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Retourner la bêche : les fonctions de l'autobiographie dans l'œuvre de Stanley CavellD'Amours, Benoît 27 January 2024 (has links)
Mon objectif ici sera de montrer que Cavell fait de l'autobiographie un exercice d'investigation philosophique. Afin d'atteindre ce but, j'emprunte une approche chronologique. Analysant une par une ses publications les plus importantes, je démontre que l'autobiographie remplit cinq fonctions distinctes dans son œuvre à savoir, une fonction descriptive, une fonction anthropologique, une fonction révisionniste, une fonction morale et une fonction perfectionniste. Ensuite, j'analyse le rapport entre le perfectionnisme moral et le récit autobiographie de Cavell intitulé Si j'avais su. Ma thèse trouve son originalité dans le fait que les commentateurs accordent généralement une faible attention au rôle de l'autobiographie dans l'œuvre de ce penseur. D'ailleurs, ce n'est que tardivement que celui-ci indique que l'autobiographie a toujours joué un rôle important dans ses écrits. Mon intention était donc de relire l'œuvre de Cavell afin de mettre en évidence l'importance de l'autobiographie dans sa pensée.
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Das Wagnis des Gewöhnlichen ein Versuch über den Glauben im Gespräch mit Ludwig Wittgenstein und Stanley CavellHunziker, Andreas January 2006 (has links)
Zugl.: Zürich, Univ., Diss., 2006
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Poetry as epistemological inquiry: reading Bernstein reading Cavell reading WittgensteinGöricke, Ursula. Unknown Date (has links) (PDF)
Techn. Hochsch., Diss., 2003--Aachen.
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Das Wagnis des Gewöhnlichen : ein Versuch über den Glauben im Gespräch mit Ludwig Wittgenstein und Stanley Cavell /Hunziker, Andreas. January 2008 (has links)
Univ., Diss.--Zürich, 2006.
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La reproduction du scepticisme quotidien dans l'art cinématographique selon Stanley CavellRose, Martin January 2008 (has links) (PDF)
Ce mémoire de maîtrise porte sur le scepticisme inhérent au langage quotidien et la reproduction de ce scepticisme dans l'art cinématographique. Plus précisément, nous examinons les thèses du philosophe américain Stanley Cavell qui propose une analyse du scepticisme du langage -autant un scepticisme face au monde extérieur qu'un scepticisme face à autrui -par le cinéma. Nous cherchons à définir à la fois les scepticismes cavelliens et la reproduction particulière qu'en fait le cinéma. Ceci nous permettra d'établir l'utilité sociale du scepticisme quotidien, de même que le rôle indispensable du cinéma pour sa recouvrance.
L'hypothèse générale tirée de cette étude est que la communication sociale est basée sur une reconnaissance mutuelle et un rapport au monde extérieur dont le scepticisme est une composante inhérente. Le cinéma peut jouer un important rôle dans notre perception de cette condition en nous fournissant des exemples d'individus outrepassant les risques du scepticisme qui nous empêchent de reconnaître autrui. Nous établissons l'utilité sociologique et philosophique du cinéma dans sa reproduction des formes de scepticisme traversant le langage quotidien et découvrons la signification et les impacts du scepticisme quotidien dans nos relations sociales et notre rapport au monde extérieur. Cette étude permet aussi de parfaire notre connaissance de philosophes peu abordés au Québec, des auteurs de tradition anglaise et américaine exerçant une philosophie proche des considérations communes et quotidiennes ; Cavell souhaite la renaissance d'une philosophie américaine accessible et traitant de conditions quotidiennes. Une philosophie proche de la sociologie: le scepticisme quotidien origine du partage social du langage, toutes les questions qui lui sont liées relèvent de la sociologie. Cavell aspire aussi à rectifier notre compréhension de la philosophie d'Austin et de Wittgenstein; des philosophes peu étudiés par la francophonie nord-américaine. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Stanley Cavell, Scepticisme, Langage, Wittgenstein, Cinéma, Art.
