Few countries have presented a policy problem for the United States with the consistency and longevity that North Korea has. The opacity of the regime that runs the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has served as a barrier to deciphering the policy perspective that Kim Jong-un, and his father before him, have pursued. This thesis analyzes the policy decisions of the US towards North Korea in an attempt to decipher which policies were pursued and what there effects have been. Modern US policy in regards to North Korea started with the signing of the Agreed Framework in 1994. US policy was largely consistent under the Clinton administration, which is the reason this paper will begin with the George W. Bush administration and will continue all the way up until the current Obama administration (2001-2013). Using the fundamental policy theories of “hawk engagement” and “strategic patience” this paper assesses the policy responses by examining a number of key events, personnel, and contextual issues. There have been a number policy responses toward North Korea but there has yet to be a permanent solution to the central concerns.

Small graphite-moderated and gas-cooled reactors have been around since the beginning of the atomic age. Though their existence in the past has been associated with nuclear weapons programs, they are capable of being used in civilian power programs. The simpler design constraints associated with this type of reactor would make them ideal for developing nations to bolster their electricity generation and help promote a greater standard of living in those nations. However, the same benefits that make this type of reactor desirable also make it suspicious to the international community as a possible means to shorten that state?s nuclear latency. If a safeguards approach could be developed for a fuel cycle featuring one of these reactors, it would ease the tension surrounding their existence and possibly lead to an increased latency through engineered barriers. The development of this safeguards approach follows a six step procedure. First, the fuel cycle was analyzed for the types of facilities found in it and how nuclear material flows between facilities. The goals of the safeguards system were established next, using the normal IAEA standards for the non-detection and false alarm probabilities. The 5 MWe Reactor was modeled for both plutonium production and maximum power capacity. Each facility was analyzed for material throughput and the processes that occur in each facility were researched. Through those processes, diversion pathways were developed to test the proposed safeguards system. Finally, each facility was divided into material balance areas and a traditional nuclear material accountancy system was set up to meet the established safeguards goals for the facility. The DPRK weapons program is a great example of the type of fuel cycle that is the problem. The three major facilities in the fuel cycle, the Fuel Fabrication Facility, the 5 MWe Reactor, and the Radiochemical Laboratory, can achieve the two goals of safeguards using traditional methods. Each facility can be adequately safeguarded using methods and practices that are relatively inexpensive and can obtain material balance periods close to the timeliness limits set forth by the IAEA. The Fuel Fabrication Facility can be safeguarded at both its current needed capacity and its full design capacity using inexpensive measurements. The material balance period needed for both capacities are reasonable. For the 5 MWe reactor, plutonium production is simulated to be 6.7 kg per year and is on the high side of estimates. The Radiochemical Laboratory can also be safeguarded at its current capacity. In fact, the timeliness goal for the facility dictates what the material balance period must be for the chosen set of detectors which make it very reasonable.

Small graphite-moderated and gas-cooled reactors have been around since the beginning of the atomic age. Though their existence in the past has been associated with nuclear weapons programs, they are capable of being used in civilian power programs. The simpler design constraints associated with this type of reactor would make them ideal for developing nations to bolster their electricity generation and help promote a greater standard of living in those nations. However, the same benefits that make this type of reactor desirable also make it suspicious to the international community as a possible means to shorten that state?s nuclear latency. If a safeguards approach could be developed for a fuel cycle featuring one of these reactors, it would ease the tension surrounding their existence and possibly lead to an increased latency through engineered barriers. The development of this safeguards approach follows a six step procedure. First, the fuel cycle was analyzed for the types of facilities found in it and how nuclear material flows between facilities. The goals of the safeguards system were established next, using the normal IAEA standards for the non-detection and false alarm probabilities. The 5 MWe Reactor was modeled for both plutonium production and maximum power capacity. Each facility was analyzed for material throughput and the processes that occur in each facility were researched. Through those processes, diversion pathways were developed to test the proposed safeguards system. Finally, each facility was divided into material balance areas and a traditional nuclear material accountancy system was set up to meet the established safeguards goals for the facility. The DPRK weapons program is a great example of the type of fuel cycle that is the problem. The three major facilities in the fuel cycle, the Fuel Fabrication Facility, the 5 MWe Reactor, and the Radiochemical Laboratory, can achieve the two goals of safeguards using traditional methods. Each facility can be adequately safeguarded using methods and practices that are relatively inexpensive and can obtain material balance periods close to the timeliness limits set forth by the IAEA. The Fuel Fabrication Facility can be safeguarded at both its current needed capacity and its full design capacity using inexpensive measurements. The material balance period needed for both capacities are reasonable. For the 5 MWe reactor, plutonium production is simulated to be 6.7 kg per year and is on the high side of estimates. The Radiochemical Laboratory can also be safeguarded at its current capacity. In fact, the timeliness goal for the facility dictates what the material balance period must be for the chosen set of detectors which make it very reasonable.

