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11	Superveniens och dess plats inom anomal monism : En analys av debatten mellan Donald Davidson och Jaegwon Kim / Supervenience and its place within Anomalous Monism : An analysis of the debate between Donald Davidson and Jaegwon Kim Beckman, Emma January 2006 (has links) <p>Denna uppsats analyserar den medvetandefilosofiska debatten mellan Donald Davidson och Jaegwon Kim rörande Davidsons tes om det mentalas superveniens på det fysiska. Tesen utgör ett element i Davidsons generella teori om relationen mellan det mentala och det fysiska; anomal monism. Författaren frågar sig om Kim har rätt i att tesen om mental superveniens inte är tillräcklig för att garantera det mentala kausal kraft. I uppsatsen analyseras de båda filosofernas ståndpunkter i debatten med speciell tonvikt på deras respektive definitioner av superveniensbegreppet. Med utgångspunkt i detta argumenterar författarinnan att Kim i viss utsträckning kan sägas ha missförstått Davidsons superveniens-begrepp. Kim har definierat "svag" respektive "stark" och velat tolka Davidsons superveniens som tillhörande den sistnämnda sorten. Uppsatsförfattaren intar en ståndpunkt motsatt Kims och menar att Davidsons superveniensbegrepp snarare bör förstås som en variant av svag superveniens, men konstaterar samtidigt att det inte är helt säkert att dennes superveniens alls kan inordnas i någon av dessa kategorier; dessa refererar till "möjliga världar", vilka Davidson vägrar acceptera.</p> / <p>This paper analyses the debate between Donald Davidson and Jaegwon Kim concerning Davidsons idea of the supervenience of the mental upon the physical. This thought is part of Davidson's general theory of the relation between mind and body; anomalous monism. The author asks wherther Kim is right that mental supervenience is insufficient to gurantee the mental causal power. The paper analyses the standpoints of both philosophers, especially regarding their definitions of "supervenience" and argues that Kim, to some extent, can be said to have misunderstood Davidson's notion of supervenience. Kim has offered definitons of "weak" and "strong" supervenience and interpreted Davidsons supervenience as being of the kind last mentioned. The author takes a standpoint opposite of Kim's and argues that Davidson's notion of supervenience is better understood as weak supervenience, but at the same time notes that it is by no means obvious that Davidsons supervenience can be said to belong to either of these categories since these refer to "possible worlds", which Davidson refuses to accept.</p> Anomalous Monism Donald Davidson Jaegwon Kim Mental Supervenience Monism Materialism Anomal Monism Donald Davidson Jaegwon Kim Mental superveniens Monism Materialism Theoretical philosophy Teoretisk filosofi
12	Superveniens och dess plats inom anomal monism : En analys av debatten mellan Donald Davidson och Jaegwon Kim / Supervenience and its place within Anomalous Monism : An analysis of the debate between Donald Davidson and Jaegwon Kim Beckman, Emma January 2006 (has links) Denna uppsats analyserar den medvetandefilosofiska debatten mellan Donald Davidson och Jaegwon Kim rörande Davidsons tes om det mentalas superveniens på det fysiska. Tesen utgör ett element i Davidsons generella teori om relationen mellan det mentala och det fysiska; anomal monism. Författaren frågar sig om Kim har rätt i att tesen om mental superveniens inte är tillräcklig för att garantera det mentala kausal kraft. I uppsatsen analyseras de båda filosofernas ståndpunkter i debatten med speciell tonvikt på deras respektive definitioner av superveniensbegreppet. Med utgångspunkt i detta argumenterar författarinnan att Kim i viss utsträckning kan sägas ha missförstått Davidsons superveniens-begrepp. Kim har definierat "svag" respektive "stark" och velat tolka Davidsons superveniens som tillhörande den sistnämnda sorten. Uppsatsförfattaren intar en ståndpunkt motsatt Kims och menar att Davidsons superveniensbegrepp snarare bör förstås som en variant av svag superveniens, men konstaterar samtidigt att det inte är helt säkert att dennes superveniens alls kan inordnas i någon av dessa kategorier; dessa refererar till "möjliga världar", vilka Davidson vägrar acceptera. / This paper analyses the debate between Donald Davidson and Jaegwon Kim concerning Davidsons idea of the supervenience of the mental upon the physical. This thought is part of Davidson's general theory of the relation between mind and body; anomalous