On 18 November 2010, the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) held that legal reforms adopted by Senegal in 2007 to incorporate international crimes into the national Penal Code to enable its domestic courts to prosecute Hissene Habre for, among others, crimes against humanity committed in Chad twenty years before, violated the principle of legality, specifically the principle against non-retroactivity of criminal law. The court held that such crimes could be prosecuted only by a hybrid tribunal with the jurisdiction to try Habre for the international crimes based on general principles of law common to the community of nations. Some scholars opined that the ECOWAS decision was wrong, stating that the crimes in question were criminalised already under international law and that Senegal‟s legal reforms simply served jurisdictional purposes. Given that, as a core component of the principle of legality, the role of non-retroactivity is to prohibit the creation of new crimes and their application to past conduct, the opinions of such scholars may hold true. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2011. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ / nf2012 / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

No description available.

No / EU law is not a subject enjoyed by most students but it really does not have to be difficult. Every EU law question is likely to ask you to apply your knowledge of the law to a particular context – either a practical one, as in problem questions, or a more theoretical one, as in essay questions. For both you need to remember that EU law does not exist in isolation but is inextricably linked with the national legal systems of the Member States. The interaction between European law and these systems is crucial to understanding how EU law works. EU law is often considered in a political context and this has become very apparent in the UK following the referendum in June 2016 and the vote for ‘Brexit’. At te time of writing Brexit negotiations are continuing and for now EU law applies as it always has in the UK. Recognising that your political stance is likely to influence your views on EU law is valuable and something which can make your answers stronger, particularly in relation to questions on historical, constitutional or institutional issues.

Le Traité sur l’Union Européenne assigne à la Cour de Justice la mission de veiller au respect du droit dans l’application et l’interprétation des traités. A ce titre, elle interprète le droit de l’Union de manière à garantir une application uniforme du droit dans tous les Etats membres. De même, la Cour Commune de Justice et d’Arbitrage (CCJA) est chargée, conformément au Traité relatif à l’Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (OHADA), d’assurer dans les Etats Parties, l'interprétation et l'application communes du droit uniforme. Ces cours de justice partagent avec les juridictions nationales l’application judiciaire du droit né des traités. Mais les traités n’ont pas réalisé une fusion du système juridictionnel qu’ils ont créé avec celui des Etats membres et, une hiérarchie juridictionnelle n’a pas été établie entre la Cour de justice et les juridictions nationales. Se pose alors la question des moyens par lesquels ces cours de justice arrivent à imposer une application uniforme du droit dans les Etats membres. Après analyse, on relève qu’à travers l’attribution des pouvoirs juridictionnels, les traités ont conféré une autorité supranationale à la Cour de justice européenne et la Cour de justice de l’OHADA. En plus de cette autorité conférée qu’elles ne se contentent pas d’entretenir à l’égard des juridictions nationales, elles génèrent aussi de l’autorité dans le cadre de leur activité juridictionnelle. Ainsi, ces cours œuvrent pour une meilleure intégration régionale. De leur propre gré, elles n’hésitent pas à adopter des positions impérieuses de plus en plus conquérantes. Ce phénomène fait donc évoluer la conception classique des sources de l’autorité de ces cours. La CCJA bénéficie des prérogatives les plus offensives d’origine textuelle, au contraire de la Cour de justice européenne qui, quant à elle, apparaît plus conquérante dans sa jurisprudence. / According to the treaty on the European Union, the Court of justice ensures that, in the interpretation and application of the treaties the law is observed. As such, it interprets EU law to make sure it is applied in the same way in all EU countries. In the same way, the treaty of the Organization for the Harmonization of the Business Law in Africa (OHBLA) has conferred to the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA) the power to rule on, in the contracting states, the interpretation and enforcement of the treaty. Both regional courts share with national courts the power to apply the law resulting from the treaties.But there has not been a fusion of the judicial system of the member states and the community judicial system. No judicial hierarchy has been established between community courts and national courts. This brings the question of by which means the regional courts can enforce the uniform application of the law in the member states. After analysis, it appears that by granting jurisdictional power, the treaties gave a supranational authority to the European Court of Justice and the CCJA. In addition to the power granted to them, the courts also generate authority through their jurisdictional activities. Thus, the courts work for a better integration of the judicial systems by adopting more and more conquering authoritarian positions. This phenomenon has led to a change in the classical conception of the sources of power of the courts. The CCJA enjoys more power from treaties than the European Court of Justice which is more offensive in case law setting.