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L'apport philosophique du sens commun : Bergson, Cavell, Deleuze et le renouveau du cinéma québécoisFradet, Pierre-Alexandre 06 September 2019 (has links)
"Thèse en cotutelle, Doctorat en philosophie: Université Laval, Québec, Canada, Philosophiæ doctor (Ph. D.) et École Normale Supérieure de Lyon, Lyon, France". / Tableau d’honneur de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales, 2017 / Concept éminemment polysémique, le sens commun a été déprécié par un vaste pan de la philosophie occidentale, qui y a vu au mieux l’expression de croyances infondées, au pire la manifestation de croyances erronées et naïves. Là où bon nombre de commentateurs ont repéré dans les pensées mêmes d’Henri Bergson, Stanley Cavell et Gilles Deleuze, trois grandes figures de la philosophie du cinéma, des critiques adressées au sens commun, nous nous efforçons ici de tirer au clair la conception positive qu’ils développent de cette notion, en dépit des soupçons occasionnels qu’ils font peser sur elle. Plus précisément, nous tâchons d’expliquer jusqu’à quel point certaines acceptions du sens commun permettent de satisfaire l’ambition de connaître le réel lui-même. En premier lieu, nous passons en revue l’argumentation élaborée par certains réalistes spéculatifs (en particulier Quentin Meillassoux et Graham Harman) afin de clarifier d’une part des réflexions qui feront l’objet de discussions et de répliques dans les chapitres subséquents et, d’autre part, de montrer que la dépréciation philosophique du sens commun se prolonge jusque dans les débats les plus actuels sur l’objectivité. Nous faisons ressortir par la suite les angles sous lesquels le sens commun est susceptible de nous rapprocher du réel d’après Bergson, Cavell et Deleuze. En second lieu, nous entrons de plain-pied dans le domaine du cinéma et examinons en quoi différentes oeuvres du renouveau du cinéma québécois (Denis Côté, Stéphane Lafleur, Sébastien Pilote, Rafaël Ouellet, Xavier Dolan, Anne Émond, Rodrigue Jean, le collectif Épopée, Mathieu Denis et Simon Lavoie) viennent à leur manière compléter, radicaliser ou critiquer les réflexions développées dans la première partie autour du sens commun et du réel. À l’encontre de ceux qui qualifient ces oeuvres de « mimétiques », « peu songées » et « esthétisantes », nous mettons donc en évidence la façon dont ces films, attentifs à la profondeur de l’expérience ordinaire et à l’exigence de trouver un certain équilibre entre le devenir incessant et la stabilité constante, parviennent à nuancer et à raffiner la philosophie. Mots-clés : sens commun, réel, ordinaire, chose en soi, objectivité, subjectivité, surinterprétation, culture populaire, actuel, virtuel, devenir, intensité, concrétude, cinéma, Henri Bergson, Stanley Cavell, Gilles Deleuze, Quentin Meillassoux, Graham Harman, Tristan Garcia, renouveau du cinéma québécois. / The eminently polysemic concept of common sense was depreciated by a vast segment of Western philosophy, which saw at best in it the expression of unwarranted beliefs, at worst the manifestation of erroneous and naïve beliefs. Where many commentators have pinpointed critiques of common sense in the thoughts of Henri Bergson, Stanley Cavell and Gilles Deleuze, three prominent figures of the philosophy of cinema, we strive here to bring out the positive conception they develop of that concept, notwithstanding the occasional suspicion they may cast on it. To put it in more precise terms, we seek to explain to what extent certain meanings of common sense are apt to satisfy the ambition of knowing reality itself. In the first place, we review the argument elaborated by certain speculative realists (specifically Quentin Meillassoux and Graham Harman) in order to clarify, on the one hand, reflections which will be the object of discussions and replies in the subsequent chapters, and, on the other hand, to show that the philosophical depreciation of common sense goes on even in the most contemporary debates on objectivity. We then bring out the angles under which, according to Bergson, Cavell and Deleuze, common sense is apt to bring us closer to reality itself. In the second place, we enter fully into the field of cinema and examine in what way different works associated with the revival of Quebec cinema (Denis Côté, Stéphane Lafleur, Sébastien Pilote, Rafaël Ouellet, Xavier Dolan, Anne Émond, Rodrigue Jean, the collective Épopée, Mathieu Denis and Simon Lavoie) end up completing, radicalizing or criticizing in their way the reflections developed in the first part around common sense and the real. In opposition to those who characterize those works as « mimetic », « thoughtless » and « aestheticizing », we thus bring to the fore the way in which those films, paying attention to the depth of ordinary experience and to the requirement of finding a certain balance between incessant becoming and constant stability, do succeed in nuancing and refining philosophy. Keywords: common sense, real, ordinary, thing-in-itself, objectivity, subjectivity, over-interpretation, popular culture, actual, virtual, becoming, intensity, concreteness, cinema, Henri Bergson, Stanley Cavell, Gilles Deleuze, Quentin Meillassoux, Graham Harman, Tristan Garcia, revival of Quebec cinema.