monism. The author asks wherther Kim is right that mental supervenience is insufficient to gurantee the mental causal power. The paper analyses the standpoints of both philosophers, especially regarding their definitions of "supervenience" and argues that Kim, to some extent, can be said to have misunderstood Davidson's notion of supervenience. Kim has offered definitons of "weak" and "strong" supervenience and interpreted Davidsons supervenience as being of the kind last mentioned. The author takes a standpoint opposite of Kim's and argues that Davidson's notion of supervenience is better understood as weak supervenience, but at the same time notes that it is by no means obvious that Davidsons supervenience can be said to belong to either of these categories since these refer to "possible worlds", which Davidson refuses to accept. Anomalous Monism Donald Davidson Jaegwon Kim Mental Supervenience Monism Materialism Anomal Monism Donald Davidson Jaegwon Kim Mental superveniens Monism Materialism Philosophy Filosofi
13	Donald Davidsons Theorie sprachlichen Verstehens / Stüber, Karsten. January 1900 (has links) Texte remanié de: Diss.--Tübingen--Universität.
14	Music, mind and the serious Zappa : the passions of a virtual listener Volgsten, Ulrik January 1999 (has links) This dissertation argues that music is always ideological. For this thesis two lines of argument are given. The first states that music is always ideological because it requires verbal discourses about itself. The second line of argument states that music is always ideological because it influences the listener affectively. That language is necessary for talk about music is trivial. The point is rather that talk about music is necessary for auditive behaviour to turn into complex cultural artefacts. Without language humans would have no more music than birds, whales or duetting apes. At the other extreme, musical experiences are affective in nature. To have a musical experience is to experience an affective unfolding through time. Affect (as distinguished from the emotions) refers to the amodal properties of perception-such as intensity, shape, rhythm-and lies at the heart of human communication. With its roots in early mother-infant interaction, affective communication is inherently social. Together with discourses about music, the affective properties of musical experiences makes music into an extremely subtle, and thereby efficient, ideological manipulator in various types of social contexts. Finally, the theoretical conclusions reached will be exemplified by introducing a virtual listener, the various facets of whose listening experiences are captured by different analytical methods and listening reports as applied to some of the "serious" music by Frank Zappa. Central for the explanation of these listening experiences are the "passions," that is, the affects, moods and emotions that the music evokes in the listener, or that the listener takes the music to express. / <p>The attached fulltext is a revised version of the original thesis.</p> affect attunement categorization cognition Daniel Stern Donald Davidson Eleanor Rosch emotions mood ideology imagination metaphor sympathy Zappa multimodal analysis
15	Full-bloodedness, modesty and minimalist truth Billinge, Daniel January 2016 (has links) This thesis discusses the central ideas that surround Michael Dummett's claim that there is an incompatibility between a truth-conditional conception of meaning and a minimalist conception of truth. These ideas are brought into relation to the work of John McDowell and Donald Davidson, as all three philosophers can be better understood by locating them within Dummett's dialectic regarding the incompatibility. Dummett's argument crucially depends upon the assumption that a meaning-theory should be full-blooded in nature, against McDowell's insistence that a meaning-theory can only ever be modest. The main contention of this thesis is that neither Dummett nor McDowell is successful in establishing their strong contentions regarding the form that a meaning-theory should take. McDowell only wants to provide trivial answers to questions about the constitutive nature of the meanings and competency of particular items in a language. Dummett, on the other hand, wants to provide a reductive account of the central concepts that concern the philosophy of language. What this thesis will argue is that once both of these claims have been rejected, the position Dummett and McDowell jointly dictate is in fact the position that we should read Davidson as occupying, who lies in a conceptual space between the extremes of maximal full-bloodedness and modesty. This is an understanding of Davidson that is contrary to how McDowell reads him, who has been an influential commentator of Davidson. How Davidson should actually be interpreted is achieved by understanding how he has the resources to avoid Dummett's claim of an incompatibility between a truth-conditional conception of meaning and a minimalist conception of truth. 121
