À la suite d'attaques terroristes massives est apparue une motivation féroce qui risque d'être manipulée pour justifier des excès de force. Voulant prévenir des attaques armées contre leurs intérêts, certains États ont adopté des politiques de « tuerie ciblée » pour éliminer de façon permanente des terroristes en sol étranger qui menacent leur sécurité. II est pourtant illégal de tuer des individus en l'absence de conflits armes sans égard au droit à la vie. La présente recherche tient à déterminer si, en vertu du droit international, des États peuvent neutraliser par force des individus dangereux ou bien venir au secours d' otages en sol etranger. En étudiant l'article 51 de la Charte des Nations Unies, un certain nombre de conclusions sont apparues, notamment que des opérations pour « arrêter ou neutraliser » ne peuvent avoir lieu que dans des États qui supportent des terroristes ou qui restent indifférents face à leur présence, et que I'expression « guerre contre Ie terrorisme » ne peut permettre des «tueries ciblées » sans avoir à considérer les droits à la vie et à la légitime défense. Puisque toute division entre les membres de la communauté internationale peut venir limiter la prévention d'attaques, le fait que la coopération entre les États ayant abolis la peine de mort et ceux ayant recours aux « tueries ciblées » puissent en souffiir fait l'objet de cet ouvrage. Ladite recherche conclue que l'utilisation de « tueries ciblées » en dehors du contexte de conflits armés ne peut être permis qu'en dernière mesure lorsque réellement nécessaire pour prévenir des attaques armées et protéger la vie. / From the ashes of devastating acts of terrorism has arIsen a resolve so powerful that measures of counterterrorism risk being manipulated by states to justify excess. In an attempt to prevent armed attacks against their interests, a number of states have adopted policies of targeted killing to permanently incapacitate terrorists on foreign soil. The intentional killing of suspected offenders, however, cannot be lawfully carried-out by states in the absence of armed conflict without regard for the right to life. The following research attempts to determine whether it is permissible for nations to use force on foreign soil to . incapacitate dangerous individuals or rescue hostages under international law. By studying article 51 selfdefense of the United Nations charter, a number of conclusions are asserted, namely that operations to "arrest or neutralise" can only be carried-out in states that support terrorists or are complacent to their presence, and that declaring "war on terrorism" cannot allow governments to kill suspected terrorists in countries where there is no war, except in a manner that is reconcilable with the rights to life and selfdefense. Since division among members of the international community may ultimately diminish their ability to collectively suppress international terrorism, the potential for hindered cooperation between abolitionist states and those that carry-out targeted killings is also addressed. The current research concludes that targeted killings can only be justified outside the context of armed conflict when they are truly necessary as a last resort to prevent armed attacks and save lives. / "Mémoire présenté à la faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 10% des mémoires de la discipline.

