The purpose of the study is to investigate and report on the origins and evolution of the Swedish intelligence organisation during the period 1905 to 1918. The study trail starts at the Swedish/Norwegian union crisis. According to Harald L. Wilensky's theories about intelligence organisations' ability to succeed primarily through professionalisation and centralisation, the security-policy situation during that crisis can be seen as a catalyst for the Swedish intelligence organisation's evolution. The study uses a qualitative text analysis with a hermeneutic approach. Through this method, an analysis of already written texts as well as new empirical data in the Swedish war archive in Stockholm has been made.The used material has been confronted to how the Swedish intelligence organisation has developed its interest and focus regarding information gathering and reporting, in order to meet its needs from Norway between the years 1905 to 1918.By addressing this issue, the study will show how collected image material evolved from being simply acquired material, to own produced photographs with detailed information, and that the initial deficit of mapping material of Norway was complemented and brought together with that same collected image material.The theoretical approach is confirmed through the reorganisation that takes place in 1908. When the Swedish intelligence agency is formed, the centralisation and professionalisation are, according to Wilensky, key to a successful intelligence organisation. This change, however, also comes with a great impact on how the Swedish military attachés report back to Sweden. Through the period 1905 to 1918, the Swedish military attaché reports are reshaped and over time, go from their bureaucratic structure towards the so-called handbrev[1]. This made it possible for the attachés to communicate in a more efficient and informal way with the Swedish foreign department at the General Staff, without the potentially wrong people gaining access to the material.This study has therefore broadened the previously existing perspective which is clearly Russia-oriented, to highlighting and accounting for how the Western threat from Norway made Sweden aware of the lack of intelligence that prevailed. The study shows that it was this growing need towards the West that caused the key evolution of intelligence. It thus clarifies a military-historical void within the Swedish intelligence organisation's emergence and evolution.  [1] In English called Hand letters

<p>During and after World War II Sweden was spying in the occupied Baltic countries which had been occupied, from 1943 by Nazi Germany and from 1944 by the Soviet Union. It began in 1943, with the Germans still occupying the Baltic countries, when Sweden and its intelligence service “C-byrån” recruited volunteers among the Baltic refugees in Sweden and sent them back to the countries they had fled from. Many of the Baltic refugees to Sweden were men aged 25-45 so the Swedish intelligence service had a good recruiting source. This started the first period of intelligence operations in the three Baltic countries. In 1946 Swedish intelligence was reorganized and Thede Palm was appointed head of, what was named, T-kontoret. He ran the T-kontoret until 1965. Palm transformed the intelligence to the situation needed for the Cold War and he expanded co-operation with the British Military Intelligence Service, MI6. This constitutes the second phase of Swedish intelligence operations in the Baltics. The first two years did not produce any exciting results. The reports from T-kontoret contained information mostly about the resistance movements in the three Baltic countries but not much about the military installations. The Swedish Defence Ministry and the Swedish High Commander of the Defence, Helge Jung, developed plans, based on a Soviet Union attack on Sweden, which was believed to be a real threat at that time. Besides, and in spite of Swedish neutrality, Helge Jung was very oriented to the West and often in opposition to parts of the Swedish Government which meant that the Government was not always fully informed about Swedish secret military operations in the Baltics and the Baltic Sea. When the Cold War intensified in 1948, the Swedes planned and carried out the setting-up of agents in the Baltics. This constitutes the third period of the operations. It all happened in co-operation with MI6. What they did not know about was that most of the operations were infiltrated by the Soviet MGB (the name of the Soviet secret police from 1946 to 1953) and therefore doomed to failure. This thesis focuses on the third period and the following questions: i) how did the results from the operations change between period 2 (1946-1948), and period 3 (1948-1953); ii) what was reported; and iii) did Swedish intelligence put the emphasis on special geographical areas and on specific targets? The results from the third period of intelligence operations in the Baltics were much better than before. The reports from the Baltics produced by T-kontoret increased from 10-20 per half-year to an average of 20-40 per half-year. The quality of the reports also improved (based on the scoring of the source and the message given by the Swedish Intelligence Service itself). The targets in the Baltics became more focused and the reports from Latvia followed by Estonia became more frequent than those from Lithuania, a fact that could have been influenced by Soviet immigration policies to the Baltic countries. In Latvia the focus was given to military targets, such as harbours and airports and the port in Liepaja and the airport Spilve outside Riga became top priorities. The thesis is based on documentation from the Swedish War Archives (Krigsarkivet) where access was given to the reports produced by T-kontoret from 1946 until 1953. We know from other sources that in 1957 the Soviet Union handed a protest note to the Swedish Government. The note was of course denied by the Swedes but after that the operations were ended both by the Swedes and the British Military Intelligence Services.</p>