16	Gud och vardagsspråket : En religionsfilosofisk förutsättningsanalys / God and Everyday Language : An Analysis of Presuppositions in Philosophy of Religion Fromm Wikström, Linda January 2010 (has links) The main purpose of this dissertation is to answer the question of how one can understand the fact that we mean very different things when we say that God exists and when we say that chairs, mountains and trees exist, and that it is still a matter of existence. On the one hand it seems that we talk about the same thing when we say that something exists, irrespective of what it is, on the other hand it seems to be a question of very different things depending on what it is we are talking about as existing. This dissertation seeks to give an understanding of the relation between the concept of truth and the concept of reality. The conclusion is not only that we presuppose these concepts in everything we do, say, believe and think, but that we presuppose a specific understanding of these concepts, namely a concept of objective truth and a concept of an external and mind independent reality. In this dissertation it is also argued that our use of these concepts and that we use them in everything we do – that they are as basic as they are – says something about how it is, about reality. The use of these concepts does not only say something of what we conceptually presuppose but it also says something about what we assume in relation to reality. The conceptual aspect, in this way, has consequences ontologi. Truth reality language everyday language conceptual scheme metaphysical realism anti-realism metaphysical anti-realism non-realism God presuppositions transcendental argument philosophy of religion Donald Davidson Michael P. Lynch Eberhard Herrmann Hilary Putnam Alessandra Tanesini Karin Johannesson Erica Appelros. Philosophy of religion Religionsfilosofi
17	"Im Spiegel der Bedeutung" eine Studie über die Begründbarkeit des Relativismus Hönig, Kathrin January 1900 (has links) Zugl.: Basel, Univ., Diss., 2002
18	Lidový dualismus a dvě konceptuální říše / Folk Dualism and the Two Conceptual Realms Jirout Košová, Michaela January 2021 (has links) The thesis focuses on the irreducibility of the concept of a person to scientific view of the world. The main inspiration for thematising this specific aspect of folk dualism comes from Donald Davidson (two realms) and Wilfrid Sellars (two images). The theoretical sections are complemented by reflexion on results of empirical studies provided mostly by experimental philosophy in order to demonstrate how this approach benefits attempts to reach complex view of philosophical questions that have close connection to moral dimension of human life. The first chapter addresses a wider concept of self and introduces the idea of the necessity to bring the two conceptual realms on the scene: there is a specific conceptual realm (irreducible to physical realm or scientific image) enabling proper grasp of the concept of a person. The subsequent chapters address particular sub-concepts of the concept of self. The second chapter focuses on the concept of free will, and by referring to different views it points to the necessity to bring folk concepts into consideration. It concludes that the folk concept of free agent is transcendent with regard to scientific accounts and bears certain "supernatural" characteristics connected to the concept of conscious will. The third (and central) chapter brings focus on the...