The aim of my master thesis is to analyze hindrances to free movement of workers both from the theoretical point of view and in relation to the European Court of Justice cases. In the first part of the thesis I summarize the development of European integration and general principles of free movement of persons. Then the attention is paid to free movement of workers itself. The definition of a worker, primary and secondary legislation governing free movement of workers and the scope of free movement of workers are presented as well. Moreover, derogations from the principle of free movement of workers are discussed. The next part of the thesis is dedicated to the description of the European Court of Justice, its composition and various types of proceedings. In the last part of the thesis the most significant ECJ cases concerning hindrances to free movement of workers are selected and analyzed.

The aim of this thesis is catch a comprehensive procedure of the Czech republic during the defense of national interests in proceedings before the Court of Justice of the EU. First the thesis characterizes methods of the Agent during his representation of the Czech republic before institutions of the EU. After that the thesis characterizes the most important institution for the thesis, the Court of Justice of the EU. In thesis reader can read about the most important references for a preliminary ruling, that the Czech republic took part in. The second largest chapter deals with Infrigement proceedings. The thesis ends with summary of others proceedings.

Africa has always aspired for the economic integration of its markets. This endeavour is evident right from the 1960s clamour for independence and shortly thereafter, as newly independent states. During this period African countries under the umbrella of the OAU underscored economic cooperation as the basis for intra-African relations. However, it was not until the year 1991, with the conclusion of the AEC Treaty, that the continent formally adopted a framework and roadmap towards continental economic integration. The 40-year roadmap towards a continental economic community was premised upon the two principles of harmonisation and devolution. Moreover, the six-stage integration process set out in Article 6 of the AEC Treaty identifies the eight RECs in Africa as the building blocks for the continent’s proposed single market and economic union. It also underpinned the economic integration of the continent on the harmonious co-existence of the RECs. A step-wise ambitious integration model was adopted under Article 6 of the AEC Treaty. The model envisaged the creation of a Free Trade Area (FTA), followed by a Customs Union, a Common Market and ultimately a fully-fledged Economic Union. As a first step towards the continental integration, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was unveiled in 2018. Cross border, intra-African trade, is bound to lead to a rise in investment and commercial transactions on the continent. This, in turn, will inevitably lead to disputes which require resolution. The economic integration of the continent is fast evolving under the aegis of the AU; whose dispute settlement system is currently also under review. Significantly, the AU has consolidated its dispute settlement mechanism, following the merger in 2008 of the ACJ and ACH&PR, into a single AU court, known as the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJ&HR). It is within the context of the merged AU single court that this thesis grounds itself. It seeks to interrogate the adequacy of the continental trade and investment dispute settlement system and examines its viability within the consolidated AU dispute settlement system. While the AU led continental economic integration gains pace, the dispute settlement system, critical for the integration, is either lagging behind or is not receiving adequate attention. As a result, the dispute settlement systems created under the AEC and AfCFTA are incongruent with the principles of harmonisation and devolution, which underpin the continent’s economic integration goals. The recommendations proffered, align with the philosophy of harmonising and devolving the continental trade and investment dispute settlement system. The research proposes to locate the continental trade and investment dispute settlement within the AU single court system. The principal recommendation is not only to expand the Court’s jurisdiction in order to accommodate the trade and investment mandate, but also to use sub-regional REC judicial organs as courts of first instance for the ACJ&HR. A hierarchical order of the continental court system, with the single AU Court at the apex, is also proposed in this study as the supreme overarching supranational judicial organ. / Public, Constitutional, and International Law / LL.D.

