Thesis (Ph. D.)--Guo li zheng zhi da xue. / Reproduced from ms. copy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 534-546).

Thesis (M.A.)--Guo li Taiwan da xue, 1975. / Cover title. Reproduced from typescript; on double leaves. Bibliography: p. 131-136.

許文浩. / 手稿本(cops. 2 & 3 複印本) / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學硏究院歷史學部. / Shou gao ben (cops. 2 & 3 fu yin ben) / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 78-85. / Xu Wenhao. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue yan jiu yuan li shi xue bu. / 引論 --- p.1 / Chapter 第一章 --- 生平事略 --- p.3 / Chapter 第二章 --- 學術淵源 --- p.19 / Chapter 第三章 --- 學術路向與為學方法　 --- p.44 / Chapter 第四章 --- 哲學思想 --- p.60 / Chapter 第五章 --- 餘論　 --- p.75 / 參考書目 --- p.78 / 附錄──年譜簡表 --- p.86

本論文之研究，旨在檢討戴震反對程朱思想的意義，以澄清戴震對程朱思想的誤解， 並評估戴震哲學的價值．參考文獻以戴震《原善》、《緒言》、《孟子私淑錄》、《 孟子字義疏證》以及《戴震文集》為主．（上述各項，係以里仁書局重新標校之《戴 震集》為底本）又後人之論述戴震思想及其反程朱之相關論著，亦儘量加以參考．研 究方法則就戴震批評程朱的三個層面：形上學、心性說、工夫論，分別處理．處理方 法是：首先說明戴震的批評意見，其次介紹戴震的思想，最後是對戴震的批評加以檢 討． 本論文全一冊，計十萬餘字，分六章十四節．第一章是緒論，說明本文的研動機、方 法與宗趣，並考察前人的研究意見，以及說明本文所依據的資料等．第二章介紹戴震 的思想淵源、哲學著作、治學精神，以及戴震與程朱的關係；其次，則是分析戴震反 程朱思想的背景，以作為本文的研究基礎．第三章說明戴震對程朱「理氣論」的批評 ，介紹戴震「理存於氣」的主張，並檢討他反對程朱「理氣論」之得失．第四章說明 戴震對程朱「心性說」的批評，介紹戴震「血氣心知」的主張，並檢討他反對程朱「 心性說」之得失．第五章說明戴震對程朱「工夫論」的批評，介紹戴震的「工夫論」 ，並檢討他反對桯朱「工夫論」之得失．第六章是結論，檢討戴震反程朱思想的意義 ，以及評估戴震哲學的價值． 透過本論文之研究，可知戴震對程朱思想的批評，是出於誤解；但無可平認，程朱思 想有其嚴峻的一面，因而有過度抑制情欲的流弊；戴震哲學的價值即來自對情欲的肯 定，而其缺失，卻也因此而產生．

鄭宗義. / 論文(博士) -- 香港中文大學哲學學部, 1995. / 參考文献 : leaves 178-187. / Zheng Zongyi. / 序論一一寫在哲學與思想史之間 --- p.I / Chapter 第一章： --- 形上與形下之間的緊張´ؤ´ؤ明末王學的再省察 --- p.1 / Chapter 一、 --- 引言：宋明儒家的形上與形下世界 --- p.1 / Chapter 二、 --- 内聖層面的緊張：玄虛而蕩與情識而肆 --- p.8 / Chapter 三、 --- 東林的救正與學風的變動 --- p.21 / Chapter 四、 --- 外王層面的緊張：儒學、亡天下與综當代之務 --- p.31 / Chapter 第二章： --- 心學系統内的救正 --- p.38 / Chapter 一、 --- 引言：廣義的王學者 --- p.38 / Chapter 二、 --- 劉蕺山誠意愼獨之敎及其在思想史上的意義 --- p.42 / Chapter 三、 --- 黄宗羲一心萬殊思想的發展與完成 --- p.62 / Chapter 四、 --- 附論孫夏峰與李二曲 --- p.83 / Chapter 第三章： --- 心學系統外的救正 --- p.98 / Chapter 一、 --- 引言：朱子學的再興 --- p.98 / Chapter 二、 --- 明末清初朱子學的三種型態及其消長 --- p.101 / Chapter 三、 --- 附論反宋明儒思潮 --- p.134 / Chapter 第四章： --- 明清儒學的轉型 --- p.151 / Chapter 一、 --- 引言：形上心靈的萎縮 --- p.151 / Chapter 二、 --- 經世、考證與達情遂欲哲學 --- p.153 / Chapter 三、 --- 附論「實學」的實義 --- p.160 / Chapter 第五章： --- 達情遂欲哲學衡論 --- p.162 / Chapter 一、 --- 引論 --- p.162 / Chapter 二、 --- 分論一：陳乾初 --- p.165 / Chapter 三、 --- 分論二 ：戴東原 --- p.170 / 參考資料 --- p.178

