The purpose of my dissertation was to examine the competition between the U.S.-led Western bloc and the Soviet bloc in the less developed world during Détente. I assessed whether or not the Soviet bloc pushed for strategic gains in the less developed world in the middle-to-late 1970’s and whether this contributed to the U.S. decision to abandon Détente in 1979. I made the attempt to test the international relations theory of balance of threat realism (Walt, 1992). I accomplished the test in two ways. First, I measured the foreign aid allocations (military and economic) made by each respective bloc towards the Third World by using a quantitative approach. Second, I examined U.S. archives using the process-tracing/historical method. The U.S. archives gave me the ability to evaluate how U.S. decision-makers and U.S. intelligence agencies interpreted the actions of the Soviet bloc. They also gave me the chance to examine the U.S. response as we evaluated the policies that were pushed by key U.S. decision-makers and intelligence agencies. On the question of whether or not the Soviet bloc was aggressive, the quantitative evidence suggested that it was not. Instead, the evidence found the Western-bloc to have been more aggressive in the less developed world. The U.S. archives also showed Soviet actions to have been defensive. Key U.S. decision-makers and intelligence agencies attested to this. Finally, the archives show that U.S. officials pushed for aggressive actions against the Third World during the final years of Détente. Thus, balance of threat realism produced an incorrect assessment that U.S. aggression in the late 1970’s was a response to Soviet aggression during Détente. The evidence suggests structural Marxism and domestic politics can better explain U.S./Western actions. The aggressive foreign aid allocations of the West, coupled with evidence of U.S. decision-makers/agencies vehemently concerned about the long-term prospects of the West, strengthened structural Marxism. Domestic politics can also claim to explain the actions of U.S. decision-makers. I found extensive archival evidence of bureaucratic inter-agency conflict between the State Department and other intelligence agencies in areas of strategic concern to the U.S.

This research examines British intellectual debates on warfare throughout the mid-20th century. The thesis identifies different discourses that emerged as a result of the changes in international relations and military technology at this time. It posits that intellectual contribution on the whole had a more significant impact than many historians have previously accredited. The thesis examines the work of specific intellectuals that made significant and detailed input into these debates and identifies their role in framing these discourses, as individuals and as part of a larger intellectual community. It also highlights the involvement of these intellectuals within the state apparatus and links their intellectual contribution to their role in government. The subject of war and its perception by intellectuals is conspicuously absent in the historiography on British intellectuals. Some of the most important studies of British intellectuals, including Stefan Collini’s Absent Minds, have engaged only slightly or not at all with the intellectual discourse surrounding international relations and warfare. This thesis attempts to fill this gap for the middle of the 20th century and demonstrates that warfare became a prolific and highly visible part of the contribution of intellectuals to British life. Recent literature has attempted to discuss the British state as a warfare state, rejecting arguments on British declinism. The thesis engages with this debate, and while it focuses on Britain’s approach to warfare, it also challenges the interpretation of Britain as either a welfare or a warfare state. The study of intellectuals does not feature heavily within this historiography on British warfare. While historians, such as David Edgerton, engage with specific intellectuals and their writings, a discussion of intellectual discourse does not appear within these analyses. This thesis argues that intellectuals as a group developed ideas and arguments on warfare and the British state in conjunction with one another, creating an intellectual discourse which influenced political decision making and public opinion. The thesis also examines a more modern understanding of the intellectual: the expert. Using both scientific and military thinkers, the thesis explores how experts became intellectuals in response to the growing threat of warfare and the rise of a military-industrial complex. Using intellectuals that conform to the classic definition alongside expert intellectuals, the thesis highlights the importance of analysing both groups as part of the larger whole, and discusses the similarities and differences between the works generated by these intellectuals. The thesis spans the years from 1932 to 1963 and discusses the continuities between intellectual debates across this period. The post-war years and the nuclear conflict feature heavily within this analysis, but the thesis highlights the importance of the 1930s in influencing later intellectual perceptions of the nuclear age and the fight against communism. The majority of this research resulted from sources published within the public domain including monographs, newspaper and periodical articles, public speeches and radio broadcasts. The research also uses the personal archives of the individual intellectuals and political documents from the time, including papers from the Ministry of Defence located in the National Archives, Defence White Papers and the Hansard House of Commons official reports.

