Given the nature of the valuation task environment appraisers are often made aware of previous value opinions rendered by appraisers, commonly in the form of an historic appraisal. And, because an appraisal task involves the rendering of market value, a hypothetical, unobservable construct based on probabilities, direct feedback against this objective is typically not possible. Alternate signals derived from the task environment such as confirmation of previous appraised values may be employed, thereby potentially altering the appraiser’s perception of the valuation objective leading to divergence from the normative model. The real estate behavioral literature suggests commercial appraisers have been susceptible to anonymous value opinions of experts, often times resulting in biased valuation judgments. This research is the first to focus on decision support tools as a technique to eliminate systematic biases in the appraisal process. The study focuses on the value opinion of an anonymous expert as a source of potential bias, because the value opinion of an anonymous expert is a common non-sanctioned source of influence representing a clear departure in the normative appraisal process. To operationalize the research hypotheses a two-factor randomized experiment to investigate the stated research hypotheses was conducted.

The technological revolution brought about by the Internet has affected numerous aspects of our everyday life, including the way we conceive and perform information and communication practices. In this sense, the Internet has drastically reduced the cost of data accessibility and data sharing, by increasing both the amount of information freely available for consultation and the speed at which it is possible to access and exchange it. Social Networking Platforms (SNPs) – such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube – are of particular interest in this sense, having become fully-fledged information environments themselves in the last decade, with an increasing number of individuals identifying such platforms as their main source for news, including political news. Given such an informative role, SNPs have attracted increasing attention regarding the proliferation of propaganda – definable as information that, though not necessarily fabricated, is specifically designed to rally public support and disparage opposing views rather than serve an informative purpose. Even though compelling evidence has revealed the widespread tendency of political actors to employ automated tools to propagate this kind of content on SNPs, scholars have also demonstrated how social media users themselves play a crucial role in this proliferation. Thus, understanding how individuals interact with and are affected by these information environments is of crucial importance to untangle the functioning of this political communication phenomenon. In particular, identifying the mechanisms underlying the evaluation of political propaganda has major relevance not only for the assessment of the persuasive power this communication practice exerts, but also for the development of countermeasures able to mitigate its impact on social media users’ deliberations. Therefore, the main aim of this doctoral research is to unravel the functioning of this multidimensional phenomenon by adopting a cognitive-sociological approach that draws on the Dual Process Model of Cognition when theoretically conceptualizing and empirically assessing the effectiveness of this communication practice. By addressing the specific cognitive mechanisms that regulate information processing, the goal is to assess whether reasoning style – and, in particular, heuristic thinking – affects judgments concerning the validity and shareability of political propaganda, thus enhancing its circulation. Given the goals of this project and the characteristics of the phenomenon under investigation, a mixed-methods approach encompassing computational social science techniques and experimental design has been adopted to explore the role played by reasoning in this kind of persuasion processes. The first set of methods has been employed to collect and analyze social media data on the 2019 European Parliament elections to assess the extent to which automation (i.e., political bots) and heuristic-based persuasion strategies have been employed consistently by political actors. Results indicate the presence of both factors among the political communication techniques deployed for this electoral event. Building on these findings, the second set of methods has been employed to design and implement a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE). By means of this experimental technique – which is designed to elicit individual preferences in contexts where revealed preference data is unavailable – it was possible to assess how individuals interpret and respond to online propaganda messages and which factors affect this evaluation process. Two main factors have been explored in this sense, namely message features of online propaganda and the cognitive context in which information processing takes place. Specifically, this experimental assessment concerned six different informational cues (i.e., source, endorsement, popularity, emotional salience, stereotyping, and moral valence) and two different cognitive contexts (i.e., a “cognitive scarcity” and a “debiasing” one, in which heuristic thinking and analytic reasoning were prompted respectively). Findings highlighted that both message features and the cognitive context in which evaluation is performed affect the likelihood of considering political messages valid and shareable on SNPs. Moreover, they also indicate that individual characteristics ascribable to supra-individual, cultural factors (e.g., perception of diversity) moderate such an effect. Overall, this research project and its outputs contribute to the existing literature on online propaganda by exploring the mechanisms underlying the persuasion processes triggered by this political communication practice. By adopting a research approach that puts recipients at the center of the investigation without neglecting the social context they are part of, this work proposes a suitable way to investigate the functioning of online propaganda and, thus, assess its actual effectiveness.

