Diss. Uppsala : Univ., 2004.

Rättskraften finns för att tillgodose den vinnande partens behov av trygghet. Den negativa rättskraften (res judicata) är det som gör att samma sak inte kan prövas på nytt i flera på varandra följande processer. Res judicata syftar alltså till att slutligt avgöra tvistefrågan. Rättskraftens objektiva utsträckning (förhållandet till saken) är oklar, särskilt i skiljeförfarande. Det finns ett nära samband mellan reglerna om rättskraft och taleändring. För att undersöka rättskraftens objektiva utsträckning finns det därför anledning att beakta vilka taleändrings-möjligheter som parterna i förfarandet har. Detta samband finns i både skiljeförfarande och civilprocess. Det finns därför anledning att jämföra civilprocessen med skiljeförfarande för att försöka klargöra rättskraftens utsträckning i den senare. Uppsatsen syftar till att undersöka rättskraftens objektiva utsträckning i skiljeförfarande för att försöka klargöra hur långt den sträcker sig. För att kunna göra detta kommer även eventuella skillnader i förhållandet mellan rättskraften och ändring av talan i civilprocess kontra skilje-förfarande att undersökas. Sett till rättskraftens bakomliggande syften finns det möjlighet att argumentera antingen för eller emot en omfattande rättskraftsverkan i skiljeförfarande. I doktrinen finns olika uppfattningar beroende på hur de olika bakomliggande syftena värderas. Den rådande uppfattningen är dock att rättskraftens objektiva utsträckning i skiljeförfarande bygger på samma principer som i civilprocessen. Det finns många skillnader mellan processformerna. Reglerna inom respektive processform är också utformade på olika vis. Det framstår därför som naturligt att en viss skillnad i rättskraften dem emellan bör finnas. Denna skillnad bör dock vara liten med anledning av att den allmänna uppfattningen är att rättskraften i de båda processformerna är i princip samma. Rättskraftens utsträckning i det enskilda fallet bör också bero på vilken sorts fråga som prövats. I skiljeförfarande är det nämligen möjligt att pröva sådana frågor som inte kan förekomma inom civilprocessen. Särskilt i dessa fall kan det därför argumenteras för en omfattning på rättskraften som avviker från civilprocessen. Frågan om rättskraftens objektiva utsträckning i skiljeförfarande får sägas vara svårbesvarad. Arbetet har inte kunnat ge ett definitivt svar på frågeställningen och den får därför fortsatt konstateras vara oklar. Min uppfattning i frågan är dock att det förefaller vara mest rimligt att rättskraftens objektiva utsträckning i skiljeförfarande kan omfatta mer än vid en likadan civilprocessuell tvist.

<p>The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the plaintiffs and the defendant’s prospects to change their claims and pleas in optional civil actions and how the rules for the modifications of a suit are affecting the framework of the process. The plaintiff's general ability to expand and alter the claim is found in the chapter 13, 3 § of the Act of Procedure and the basic principle is that a claim is not to be changed. From this basic principle exceptions are allowed to claim another fulfillment or to expand the process with a claim for interest or other additional obligations. The plaintiff can also limit his or her claim or expand the claim with new legal foundations as long as the issue of the process does not change. The defendant’s prospects to make changes in his or her plea are limited to admission and setting off.</p>

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the plaintiffs and the defendant’s prospects to change their claims and pleas in optional civil actions and how the rules for the modifications of a suit are affecting the framework of the process. The plaintiff's general ability to expand and alter the claim is found in the chapter 13, 3 § of the Act of Procedure and the basic principle is that a claim is not to be changed. From this basic principle exceptions are allowed to claim another fulfillment or to expand the process with a claim for interest or other additional obligations. The plaintiff can also limit his or her claim or expand the claim with new legal foundations as long as the issue of the process does not change. The defendant’s prospects to make changes in his or her plea are limited to admission and setting off.

Abstract Unlike litigation and arbitration, mediation is a more informal way to settle disputes. The process has been considered to be quick, cheap and interest-based and it is said to promote amicable settlements. Yet mediation is not commonly used as a dispute resolution method in Sweden today. However, mediation as a dispute resolution method is promoted by the EU institutions and the European Parliament and the Council has adopted a directive which will secure that the EU citizens, in some cases, will have the possibility to choose extrajudicial mediation as a dispute resolution method. Until now, it has not been possible for parties to immediately seek enforcement of the content of a Swedish extrajudicial mediation settlement agreement. However, the directive will also ensure that the EU Member States provide the EU citizens with such enforcement possibilities. According to the wording of the directive, the request of enforcement will require all parties' explicit consent. This means, that if such consent is not given, the content of the agreement cannot be made enforceable. The uncertainty whether such consent will begiven in the end of the process or not may contribute to people waiving to initiate a mediation process because the actual outcome of the process could be difficult to predict. For the mediation process to be considered as an equivalent way to settle disputes to the e.g. litigation proceeding, it is necessary that the parties also experience the results of the processes as equivalent. The requirement of consent is not totally abandoned in the proposed Swedish Mediation Act by which the directive shall be implemented. Instead of choosing the wording of the directive, there are other perspectives on the matter of enforcement which the Swedish legislature perhaps could be inspired by when implementing the directive.