The Court of Justice of the European Union has in its case law been strict in its approach towards Member States’ legislative measures providing for retention of and access to data relating to electronic communications. In recent case law the Court has made clear that also such provisions with the object of safeguarding national security need to comply with EU law and the Court’s jurisprudence. This might mean that the Swedish cable-based signals intelligence is within the scope of EU law contrary to the previous conception. It is decisive for whether the Swedish signals intelligence is within the scope of EU law whether the requirement on the providers of electronic communications systems to transfer all signals crossing the Swedish border to collaboration points, in order for the signals intelligence to be carried out, is to be interpreted as a requirement on the providers to process personal data. If within the scope of EU law, a great majority of the Swedish signals intelligence could be disproportionate in the light of the Court’s case law and thus contrary to EU law. Since the signals intelligence is considered to be an indispensable tool to solve all tasks the Swedish foreign intelligence encompasses this could affect the capability of the foreign intelligence.

<p>Постојеће законодавство ЕУ не пружа довољан правни основ за слободно кретање привредних друштава међу државама чланицама ЕУ из разлога недовољне легислативне активности органа ЕУ. Одредбе о слободи настањивања из Уговора о функционисању Европске уније не дају јасну слику о томе коју теорију о припадности привредних друштава треба примењивати како би привредна друштва несметано уживала слободу настањивања &ndash; теорију оснивања, теорију стварног седишта или, пак, неку трећу. Вишегодишњи неуспеси органа ЕУ да правно уреде питање припадности привредних друштава дали су слободу Суду ЕУ да буде веома активан у креирању судске праксе поводом припадности привредних друштава, а путем тумачења слободе настањивања. Видна је разлика између либералистичког приступа Суда са једне стране и протекционизма ког поједине државе чланице ЕУ потенцирају у својим националним правима, као и кроз органе ЕУ.<br />Пракса Суда ЕУ показала је да се разлике између теорија о припадности привредних друштава могу премостити, а да при томе не дође до напуштања једне од њих. Тако би се из теорије оснивања прихватило начело аутономије воље оснивача, док би се из теорије стварног седишта прихватио став да државе чланице имају право да интервенишу у одређеним питањима из домена права привредних друштава, када је то потребно ради заштите одређеног општег интереса. Разлике између теорије оснивања и теорије стварног седишта суштински представљају разлике у поимањима обима државног суверенитета од стране различитих држава чланица ЕУ. Тако се оне државе које желе да стимулишу развој привреде привлачењем страних инвеститора одлучују за прихватање теорије оснивања, док са друге стране теорију стварног седишта прихватају оне државе које желе да остваре што је могуће већу контролу привредних активности које се врше на њеној територији.<br />Иако су и Суд ЕУ и правна теорија покушавали да реше питање сукоба између две преовлађујуће теорије о припадности привредних друштава &ndash; теорије оснивања и теорије стварног седишта &ndash; то се до данашњег дана није догодило, превасходно јер су наведене теорије засноване на двема супротстављеним филозофијама. Филозофија којом се води теорија оснивања потиче из држава које имају традиционално јаку међународну трговину и које, стога, проблему прилазе на један отворенији и флексибилнији начин, стављајући у први план пре свега слободу трговине и принцип сигурности у привредним односима. Теорија стварног седишта проблему прилази сагледавајући стварну везу између одређеног привредног друштва и одређене државе.&nbsp;<br />Из скоријих пресуда Суда ЕУ може се закључити да право ЕУ све више иде ка прихватању теорије оснивања као преовлађујуће теорије о припадности привредних друштава, која, међутим, не може бити примењивана без корективних мера којима би се штитила права трећих лица. Оно што би требало да буде повезујући чинилац и за теорију оснивања и за теорију стварног седишта јесте управо то што је њихов коначан циљ исти, а то је што мање ограничење слободе настањивања привредних друштава.</p> / <p>Postojeće zakonodavstvo EU ne pruža dovoljan pravni osnov za slobodno kretanje privrednih društava među državama članicama EU iz razloga nedovoljne legislativne aktivnosti organa EU. Odredbe o slobodi nastanjivanja iz Ugovora o funkcionisanju Evropske unije ne daju jasnu sliku o tome koju teoriju o pripadnosti privrednih društava treba primenjivati kako bi privredna društva nesmetano uživala slobodu nastanjivanja &ndash; teoriju osnivanja, teoriju stvarnog sedišta ili, pak, neku treću. Višegodišnji neuspesi organa EU da pravno urede pitanje pripadnosti privrednih društava dali su slobodu Sudu EU da bude veoma aktivan u kreiranju sudske prakse povodom pripadnosti privrednih društava, a putem tumačenja slobode nastanjivanja. Vidna je razlika između liberalističkog pristupa Suda sa jedne strane i protekcionizma kog pojedine države članice EU potenciraju u svojim nacionalnim pravima, kao i kroz organe EU.