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The present work describes the model of heuristic judgment of Kahneman & Frederick (2002) and two experiments based upon it. According to the model people answer a question with an answer to an easier question when making a heuristic judgment. This process is called the attribute substitution because a target attribute of a question is substituted by an associated and easier accessible heuristic attribute. The first experiment investigated whether two heuristic attributes can be used simultaneously during making of a judgment. A part of participants gave 1 or 4 reasons for one of the statements in Linda problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Numbers of reasons were selected so as to produce a feeling of fluency of disfluency. Although the conjunction fallacy occurred, the writing of the reasons didn't have any influence on the assessment of the probability of the related statement. The second experiment investigated whether the priming of the relation between processing fluency and risk can influence the effect of pronounceability of a food additive name on the assessment of its harmfulness. In accord with previous study (Song & Schwarz, 2009) it was shown that food additives with less pronounceable names were considered as more harmful. The priming didn't have any effect. The present studies...

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Eduardo Jose da Fonseca Costa.pdf: 1263073 bytes, checksum: 5e0088ac0a9fdf2802c5b0844e006375 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-15 / Impartiality is essential to jurisdiction, and among other things, it guarantees the parties and the maintenance of democracy itself. The procedural law systems currently in force in Brazil need to walk in opposite direction to the path they are actually taking in order for it to be minimally guarded, that is, regarding subjective impartiality specifically. These systems have already been feeding the cognitive bias factors of the adjudicative decision-makers and, therefore, feeding a breach of its systemic and unconscious biases. In this sense, the present work proposes a legislative reform, offering a precautionary model of lege ferenda inspired in algorithmic strategies based on the latest findings of a new discipline increasingly thriving in Anglo-Saxon countries, Israel and Western Europe called Behavioral Law and Economics (resulting from a fusion of law, cognitive psychology and behavioral economics). Hence the reason it is a legal enginnering work. Now, assuming that any decision maker is equipped with a bounded rationality (not to be confused with actual irrationality ), these techniques seek to undo or to isolate the effects of the so-called cognitive biases , which are mere shortcuts predictable and therefore, preventable which the human mind develops in order to make decisions from complex information under situations of uncertainty. Thus, the major cognitive illusions which affect the adjudicative decision-makers (representativeness bias, anchoring-and-adjustment bias, confirmation bias and in-group bias) were studied along with the procedural standards better suited to neutralize or eliminate these biases. Nevertheless, the proposed model is open to new discoveries that may occur regarding this matter. However, even in the case of a lege ferenda model, one can from it criticize de lege lata of the Brazilian Positive Law and demonstrate that many of the common biased practices in daily forensic activities could have already been confronted / A imparcialidade, sendo nota essencial à jurisdição, é dentre outras coisas garantia das partes e da própria manutenção da Democracia. No que concerne especificamente à imparcialidade subjetiva, para que seja minimamente resguardada, é preciso que os sistemas de direito processual atualmente vigentes no Brasil caminhem em sentido oposto ao rumo que estão tomando, já que têm alimentado fatores de enviesamento cognitivo dos julgadores e, portanto, uma quebra inconsciente e sistêmica de suas imparcialidades. Nesse sentido, o presente trabalho propõe uma reforma legislativa, oferecendo um modelo precaucional de lege ferenda inspirado em estratégias algorítmicas fundadas nas mais recentes descobertas de uma nova disciplina cada vez mais pujante em países anglo-saxões, Israel e Europa Ocidental chamada Behavioral Law & Economics (resultante de uma fusão entre Direito, Psicologia Cognitiva e Economia Comportamental). Daí por que se trata de um trabalho de engenharia jurídica. Ora, partindo da premissa de que todo e qualquer tomador de decisão é provido de uma racionalidade limitada (que não se confunde propriamente com irracionalidade ), essas técnicas buscam desfazer ou isolar os efeitos dos chamados vieses cognitivos , que nada mais são do que atalhos simplificadores previsíveis e, portanto, evitáveis que a mente humana desenvolve para tomar decisões a partir de informações complexas sob situação de incerteza. Assim sendo, estudar-se-ão as principais ilusões cognitivas que acometem os julgadores (viés de representatividade, viés de ancoragem e ajustamento, viés de confirmação e viés de grupo) e as normas processuais mais adequadas à neutralização, mitigação ou à eliminação desses vieses. Não obstante, o modelo proposto é aberto às novas descobertas que vierem porventura a ocorrer nessa matéria. Todavia, ainda que se trate de um modelo de lege ferenda, a partir dele se podem tecer críticas de lege lata ao direito positivo brasileiro e demonstrar que muitas das práticas enviesantes corriqueiras no dia a dia forense já poderiam estar sendo combatidas