This thesis traces the relationship between militarism and geographical thought in the United States during the early Cold War. It does so by traveling across certain spaces, or environments, which preoccupied American geopolitics and American science during the 1940s and 1950s. Indeed, geopolitics and science, understood during the Second World War as markedly distinct terms, came together uniquely to wage the Cold War from the position of strategy. The most intriguing and influential conjunctions were made possible by militarism, not in the deterministic sense of conditioning technologies or funding lines, but as a result of antagonistic, violent practices pervading American life. These practices reaffirmed America's status as distinctly, powerfully modern, while shoring up the burden of global responsibility that appeared to accompany this preeminence. Through militarist reasoning, the American world was turned into an object that needed securing - resulting in a profoundly insecure proliferation of danger that demanded an equal measure of global action and retreat behind new lines of defence. And in these American spaces, whether expanded or compressed, the identity of America itself was defined. From the global horizons of air power and the regional divisions of area studies to the laboratories of continental and civil defence research, the spaces of the American Cold War were material, in the sense that militarism's reach was clearly felt on innumerable human and natural landscapes, not least within the United States. Equally, however, these environments were the product of imaginative geographies, perceptual and representational techniques that inscribed borders, defined hierarchies, and framed populations governmentally. Such conceptions of space were similarly militarist, not least because they drew from the innovations of Second World War social science to reframe the outlines of a Cold War world. Militarism's methods redefined geographical thought and its spaces, prioritizing certain locations and conventions while marginalizing others. Strategic studies formed a key component of the social sciences emboldened by the successes and excesses of wartime science. As social scientists grappled with the contradictions of mid-century modernity, most retreated behind the formidable theories of their more accomplished academic relatives, and many moved into the laboratories previously associated with these same intellectual stalwarts. The result was that at every scale, geography was increasingly simulated, a habit that paralleled the abstractions concurrently promoted in the name of political decisiveness. But simulation also meant that Cold War spaces were more than the product of intangible musings; they were constructed, and in the process acquired solidity but also simplicity. It was in the fashioning of artificial environments that the fragility of strategy was revealed most fully, but also where militarism's power could be most clearly expressed. The term associated with this paradoxical condition was 'frontier', a zone of fragile, transformational activity. Enthusiastic Cold Warriors were fond of transferring this word from a geopolitical past to a scientific future. But in their present, frontiers possessed the characteristics of both. / Arts, Faculty of / Geography, Department of / Graduate

This thesis deals with the influence of foreign policy of Ronald Reagan on his budget policy. The foreign policy is studied in relation to the USSR. First stage of this thesis is devoted to economic development in the USA before Ronald Reagan era with focusing on 1970's. There are also crucial aspects, which affected economic development within the Ronald Reagan era and his decisions. The goal of main part of the thesis is an analysis of impacts of foreign policy on the federal dept in the USA in 1980's with focusing on the relationship between USA a USSR. The thesis analyzes the impact of military spending and Strategic Defense Initiative on the growing federal dept as a consequence of the relationship between USA and USSR. In this stage of the thesis is descriped Reagan's budget program as well as the reasons why the program was unsuccessful. At the end of the thesis is emphasized the influence of Ronald Reagan on the dissolution of the USSR and summarizes the knowledges about the relationship between the budget and foreign policy in the USA in 1980's.

This study attempts to cast empirical light on the traditionalist-revisionist debate regarding the impact of the Soviet Union's collapse on U.S. foreign policy decision-making. To accomplish this goal, the relationship between human rights and U.S. foreign aid decision-making is examined before and after the Cold War. In doing so, the author attempts to determine if "soft" approaches, such as the use of a country's human rights records when allocating aid, have garnered increasing attention since the end of Cold War, as traditionalists assert, or declined in importance, as revisionists content.

No description available.

