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Underrättelsetjänsten har alltid haft som sin  viktigaste uppgift att agera som varningsklocka för hot mot landet för vilket den existerar. Under det kalla kriget var det största hotet mot Sverige en invasion och ett tredje världskrig. I och med murens fall och slutet på det kalla kriget ändrades hoten snabbt. Idag så finns inte längre någon tydlig hotbild mot Sverige men den ökade globaliseringen och det informationsberoende samhället skapar nya hot mot oss. En regional konflikt kan ha globala konsekvenser, och där med även beröra Sverige. I arbetet ställer sig författaren frågan hur den svenska underrättelsetjänsten har förändrats med den förändrade hotbilden och om underrättelsetjänsten är anpassad till de nya krav som ställs på den. Organisationens  struktur är i fokus men lag och förordningar som styr verksamheten tas också upp. Analysen sker genom att först problematisera organisationen på en underrättelsetjänst(generell) för att sedan analysera den svenska underrättelseorganisationen med dessa frågeställningar. Inledningsvis analyseras det hur den var organiserad 1976, därefter den organisatoriska förändring som gjordes mellan 1976 och 2011, för att slutligen analysera år 2012:s organisation och dra slutsatser om denna utvecklig och dagens organisation. De slutsatser som drogs var att den svenska underrättelsetjänsten försöker vara anpassad efter dagens behov men att arv ifrån tidigare organisationen skapar en viss ostruktur och att vissa enheters placering och tillhörighet är svår att motivera. / The main objective for the Intelligence community has always been to work as a safety net for the nation under which it exist.  The definition of threat has changed in recent times. During the Cold War the biggest threats against Sweden was a Third World War and an invasion of the nation. Due to the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War the main threats have changed. Today there is no conceivable threat against Sweden but the continuously increasing globalization and information dependent society creates new threats against it and a regional conflict could affect Swedish society The question that this study  raises is if Swedish intelligence has changed due to the change in threat and whether it has adapted to new demands places upon it. The organization structure is in focus but laws and regulations must also be taken into account. In order to conduct the analysis, the problem of organizing an intelligence organization at a general level must be addressed first. The Swedish intelligence community will be analysed based on previous problems starting with how the organisation was in 1976, followed by the changes in the organisation between 1976 and 2011 and finally with how the organisation stands today. Thereafter conclusions will be drawn from the analysis. In conclusion the Swedish intelligence community is trying to adapt to todays need but the legacy from past intelligence organizations creates an unstructured appearance and that the placement of some sections and units is hard to motivate.

The need to collect electronic communications for foreign intelligence purposes has increased in the past two decades, primarily due to the increase of international threats such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Meanwhile, digitalization and technical innovation have given rise to new possibilities for government surveillance and expanded the scope of the types of communications that may be collected. This gives rise to issues concerning the balance between effective foreign intelligence activities and the protection of personal integrity. This thesis performs a comparative analysis of the protection of personal integrity in signals intelligence in Sweden and the United States, by examining the protection of personal integrity under the Swedish Instrument of Government and Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (European Convention) compared to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the requirements for signals intelligence under the Swedish Act (2008:717) on Signals Intelligence in Defense Intelligence Operations (the Surveillance Act) and § 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA, as amended). The analysis further includes a review of the safeguards adopted in each legal system to limit the collection of communications and to ensure that personal integrity is considered in signals intelligence operations. In regard to the protection of personal integrity, the analysis concludes that Swedish law, combined with the European Convention, offers a wider and more extensive protection for individuals when compared to the United States’ framework. However, all provisions include a requirement of proportionality or reasonableness intended to balance the need for effective law enforcement with the protection of personal integrity. The analysis further concludes that the Fourth Amendment has limited impact on signals intelligence carried out under § 702 FISA due to its limitations to the people of the United States, and that individuals' ability to exercise their rights is greater under the European Convention. The European Convention further offers protection beyond Sweden's borders, resulting in some protection for non-Swedish persons. As for the signals intelligence conducted under the Surveillance Act and § 702 FISA, several similarities and differences are identified. Both regulations limit the signals intelligence to be carried out for certain purposes. However, a notable difference is that, while signals intelligence under both the Surveillance Act and § 702 FISA are limited to foreign conditions, Swedish signals intelligence may be conducted on communications that cross Sweden’s borders. Meanwhile, collection under § 702 FISA may only target non-US persons outside of the United States. Despite this difference, signals intelligence under both regulations result in the collection of communications of the country’s own citizens. To limit the collection, both the Swedish National Defense Radio Establishment (Sw. Försvarets Radioanstalt, FRA) and the United States National Security Agency (NSA) apply certain safeguards. These include the use of search terms in Swedish signals intelligence and selectors in American signals intelligence. While they are both used to make relevant selections in the collection of communications, there are some notable difference between the two. For example, selectors consist of, inter alia, an email address or phone number, while search terms should not, as a general rule, target a specific individual. Further, there is no warrant requirement for collections under § 702 FISA compared to the Surveillance Act, which requires court approval. Lastly, in regard to the control and review of Swedish and American signals intelligence, the analysis concludes that such activities are conducted in different manners in both legal systems. This includes both internal and external controls. However, the Swedish control units appear to have greater opportunities to intervene by, for example, controlling the FRA's access to signal carriers and interrupting an ongoing collection if needed.