Quel est le point commun entre George Orwell, André Malraux, Davy Crockett et Oussama Ben Laden ?Cette question pourrait en surprendre certains. Comment trouver un point commun entre, l’auteur de La Ferme des animaux et de 1984, le résistant et ministre français et l’élu du Congrès des États-Unis ancré dans la culture populaire ?Qui plus est s’ils le partagent avec l’ancien leader d’Al Qaida.Comme des milliers d’autres, ils ont été des « combattants étrangers ». En des temps différents et pour défendre des causes différentes, ils entreprirent un voyage qui les mena à prendre les armes dans des guerres étrangères. Ce phénomène historique a connu, depuis la dernière décennie, un nouveau tournant juridique à travers le flux des milliers d’étrangers qui ont rejoint l’une des parties belligérantes en Syrie ou en Irak. Pour faire face à cette menace pour la paix et la sécurité internationales, les Nations unies ont alors créé le statut juridique de « combattant terroriste étranger », soumettant ces étrangers des conflits armés aux dispositions de la lutte contre le terrorisme. Toutefois, ce statut semble souffrir de nombreuses lacunes qui, notamment, ne permettent pas de différencier un terroriste international d’un simple volontaire international, d’un membre d’un groupe armé organisé ou encore d’un combattant d’une force armée étatique. George Orwell, André Malraux et Davy Crockett seraient aujourd’hui sûrement considérés comme des « combattants terroristes étrangers ». De plus, l’application de ce statut pour identifier des acteurs des conflits armés entre en opposition avec certaines règles du droit international. Finalement, pour trouver le statut juridique des « combattants étrangers », pour les identifier et encadrer leurs activités, y compris leurs actes terroristes, c’est vers les règles du Droit international humanitaire qu’il faut se tourner. Les « combattants étrangers », même terroristes, sont déjà identifiés par les statuts du Droit dans la guerre. / What do George Orwell, André Malraux, Davy Crockett and Osama Bin Laden have in common? This question might be surprising to some. How to find a common trait between the author of Animal Farm and 1984, the French resistance former minister, and the elected representative of the United States congress rooted in popular culture? Especially, if they are to share it with the former leader of Al Qaeda.Like thousands of others, they were "foreign fighters". In different times and to defend different causes, they undertook a journey which led them to take up arms in foreign wars. This historic phenomenon underwent a new legal turning point the last decade through the flow of thousands of foreigners who joined one of the belligerent parties in Syria and Iraq. To address this threat to international peace and security, the United Nations created the legal term of “foreign terrorist fighter”, subjecting these foreigners in armed conflicts to provisions in international counter-terrorism law. However, this status suffers shortcomings, which make it impossible, in particular, to differentiate between an international terrorist, an international volunteer, a member of an organized armed group or even a combatant of a state armed force. Today, George Orwell, André Malraux and Davy Crockett would probably be considered as "foreign terrorist fighters". In addition, the application of such status to identify actors of armed conflicts is in opposition with some rules of international law. Finally, to determine the correct legal status of "foreign fighters", to identify them and thus regulate their activities, including their terrorist acts, it is to the rules of international humanitarian law that we must turn. Even when qualified as “terrorists”, "foreign fighters" are already identified by the status of the law of war. / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Dans un contexte où le terrorisme est de plus en plus présent au sein des conflits civils, les opérations de paix des Nations Unies sont régulièrement déployées au côté de forces de contreterrorisme. Ces derniers manquent généralement d’efficacité dans leur mission en attisant le terrorisme plutôt que de le réduire. Dans ces conditions, en général, les opérations de paix coopèrent avec ces forces de lutte contre le terrorisme ce qui influence leur efficacité dans la mise en œuvre de leur mandat. Au Mali, depuis 2013, la MINUSMA est déployée en parallèle des forces françaises (l’opération Serval puis Barkhane) et d’une force de contreterrorisme créé par les pays du Sahel. Elle coopère avec elles dans la limite de leurs mandats respectifs. La mission doit ainsi faire face à de nouveaux défis dus à un environnement sécuritaire plus complexe, un manque de ressource pour faire face au terrorisme et une coopération avec le local compliqué à mettre en œuvre. Dans ce sens, l’efficacité de la MINUSMA est largement amoindrie par sa coopération avec les interventions militaires de lutte contre le terrorisme. / In a context where terrorism is increasingly present in civil conflicts, United Nations peace operations are regularly deployed alongside counterterrorism forces. The latter are generally ineffective in their mission by fueling terrorism rather than reducing it. Under these conditions, in general, peace operations cooperate with these counterterrorism forces, which influences their effectiveness in the implementation of their mandate. In Mali, since 2013, MINUSMA has been deployed alongside French forces (Operation Serval then Barkhane) and a counterterrorism force created by Sahel countries and cooperating with them within the limits of their respective mandates. The mission must therefore face new challenges due to a more complex security environment, a lack of resources to deal with terrorism and cooperation with the locals which is difficult to implement. In this sense, the effectiveness of MINUSMA is greatly diminished by its cooperation with military interventions that combat terrorism.

Over 5,000 European citizens joined the ranks of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the early 2010s. Since the rollback of the terrorist organization in 2016, European Union (EU) member states have had to decide whether or not to repatriate these individuals who were made prisoners mainly by Iraqi, or Kurdish authorities. France, the EU country that saw the highest number of its citizens join ISIS was also directly targeted by terrorist attacks orchestrated by ISIS returnees. From 2017 to 2019, it relied heavily on a non-repatriation approach, a measure which was welcomed by the general public but criticized by human rights and legal experts. However, in 2019, the withdrawal of US troops and the Turkish offensive in North-East Syria have further destabilized the region and pushed the French government to adapt its strategy. This study aims at understanding how the Macron administration legitimized the measures it implemented to tackle the ISIS returnees phenomenon and whether its approach has evolved. Through critical discourse analysis (CDA) and by drawing from the securitization theory, this research investigates the official communications of the French government between 2017 and 2020. The data will reveal that the “low-probability, high impact” threat posed by ISIS returnees has been over-securitized. This might lead an over-perception of this threat, which could threaten the social cohesion of the country and make measures bargaining with human rights and the rule of law acceptable for the public opinion. While many contributions have analyzed the policies and laws related to the issue of ISIS returnees in the EU, few have investigated how states responded to it in their official communications. With a focus on the EU country that has been the most concerned by this phenomenon, this study will help to bridge this gap in knowledge and will have broader implications for discursive practices regarding ISIS returnees and terrorism in Europe and the West.

security of nation. What is intelligence's role in the case of Israel? How has it evolved during s that Israel has learned from its mistakes in the past "has actually picked up that up call", and has made its intelligence the most powerful and reliable weapon in their V posledních několika desetiletích byla inteligence srdcem boje proti terorismu a bezpečnosti národa. Jaká je úloha zpravodajských služeb v případě Izraele? Jak se vyvíjel během své existence? Jaké byly zaměřující se události, selhání, která způsobila tento vývoj ve inteli Jaká je úloha inteligence v boji proti terorismu? Většina studií ignoruje zásadní roli, kterou inteligence přináší do arény, nebo se zaměřuje pouze na její nejkontroverznější aspekty. Tento článek tvrdí, že se Izrael poučil ze svých chyb v minulosti "skutečně vzal toto budící volání" a učinil ze své inteligence nejsilnější a nejspolehlivější zbraň ve svém arzenálu v národní bezpečnosti. Prozkoumá a důležité role, které musí každé odvětví zpravodajství přinést ke stolu blémy mají jednotlivé pobočky a jak mohou zabránit problémům? Tato práce bude zdůrazňovat klady a efektivitu izraelského modelu boje proti terorismu jako dosud nejúčinnějšího a nejúspěšnějšího s ohledem na liberální demokracii. o dvojsečný meč, který nemůže být nahrazen žádnou jinou formou sběru inteligence.