Opposition of socialist East and capitalist West in XX century led to division of nations andcreation of new states. Due to historical process Korea and Germany were divided intoDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea and Republic of Korea, and German DemocraticRepublic and Federal Republic of Germany, respectively. Development of states requiredconstruction of new ethnic identities/ethnicities. In this research through the prism of Cornell andHartmann’s constructivist approach and stereotype theory secondary and primary data isanalyzed.. On the basis of analysis of secondary data this research examines and comparesmeasures that were used by ruling parties of GDR and DPRK in order to create and develop newethnic identities. Further in paper on the basis of results of interviews and analysis of secondarydata is described and compared how West Germans perceive East Germans and how SouthKoreans perceive North Koreans. According to the results of the research it is possible to statewhich measures were undertaken by governments of GDR and DPRK in order to create anethnicity and it is possible to state that West German stereotypes about East Germans and SouthKorean stereotypes about North Koreans are partly based on ideological/political aspects ofdivisions of nations.

Depuis le début des années 2000, la Chine et la RPDC (« Corée du Nord) ont tenté de mettre en œuvre des programmes de coopération économique et d’intégration transfrontalière. Ces programmes de coopération ont été facilité par des politiques réformatrices en Corée du Nord, la famine des années 1990 ayant fait prendre conscience à Pyongyang qu’un certain degré de réforme économique était nécessaire pour reprendre le contrôle et relancer une économie désorganisée et appauvrie. En conséquence, les échanges et les investissements entre la Chine et la RPDC ont connu une hausse spectaculaire. Ceci étant, les expérimentations politiques menées par Pyongyang, dont notamment les Zones Économiques Spéciales, n’ont pas réussi à attirer l‘attention des entrepreneurs et des officiels chinois.A travers l’étude empirique d’une selection de Zones Économiques Spéciales et de leurs environnements politiques et législatifs, des entretiens avec des hommes d’affaires chinois impliqués dans les relations économiques bilatérales à la frontière et des observations sur le terrain en Corée du Nord, l’auteur développe l’idée selon laquelle les stratégies d’engagement économiques chinoises et les politiques de développement économique nord-coréennes sont fondamentalement incompatibles, ce qui fait des actuellespratiques de coopération économique une source de tensions politiques. Il semblerait que la Chine a en effet essayé d’atteindre certains objectifs politiques et géopolitiques à travers des outils économiques, ce qui est vu par Pyongyang comme une ingérence dans ses affaires internes. Ces stratégies chinoises sont particulièrement intéressantes à étudier dans le contexte de l’initiative « One Belt, One Road ». Paradoxalement, l’auteur cherche à expliquer que les plus récentes générations de Zones Économiques Spéciales ne visent pas seulement à faciliter une certaine forme d’intégration économique bilatérale mais incarnent dans le même temps une forme de résistance à l’étreinte économique chinoise. / Since the beginning of the 2000’s, China and the DPRK (North Korea) have tried to implement economic cooperation and crossborder-economic integration programs. These cooperation programs have been facilitated by reformist policies in the DPRK, as the 1990 decade famine that struck North Korea convinced the Pyongyang leadership that some degree of economic reform was needed to restart and regain control over a greatly damaged economy. As a result, trade and investment ties between China and North Korea soared. However, political experimentations by the Pyongyang leadership, such as Special Economic Zones, have attracted limited attention from Chinese entrepreneurs and officials.Through an empirical analysis of a selection of North Korean Special Economic Zones and related policies, interviews with Chinese businessmen active in the borderlands as well as anecdotal evidence gathered in the DPRK, the author argues that Chinese economic engagement policies and North Korea’s economic development strategy bear structural incompatibilities which makes the current economic cooperation patterns a source of diplomatic and political friction. It seems that China has indeed been trying to achieve different political and geopolitical objectives through economic means, which largely resonates with the larger Chinese-led “One Belt, one Road” initiative” but is seen as interfering from Pyongyang. Quite paradoxically, the author argues that later generations of Special Economic Zones do not only constitute institutions designed to foster economic integration between China and the DPRK but also embody political resistance to the Chinese economic embrace. / Seit dem Beginn der 2000er Jahre haben China und die Demokratische Volksrepublik Korea (Nordkorea) versucht, eine wirtschaftliche Kooperation und grenzüberschreitende wirtschaftliche Integrationsprogramme zu implementieren. Diese Projekte wurden durch reformorientierte Politik in der DPRK ermöglicht, da die Hungersnot, welche Nordkorea in den 90er Jahren heimsuchte, die Pjöngjanger Führung überzeugte, dass ein gewisser Grad an wirtschaftlichen Reformen nötig sei, um die schwer beschädigte Wirtschaft neu zu starten und über sie Kontrolle auszuüben. Infolgedessen steigerten sich der Handel und die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen insgesamt zwischen China und Nordkorea auf ein noch nie da gewesenes Niveau. Jedoch haben politische Experimente der Führung in Pyongyang, einschließlich eines direkten „Policytransfers“, welche chinesischen Erfahrungen nachempfunden waren, wie zum Beispiel Sonderwirtschaftszonen, eingeschränkte Aufmerksamkeit von chinesischen Unternehmern und Beamten erfahren.Auf Basis einer empirischen Analyse einer Auswahl von nordkoreanischen Sonderwirtschaftszonen und damit verbundenen „Policies“, Interviews mit im Grenzgebiet aktiven, chinesischen Unternehmern und in Nordkorea gesammelten Einzelberichten, argumentiert der Autor, dass die chinesischen wirtschaftlichen Engagement Strategien und die wirtschaftliche Entwicklungsstrategie Nord-Koreas strukturellen Unvereinbarkeiten aufweisen, welche die derzeitigen wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsmuster zu eine Quelle diplomatischer und politischer Spannungen werden lassen. Es scheint, dass China in der Tat versucht hat, verschiedene politische und geopolitische Ziele auf wirtschaftlichem Wege zu erreichen, was größtenteils in der bedeutenden, von China angeführten, „One Belt, one Road“ Initiative seinen Nachhall findet, jedoch von Pjöngjang als Einmischung gesehen wird. Paradoxerweise sind, so die Argumentation des Autors, spätere Generationen der Sonderwirtschaftszonen nicht nur Institutionen zur Förderung der wirtschaftlichen Integration zwischen China und der Demokratischen Volksrepublik Korea, sie verkörpern auch den politischen Widerstand gegen die chinesische wirtschaftliche Umklammerung.

