No description available.

Refugee espionage, the act of spying on individuals to gather information for a foreign state, is illegal in Sweden. In this study, this phenomenon is considered part of transnational repression, an increasing threat against primarily dissidents posed by authoritarian states.  By using the method of qualitative content analysis on texts from the Swedish parliament and four large Swedish newspapers, the study attempts to answer questions about the debate on refugee espionage in the Swedish parliament and media. The timespan ranges from 2014- 2023. How do debaters talk about sovereignty and national security in relation to refugee espionage? Do debaters discuss the digital dimension: the opportunities, and risks from digital technology, in relation to refugee espionage?  The theoretical perspective is based on Lucas Kello’s cybertheory in international relations, on how cyberspace alters relations between states and has the possibility of expanding and enhancing ways to perform espionage.  Results reveal that debaters see refugee espionage as a threat to both Swedish sovereignty and national security. However, the debate rarely touches on concerns with digital technology as a mean to use refugee espionage against a state.

After the cold war the border or epicenter in the conflict between east and west has moved north. From central Europe to the Baltic sea region. The Åland archipelago in the middle of the Baltic Sea, is a military strategic interest for many actors in the Baltic Sea. Demilitarized and neutral according to international law. This thesis will study the Swedish, Finish, Russian and Nato perspective of which impact Åland has a on national security policy and military strategy for the Baltic region. What are the mechanisms and strategic motives for the actors in using Åland for military purposes. Will the international agreements concerning Åland have any effect in armed conflict? This case study is performed as a qualitative study based on Graham Allison and Philip Zelikows book Essence of decision which will also serve as frame of reference for the thesis. In order to understand Ålands special status according to international law, we have made a historic exposé which aims to give the reader the background needed to understand the islands significance, both historically and present. The analysis is based on four perspectives; The actors ideological position, The rational actor model (RAM), Organizational behavior and Governmental politics. The result of this study shows that Åland will not be left untouched in case of a conflict in the Baltic area. Due to the geographic position of the islands it will be affected regardless of its status in accordance with international law. The motives for using Åland for military purposes can be found with all our four actors with regards to the islands strategic location. The one who can control Åland will also increase his ability to control sea and airspace in the northern Baltics. He will also be able to control the sea lines of communication in to the bay of Bothnia. The incentive to re-militarize Åland and use the island for own military purposes however varies with the four actors. We have found that the incentive is strongest with Finland and Sweden and very limited with Russia and Nato. Ålands status as demilitarized and neutral will probably not have any big significance in an armed conflict in the Baltic sea area. However, it may delay military intervention on Åland but not stop it.

The need to collect electronic communications for foreign intelligence purposes has increased in the past two decades, primarily due to the increase of international threats such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Meanwhile, digitalization and technical innovation have given rise to new possibilities for government surveillance and expanded the scope of the types of communications that may be collected. This gives rise to issues concerning the balance between effective foreign intelligence activities and the protection of personal integrity. This thesis performs a comparative analysis of the protection of personal integrity in signals intelligence in Sweden and the United States, by examining the protection of personal integrity under the Swedish Instrument of Government and Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (European Convention) compared to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the requirements for signals intelligence under the Swedish Act (2008:717) on Signals Intelligence in Defense Intelligence Operations (the Surveillance Act) and § 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA, as amended). The analysis further includes a review of the safeguards adopted in each legal system to limit the collection of communications and to ensure that personal integrity is considered in signals intelligence operations. In regard to the protection of personal integrity, the analysis concludes that Swedish law, combined with the European Convention, offers a wider and more extensive protection for individuals when compared to the United States’ framework. However, all provisions include a requirement of proportionality or reasonableness intended to balance the need for effective law enforcement with the protection of personal integrity. The analysis further concludes that the Fourth Amendment has limited impact on signals intelligence carried out under § 702 FISA due to its limitations to the people of the United States, and that individuals' ability to exercise their rights is greater under the European Convention. The European Convention further offers protection beyond Sweden's borders, resulting in some protection for non-Swedish persons. As for the signals intelligence conducted under the Surveillance Act and § 702 FISA, several similarities and differences are identified. Both regulations limit the signals intelligence to be carried out for certain purposes. However, a notable difference is that, while signals intelligence under both the Surveillance Act and § 702 FISA are limited to foreign conditions, Swedish signals intelligence may be conducted on communications that cross Sweden’s borders. Meanwhile, collection under § 702 FISA may only target non-US persons outside of the United States. Despite this difference, signals intelligence under both regulations result in the collection of communications of the country’s own citizens. To limit the collection, both the Swedish National Defense Radio Establishment (Sw. Försvarets Radioanstalt, FRA) and the United States National Security Agency (NSA) apply certain safeguards. These include the use of search terms in Swedish signals intelligence and selectors in American signals intelligence. While they are both used to make relevant selections in the collection of communications, there are some notable difference between the two. For example, selectors consist of, inter alia, an email address or phone number, while search terms should not, as a general rule, target a specific individual. Further, there is no warrant requirement for collections under § 702 FISA compared to the Surveillance Act, which requires court approval. Lastly, in regard to the control and review of Swedish and American signals intelligence, the analysis concludes that such activities are conducted in different manners in both legal systems. This includes both internal and external controls. However, the Swedish control units appear to have greater opportunities to intervene by, for example, controlling the FRA's access to signal carriers and interrupting an ongoing collection if needed.

No description available.

The Court of Justice of the European Union has in its case law been strict in its approach towards Member States’ legislative measures providing for retention of and access to data relating to electronic communications. In recent case law the Court has made clear that also such provisions with the object of safeguarding national security need to comply with EU law and the Court’s jurisprudence. This might mean that the Swedish cable-based signals intelligence is within the scope of EU law contrary to the previous conception. It is decisive for whether the Swedish signals intelligence is within the scope of EU law whether the requirement on the providers of electronic communications systems to transfer all signals crossing the Swedish border to collaboration points, in order for the signals intelligence to be carried out, is to be interpreted as a requirement on the providers to process personal data. If within the scope of EU law, a great majority of the Swedish signals intelligence could be disproportionate in the light of the Court’s case law and thus contrary to EU law. Since the signals intelligence is considered to be an indispensable tool to solve all tasks the Swedish foreign intelligence encompasses this could affect the capability of the foreign intelligence.