This study uncovers and interprets the representation of alterity in Schubert’s Moment musical in Aβ, op. 94 no. 2 (1828) and Wilde’s ‘The Nightingale and the Rose’ from The Happy Prince and Other Stories (1888). Furthermore, the study locates and contextually investigates analogies between Schubert’s representation of alterity and Wilde’s. There is a strong likelihood that Schubert was part of a Viennese subculture that was involved in illicit activities and dissident experimentation. Since Maynard Solomon published his essay ‘Franz Schubert and the Peacocks of Benvenuto Cellini’ in 1989, the possibility of Schubert’s homosexuality has received a vast amount of critical attention. Whatever his sexuality, his music has long been seen as containing distinctly feminine traits and subversive elements. Similarly to Schubert, Wilde’s homosexuality and resulting ostracism forms an essential aspect of his life, oeuvre and of subsequent and current Wilde studies. The way in which both Schubert and Wilde’s marginalisation and illicit activities lent a sense of alterity to their works is intriguing. Taking on the loose appearance of deconstructive readings, the analysis of Schubert’s work incorporates musical semiotics, while the analysis of Wilde’s fairy tale builds on ideas raised in the Schubert analysis. The deconstructive readings focus on the binary opposition between the concepts of redemption and defeat as found in Wilde’s fairy tale. The duality between redemption and defeat is shown to have particular resonance with the Romantic image of the artist as messiah and martyr. This study offers the hypothesis that the sense of alterity experienced by Schubert and Wilde is reflected in their works as a longing for the unattainable, a quest for redemption, and that the representation of this alterity is often subversive and dissident. Specific ways in which Schubert and Wilde represent alterity are by refusing climactic moments, by juxtaposing opposites, by symbolising homoeroticism, and by purposefully disobeying stylistic obligations. Copyright / Dissertation (MMus)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Music / unrestricted

Just as the surrealistic movement challenged our perception of reality, the present work applies surrealistic methods to challenge our preconceived hierarchies between body, dress, and accessory. Adding to past surrealistic work in fashion design, the present work does not only strive to create surrealistic expressions, but to enhance the creative process through surrealistic methods. Three surrealistic methods were tested: Entopic Graphomani, Frottage, and Exquisite Corpse. The methods ability to challenge hierarchies between body, dress, and accessory was assessed through their ability to result in an element of surprise. For the present work, Exquisite Corpse had the greatest potential. By using participant observation and an adapted version of Exquisite Corpse seven looks were developed. The present work concludes that the surrealistic methods can by used not only to develop surrealistic expressions, but also to enhance the creative process within fashion design.

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Modern writers like Djuna Barnes allow for the post-modern fluidity and explosion of sex and gender without finalizing either in a fixed form. Whereas the classical, archetypal androgyne is made up of two halves, one man and one woman; the deconstructed androgynous figure is not constituted of oppositional terms which would reflect an essential and unimpeachable truth. I reveal the way Djuna Barnes’ Nightwood not only thematizes the fluid androgyne, but also cleverly verbalizes David Wood’s perpetual and un-dischargable “debt” to extra-discursivity while poetically critiquing gender “appropriateness,” societal constraints, and the constitution of identity. Barnes presents a decentralized, ungrounded and non-prescribed world in Nightwood not only through her cross-dressing and androgynous characters, but also in her poetics, her assertion of the open-ended quality of language, and a strong imperative to negotiate our physical existence in a world of fluid gender and sexual boundaries.

The purpose of this thesis was to contribute to a dialogue that considers the relationship between history, literature, and empathy as a literary affect. Specifically, I explored sites of literature’s transformative potential as it relates to cultural studies and the ethics of deconstruction. Via a deconstructive, post-colonial reading of Toni Morrison’s Beloved and Junot Díaz’s The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao, I considered how subjects in our current socio-political moment can feel history. Emerging from a post-structurally mediated engagement with history, signification, and feeling, I argued that empathy, as it is contentiously presented in the context of deconstruction, is not necessarily a reductive or essentialist approach towards relating or “being-with” an-other. Instead, I proposed that the act of reading historiographical novels that take constructions of the Atlantic Slave Trade to task might generate an affective empathy, which could in turn engender a more empathetic relationality and way of being-in-the-world.

