The topic of this work is a multifaceted, in times permeating or partially blending view of the Korean war, a view which is, above all, disproving itself in many subnarratives. This view was constructed from various period sources, namely official and unofficial diplomatic materials, periodical press, reports of United Nations Committee and an immediate (partially also delayed) reflection of the Korean war as it was presented by the authors/the propaganda of the Eastern and Western blocs. The subject of my analysis is then argumentation, the genesis of relabeling of individual narratives and significant motives, connections between individual alternative histories as they were being built, relations between significant subordinate motives (those which are crucial for the complete narrative of the war) as they tie into the context, all of the above realized in my concept of syntax of a propagandistic picture of reality and a fictional world.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the Democratic People's Republic of Korea regime in the period 1970 - 1994 and to apply the results of the analysis on the Linz typology of non- democratic regimes. The first part focuses on a detailed characterization of three chosen types, namely totalitarian, sultanistic and post-totalitarian, on the searching for parallels and their comparsions. In the other two parts, the thesis focuses on certain aspects of the DPRK development that were chosen as the most appropriate regarding the typology. First, the period that followed after the fall of the Japanese protectorate,1945 to 1969, is analysed. In this period the regime start to establish its own new institutions. The next part examines the already established institutions in the period 1970 - 1994. All the results are then applied on the Linz typology.

In this paper I apply the Rational Actor model to the 1993-1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis. I begin with two hypotheses: 1) North Korea attempted nuclear armament because of its perception of threat from South Korea and the United States; 2) North Korea attempted nuclear armament because it wanted to use its nuclear program as leverage to obtain economic assistance from the United States. I conduct a diplomatic historical analysis based on the Rational Actor model to determine which was North Korea's primary objective, and conclude that the primary objective of North Korea was obtaining economic concessions, but that threat perception did seem to play a role in the decision to start the nuclear program. In this process, I show that the Rational Actor model was insufficient in the analysis and that it must be complemented by cultural factors, "thickening" the rationality. / Master of Arts

South Korea’s security discourse on the nuclear threat posed by North Korea has been dichotomised by its position within the political spectrum between the progressives and conservatives. By drawing upon Securitisation Theory (ST), this study challenges the current security discourse in South Korea, which has divided and misled the public as well as securitising actors. This study examines the security discourses of the Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008) and Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) administrations, since they represent the archetypes of the progressives and conservatives respectively. The results of the analysis suggest that the current security discourses that have been prevalent in South Korea do not correspond with reality and, subsequently, the discourses were not able to deal with real challenges that the nuclear threat posed. This research also explains the root cause of the distorted security discourses by applying a ‘discursive chasm’ as a preliminary concept, which indicates a discursive structure that fundamentally impedes the performance of securitising actors’ articulation, and that distorts the discursive formation (securitisation processes). The chasms consist of three elusive discourses: first, a discourse on threats that cannot simply be said to be either imminent or not imminent (nuclear weapons as materiality and discourse); second, a discourse on the other that cannot easily be defined (the difficulty of representation of North Korea); and third, a discourse on measures that cannot easily be realised (intangible extraordinary measures).

South Korea’s security discourse on the nuclear threat posed by North Korea has been dichotomised by its position within the political spectrum between the progressives and conservatives. By drawing upon Securitisation Theory (ST), this study challenges the current security discourse in South Korea, which has divided and misled the public as well as securitising actors. This study examines the security discourses of the Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008) and Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) administrations, since they represent the archetypes of the progressives and conservatives respectively. The results of the analysis suggest that the current security discourses that have been prevalent in South Korea do not correspond with reality and, subsequently, the discourses were not able to deal with real challenges that the nuclear threat posed. This research also explains the root cause of the distorted security discourses by applying a ‘discursive chasm’ as a preliminary concept, which indicates a discursive structure that fundamentally impedes the performance of securitising actors’ articulation, and that distorts the discursive formation (securitisation processes). The chasms consist of three elusive discourses: first, a discourse on threats that cannot simply be said to be either imminent or not imminent (nuclear weapons as materiality and discourse); second, a discourse on the other that cannot easily be defined (the difficulty of representation of North Korea); and third, a discourse on measures that cannot easily be realised (intangible extraordinary measures).

The thesis argues that non-proliferation sanctions are effective primarily by their coercive effect, that is their power to change the target’s cost/benefit ratios. It does so by contrasting and comparing two key works in sanctions literature, authored by David Baldwin and the Targeted Sanctions Consortium respectively. In the case of the UN sanctions regime against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), it concludes that the reason why no sufficient coercive effect has been apparent, is due to the lack of costs shouldered by the actors who have implemented the sanctions, as this reflects an apparent lack of commitment. This in turn does not sufficiently increase the possible cost of the DPRK, in continuing its nuclear weapons program. Therefore it is not incentivized to cancel its program.