<br />Praksa Suda EU pokazala je da se razlike između teorija o pripadnosti privrednih društava mogu premostiti, a da pri tome ne dođe do napuštanja jedne od njih. Tako bi se iz teorije osnivanja prihvatilo načelo autonomije volje osnivača, dok bi se iz teorije stvarnog sedišta prihvatio stav da države članice imaju pravo da intervenišu u određenim pitanjima iz domena prava privrednih društava, kada je to potrebno radi zaštite određenog opšteg interesa. Razlike između teorije osnivanja i teorije stvarnog sedišta suštinski predstavljaju razlike u poimanjima obima državnog suvereniteta od strane različitih država članica EU. Tako se one države koje žele da stimulišu razvoj privrede privlačenjem stranih investitora odlučuju za prihvatanje teorije osnivanja, dok sa druge strane teoriju stvarnog sedišta prihvataju one države koje žele da ostvare što je moguće veću kontrolu privrednih aktivnosti koje se vrše na njenoj teritoriji.<br />Iako su i Sud EU i pravna teorija pokušavali da reše pitanje sukoba između dve preovlađujuće teorije o pripadnosti privrednih društava &ndash; teorije osnivanja i teorije stvarnog sedišta &ndash; to se do današnjeg dana nije dogodilo, prevashodno jer su navedene teorije zasnovane na dvema suprotstavljenim filozofijama. Filozofija kojom se vodi teorija osnivanja potiče iz država koje imaju tradicionalno jaku međunarodnu trgovinu i koje, stoga, problemu prilaze na jedan otvoreniji i fleksibilniji način, stavljajući u prvi plan pre svega slobodu trgovine i princip sigurnosti u privrednim odnosima. Teorija stvarnog sedišta problemu prilazi sagledavajući stvarnu vezu između određenog privrednog društva i određene države.&nbsp;<br />Iz skorijih presuda Suda EU može se zaključiti da pravo EU sve više ide ka prihvatanju teorije osnivanja kao preovlađujuće teorije o pripadnosti privrednih društava, koja, međutim, ne može biti primenjivana bez korektivnih mera kojima bi se štitila prava trećih lica. Ono što bi trebalo da bude povezujući činilac i za teoriju osnivanja i za teoriju stvarnog sedišta jeste upravo to što je njihov konačan cilj isti, a to je što manje ograničenje slobode nastanjivanja privrednih društava.</p> / <p>The current EU legislation does not provide a sufficient legal basis for the free movement of companies within the member states of the EU, due to insufficient legislative activities of the EU institutions. The provisions on the freedom of establishment contained in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union do not show a clear picture on which of the theories on the nationality of companies ought to be applied in order for companies to enjoy the freedom of establishment without a hindrance &ndash; the incorporation theory, the real seat theory or some other theory. Perennial failures of the EU authorities to put in order the legislation pertaining to the question of the nationality of companies have resulted in wide discretion of the Court of Justice of the European Union to actively create the case-law in regards to the nationality of companies, by means of interpretation of the freedom of establishment. The difference between the liberal approach adopted by the Court, on one side, and the protectionism that some member states are so prone to in their national laws and which they eagerly advocate via the institutions of the EU, on the other side, is blatant.&nbsp;<br />The case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU has shown that the differences between theories for establishing the nationality of companies could be overcome, without abandoning one or the other. This could be done by accepting the principle of autonomy of will, characteristic for the incorporation theory, whereas the stance that member states are entitled to intervene in certain matters of company law, if necessitated by the protection of certain public interests, could be harvested from the real seat theory. The distinction between these two theories basically stems from divergent conceptions of the scope of state sovereignty advanced by different member states of the EU. This means that states keen to stimulate industry growth opt for the incorporation theory, while on the other hand, the real seat theory is adopted by those states avid to control, to the fullest possible extent, the economic activities performed on their territory.<br />Although both the Court of Justice of the EU and the doctrine have attempted to resolve the contention between the two dominant theories on the nationality of companies&nbsp; &ndash; the incorporation theory and the real seat theory &ndash; no solution has hitherto been found, mainly because the two theories are strongly based on two opposing philosophical viewpoints. The mindset that navigates the incorporation theory is derived from states with traditionally substantial international trade and which states, accordingly, approach the pertinent problem in a more open and flexible manner, putting first and foremost the freedom of trade and the principle of certainty in economic relations. The real seat theory, however, approaches the issue by contemplating the actual connection between a company and a certain state.<br />&nbsp; It can be deduced from recent judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the law of the European Union is more and more inclined to adopt the incorporation theory as the dominant theory on the nationality of companies; this theory, however, cannot be implemented without applying corrective measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of third persons. What ought to be the connecting factor for both the incorporation theory and the real seat theory is precisely the fact that their final goal is identical &ndash; that is to reduce, to the fullest possible extent, the limitations on the freedom of establishment of companies.</p>