During and after World War II Sweden was spying in the occupied Baltic countries which had been occupied, from 1943 by Nazi Germany and from 1944 by the Soviet Union. It began in 1943, with the Germans still occupying the Baltic countries, when Sweden and its intelligence service “C-byrån” recruited volunteers among the Baltic refugees in Sweden and sent them back to the countries they had fled from. Many of the Baltic refugees to Sweden were men aged 25-45 so the Swedish intelligence service had a good recruiting source. This started the first period of intelligence operations in the three Baltic countries. In 1946 Swedish intelligence was reorganized and Thede Palm was appointed head of, what was named, T-kontoret. He ran the T-kontoret until 1965. Palm transformed the intelligence to the situation needed for the Cold War and he expanded co-operation with the British Military Intelligence Service, MI6. This constitutes the second phase of Swedish intelligence operations in the Baltics. The first two years did not produce any exciting results. The reports from T-kontoret contained information mostly about the resistance movements in the three Baltic countries but not much about the military installations. The Swedish Defence Ministry and the Swedish High Commander of the Defence, Helge Jung, developed plans, based on a Soviet Union attack on Sweden, which was believed to be a real threat at that time. Besides, and in spite of Swedish neutrality, Helge Jung was very oriented to the West and often in opposition to parts of the Swedish Government which meant that the Government was not always fully informed about Swedish secret military operations in the Baltics and the Baltic Sea. When the Cold War intensified in 1948, the Swedes planned and carried out the setting-up of agents in the Baltics. This constitutes the third period of the operations. It all happened in co-operation with MI6. What they did not know about was that most of the operations were infiltrated by the Soviet MGB (the name of the Soviet secret police from 1946 to 1953) and therefore doomed to failure. This thesis focuses on the third period and the following questions: i) how did the results from the operations change between period 2 (1946-1948), and period 3 (1948-1953); ii) what was reported; and iii) did Swedish intelligence put the emphasis on special geographical areas and on specific targets? The results from the third period of intelligence operations in the Baltics were much better than before. The reports from the Baltics produced by T-kontoret increased from 10-20 per half-year to an average of 20-40 per half-year. The quality of the reports also improved (based on the scoring of the source and the message given by the Swedish Intelligence Service itself). The targets in the Baltics became more focused and the reports from Latvia followed by Estonia became more frequent than those from Lithuania, a fact that could have been influenced by Soviet immigration policies to the Baltic countries. In Latvia the focus was given to military targets, such as harbours and airports and the port in Liepaja and the airport Spilve outside Riga became top priorities. The thesis is based on documentation from the Swedish War Archives (Krigsarkivet) where access was given to the reports produced by T-kontoret from 1946 until 1953. We know from other sources that in 1957 the Soviet Union handed a protest note to the Swedish Government. The note was of course denied by the Swedes but after that the operations were ended both by the Swedes and the British Military Intelligence Services.

I arbetet har processen med att ta fram ett utbildningskoncept för en underrättelse- ochsäkerhetskarriär analyserats. Processen har genomförts under ledning av FM UndSäkC.Syftet med analysen har varit att studera huruvida processen har genomförts utifrån engemensam uppfattning om vilka kunskaper och förmågor som krävs för att tillgodoseunderrättelse- och säkerhetsfunktionens behov av kompetens och om det är personligaåsikter eller organisationens förväntningar som ligger till grund för resultatet.Analysen har genomförts utifrån Parasuraman, et al och deras teorier om olika källortill kvalitetsproblem i ett företags planering och agerande när nya produkter skall tasfram och marknadsföras. Underlaget har inhämtats genom intervjuer med respondenterfrån hela Försvarsmakten.Resultatet har visat att det till viss del finns olika uppfattningar om vem utbildningen ärtill för och att det därmed finns olika uppfattningar om vilka kunskaper och färdighetersom krävs. Vidare har undersökningen visat att det under processen endast i ringaomfattning har arbetats för att klarlägga förväntningar ute i organisationen. Orsaker tilldetta som förts fram är tidsbrist, ointresse och till viss del okunskaper. Resultatet istudien och framkomna förslag har legat till grund för en modell över hur ettprocessarbete kan genomföras. Modellen presenteras i slutet av detta arbete. / The essay has analysed the development process concerning the new trainingconcept for the Armed Forces Intelligence Service, led by the Armed ForcesIntelligence- and Security Centre. The purpose of the analysis has been tostudy if the process is conducted with a common conception of whatknowledge and ability is needed to meet the Intelligence Service’s competencerequirements. Furthermore to see if it is personal opinions or theorganization’s expectations that have constituted the suggested solutions. Theanalysis has been conducted from the theory of Parasuraman et al aboutdifferent sources of quality problems during the development process of a newproduct. The basic data has been obtained through interviews with respondentsfrom most of the branches of the Armed Forces. The result has shown thatthere are some differences in opinion on whom the training is meant for andthat there exist different opinions on what knowledge and ability is needed.The result has also revealed that the effort to ascertain the expectations in theorganization has been limited. The reasons for this, according to therespondents, is lack of time, lack of interest and to some extend ignorance.Suggestions from the respondents, together with the result in this study,constitute the framework of a model for a working process that is shown at theend of this essay. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 01-03

