The attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) caused thousands of deaths, national and global panic, and immediate action by the federal government to protect the borders of the United States of America (USA) from terrorism. In response to these attacks, the United States (U.S.) government enacted laws for law enforcement agencies to protect against terrorist activities. Law enforcement agencies are effective in combating terrorism, but their measures contain a major flaw - the improper use of race in profiling to address national security and public safety concerns. Racial profiling is an ineffective measure for preventing terrorism. There are solutions to correct this flaw through reconstructing training and implementing policies for all law enforcement agencies. The intent of this thesis is to discuss the history and the effectiveness of profiling in U.S. post-9/11 counterterrorism through theoretical research of peer-reviewed journals and articles, relevant laws, and United States Supreme Court cases to offer solutions to the problems racial profiling presents. The discussion will generate a search for new ways law enforcement agencies could conduct daily counterterrorism operations.

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According to conventional wisdom winning hearts and minds is one of the most important goals for defeating terrorism. However, despite repeated claims about U.S. efforts to build popular support as part of the war on terror during the first seven years after 9/11, a steady stream of polls and surveys delivered troubling news. Using a counterinsurgency and social movement informed approach, I explain why the United States performed poorly in the race for Muslim hearts and minds, with a specific focus on problems inherent in the social construction of terrorism, the use of an enemy-centric model while overestimating agency, and the counterproductive effect of policy choices on framing processes. Popular support plays wide-ranging roles in counterterrorism, including: influencing recruitment, fundraising, operational support, and the flow of intelligence; providing credibility and legitimacy; and, sanctifying or marginalizing violence. Recognizing this the U.S. emphasized public diplomacy, foreign aid, positive military-civilian interactions, democracy promotion, and other efforts targeting populations in the Muslim world. To explain the problems these efforts had, this thesis argues that how Americans think and talk about terrorism, reflected especially in the rhetoric and strategic narrative of the Bush administration, evolved after 9/11 to reinforce normative and enemy-centric biases undermining both understanding of the underlying conflicts and resulting efforts. U.S. policy advocates further misjudged American agency, especially in terms of overemphasizing U.S. centrality, failing to recognize the importance of real grievances, and overestimating American ability to implement its own policies or control the policies of local governments. Finally, the failure to acknowledge the role of U.S. policies counterproductively impacted contested framing processes influencing the evolution of mobilization. The resulting rhetoric and actions reinforced existing anti- American views, contributed to the perception that the war on terror is really a war on Islam, and undermined natural counter narratives.

L’objectif de ce mémoire est d’analyser les impacts et l’efficacité de la politique d’assassinats ciblés d’Israël dans le cadre du conflit israélo-palestinien. Pour ce faire, trois angles d’approches sont utilisés; militaire, légale et politique. Pour cette raison, l’hypothèse de départ soutient que la politique compromet la résolution du conflit et se divise en trois sections. Tout d’abord, les assassinats ciblés nuisent au règlement du conflit car ils engendrent un cycle de représailles contre Israël. Deuxièmement, ils représentent une violation du droit international ainsi que du droit national israélien. Finalement, ils sont un sérieux obstacle à la résolution politique du conflit dû au climat de violence et de méfiance qu’ils instaurent. Dans la conclusion, il est retenu que, bien que la politique d’assassinats ciblés ne soit pas efficace pour lutter contre les organisations terroristes, elle n’engendre cependant pas d’effet contreproductif de cycle de violence. Dans un second temps, la politique va à l’encontre de lois internationales mais elle peut cependant être justifiée par certains articles issus de ces mêmes textes alors que la Cour suprême israélienne a reconnu que certaines opérations pouvaient s’avérées légales. Troisièmement, elle nuit bel et bien à la résolution politique du conflit israélopalestinien en exacerbant les tensions de par le climat qu’elle instaure. Finalement, les nombreux impacts de celle-ci sur le conflit n’en font pas une politique efficace. / This goal of this thesis is to analyse the impact and effectiveness of the Israeli targeted killing policy within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To this end, three different approaches will be used; military, legal and political. Our hypothesis supports that the policy impedes the resolution to the conflict and is divided into three sections. First of all, Israeli targeted killings impede the conflict resolution because they, in turn, generate retaliations against Israel. Secondly it is a clear violation of international rights, including those of the Israelis. Finally, the policy is a serious obstacle to the settlement of the conflict due to the violent and distrustful atmosphere it arouses. In the conclusion, it is said that, although the policy does not prove to be an effective measure to fight terrorism, neither does it create an escalating cycle of violence. Secondly, the policy is a violation of the international legal system; however it can still be justified by some of the articles present in the same law texts. The Israeli Supreme Court has ruled that some of the operations could be legal. Thirdly, it is effectively detrimental to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because the ambiance it creates exacerbates tensions. In conclusion, the myriad of impacts the policy has on the conflict make it ineffective.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / Terrorism is the principal threat to global and national security in the post-11 September world. Facing terrorist threats at home and abroad, the United States has declared counterterrorism its top priority. As the United States embarks on its global counterterrorism campaign, it must draw on the experience of other countries. Specifically India, with an extensive history of counterterrorism efforts, can reveal important lessons applicable to America's endeavors. India offers three primary examples of counterterrorism strategies: Punjab, its northeast region, and Kashmir, from which four findings emerge. First, aggressive military operations are central to beating terrorism. Second, economic and social development programs, though not enough to end terrorism alone, are essential components of the larger national strategy. Third, terrorism cannot be stopped without international assistance. Terror networks export personnel, knowledge, weapons and money across international boundaries with growing frequency. This cannot be effectively stopped without a coordinated national and international effort. Fourth, to be successful, a counterterrorism strategy must engender the public's support for the government and promulgate a sense of public ownership to the conflict. By applying these lessons from the Indian case study, America's efforts to end terrorism both domestically and internationally will be significantly more productive. / Captain, United States Air Force

This thesis investigates how and why U.S. policies and agencies are ill-equipped to respond to narco-terrorism and offers some policy recommendations for remedying that. Narco-terrorism is the merging of terrorism and drug trafficking. Terrorist organizations and narcotics traffickers each have much to offer the other; there is potential for symbiosis in the form of cooperation and even hybridization. Examination of the dynamics between terrorist organizations and drug traffickers, combined with an evaluation of the US responses to narcoterrorism in Colombia and Afghanistan, makes it clear that current US policy responses fail to recognize narcoterrorism as a unique challenge, and instead attempt to deal separately with terrorism and drug trafficking. This approach has the potential to actually worsen both situations. The US needs a narcoterrorism strategy and institutions in place to implement it.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 2, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Dec 29, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Dec 29, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.