La demande reconventionnelle est une conclusion du défendeur qui poursuit des avantages autres que le simple rejet de la prétention du demandeur. Elle peut être introduite dans toutes les juridictions, mais devant la Cour Internationale de Justice elle présente des caractéristiques particulières que notre recherche a souhaité mettre en lumière. Celles-ci apparaissent tant dans les éléments constitutifs de cette demande que dans ses conditions de recevabilité. En ce qui concerne les éléments de sa définition, il ressort de la jurisprudence de la Cour qu’elle est une demande autonome et indépendante, qu’elle est un moyen de défense, qu’elle est formée par le défendeur et qu’elle est une demande incidente. Toutefois, s’il ne fait aucun doute qu’elle constitue une demande autonome, il n’en demeure pas moins que la pertinence de son influence sur le sort de la demande de la partie adverse, l’identification de la partie habilitée à l’introduire en cas de saisine de la Cour par compromis, et sa distinction d’autres demandes réciproques, restent à déterminer. S’agissant des conditions de sa recevabilité, une distinction délicate doit être établie entre la « connexité » requise par l’article 80 du Règlement et la « jonction » de la demande à l’instance en cours. A ce titre une question centrale se pose, celle de savoir si le juge peut refuser une demande reconventionnelle pourtant connexe à l’objet du litige, et inversement, l’accepter quand la connexité fait défaut. Alors que la jurisprudence de la Cour paraît incertaine et la doctrine reste partagée, notre thèse avance des arguments pour une réponse favorable. / The counterclaim is the submission of respondent that pursuing objectives other than the mere dismissal of the claim of the applicant in the main proceedings. The counterclaim which the International Court of Justice may entertain by virtue of article 80 of the rules, although similar to those that can be introduced in other jurisdictions, has unique characteristics. This appears in both components of this claim and in its conditions of admissibility. Regarding its definition, if one should not doubt that it constitutes a legal claim, the fact remains that its influence on the fate of the claim of the other party, the identification of the party entitled to present such a claim when the case is brought before the Court by ad hoc compromise, and its distinction from other cross-claims, are to be determined. As regards the conditions of admissibility, after explaining that it must comes within the jurisdiction of the Court and maintain a direct connection with the subject-matter of the claim of the other party, this research emphasizes the distinction between its admissibility under rule 80 and its junction with the current proceeding. The goal is to demonstrate that an claim brought by the defendant may not be attached to the pending proceeding even though the conditions imposed by the rules are met.