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Solipsismo, solidão e finitude : algumas lições de Strawson, Wittgenstein e Cavell sobre metafísica e método filosóficoTechio, Jônadas January 2009 (has links)
O presente estudo é constituído de cinco ensaios relativamente autossuficientes, mas redigidos tendo em vista um objetivo comum, que será perseguido por várias vias—a saber, a exploração de um núcleo de problemas filosóficos relacionados com a possibilidade, e com a própria inteligibilidade, do solipsismo. Os resultados obtidos nesses ensaios, assim como os caminhos que levam a eles, pretendem servir como exemplos para a extração de lições mais gerais sobre o método filosófico, e sobre a própria natureza humana. O procedimento adotado para esse fim consiste na leitura de um conjunto de escritos de filósofos contemporâneos que refletiram profundamente sobre o solipsismo— sobretudo Peter Strawson, Ludwig Wittgenstein, e Stanley Cavell. A tese central à qual procuro fornecer suporte por meio dessas leituras é que o solipsismo é uma resposta intelectualizada, e radical, a um conjunto de dificuldades práticas ou existenciais relacionadas com a finitude da condição humana. (Essas mesmas dificuldades originam respostas menos radicais, que são manifestas por meio de outras “posições filosóficas”— ou, pelo menos, é isso que tentarei mostrar.) Estar sujeito a essas dificuldades implica estar permanentemente sujeito à ameaça da solidão, da privacidade e da perda de sintonia em relação ao mundo e aos demais sujeitos. Reconhecer e levar a sério a possibilidade dessa ameaça implica reconhecer que somos, individual e imprevisivelmente, responsáveis por superá-la (um ponto que é notado, mas superestimado, pelo cético, que interpreta nossos limites como limitações), bem como reconhecer a força da tentação (demasiado humana) de tentar reprimi-la (como faz o dogmático/realista metafísico) ou sublimá-la (como faz o idealista/solipsista). Buscar uma filosofia aberta ao reconhecimento de que nossa experiência é essencialmente limitada e condicionada—em especial, pelo fato de que temos corpos, e com eles vontades, desejos, temores, fixações e sentimentos que não escolhemos, e que informam nossa racionalidade e moldam nossas atitudes em relação ao mundo e aos demais sujeitos—é parte da tarefa contínua de aceitação de nossa finitude, em direção à qual o presente estudo pretende ter dado os primeiros passos. / This study consists of five essays which are nearly self-contained, yet written with a common goal, which will be pursued by various routes—namely, the exploration of a core of philosophical problems having to do with the possibility, and the very intelligibility, of solipsism. The results obtained in these essays, as well as the paths leading to them, are intended to serve as examples from which some general lessons about the philosophical method, and about human nature itself, are to be drawn. The procedure adopted for that end consists in reading a set of writings by contemporary philosophers who have thought deeply about solipsism—most notably Peter Strawson, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell. The central thesis to which I seek to provide support through those readings is that solipsism is an intellectualized response, and a radical one at that, to a set of practical or existential difficulties related to the finitude of the human condition. (Those same difficulties may as well promt less radical responses, which are expressed by other “philosophical positions”—or so I shall try to show.) Being subjected to those difficulties implies being permanently subjected to the threat of loneliness, of privacy, of loosing attunement with the world and others. To acknowledge and to take seriously the possibility of that threat means to acknowledge that we are responsible, individually and unpredictably, for coming to grips with it (a point which is noted, but overrated, by the skeptic, who takes our limits as limitations), as well as acknowledging the strength of the (all-too-human) temptation of trying to repress it (as does the dogmatic/metaphysical realist) or to sublimate it (as does the idealist / solipsist). To seek an attitude open to the acknowledgement that our experience is essentially limited and conditioned—in particular, by the fact that we have bodies, and with them wills, desires, fears, fixations and feelings that we do not choose, and which inform our rationality and shape our attitudes toward the world and others—is part of the continuous task of accepting our finitude, a goal toward which I claim to have taken some preliminary steps with this study.