This thesis investigates individual and interpersonal predictions of future affect and explores their relation to implicit theories of emotion, prediction recall, debiasing, and focalism. Studies 1, 2, and 3 assessed affect predictions to upcoming reasoning tests and academic results, and Studies 4, 5, and 6 concerned predictions for self-identified events. The first study investigated the influence of implicit theories of emotion (ITE; Tamir, John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2007) on impact bias and prediction recall manipulating ITE between participant pairs who predicted and reported their affective reactions to feedback on a test of reasoning skills. Neither impact bias nor recalled predictions were affected by the manipulation. Recalled affect predictions differed from original affect predictions, but were not influenced by experienced affect. Study 2 further investigated the effects of target event timing on impact bias and affect prediction recall. The results showed no differences between individual and interpersonal impact biases across conditions. Again, recalled predictions differed from original predictions, and were not influenced by experienced affect. Study 3 investigated the influence of prior information about impact bias on interpersonal affective forecasting involving real-world exam results. The results demonstrated no differences in predictions due to information, however, significantly less unhappiness was predicted for participants’ friends compared to self-predictions. Study 4 examined the effect of different de-biasing information on affective predictions. The results demonstrated no differences in affective predictions by condition and found that participants’ ITE were not associated to affect predictions. Study 5 examined individual and interpersonal affect predictions using a between-subjects design in place of the within-subjects design. The results demonstrated no differences between the affect predictions made for self and for friends, and ITE were not associated with predictions. Study 6 examined the impact bias in interpersonal affective forecasting and the role of focalism. The results demonstrated distinctions between individual and interpersonal affecting forecasting with individual impact bias for positive reactions for negative events and individual and interpersonal reverse impact bias for calm emotional reactions to positive events. Immune neglect was found not to be associated with predictions. Overall, the studies found evidence for similar individual and interpersonal predictions which are resistant to influence.

Humans repeatedly commit the so called “conjunction fallacy”, erroneously judging the probability of two events occurring together as higher than the probability of one of the events. Certain hints have been shown to mitigate this tendency. The present thesis investigated the relations between three psychological factors and performance on conjunction tasks after reading such a hint. The factors represent the understanding of probability and statistics (statistical numeracy), the ability to resist intuitive but incorrect conclusions (cognitive reflection), and the willingness to engage in, and enjoyment of, analytical thinking (need-for-cognition). Participants (n = 50) answered 30 short conjunction tasks and three psychological scales. A bimodal response distribution motivated dichotomization of performance scores. Need-for-cognition was significantly, positively correlated with performance, while numeracy and cognitive reflection were not. The results suggest that the willingness to engage in, and enjoyment of, analytical thinking plays an important role for the capacity to avoid the conjunction fallacy after taking a hint. The hint further seems to neutralize differences in performance otherwise predicted by statistical numeracy and cognitive reflection. / Människor begår ofta det så kallade ”konjuktionsfelslutet”, genom att felaktigt bedöma sannolikheten för sammanträffandet av två händelser som större än sannolikheten för en av händelserna. Vissa typer av ledtrådar har visat sig mildra denna tendens. Denna uppsats undersökte relationerna mellan tre psykologiska faktorer och prestation på konjunktionsuppgifter efter att ha läst en sådan ledtråd. Faktorerna motsvarade förståelsen för sannolikhet och statistik (statistisk räknefärdighet, eng., statistical numeracy), förmågan att motstå intuitiva men felaktiga slutsatser, (kognitiv reflektion, eng., cognitive reflection), samt viljan och lusten till analytiskt tänkande (behov-av-tänkande, eng., need-for-cognition). Deltagare (n = 50) besvarade 30 korta konjunktionsuppgifter och tre psykologiska mätskalor. En bimodal svarsfördelning motiverade dikotomisering av resultaten. Behov-av-tänkande var signifikant, positivt korrelerat med prestation, vilket varken räknefärdighet eller kognitiv reflektion var. Resultaten tyder på att viljan och lusten till analytiskt tänkande spelar en viktig roll i förmågan att undvika konjunktionsfelslutet efter att ha fått en ledtråd. Ledtråden verkar också neutralisera skillnader i prestation som annars uppstår på grund av räknefärdighet och kognitiv reflektion.