In 1971 the right of re-trial in the Supreme Court was reformed and led to the court becoming a distinct forum for setting precedents. As a consequence of this the possibility of appeal to the Supreme Court was greatly reduced as the court’s primary task would be only to try cases and other issues of importance for the guidance of the application of the law. Before the reform in question, the focus of reviewing cases in the Supreme Court had been to ensure materially correct rulings. However, the legislator’s ambition was, through the reform, to allow the later function to disappear and instead concentrate the judicial activity to the legal system’s need for guidance, to reduce the flow of appealed cases and thereby the court’s workload. As a court of precedent, the Supreme Court’s rulings have a great authoritative effect, not only for the practice in the lower courts, but also for others who operate in the practical legal life such as government agencies, industry- and interest organizations, lawyers and, in the long run, general citizens. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s way of writing its judgments has changed over time, especially since the 1971 reform. Today the reasons in the decisions, both in criminal and civil cases, show a considerable scope of legal argumentation from several angles in a completely different way compared to the quite laconic rulings from older times. Because of this, a common element in the Supreme Court’s verdicts nowdays is the use of obiter dicta (in singularis: obiter dictum). Ratio decidendi means the reasons that determined the outcome of the case. In other words, the parts of the court’s reasoning that is necessary for the verdict. Obiter dictum is the opposite, i.e. something that is stated in the reasons but not necessary for the court to be able to decide on the disputed matter. For instance, obiter dicta can be made through general statements containing detailed descriptions of the legal situation, solid investigations regarding related issues but not relevant for the case or drawn conclusions linked to things or circumstances not invoked by the parties and therefore outside the frame of the trial. In this context severel interesting questions arise connected to obiter dicum as a legal phenomenon and whether it is appropriate. Some prominent doctrinal authors and former judges of the Supreme Court believe that the same court lacks the mandate to present answers to unclear legal issues and precedential matters outside the framework of the trial and through obiter dicta - statements. A few have even argued that it is unconstitutional. The aim of this master thesis is to examine whether the use of obiter dicta corresponds with the Supreme Court’s main function based on the rules of procedure and other relevant legislation for the court in its precedent setting activity.

The starting point of this thesis is the assertion that the interaction between individuals and public authorities sometimes produces claims which cannot easily be categorized as public or private law claims – “claims in the twilight zone”. The aims of the thesis are to examine to what extent such claims can be determined by a court of law and to establish to which kind of court such a claim is properly to be submitted. Moreover, assuming that there is a division of competence between the general courts and the administrative courts that purport to “cut through” claims in the twilight zone, the thesis examines three specific interests: 1) the interest of effective adjudication of claims in the twilight zone; 2) the interest of upholding the division of competence between the general courts and the administrative courts; and 3) the interest of avoiding parallel decisions on the same subject matter.      There is much to support the conclusion that claims in the twilight zone have hitherto, with a couple of important exceptions, been adjudicated in the general courts. However, certain ambiguities relating to the proper role of the administrative courts make it uncertain whether this can still be said to be the case. It may perhaps be that the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court have divergent conceptions of the meaning and effect of a decision made by an administrative court. The present uncertainty makes it difficult to establish to which kind of court a claim in the twilight zone is properly to be submitted, and there is a certain risk that such a claim will not be possible to pursue through a judicial process at all. There is also a certain risk that new boundary lines between public law and private law will be created as a result of procedural ambiguities and not as a result of clear standpoints in matters of substantial law. It is suggested that the situation should be remedied by clarifying the proper role of the administrative courts – or by an amalgamation of the general courts and the administrative courts to one single court system.

Rättegångskostnader – Costs in Civil Procedure The rules on costs in Chapter 18 of the Swedish Code of Legal Procedure (Sw: Rättegångsbalken) have an impact on several procedural questions but have rarely been thoroughly discussed in legal practice or theory since their adoption in 1942. On the other hand, since the Code was adopted civil procecedure scholars have considerably focused on the development and changes in society and how they affect civil procedure. This thesis aims at examining both these lines of development. The impact of the theoretical discussions during the 20th century is critically addressed, with special attention to cost-related questions, and the application of rules on costs in some current and actual situations are examined and evaluated from a pragmatic perspective. The inquiry shows that costs have been of indirect relevance for the theoretical discussion in procedural law and that this theoretical development in turn has had effects on cost rules. Changing views on civil procedure have led to altered framings of cost problems and to shifts in how the rules have been comprehended and applied. The inquiry covers questions on cost assessment and cost shifting between the parties, as well as problems connected to possibilities to spread costs and risk on legal representatives, funders and others. It is argued that a more compromising and pluralistic application of the rules combined with more explicit communication in cost issues between the parties and the court during early stages of the proceedings may facilitate and lead to more nuanced cost decisions without burdening the final stages of the proceedings with extensive legal argumentation.