The thesis argues for the inclusion of the study of religion within the public school curriculum. It argues that the whole division between “religious” and “secular” spaces and institutions is itself rooted in a specific religious tradition. Using the theories of Jacques Derrida, I argue that, unless the present process of globalization is tempered with alternative models of organizing that don’t include this secular/sacred division, the very process of Western globalization acts as a moral religion. Derrida calls this process “globalatinization,” the imposition of Western defined institutions upon other cultures. The process creates a type of religious violence through act of imposing notions of “secular/public” and “sacred/private.” Drawing from Mark Juergensmeyer’s theory of religious violence, and Derrida’s and Foucault’s understanding of discursive formations, I argue that religious studies should enter this “secular/public” space in the form of educating about the world’s religions. Such education would go a long way in preventing the demonization of the “other” through promoting empathy, understanding, and respect for “other” traditions. Finally, education would provide a needed self-critique of the dividing of “secular/sacred” in contemporary Western life.

In Painter, Painter, Elle Chae explores the home as an unstable, unpredictable environment that is highly sensitive to the traces emanating from the domestic space, including its inhabitants. This body of work examines how the occupant’s interactions can blur the notion of home as a shelter. Using the creative deconstruction as a mode of generating new meanings, Chae’s conceptual juxtaposition and wide range of techniques and surface create reverie scenes that are open to and encourage freedom of interpretations.

By framing his deconstruction of Plato’s Phaedrus and Timaeus as a response to Platonism, Jacques Derrida overlooks the possibility of a Platonic philosophy beyond dogma and doctrine. This thesis argues that Derrida’s deconstructions target a particularly Platonist abstraction of the dialogues, and thus, his critique relies on the underlying assumption that Plato defends the metaphysics of presence. Derrida attempts to show how the thesis that Being is presence undermines itself in both dialogues through hints of différance like pharmakon and khôra. To answer the Derridean critique, I analyze the hermeneutics of Derrida’s deconstruction of Plato and identify what in the dialogues lies beyond the limits Derrida’s reading, for example Derrida’s notable exclusion of ἔρως.

L'enseignement de la philosophie, dans les lycées chiliens et français a su défendre sa place au sein de l'enseignement secondaire malgré l'intervention des politiques libérales et néolibérales qui ont envahi l'éducation. Cela a été un succès, mais la question devient: quelle philosophie a-t-on voulu défendre? Pourquoi faire? Ce sont aussi ces questions que s'est posé Jacques Derrida dans les années soixante-dix aux fin de mettre en pratique et systématiser le travail théorique qu'il avait fait à partir de la publication de: De la Grammatologie en 1967. Dans cette recherche nous essayerons de répondre à ces questions à partir du travail réalisé par Derrida dans les années 1967 et 1978. Nous considérons que cette période  propédeutique  nous permet de démontrer que la déconstruction aurait comme base stratégique l'enseignement philosophique. C'est à partir de cette prémisse que nous espérons pouvoir établir quelques idées régulatrices déconstructives qui justifient la présence de la philosophie dans le secondaire. Elles seraient nécessaires et fondamentales pour construire un cadre philosophique référentiel et de cette façon, créer des stratégies d'enseignement propres aux conditions historiques, géographiques et culturelles des jeunes. Ces fondements seraient la base principale de la possibilité de déconstruction – la lutte et la résistance – de l'institution de la philosophie. / Although secundary education, both Chilean and French education, has not been unaware to the risk that philosophy has run with the intervention of the liberal and neoliberal policies in education, the multiple edges that build its institutional framework have been able to defend and, therefore, maintain the teaching to adolescents. This has certainly been an achievement, but, what philosofy has defended itself? For what? These interrogatives are also some of which Jaques Derrida contemplated in the seventies, with the idea of putting into practice and systematize the theoretical work that he had been doing since the publication of Of Grammatology in 1967.In this research, we attempt to answer these interrogatives from Derrida’s work, done between 1967 and 1968. We consider that this period – which is institutive– allows us to demonstrate that deconstruction would have the philosophical basis as strategic teaching. From the deconstructive premise, we intend to establish certain guidelines to justify the presence of philosophy in high school, needed to generate a referential philosophical framework and create future strategies of teaching philosophy, distinctive of historical, geographical and cultural conditions of the adolescents and which are the fundamental basis of the possibility of deconstruction -resistance and struggle- of the philosophical institution. / A pesar que la enseñanza secundaria, tanto la chilena como la francesa, no ha estado ajena al riesgo que ha corrido la filosofía con la intervención de políticas liberales y neoliberales en la educación, las múltiples aristas que constituyen su entramado institucional, han sabido defender y, por lo tanto, mantener la enseñanza de la filosofía para los jóvenes. Sin duda que esto ha sido un logro, pero ¿qué filosofía se ha defendido? ¿Para qué? Estas preguntas son también algunas de las cuales se planteó Jacques Derrida en los años setenta con la idea de poner en práctica y de sistematizar el trabajo teórico que venía haciendo desde la publicación de De la gramatología en 1967. En esta investigación intentamos responder estas interrogantes a partir del trabajo realizado por Derrida entre los años 1967 y 1978. Consideramos queeste período −que es instituyente− nos permite demostrar que la deconstrucción tendría como base estratégica la enseñanza filosófica. A partir de esta premisa pretendemos establecer ciertos lineamientos deconstructivos que justifiquen la presencia de la filosofía en secundaria, necesarios para generar un marco filosófico referencial y para crear futuras estrategias de enseñanza de la filosofía que sean propias a las condiciones históricas, geográficas y culturalesde los jóvenes, base fundamental de la posibilidad de deconstrucción −resistencia y lucha− de la institución filosófica.

