Distinguer entre le droit commun et le droit spécial est une habitude fortement ancrée chez les juristes, dans le domaine de la théorie comme de la pratique. Les rôles attribués à cette distinction sont d’une grande diversité ; mais ils sont aussi sous la menace de deux phénomènes : la multiplication des degrés de spécialité et le développement de rapports -horizontaux - entre droits communs d'une part, et entre droits spéciaux d'autre part. Véritable "summa divisio", elle disposerait cependant toujours d’une vertu ordonnatrice très importante,tant pour le législateur que pour le juge, et tant à l’université que dans la pratique.Il y a pourtant un singulier paradoxe. Le droit commun et le droit spécial sont indéfinissables ; leur relativité est telle qu’ils ne se conçoivent pas abstraction faite l’un de l’autre. Et, toutefois, la relation qu’ils entretiennent est généralement décrite en termes d’opposition. Or, la relativité appelle bien plutôt la collaboration que l’opposition.C’est ainsi que, s’agissant de l’élaboration du droit, des influences positives sont à l’oeuvre. Le droit commun et le droit spécial se servent mutuellement de modèle. Leur évolution se déroule en contemplation l'un de l'autre. Cela permet surtout, concernant l’application du droit, de réfuter l’idée suivant laquelle le droit commun et le droit spécial s’excluraient mécaniquement. En dehors des hypothèses prévues par le droit écrit, aucun fondement ne justifie l’exclusivisme. Ce dernier ne dispose en outre que d’un régime juridique plein d’incertitude. La valeur de la solution préconisée par l’adage "Specialia generalibus derogant" n’est que celle d’une présomption, simple. « Sur-mesure », le droit spécial est supposé mieux adapté à la situation litigieuse, mais il peut concrètement se révéler moins approprié que le droit commun / Distinguishing between general and specific rules of law is a deeply rooted habit among civilist lawyers, concerning the field of theory as the practice one. The roles of this distinction are very different, but they are threatened by two kinds of phenomenas as well : the increasing degreesof specialization and the development of -horizontal- relationship between general rules of lawon the one hand, and specific rules of law in the other hand. As a genuine, it would work,however, always as a good way to order the priority of different rules of law for both legislature and judges, both in academia and in practice.There is however a singular paradox. The general and specific rules of law can't be defined,their relativity is such an obvious one that they inconceivable if the other doesn't exist. According to this idea, their relationship is usually described in terms of opposition. Yet, the meaning of "relativity" is closer to collaboration rather than opposition.Thus, as regards to the development of the law, positive influences are at work. General and specific rule of law are a model to each other. Their evolution takes place in contemplation ofeach part. This especially helps the application of law to refute the idea that the general andspecific rules of law are mechanically mutually exclusive. A part from the possibilities provided by statute law, no basis justifies exclusiveness. Furthermore, specific rules of law sometimes contain a lot of less-defined rules. The value of the solution advocated by the adage "specialia generalibus derogant " is just a presumption, a simple one. A specific rule of law is supposes to be perfectly adapted to a situation, but it may pragmatically, about some case, be less appropriate than the general rule of law.

<p>Denna uppsats består av en jämförande studie av två ärkebiskopar – KG Hammar (Svenska kyrkan) och Rowan Williams (Church of England) - ur ett postmodernt teologiskt perspektiv. Syftet var att söka finna postmoderna influenser hos de båda ärkebiskoparna i såväl teori som praktik och undersöka konsekvenserna av ett postmodernt teologiskt agerande.  Undersökningen visade att båda ärkebiskoparna influerades av postmodern teologi i teorin. Hammar förde också som ärkebiskop fram sina personliga postmoderna insikter, medan Williams av olika anledningar generellt valde att endast föra fram kyrkans åsikt. Båda handlingsalternativen medförde såväl kritik som uppskattning. Båda ärkebiskoparna tog fasta på den postmoderna teologins framhållande av dialog som metod: Dialog kännetecknade allt deras handlande, såväl inomkyrkligt som mot andra religiösa och samhälleliga grupper. Trots dialogen kunde dock inte vissa splittringar undvikas. Samhällsengagemanget visade sig däremot till största delen framgångsrikt och visade en postmodern insikt om kyrkans roll i en sekulär värld. Trots att ett postmodernt förhållningssätt inte helt accepterades, medverkade ärkebiskoparnas agerande till att skapa intresse för framför allt religiös dialog bland många olika grupper.</p> / <p>This essay is a comparative study of two archbishops - KG Hammar (Church of Sweden) and Rowan Williams (Church of England) - from a postmodern theological perspective. The aim was to discover postmodern influences for the archbishops in theory and practice, and to investigate the consequences of acting from a postmodern theological perspective. The study revealed postmodern influences in both archbishops' theory. Hammar chose to act according to his personal postmodern convictions also as archbishop whereas, for various reasons, Williams generally chose to speak only for the whole church. Both strategies were criticized as well as appreciated. Both archbishops were committed to dialogue as described by postmodern theology. This influenced all their actions, within the church as well as with other religious denominations and various groups in society. However, even with dialogue certain schisms proved to be unavoidable. The engagement in society proved more successful and showed a postmodern understanding of the church in a secular world. Even though a postmodern course of action was not totally accepted, the archbishops managed to promote a wide interest especially for religious dialogue.</p>