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Solipsismo, solidão e finitude : algumas lições de Strawson, Wittgenstein e Cavell sobre metafísica e método filosóficoTechio, Jônadas January 2009 (has links)
O presente estudo é constituído de cinco ensaios relativamente autossuficientes, mas redigidos tendo em vista um objetivo comum, que será perseguido por várias vias—a saber, a exploração de um núcleo de problemas filosóficos relacionados com a possibilidade, e com a própria inteligibilidade, do solipsismo. Os resultados obtidos nesses ensaios, assim como os caminhos que levam a eles, pretendem servir como exemplos para a extração de lições mais gerais sobre o método filosófico, e sobre a própria natureza humana. O procedimento adotado para esse fim consiste na leitura de um conjunto de escritos de filósofos contemporâneos que refletiram profundamente sobre o solipsismo— sobretudo Peter Strawson, Ludwig Wittgenstein, e Stanley Cavell. A tese central à qual procuro fornecer suporte por meio dessas leituras é que o solipsismo é uma resposta intelectualizada, e radical, a um conjunto de dificuldades práticas ou existenciais relacionadas com a finitude da condição humana. (Essas mesmas dificuldades originam respostas menos radicais, que são manifestas por meio de outras “posições filosóficas”— ou, pelo menos, é isso que tentarei mostrar.) Estar sujeito a essas dificuldades implica estar permanentemente sujeito à ameaça da solidão, da privacidade e da perda de sintonia em relação ao mundo e aos demais sujeitos. Reconhecer e levar a sério a possibilidade dessa ameaça implica reconhecer que somos, individual e imprevisivelmente, responsáveis por superá-la (um ponto que é notado, mas superestimado, pelo cético, que interpreta nossos limites como limitações), bem como reconhecer a força da tentação (demasiado humana) de tentar reprimi-la (como faz o dogmático/realista metafísico) ou sublimá-la (como faz o idealista/solipsista). Buscar uma filosofia aberta ao reconhecimento de que nossa experiência é essencialmente limitada e condicionada—em especial, pelo fato de que temos corpos, e com eles vontades, desejos, temores, fixações e sentimentos que não escolhemos, e que informam nossa racionalidade e moldam nossas atitudes em relação ao mundo e aos demais sujeitos—é parte da tarefa contínua de aceitação de nossa finitude, em direção à qual o presente estudo pretende ter dado os primeiros passos. / This study consists of five essays which are nearly self-contained, yet written with a common goal, which will be pursued by various routes—namely, the exploration of a core of philosophical problems having to do with the possibility, and the very intelligibility, of solipsism. The results obtained in these essays, as well as the paths leading to them, are intended to serve as examples from which some general lessons about the philosophical method, and about human nature itself, are to be drawn. The procedure adopted for that end consists in reading a set of writings by contemporary philosophers who have thought deeply about solipsism—most notably Peter Strawson, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell. The central thesis to which I seek to provide support through those readings is that solipsism is an intellectualized response, and a radical one at that, to a set of practical or existential difficulties related to the finitude of the human condition. (Those same difficulties may as well promt less radical responses, which are expressed by other “philosophical positions”—or so I shall try to show.) Being subjected to those difficulties implies being permanently subjected to the threat of loneliness, of privacy, of loosing attunement with the world and others. To acknowledge and to take seriously the possibility of that threat means to acknowledge that we are responsible, individually and unpredictably, for coming to grips with it (a point which is noted, but overrated, by the skeptic, who takes our limits as limitations), as well as acknowledging the strength of the (all-too-human) temptation of trying to repress it (as does the dogmatic/metaphysical realist) or to sublimate it (as does the idealist / solipsist). To seek an attitude open to the acknowledgement that our experience is essentially limited and conditioned—in particular, by the fact that we have bodies, and with them wills, desires, fears, fixations and feelings that we do not choose, and which inform our rationality and shape our attitudes toward the world and others—is part of the continuous task of accepting our finitude, a goal toward which I claim to have taken some preliminary steps with this study.