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In 1990's, the North Korean leaders opened the military nuclear program in order to avoid the collapsing trend which affected many totalitarian regimes at that time. Thanks to the specific geographical position, Inter-Korean dispute became a very important issue of foreign policy of many great powers such as United States of America, People's Republic of China, Japan, or Russian Federation. This nuclear program is generally considered as a tool of threatening in order to maintain the regime and secure the food and energy assistance. In this thesis, the North Korean threatening policy is applied to various concepts dealing with the deterrence theory introduced by many authors.

Theories of nuclear weapons proliferation cannot fully account for the nuances of certain cases because proliferation is a complex process involving numerous variables, the importance of which can potentially shift across time. This seems especially true when applied to the case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) where motivations have shifted in relevance numerous times in its proliferation history. In order to investigate this, this thesis reviews extant theories of nuclear proliferation and their ability to explain the case of the DPRK by critically examining its historical nuclear progress and nuclear weapons ambitions across time. The result is that indeed, proliferation theories are ill-equipped to completely account for the DPRK’s nuclear choices. The DPRK has ostensibly been motivated by numerous variables at different times, each having varying degrees of influence, inexplicable for mono-causal and often western and ethno-centric accounts of its proliferation motivations.

Theories of nuclear weapons proliferation cannot fully account for the nuances of certain cases because proliferation is a complex process involving numerous variables, the importance of which can potentially shift across time. This seems especially true when applied to the case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) where motivations have shifted in relevance numerous times in its proliferation history. In order to investigate this, this thesis reviews extant theories of nuclear proliferation and their ability to explain the case of the DPRK by critically examining its historical nuclear progress and nuclear weapons ambitions across time. The result is that indeed, proliferation theories are ill-equipped to completely account for the DPRK’s nuclear choices. The DPRK has ostensibly been motivated by numerous variables at different times, each having varying degrees of influence, inexplicable for mono-causal and often western and ethno-centric accounts of its proliferation motivations.

In examining why the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) pursues nuclear weapons, this study focuses on Pyongyang's consistent demand for normalization of relations with Washington. The primary aims of this study are 1) to study the significance of normalization of relations with Washington as an alternative to nuclear weapon development in the DPRK, 2) to investigate potential causal relationships between Pyongyang's policy choices and Pyongyang's expectation for normalization of relations with Washington, and 3) to examine whether culturally sensitive behavior significantly influences Pyongyang's policy decisions. To understand the significance of normalization of relations and the meaning of Pyongyang's behavior, this study depends heavily on cultural perspectives. In this study, two independent variables are examined for their effects on Pyongyang's policy, 1) Pyongyang's expectation for normalization of relations with Washington, and 2) the alignment of Washington's policy with Pyongyang's cultural code. Two hypotheses emerge from these two factors: first, when Pyongyang had high expectations for normalization of relations with Washington, Pyongyang was more likely to choose engagement policies and give less priority to pursuit of nuclear weapons; and second, the more Washington's policies harmonized with Pyongyang's cultural code, the more Pyongyang cooperated with Washington. Using case studies and discourse analysis, this study examines four periods from 1991 to 2011. Interviews with North Korean defectors and with South Korean experts complement this study of expectation and cultural meaning. The study concludes, first, that normalization of relations with Washington appeared to Pyongyang as a viable alternative to nuclear weapon development in providing a security guarantee and national dignity. Second, during most periods, Pyongyang appeared to believe that it was highly dependent on nuclear weapons for its regime survival when it could not expect the benefits of improved relations with Washington. By the same token, Pyongyang's regime survival seemed less dependent on nuclear weapons when it could expect improved relations with Washington. At some times, however, Pyongyang practiced confrontation as a way to improve domestic stability. But usually high context diplomacy by the United States elicited positive responses.