Syftet med uppsatsen är att teoretiskt avgöra om underrättelsefrågorna, de åtta s-en, tillsammans kan utgöra en grund för val av sensorkombinationer. Frågorna skall svara mot den frågeställning beslutsfattaren ställer till ledningsstödsystemet för att uppnå framtida förmågor. Uppsatsen har inledningsvis utvecklat tre av de förmågor som projekt FoRMA redovisar i sin rapport, avseende FM framtida förmågor år 2010. Förmågorna är identifiering, att verifiera före en insats och kunna bekräfta och dokumentera verkan av en insats. I uppsatsen behandlas endast elektrooptiska och elektromagnetiska sensorer som utifrån sina egenskaper delas in i olika sensorklasser. Sensorklasserna kopplas senare till underrättelsefrågorna. Vid analysen kopplas förmågorna, genom underrättelsefrågorna, ihop med sensorklasserna. Denna koppling ger för valda förmågor, ett utfall i sensorkombinationer som värderas. Resultatet visar att användandet av underrättelsefrågorna inte ger en entydig sensorkombination, som svarar mot sökt förmåga. För att klarlägga vilken sensorkombination som är lämpligast måste ytterligare information inhämtas om stridsfältsmiljön samt egenskaper hos målobjektet. Med hjälp av denna ytterligare information, faller det ut en bästa sensorkombination. Den förmåga som är realiserbar till år 2010, av de sensorkombinationer som värderades är: kunna bekräfta och dokumentera verkan av en insats / Based on the extensive changes that the Swedish Armed Forces are undergoing within the framework of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), there are reasons to examine what demands sensor-systems are needed to meet in the future. The Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) and The Swedish Defense Materiel Administration (FMV) made a study and identified important abilities. Some of the abilities were Identification, Verification of Targets before Impact and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) and will be further examined in this paper. The aim of this paper is to clarify if specified intelligence-questions toward Command and Control system can help to select adequate combination of multiple sensors that solves the chosen abilities that are needed within the specified timeframe in 2010. Open literature, reports and researches from FOI have been used during this work. To start the work it was necessary to couple ability towards. Then the questions were coupled towards classes of sensors. Different types of sensors were then divided in different sensor-classes. The result of the analysis shows that specified intelligence-questions could work in pinpointing out appropriate combination of sensors but the results were not unique. Further questions have to be found and answered i.e. conditions of the atmosphere and furthers information of the target. These facts could increase the possibility for the Command and Control system to deliver appropriate combination of multiple sensors in the future. An ability that will work within the timeframe is Battle Damage Assessment. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 99-01

Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka det som i militära sammanhang samlas under denengelska termen ”Medical Intelligence” eller med den svenska översättningen ”medicinskaunderrättelser”. Med uppsatsen avses att, ur ett militärt perspektiv, undersöka medicinskaunderrättelsers inverkan att lösa uppgifter såväl nationellt som internationellt, tyngdpunkten liggervid de internationella insatserna. För att få ytterligare ett djup och dimension i uppsatsen undersöksinverkan på olika militära ledningsnivåer, d.v.s. hur de medicinska underrättelserna inverkar påmilitärstrategisk, operativ respektive taktisk nivå.För uppsatsen har övergripande en kvalitativ deskriptiv arbetsmetod använts. Som teorianknytninghar valts NATO Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP 01).Uppsatsens viktigaste resultat är följande: Medicinska underrättelser ska stödja beslutsfattare,planerare och de som genomför insatser. Den viktigaste slutsatsen är att stridsvärdet är den mestavgörande faktorn i dessa underrättelser, d.v.s. möjligheterna att lösa de tilldelade uppgifterna. Omstridsvärdet är högt ökar även möjligheterna att lösa beordrade uppgifter och tvärt om. Enframgångsfaktor för medicinska underrättelse är en centraliserad ledning. USA har, som en globalaktör, valt en sådan lösning genom skapandet av AFMIC som en nationell strategisk resurs. MedSveriges Försvarsmakts ökade internatio nella engagemang, bl. a. genom EU:s krishantering bördenna funktion utvecklas. Inom alla ledningsnivåer bör rådgivare med både underrättelse- ochmedicinska kunskaper finns i syfte att stödja chefen. De hälso- och sjukvårdsrelaterade problemenär lika transnationella som den globala organiserade kriminaliteten och terrorismen. / The aim of this essay is to examine the definition of ”Medical Intelligence”.The essay will examine, from a military point of view, the medicalintelligence impact on military operations, national and international. Themain focus will be on multinational operations. Delving deeper I willexamine the impact on different command and control (C2) levels, howmedical intelligence can effect the military strategic, operational and tacticallevels.The main method for this essay has been a qualitative descriptive method.I have worked with the NATO Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP 01) for thetheoretical connections.The essay’s most important results are as follows:Medical intelligence must support decision makers, planners and operationalpersonnel on all levels. The most important conclusion is that fightingefficiency is the key factor. That means the possibility to achieve theobjectives in the planned or ongoing operation. If the fighting efficiency ishigh it is more likely to achieve the objective or vice versa.Another key factor for these types of intelligence is a centralised commandand control function. The United States of America have, as a global actor,chosen such a solution, by creating the Armed Forces Medical IntelligenceCentre (AFMIC) as a national strategic resource.With the Swedish Armed Forces´ increasing international engagements, e.g.through The European Union Crises Management, the function of medicalintelligence ought to be more developed. On all command levels, advisorswith both intelligence and medical knowledge should and must support thecommanders. The problems connected to the healthcare and medical fieldsare as transnational as those of global organised crime and terrorism. Wecannot afford to underestimate these threats. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 00-02

Bakgrund till uppsatsens tillkomst är sista decenniets omvärldsförändring och Sveriges allt ökande engagemang internationellt med förband och officerare i multinationella staber. Uppsatsen avhandlar huruvida den svenska operativa underrättelsebedömandemodellen skall förändras mot bakgrund av hur USA:s Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) är uppbyggd. Uppsatsen utgår från hypotesen att JIPB är mer detaljerad och penetrerar djupare fler områden än den svenska motsvarigheten. Uppsatsen inleds med en beskrivning av de två modellerna. Härvid är den amerikanska modellen beskriven relativt ingående. Efter denna del analyseras och jämförs de två modellerna i syfte att svara på den övergripande frågan huruvida den svenska operativa underrättelsebedömandemodellen skall bibehållas, förändras eller om en övergång ska ske till JIPB. Resultatet visar på att en övergång till den amerikanska modellen skall ske, dock med vissa kompletteringar från den svenska motsvarigheten. Som avslutning ges ett förslag till hur utveckling av underrättelsebedömandemetodik bör drivas vidare. / The background that gave rise to this paper is the change in the world around us during the last decade and Sweden’s ever increasing involvement internationally by sending units and officers to multi-national staffs. This paper discusses how the Swedish Method of Operational Intelligence Assessment will change in comparison to the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace of the US (JIPB).The paper begins with the hypothesis that the JIPB is more detailed and penetrates deeper into more areas than the Swedish equivalent. The paper continues with a description of the two models. In this connection, the American model is described fairly exhaustively. After this part, the two models are analysed and compared with the purpose of answering the overall question of whether or not the Swedish Method of Operational Intelligence Assessment should be retained, changed or if a transition to the JIPB should take place. The result indicates that a change to the American model will occur, though with certain additions from the Swedish equivalent. Finally, a suggestion is made for the continued development within the area of Operational Intelligence Assessment at an operational level. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 99-01