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Solipsismo, solidão e finitude : algumas lições de Strawson, Wittgenstein e Cavell sobre metafísica e método filosóficoTechio, Jônadas January 2009 (has links)
O presente estudo é constituído de cinco ensaios relativamente autossuficientes, mas redigidos tendo em vista um objetivo comum, que será perseguido por várias vias—a saber, a exploração de um núcleo de problemas filosóficos relacionados com a possibilidade, e com a própria inteligibilidade, do solipsismo. Os resultados obtidos nesses ensaios, assim como os caminhos que levam a eles, pretendem servir como exemplos para a extração de lições mais gerais sobre o método filosófico, e sobre a própria natureza humana. O procedimento adotado para esse fim consiste na leitura de um conjunto de escritos de filósofos contemporâneos que refletiram profundamente sobre o solipsismo— sobretudo Peter Strawson, Ludwig Wittgenstein, e Stanley Cavell. A tese central à qual procuro fornecer suporte por meio dessas leituras é que o solipsismo é uma resposta intelectualizada, e radical, a um conjunto de dificuldades práticas ou existenciais relacionadas com a finitude da condição humana. (Essas mesmas dificuldades originam respostas menos radicais, que são manifestas por meio de outras “posições filosóficas”— ou, pelo menos, é isso que tentarei mostrar.) Estar sujeito a essas dificuldades implica estar permanentemente sujeito à ameaça da solidão, da privacidade e da perda de sintonia em relação ao mundo e aos demais sujeitos. Reconhecer e levar a sério a possibilidade dessa ameaça implica reconhecer que somos, individual e imprevisivelmente, responsáveis por superá-la (um ponto que é notado, mas superestimado, pelo cético, que interpreta nossos limites como limitações), bem como reconhecer a força da tentação (demasiado humana) de tentar reprimi-la (como faz o dogmático/realista metafísico) ou sublimá-la (como faz o idealista/solipsista). Buscar uma filosofia aberta ao reconhecimento de que nossa experiência é essencialmente limitada e condicionada—em especial, pelo fato de que temos corpos, e com eles vontades, desejos, temores, fixações e sentimentos que não escolhemos, e que informam nossa racionalidade e moldam nossas atitudes em relação ao mundo e aos demais sujeitos—é parte da tarefa contínua de aceitação de nossa finitude, em direção à qual o presente estudo pretende ter dado os primeiros passos. / This study consists of five essays which are nearly self-contained, yet written with a common goal, which will be pursued by various routes—namely, the exploration of a core of philosophical problems having to do with the possibility, and the very intelligibility, of solipsism. The results obtained in these essays, as well as the paths leading to them, are intended to serve as examples from which some general lessons about the philosophical method, and about human nature itself, are to be drawn. The procedure adopted for that end consists in reading a set of writings by contemporary philosophers who have thought deeply about solipsism—most notably Peter Strawson, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell. The central thesis to which I seek to provide support through those readings is that solipsism is an intellectualized response, and a radical one at that, to a set of practical or existential difficulties related to the finitude of the human condition. (Those same difficulties may as well promt less radical responses, which are expressed by other “philosophical positions”—or so I shall try to show.) Being subjected to those difficulties implies being permanently subjected to the threat of loneliness, of privacy, of loosing attunement with the world and others. To acknowledge and to take seriously the possibility of that threat means to acknowledge that we are responsible, individually and unpredictably, for coming to grips with it (a point which is noted, but overrated, by the skeptic, who takes our limits as limitations), as well as acknowledging the strength of the (all-too-human) temptation of trying to repress it (as does the dogmatic/metaphysical realist) or to sublimate it (as does the idealist / solipsist). To seek an attitude open to the acknowledgement that our experience is essentially limited and conditioned—in particular, by the fact that we have bodies, and with them wills, desires, fears, fixations and feelings that we do not choose, and which inform our rationality and shape our attitudes toward the world and others—is part of the continuous task of accepting our finitude, a goal toward which I claim to have taken some preliminary steps with this study.
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Such Building Only Takes Care: A Study of Dwelling in the Work of Heidegger, Ingold, Malinowski, and ThoreauO'Malley, Matthew L. 29 December 2014 (has links)
No description available.
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