The way communities build resiliency and prepare for acts of terrorism is ambiguous in the United States; best practices remain unclear. Due to mobility and advancements in communication technologies, individuals and organizations share information, incite anger, recruit, and act on ideological grievances with ease. Such grievances are bolstered by the political and social exclusion of disparate groups through poorly designed policies and ineffective government structures. Using a combination of social constructivism and systems thinking theories, this case study explored collaboration efforts between government agencies and nongovernment experts in Oklahoma City, OK, identifying best practices as a result of lessons learned following the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building. Data were acquired through public records related to the bombing, combined with a qualitative survey of 31 community leaders. These data were inductively coded and subjected to a thematic analysis procedure. Key findings indicate that while open communication with the community and increased coordination were suggested by participants, reports were kept internal to each agency and not widely shared or implemented effectively across the community. Sharing the identified best practices and acknowledging collaboration opportunities promotes positive social change by involving the broader community and building early resiliency to address ideologic grievances and create more effective community counterterrorism plans.

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The thesis analyzes how the administrations of Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush used force in response to incidents of international terrorism. Key players in each administration and whether they advocated a law enforcement approach or a war paradigm approach to counterterrorism are examined. In addition, Koh¿s pattern of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance forms a theoretical lens through which to compare and contrast administrations. An assessment of the role of Congress in making the administrations¿ counterterrorism policies confirms the vitality of this pattern, and suggests future administrations will adhere to it. During the George W. Bush administration, Koh¿s pattern of executive initiative (led by personalities like Vice President Cheney), congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance combined with the 9/11 tragedy and pervasive fears of another attack to create a ¿perfect storm¿ known as the ¿war on terror¿. The research also analyzes to what extent the four administrations were constrained by international legal norms on the use of force, i.e. articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter. On the domestic side, the thesis analyzes the extent to which American legal norms on the use of force constrained the administrations. Although the lack of compelling constraints on the use of force is present in all four administrations, the thesis indicates that the George W. Bush administration embodied an extreme example of this trend.

The Arab Spring led to the overthrow of multiple authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa and to the flow of arms and fighters from Libya to Western African countries, triggering the crisis in the Sahel and altering the security landscape of the region. The Sahel, a quite stable region, became vulnerable to the rise of terrorism due to political instability, internal conflicts dynamics and power vacuum which led to ungoverned spaces to be seen as safe havens to terrorist groups. The international community, fearing the spread of terrorism, initiated multiple operations in the region such as an UN mission in Mali – MINUSMA – and the French-led intervention in the G5 – operation Barkhane. After 9/11, a change in perception took place and terrorism now came to be seen as a transnational threat to world peace and stability, leading to the inclusion of a new role during peacekeeping operations – stabilisation – achievable by the use of military power. This study, based on secondary data research, aims to understand the transformation of peace and counterterrorism operations in the Sahel region. The study notes that the view of Sahelian states as fragile and weak and due to that the perfect target for transnational terrorism justifies the West interventions in the region. However, even under a development-security nexus, all interventions were carried out with only one purpose – fight against terrorism – as the global war on terror was seen as required to reinstate security in the Sahel. In this sense, MINUSMA can be seen as a laboratory test, also because it was working side by side with French troops which were under a counterterrorism mandate, which goes completely out of UN’s character. This mission created a dangerous precedent as it goes beyond the normal understanding of peacekeeping missions. This thesis argues that the change of peace and counterterrorism operations in the region happened due to the perception of terrorism as a transnational threat and of the Sahel region as a safe haven for the proliferation of terrorism. Moreover, all interventions had Western interests in mind and not even one was focused on addressing the underlying causes of the conflicts such as political instability, climate change and food insecurity which enlarged the humanitarian challenges in the Sahel.

The attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) caused thousands of deaths, national and global panic, and immediate action by the federal government to protect the borders of the United States of America (USA) from terrorism. In response to these attacks, the United States (U.S.) government enacted laws for law enforcement agencies to protect against terrorist activities. Law enforcement agencies are effective in combating terrorism, but their measures contain a major flaw - the improper use of race in profiling to address national security and public safety concerns. Racial profiling is an ineffective measure for preventing terrorism. There are solutions to correct this flaw through reconstructing training and implementing policies for all law enforcement agencies. The intent of this thesis is to discuss the history and the effectiveness of profiling in U.S. post-9/11 counterterrorism through theoretical research of peer-reviewed journals and articles, relevant laws, and United States Supreme Court cases to offer solutions to the problems racial profiling presents. The discussion will generate a search for new ways law enforcement agencies could conduct daily counterterrorism operations.