Frontier Internship in Mission (FIM) was an experimental mission project conceived of and run by Presbyterian Student World Relations director Margaret Flory between 1961 and 1974. It was broadly ecumenical in concept and execution and closely tied to the World Student Christian Federation community. Recent college or seminary graduates were assigned to live and work with local people who were connected in some way to the global ecumenical network and who had invited them. They worked on projects mutually agreed upon, usually for two years. One hundred fourteen of the 140 Americans who originally participated and eight of the original 20 international participants were interviewed for this study. Their narratives about their life histories and experience during and after these international partnerships offer an intimate look at one group of largely mainline Protestant Americans born in the 1930s and 1940s, and the social and religious institutions that were their avenues to engagement with the wider world at a time of cataclysmic change. Over the thirteen years of FIM program operation considered here, conditions in the forty-eight different countries where Frontier Interns (FIs) served were transformed by movements for independence and by escalating covert and overt American intrusions. The core of this dissertation presents regionally-organized internship case studies highlighting the impact of those encounters on the FI’s Christian and American identities . It also analyzes the rejection of their witness when they returned home. Moving forward with their lives, Frontier Interns reaffirmed their commitment to “right relations” of mutual respect across difference and most often gravitated to social roles as bridge-builders and interpreters, domestically and internationally. The strong internal opposition to global ecumenism that had developed in some mainline Protestant churches changed the relationship of many FIs to those churches. It is argued here that the Frontier Interns’ experience highlights a societal shift from a moral order based on covenant or social contract to one that privileged the unrestrained exercise of power and interests. A covenantal commitment to mutual global partnerships is central to who the FIs are, their internships, and what they did with their lives subsequently.

No description available.