[pt] O objetivo geral do presente estudo é sustentar que a consideração da literatura existente sobre julgamento e tomada de decisão (JTD), oriunda da psicologia e das ciências cognitivas, (i) não apenas confirma a direção acertada de nosso modelo constitucional de processo democrático pautado em um contraditório substancial, como também (ii) demonstra-se imprescindível ao seu aprimoramento. De início, apresentam-se os contornos teóricos daquilo que se entende por processo judicial democrático, focando-se no desenvolvimento dos principais (e novos) aspectos relacionados ao princípio do contraditório - garantidor do fluxo discursivo que permite a construção conjunta (comparticipada e policêntrica) da decisão. Passado o referido ponto, o estudo converge para o terreno da psicologia e das ciências cognitivas. Parte-se das mais conhecidas pesquisas sobre as limitações do raciocínio humano. Posteriormente, introduz-se a provocativa (e recente) teoria sobre o entendimento humano, formulada por Dan Sperber e Hugo Mercier (teoria interacionista do raciocínio). Ao final, concluise que tais estudos e experimentos - intimamente ligados à cognição individual e aos aspectos da deliberação coletiva – nos permitem lançar um novo olhar sobre diversas questões atinentes à (efetiva) adoção de um modelo de processual democrático. / [en] The general purpose of this study is to sustein that the consideration of the existing literature on judgment and decision making, from psychology and cognitive sciences, (i) not only endorses our constitutional model of democratic process, based on a substantial adversarial mechanism, while also (ii) proves to be essential to its improvement. At first, the theoretical contours of what should be understood by a democratic judicial process are presented, focusing on the development of the main (and new) aspects related to the adversarial principle - guarantor of the discursive flow that allows the joint construction (co-participated and polycentric) of the decision. Thereafter, the study steps into psychology and cognitive sciences domain. It is starts with the most acknowledged researches in about the limitations of the human reasoning. Later on, Dan Sperber and Hugo Mercier s recent provocative theory of human understanding is introduced (the interactionist theory of reasoning). Finally, it is concluded that such studies and experiments - intimately connected to individual cognition and the aspects of collective deliberation - allow us to acquire a new perspective over several of pertaining topics related to the (effective) adoption of a democratic procedural model.

Les erreurs récurrentes et systématiques dans les processus de décision stratégique sont fréquentes ; et les théories actuelles des organisations sont insuffisantes pour les expliquer. La « Behavioral Strategy » suggère de lier ces erreurs à la psychologie des décideurs, et notamment à leurs biais cognitifs. Toutefois, cette vision suppose de connecter le niveau d’analyse de l’individu et celui de l’organisation. Nous proposons pour ce faire un niveau « méso », la routine de choix stratégique (RCS), où interagissent la psychologie des décideurs et les décisions stratégiques. Après avoir distingué trois types de RCS, nous formulons des hypothèses d’intervention sur celles-ci visant à prévenir les erreurs stratégiques. Nous illustrons ces hypothèses par six cas pratiques, en testons certaines par une étude quantitative, et analysons les préférences qui conduisent les dirigeants à les adopter ou non. Nous concluons en discutant les implications théoriques et pratiques de notre démarche. / Many types of strategic decisions result in recurring, systematic errors. Extant theories of organizations are insufficient to account for this phenomenon. Behavioral Strategy suggests that an explanation may be found in the psychology of decision makers, and particularly in their cognitive biases. This, however, calls for a link between individual-level cognition and affects, and organization-level choices. We propose “Strategic Choice Routines” as a middle level of analysis to bridge this gap, and identify three broad types of Strategic Choice Routines.This leads us to formulate hypotheses on how Strategic Choice Routines can be modified to minimize strategic errors. We illustrate these hypotheses through case studies; test some of them quantitatively; and analyze preferences that drive their adoption by executives. Finally, we discuss theoretical and managerial implications.