This research project investigates Confucian thinker Dai Zhen (1724-1777) and Jewish thinker Emmanuel Levinas’s (1906-1995) philosophical discourses on desire from a comparative perspective. First, I look at Dai Zhen and Levinas individually each in their own philosophical contexts, while framing my readings with parallel structure that pivots on a hermeneutic strategy to examine their ideas of desire within the larger prospect of the human relation with transcendence. Then, my inquiry leads to a critical analysis of several interesting issues yielded in my interpretive readings of the two thinkers as regards transcendence and immanence and the self-other relationship. Methodologically, my study combines careful textual analysis, philosophical reflection, and historical sensitivity. We might want to say that there is in fact no correlative of the Levinasian desire in Dai Zhen’s philosophy. Dai Zhen’s notion of desire perhaps comes closer to Levinas’s concept of need. However, the disparity of their conceptual formulations does not keep us from discerning their shared ethical concern for the other, the weak, marginalized, and underprivileged group of society, which provides me the very ground for a dialogical comparison between the two thinkers. Henceforth, my writing is hinged on a comprehension of their conception of desire as an articulation of human striving for what is lying beyond themselves, as a redefinition of the being or essence of humankind in relation to the transcendent which in both philosophers’ ethical thinking is translated into a sympathetic understanding of and care for the other, particularly the stranger, the widow, the orphan, the young, the weak and the like. Through the comparative study of the two thinkers’ ideas of desire, I want to argue that “desire,” which is most readily directed to human egoism and instinctive propensity in both Confucian and Western philosophical traditions, can be at once the very driving force to open us to the other beyond ourselves and an actual moral creativity to produce ethical being out of material existence.

This research project investigates Confucian thinker Dai Zhen (1724-1777) and Jewish thinker Emmanuel Levinas’s (1906-1995) philosophical discourses on desire from a comparative perspective. First, I look at Dai Zhen and Levinas individually each in their own philosophical contexts, while framing my readings with parallel structure that pivots on a hermeneutic strategy to examine their ideas of desire within the larger prospect of the human relation with transcendence. Then, my inquiry leads to a critical analysis of several interesting issues yielded in my interpretive readings of the two thinkers as regards transcendence and immanence and the self-other relationship. Methodologically, my study combines careful textual analysis, philosophical reflection, and historical sensitivity. We might want to say that there is in fact no correlative of the Levinasian desire in Dai Zhen’s philosophy. Dai Zhen’s notion of desire perhaps comes closer to Levinas’s concept of need. However, the disparity of their conceptual formulations does not keep us from discerning their shared ethical concern for the other, the weak, marginalized, and underprivileged group of society, which provides me the very ground for a dialogical comparison between the two thinkers. Henceforth, my writing is hinged on a comprehension of their conception of desire as an articulation of human striving for what is lying beyond themselves, as a redefinition of the being or essence of humankind in relation to the transcendent which in both philosophers’ ethical thinking is translated into a sympathetic understanding of and care for the other, particularly the stranger, the widow, the orphan, the young, the weak and the like. Through the comparative study of the two thinkers’ ideas of desire, I want to argue that “desire,” which is most readily directed to human egoism and instinctive propensity in both Confucian and Western philosophical traditions, can be at once the very driving force to open us to the other beyond ourselves and an actual moral creativity to produce ethical being out of material existence.