Si la déconstruction devait commencer quelque part, si son principe n'était pas d'emblée celui de lamultiplication originaire du principe, il faudrait alors dire que c'est comme déconstruction de l'autoaffectionpure qu'elle commence. En effet, l'interrogation du concept d'auto-affection pure estl'interrogation d'une dernière tentative pour penser encore la subjectivité en termes de principe (c'est-àdireen termes aussi de « subjectivité »). L'« auto-affection pure » est un concept qui renvoiecouramment au livre de 1929 de Heidegger sur Kant, Kant et le problème de la métaphysique. Or, dansce contexte, il renvoie déjà de manière essentielle à la répétition comme dispositif de sa production etcomme ce à partir de quoi sa déconstruction a concrètement lieu. La question de la répétition est en faitinséparable de la déconstruction de l'auto-affection pure. Si celle-ci est un autre nom de la temporalité,il faut alors démontrer en droit ce qui est un fait : c'est à partir de la répétition que la temporalité peutseulement être dévoilée. En ce sens, la répétition est déjà répétition de la question de l'être (Sein undZeit) mais aussi répétition de Kant (Kant et le problème de la métaphysique). Or, la détermination de latemporalité comme auto-affection pure, dans la répétition heideggerienne de Kant, n'est elle-mêmepossible que d'après la compréhension essentielle de la temporalité phénoménologique à partir duconcept de Husserl d'impression originaire. En ce sens, comme déconstruction de l'auto-affection pure,la répétition – en-deçà de toute identité constituée – doit aussi se trouver déjà à la racine de touteimpression originaire. / If deconstruction begins somewhere, if its starting point is not already the original multiplication ofprinciple and origin, then it is necessary to say that it begins first as the deconstruction of pure selfaffection.The interrogation of the concept of pure self-affection is the interrogation of probably the lastattempt to think about subjectivity in the terms of a principle (which are of course the terms of“subjectivity”). The pure self-affection concept widely refers to the 1929 book by Heidegger on Kanttitled Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. In this context, the concept of pure self-affection refersalready to repetition as the essential “device” for its production. The question of repetition is in factinseparable from pure self-affection deconstruction. If pure self-affection can work as another name fortemporality, then we have to show the reason for a well established fact : it is just through repetitionthat temporality can be disclosed. In this sense, repetition is already the repetition of the question onbeing (Sein und Zeit), but also the repetition of Kant (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics). Now, thedetermination of temporality as pure self-affection, through Heidegger's repetition of Kant, supposesthe essential understanding of phenomenological temporality on the basis of Husserl's concept oforiginary impression. In this sense, as leading pure self-affection deconstruction, repetition – before theconstitution of identity – is to be found on the grounds of the originary impression itself.