provide some insights into how to price carbon, but a final answer to the question of whether we should price carbon can only be given after an interdisciplinary debate to which this work of moral philosophy is but one contribution.

This thesis evaluates the equity performance of a recent state environmental justice policy, California’s Senate Bill 535 (S.B. 535). “Environmental justice” refers to the disproportionate environmental harm imposed on low-income and minority communities. S.B. 535 uses competitive grants to provide funding to these communities. The research is centered around two questions: (1) to what extent has S.B. 535 experienced successful implementation in its first year of operation, and (2) how can policy actors improve implementation while balancing performance and equity goals? In regards to the first question, I utilize a case study of the policy’s implementation within 17 local governments in Riverside County. I find that the number of actors involved and the alignment of their interests prevent the policy from more successful implementation. Local government officials identify staff capacity as a primary concern in the program’s implementation. I then evaluate the policy’s balance of program performance and equity with an econometric analysis that characterizes the decisions of local governments to implement the policy. I find impressive equity performance, as low-income and minority populations are more likely to participate. The implementing governments have sufficient capacity to achieve program goals, as larger cities and cities with more staff per capita are more likely to participate. My findings support the use of competitive grants in environmental justice policies. The S.B. 535 grant program demonstrates the ability to distribute funding to governments with both socioeconomic disadvantage and the capacity for successful implementation. The analysis concludes with policy recommendations.

The pressing global demand to transform to a low-carbon business community, which is required by the urgency of mitigating climate change, significantly alters the operating procedures for carbon emitters and carbon revenue generators alike. Although agricultural activities are not considered as heavy carbon emission source, the increased public focus on climate change has catapulted the exploitation of sustainable agricultural land management mitigating strategies as intervention by the sector. Additionally, the focus on market-based mechanism to address climate change, which has led to the evolution of cap-and-trade schemes, makes the agricultural sector become a source of low-cost carbon offsets. However, the fact that cap-and-trade schemes in the agricultural sector are voluntary has resulted into not only very diverse farming practices but also diverse accounting practices. The consequences of the diversity practices are that, the impacts on financial performance and position are not comparable. Therefore, the overall objective of this study was to investigate the recognition, measurement and disclosure for cap-and-trade schemes in the agricultural sectors This study was conducted through literature reviews and empirical test. A qualitative research approach utilising constructivist methodology was employed. Primary data was collected in Kenya by administering three sets of semi-structured questionnaires to drafters of financial statements, loan officers and financial consultants. Secondary data involved content analysis of financial statements and reports of listed entities across the globe. It was established that proper accounting for cap-and-trade schemes adaptation activities is critical to the success of an entity’s environmental portfolio. Additionally, a model for valuing an organisation's carbon capture potential as suggested by this study enables entities to better report the impact of the adaptation activities on the financial performance and financial position. The outcome of this study enables entities to integrate the carbon capture potential on an entity sustainability reporting framework. / Colleges of Economic and Management Sciences / D. Phil. (Accounting Science)

隨著全球溫室氣體排放量的增長，氣候變遷帶來的衝擊益加嚴重，京都議定書的三種彈性減量機制為人類對抗氣候變遷帶來了新的契機，「碳交易」及「碳市場」於焉而生。為與國際的潮流接軌，立法院於2015年6月15日三讀通過了《溫室氣體減量及管理法》，嗣經總統於同年7月1日公布施行，我國將可藉由「總量管制與排放交易」(Cap and Trade)的實施，建立一個強制性的碳市場。本論文以市場規模最大的歐盟及中、美兩大排碳國為例，探討它們碳市場發展的經驗，並將重點聚焦在其歷史背景、制度面的設計、碳交易的情形及執行減量的成效上，希望從中找出我國碳交易可以學習與借鑑的地方。 歐、美及中國的碳市場各在不同的背景之下產生，歐盟及中國以強制性市場為主，美國則以自願性市場為主。本論文發現，歐盟排放交易體系(EU ETS)及中國的7個碳試點，其發展有賴明確的溫室氣體減量目標與碳交易的強制規定作為基礎，此正是美國碳市場所缺乏的。芝加哥氣候交易所(CCX)本質上其實類似歐盟及中國的碳市場，它們最大的差別在於：前者可由企業自行決定加入與否，後兩者則強制達一定排放量的企業加入。CCX失敗的例子，恰恰說明了缺乏國家明確方向的指引，單靠企業憑良心加入的自願性市場，發展仍然有限。 最後，本論文提出對我國碳交易後續規劃方向的7項建議，以及後續論文研究方向的3項建議。 / With the rapid growth of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, impacts of climate change become more serious. To reduce GHG emissions, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 and entered into force on 16 February 2005. Various carbon markets have been structured at the domestic or international level, especially since the introduction of three flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. To demonstrate Taiwan’s commitment to combating climate change in line with the global trend, the Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction and Management Act was promulgated by the president on 1 July 2015. It provides a legal basis for establishing a cap and trade system, and a compliance carbon market will be structured in Taiwan. In this paper, we consider the world’s three major carbon markets, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) and the Chinese seven official ETS pilots. This study seeks to provide some suggestions for future carbon transactions in Taiwan from their evolution experiences. The discussions developed in this study will focus on their historical backgrounds, system designs, allowance transactions, and emission reductions achievement. By comparing their evolution experiences, we find critical success factors behind carbon markets. Finally, suggestions for Taiwan’s government and future researches are presented.