The thesis focuses on the relationship between China and the Korean Peninsula. It examines China's view on the peninsula, its ties to and influence over this region and its conceptions for the future of the peninsula. The thesis concentrates on the relations between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Nevertheless, the relationship between them is analyzed in the context of the Chinese long-term strategy for the Korean Peninsula. The primary Chinese interests related to North Korea are identified together with instruments that can China use to accomplish them. Special focus is given to the assessment of the economic influence that China has over North Korea. However, the Chinese economic leverage is examined in connection with political and military relations between those two countries and in broader context of the development of international relations in Northeast Asia.

The overall purpose of this dissertation is to provide an empirical study of the post-Cold War EastAsian security setting, with the aim of understanding why there is an East Asian peace. The EastAsian peace exists in a region with a history of militarised conflicts, home to many of the world'slongest ongoing militarised problems and a number of unresolved critical flashpoints. Thus, thepost-Cold War East Asian inter-state peace is a paradox. Despite being a region predicted to be ripefor conflict, there have not only been less wars than expected, but the region also shows severalsigns of a development towards a more durable peace. The dominant research paradigm –neorealism – has painted a gloomy picture of post-Cold War East Asia, with perpetual conflictsdominating the predictions. Other mainstream international relations theories, too, fail to accountfully for the relative peace. One of the greatest problems for mainstream theories, is accounting forpeace given East Asia's lack of security organisations or other formalised conflict managementmechanisms. Given this paradox/problem, this dissertation sets out to ask "Why is there a relativepeace in the East Asian security setting despite an absence of security organisations or otherformalised mechanisms to prevent existing conflicts from escalating into violence?" In order to answer this question, the case of East Asian peace is approached by comparingthree embedded case studies within the region: the Taiwan issue, the South China Sea, and theKorean nuclear conflict. It explores the full range of informal and formal processes plus the ConflictPrevention and Peacebuilding Mechanisms (CPPBMs) that have been important for the creation ofa continuing relative peace in East Asia between 1990 and 2008. The study furthermore focuses onChina's role in the three cases, on an empirical basis consisting of interviews conducted with keypersons during more than 1.5 years fieldwork in China. The three cases show that informal processes exist, and that they have furthermore beenimportant for peace, both by preventing conflicts from escalating into war, and by buildingconditions for a stable longer-term peace. Their impact on the persistence of peace has been tracedto a range of different CPPBMs. Returning to the level of the East Asian case, a common feature ofmany of the identified processes is that they can be understood as aspects or manifestations of theEast Asian regionalisation process. Specifically, elite interactions (personal networks, track twodiplomacy), back-channel negotiations, economic interdependence and integration, and functionalcooperation have together with (China's acceptance of) multilateralism and institutionalisation (ofpeaceful relations) been of high importance for the relative peace. Whereas formalised conflictmanagement mechanisms and the U.S. presence have also contributed to peace, this dissertationshows their contribution to be much more limited.

南韓金大中總統在1998年2月上台時，提出一套與北韓達成和平、和解與合作為基礎的對北韓新政策－陽光政策。陽光政策係以善意、真誠化解北韓的敵意與戒心，使北韓願意與南韓對話與交流，協助北韓走出經濟困境與國際孤立，降低朝鮮半島緊張情勢，進而開放門戶，進行經改。 因此，金大中政府的對日政策，作為陽光政策的一環，不但呼籲南韓與日本走出歷史仇恨，大力推動與日本合作援助北韓糧食物資，還積極幫助日本與北韓關係正常化。讓原本存於日本與北韓交涉障礙中的「南韓因素」轉為正面的推力。此外，金大中政府的對日政策，亦積極主動地改善南韓與日本兩國關係。為因應1997年的金融危機，金大中拋出與北韓和解的陽光政策，在朝鮮半島上製造和平穩定的投資環境，俾利南韓經濟復甦，並力圖引進日本的資金與經援，助南韓早日走出經濟困境。 雖然日本極為擔憂南北韓有可能隨著南韓政府北韓交往政策的持續推動下，在歷史問題、領土紛爭，以及日本軍事能力發展上，達成共同反日陣線。但是，在日本的朝鮮半島政策之中，被民族主義所蒙蔽的小泉政府無法看清局勢，未能好好把握南韓金大中政府，這個前所未見的親日政權，加深與南韓緊密合作的關係，消除或淡化兩國間的歷史議題。同時，在陽光政策下推行經改急需建設資金的北韓，小泉政府也未能把握金正日國防委員長在政治及安全議題上讓步的機會，解決兩國間的懸案，一舉達成兩國建交，再利用經濟合作的機會，降低北韓的反日情緒。小泉政府卻不斷的做出讓周邊國家反感的舉動，像是每年參拜象徵日本軍國主義的靖國神社，大力提升日本自衛隊軍事能力，試圖打破和平憲法的框架等，反而加深與鄰國之間的隔閡。

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