Das Hauptziel der Stasi war immer die Erlangung von vertieften Kenntnissen über den Feind, wobei der BRD besondere Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet wurde. Italien, trotz des geringen politischen und militärischen Potenzials, zog seit Beginn des Kalten Krieges das Interesse des MfS und der HV A, auf sich. Die Beweggründe für dieses Interesse passten sich einerseits den strategischen Bedürfnissen der UdSSR und andererseits denen der ostdeutschen Führung an. Mit der Entspannung in Europa und der exponentiellen Zunahme der Ost-West-Kontakte sah sich die sowjetische Führung veranlasst, die Intensität und Art dieser Kontakte zu überwachen. Ausdruck dieses Trends waren die seit 1970 alle vier Jahre stattfindenden multilateralen Konferenzen der Sicherheitsorgane der europäischen Verbündeten Moskaus, was in der Dokumentation über Italien sich widerspiegelt. Was die politische und militärische Spionage anbelangt konnte die These von Gianluca Falanga bestätigt werden, dass es sich meistens um eine indirekte Spionage gehandelt hat. Viele der von der HV A erstellten und an die politische Führung verteilten Informationen erwähnen ausdrücklich Quellen aus parteinahem Umfeld der großen westdeutschen Parteien. Die HVA konnte sich auf die Informationen aus den genannten Parteien stützen, sodass es überflüssig gewesen wäre, auf direkte Spionage in Italien zu investieren. Es können jedoch alternative Informationskanäle nicht ausgeschlossen werden, wie zum Beispiel zwischen Mitgliedern der SED und Elementen der IKP-Linken oder anderen Akteuren. Die Rekonstruktion dieser Art von Kontakten sollte vielleicht über die Querverwendung der Dokumentation von BStU und SAPMO erfolgen. Zum Thema der effektiven politischen Verwertbarkeit der an die SED gelieferten Informationen lässt sich festhalten, dass die Rolle der HV A tiefgreifend dazu beigetragen hat, die Wahrnehmung der ostdeutschen politischen Führung gegenüber Italien zu prägen, die engen politischen Handlungsspielräume für die SED zu identifizieren und sie darüber zu informieren. Unter dem Gesichtspunkt der technisch-wissenschaftlichen Spionage und des illegalen Technologietransfers verweisen die Akten kaum auf relevante Fälle. Die technologische Spionage des MfS in Italien ist vor allem als ein pragmatischer Versuch zu sehen, die Produktion und Verbreitung bestimmten technischen Wissens zu beschleunigen, ohne eine längere Phase der Forschung und Entwicklung zu durchlaufen. Diese wird ebenfalls als überwiegend an den kontingenten Bedürfnissen der für die Konsumgüterproduktion zuständigen Industriekombinate orientiert angesehen, was einmal mehr die Versuche des MfS unterstreicht, die von der politischen Führung geförderten Hilfsmaßnahmen zu unterstützen. Bei der Militärspionage auf der Halbinsel erzielte das MfS die beständigsten Ergebnisse. Die Analysten des HV A verfügten über detaillierte Informationen über die Strukturen der NATO in Italien, über die Stationierung italienischer und amerikanischer Kontingenten auf der Halbinsel und über einige der wichtigsten strategischen Infrastrukturen des Atlantischen Bündnisses auf und unter dem Territorium (siehe den Fall des NIPS), Kenntnisse die zum großen Teil mithilfe der Warschauer-Pakt-Verbundeten erlangt wurden. Die Bruderorgane erscheinen als Quelle in fast allen betrachteten Spionagebereichen. In den 1970er und 1980er Jahren kam es zu einer exponentiellen Vermehrung von Geheimdienstinformationen aus verbündeten Sicherheitsorganen, ein Zeichen dafür, dass die auf den oben erwähnten multilateralen Konferenzen formulierten Anreize des KGB für eine stärkere Zusammenarbeit nicht unbeachtet bleiben mussten. Es lässt sich nicht leugnen, dass zumindest für Italien die wachsende Zusammenarbeit zwischen kommunistischen Sicherheitsdiensten aus der ostdeutschen Dokumentation stark hervorgeht. Offen bleibt die Frage, ob Moskau tatsächlich vom Funktionieren des Systems profitiert hat, d.h. ob und in welchem Maße die alliierten Geheimdienste dazu beigetragen haben, die Entscheidungsprozesse des Kremls in Bezug auf die Halbinsel zu beeinflussen.:Inhaltsverzeichnis. Kapitel 1. Die DDR. Machtstrukturen und internationale Relevanz. 1.1. Der SED-Staat 1.1.1. Diktaturdurchsetzung. Die SED als Instrument der Arbeiterklasse zur Diktatur des Proletariats 1.1.2. Das Rechtssystem der DDR 1.1.3. SED und Gesellschaft 1.2. Die DDR im internationalen Kontext. UdSSR und BRD als bestimmende Faktoren der ostdeutschen Außenpolitik. 1.2.1. DDR und UdSSR 1.2.2. DDR und BRD 1.3. Die Stabilität gewährleisten. MfS, Partei und Gesellschaft 1.3.1. Erhaltung und Forschung. BStU, SED und MfS 1.3.2. MfS und ostdeutsche Gesellschaft 1.3.3. Das Gesicht dem Westen zu. Die Stasi im Ausland Kapitel II. Italien und DDR. 2.1. Politische Beziehungen 2.2. Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 2.3. Das „Centro Thomas Mann und die Kulturbeziehungen 2.4. SED und IKP Kapitel III. Italien in den Akten des MfS (1969-1970) 3.1. Politische Spionage und Quellen. 3.2. Die HV A und der Westen. Eine Bestandaufnahme. 3.2.1. HV A und politische Spionage. 3.2.2. Politische Spionage in Italien. 3.3. NATO und MfS 3.3.1. Militärspionage in Italien 3.3.2. Die Agenten 3.4. Die wissenschaftlich-technische Aufklärung über Italien 3.4.1. Italien in SIRA TDB 11 3.4.2. Die Hauptabteilung XVIII und der Bereich Kommerzielle Koordinierung (KoKo) 3.4.3. Fazit. 3.5. Italien in den Akten der Gegenspionage der DDR. 3.6. Das MfS und die politische Gewalt im Lichte der Dokumentation über die Roten Brigaden. 3.7. Die Datenbank SOUD und die Unterstützung der Bruderorgane bei der Informationssammlung über Italien. Schlussbemerkungen Literatutverzeichnis

This thesis attempts to prove the significance of the relationship between the United States and Australia, and how their similar cultures and experiences assisted creating that shared bond throughout the twentieth century. Chapter 2 examines the effects of the Cold War on both the United States and Australia, as well as their growing relationship during that period. There is some backtracking chronologically in order to make connections to important historical legacies such as the ANZAC Legend and settlement on the periphery of their respective societies. Then the first half of chapter 3 delves into the Vietnam War by examining the interactions of the American support unit, the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion, a helicopter unit that includes transports and gunships. Afterwards, the latter half of chapter 3 examines the Australians' after-action reports to better understand their tactical and operational methods. Finally, chapter 4 provides an overview of Australian and American interactions between the advisers and the Vietnamese, as well as their attitudes towards the end of the war and the withdrawal from Vietnam. The conclusion summarizes the significance of the thesis by reemphasizing the significance of US-Australian interactions in the twentieth century and the importance of continued studies on this topic between US and Australian historians.