<p>Inom det akademiska studieområdet som berör underrättelseverksamhet finns inte någon vedertagen teori. Teorier avseende vad underrättelsetjänst är och hur den skall bedrivas varierar. Vidare har nationella särintressen stor inverkan vid utformningen av dessa. Inom den militära kontexten är läget i vissa stycken annorlunda. Dagens multinationella operationer kräver samarbete inom en rad olika områden inklusive underrättelsetjänst. I denna uppsats genomförs en studie av tre doktriner/handböckerna avseende underrättelsetjänst. Dessa undersöks utifrån de tre perspektiven Ledning, Adaptivitet och Samarbete. Syftet med detta är att finna vad dessa dokument framhåller som viktigt för underrättelsetjänstens utövande. Dessa viktiga punkter används därefter för att konstruera ett analysverktyg som kan undersöka huruvida dessa doktriner är implementerade inom en för närvarande högaktuell doktrin, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. Utifrån de doktriner och handböcker som denna undersökning har baserats på finns tydliga samband mellan hur underrättelsetjänst utövas mellan Sverige, USA och NATO. Detta trots det faktum att vissa variationer kring begrepp och upplägg förekommer mellan styrdokument. Samarbete utgör ett centralt begrepp mellan samtliga underrättelsedokument och förefaller även vara viktigt inom FM 3-24. Vikten av interoperabilitet inom underrättelsetjänsten, som samtliga underrättelsedokument betonar, tycks inte vara implementerad inom FM 3-24.</p> / <p>Within the academic field of intelligence studies, there is no established theory. Theories regardingwhat intelligence is and how it should be conducted vary, and national interests have a major impact in the design of these. Within the military context, the situation is different in certain aspects. Today's multinational operations require cooperation in a variety of areas, including intelligence. In this essay a study of three doctrine/manuals is presented. These are examined from three perspectives, Control, Adaptivity, and Cooperation. The purpose of this is to find what these documents present as important for intelligence exercise. These important points are then used to construct an analysis tool that examine whether these doctrines are implemented in a currently highly topical doctrine, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. This study shows a clear link between how intelligence services are organized in Sweden, the United States and NATO. This despite the fact that some variation around concepts and structures exists between their regulatory documents. Cooperation is a central concept among all intelligence documents and appears to be important in FM 3-24. The importance of interoperability within the Intelligence Service, as all intelligence document stresses, does not seem to be implemented in FM 3-24.</p>

Inom det akademiska studieområdet som berör underrättelseverksamhet finns inte någon vedertagen teori. Teorier avseende vad underrättelsetjänst är och hur den skall bedrivas varierar. Vidare har nationella särintressen stor inverkan vid utformningen av dessa. Inom den militära kontexten är läget i vissa stycken annorlunda. Dagens multinationella operationer kräver samarbete inom en rad olika områden inklusive underrättelsetjänst. I denna uppsats genomförs en studie av tre doktriner/handböckerna avseende underrättelsetjänst. Dessa undersöks utifrån de tre perspektiven Ledning, Adaptivitet och Samarbete. Syftet med detta är att finna vad dessa dokument framhåller som viktigt för underrättelsetjänstens utövande. Dessa viktiga punkter används därefter för att konstruera ett analysverktyg som kan undersöka huruvida dessa doktriner är implementerade inom en för närvarande högaktuell doktrin, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. Utifrån de doktriner och handböcker som denna undersökning har baserats på finns tydliga samband mellan hur underrättelsetjänst utövas mellan Sverige, USA och NATO. Detta trots det faktum att vissa variationer kring begrepp och upplägg förekommer mellan styrdokument. Samarbete utgör ett centralt begrepp mellan samtliga underrättelsedokument och förefaller även vara viktigt inom FM 3-24. Vikten av interoperabilitet inom underrättelsetjänsten, som samtliga underrättelsedokument betonar, tycks inte vara implementerad inom FM 3-24. / Within the academic field of intelligence studies, there is no established theory. Theories regardingwhat intelligence is and how it should be conducted vary, and national interests have a major impact in the design of these. Within the military context, the situation is different in certain aspects. Today's multinational operations require cooperation in a variety of areas, including intelligence. In this essay a study of three doctrine/manuals is presented. These are examined from three perspectives, Control, Adaptivity, and Cooperation. The purpose of this is to find what these documents present as important for intelligence exercise. These important points are then used to construct an analysis tool that examine whether these doctrines are implemented in a currently highly topical doctrine, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. This study shows a clear link between how intelligence services are organized in Sweden, the United States and NATO. This despite the fact that some variation around concepts and structures exists between their regulatory documents. Cooperation is a central concept among all intelligence documents and appears to be important in FM 3-24. The importance of interoperability within the Intelligence Service, as all intelligence document stresses, does not seem to be implemented in FM 3-24.

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