19	Δύο προσεγγίσεις για την έννοια της Πρόθεσης Σκλαβούνος, Παναγιώτης 01 February 2013 (has links) Η “καθιερωμένη θεώρηση για την πράξη”, όντας δεσμευμένη σε ένα ευρύτερο νατουραλιστικό μοντέλο, κατανοεί την πράξη ως “επιμέρους συμβάν”, το οποίο προκαλείται αιτιακά από συγκεκριμένες νοητικές καταστάσεις. Σ’ αυτό το πλαίσιο, η αιτιακή επίδραση της πρόθεσης υπάγεται στο σύνηθες χιουμιανό μοντέλο της αιτιότητας μεταξύ συμβάντων. Ωστόσο, η εν λόγω θεώρηση αποτυγχάνει ουσιωδώς να ερμηνεύσει τις πράξεις στην εξέλιξή τους, πριν δηλαδή να διαμορφωθεί το απαιτούμενο (από το χιουμιανό μοντέλο) εξατομικευμένο συμβάν. Το γεγονός αυτό έχει ευρύτερες επιπτώσεις για τον τρόπο με τον οποίο αντιλαμβάνεται η εν λόγω προσέγγιση τόσο την έννοια της πρόθεσης, όσο και κατ’ επέκταση το ρόλο του δρώντος. Στην παρούσα εργασία και με αφορμή κυρίως πρόσφατες εργασίες από τους Hornsby και Crowther, επιχειρηματολογώ σχετικά με το ότι μπορούμε να υιοθετήσουμε μια εναλλακτική προσέγγιση, τόσο για την οντολογία της πράξης, όσο και για την πρόθεση, η οποία δίνει ικανοποιητικότερες απαντήσεις στις ανωτέρω προκλήσεις. Κεντρική θέση στα πλαίσια αυτής της προσέγγισης είναι η αναγνώριση της “δραστηριότητας” ως συγκροτησιακού στοιχείου της πράξης, κατά τη διάρκεια της οποίας η αιτιακή συμβολή του δρώντος παραμένει συνεχής, σε συμφωνία με μια αριστοτελικού τύπου προσέγγιση της αιτιότητας. Όι παραδοχές αυτές οδηγούν σε μια θεώρηση της πρόθεσης ως καθοδηγητικής της πράξης καθόλη τη διάρκεια εξέλιξής της. / The “standard story of action” being committed to a broader naturalistic model, understands action as a “particular event”, which is caused by certain mental states. In this context, the causal efficacy of intention is covered by the standard humean model of causality between events. Nevertheless, the story in question substantially fails to give an account for actions as they develop, that is, before the required (by the humean model) individuated event has been formed. That fact has broader effects on the way that the approach in question understands the concept of intention, and ultimately the role of the agent. In this thesis, following mainly on recent papers by Hornsby and Crowther, I argue that we can endorse an alternate approach regarding the ontology of action, as well as intention, that gives more adequate answers to the challenges mentioned above. The main thesis in this context is to recognize “activity” as a constitutional element of action, during which the causal efficacy of the agent remains ongoing, in accordance with an aristotelian type of approach to causality. These commitments result in recognizing intention as guiding action throughout the whole of its development. Πράξη Πρόθεση Εμπρόθετη πράξη Πρότερη πρόθεση Πρόθεση εν τη πράξει Ουσιώδης γενικότητα Ρηματική όψη Η απλή οπτική Λάθη στην επιτέλεση Αιτιακή απόκλιση 128.4 Action Intention Standard story of action Intentional action Humean notion of causality Prior intention Intention in action Accidental generality Categorial generality Essential generality Stretches of activity Directed activities The simple view Mistakes in performance Causal deviance G. E. M. Anscombe Donald Davidson Michael E. Bratman Jennifer Hornsby Paul Crowther Alexander P. D. Mourelatos
20	Overeating, Obesity, and Weakness of the Will Sommers, Jennifer Heidrun 28 August 2015 (has links) The philosophical literature on akrasia and/or weakness of the will tends to focus on individual actions, removed from their wider socio-political context. This is problematic because actions, when removed from their wider context, can seem absurd or irrational when they may, in fact, be completely rational or, at least, coherent. Much of akrasia's apparent mystery or absurdity is eliminated when people's behaviours are considered within their cultural and political context. I apply theories from the social and behavioural sciences to a particular behaviour in order to show where the philosophical literature on akrasia and/or weakness of the will is insightful and where it is lacking. The problem used as the basis for my analysis is obesity caused by overeating. On the whole, I conclude that our intuitions about agency are unreliable, that we may have good reasons to overeat and/or neglect our health, and that willpower is, to some degree, a matter of luck. / Graduate / 0630 / 0573 / 0422 / felshereeno@aol.com akrasia action theory addiction agency Alison McIntyre applied ethics Bernard Williams body studies Bourdieu Cartesian dualism Christine Korsgaard compulsion continence deviance diet Distinction Donald Davidson dualism externalism incontinence inequality internalism intuition Irving K. Zola Marx medicalization morality Nichomachean Ethics Nomy Arpaly obesity epidemic orthorexia overeating overweight personal identity Petr Skrabanek Philip Kitcher philosophical intuition picoeconomics Pierre Bourdieu fat free will Gary Watson George Ainslie habitus healthism rat park rational choice rationality Richard Holton Robert Crawford social class stigma taste for luxury temperance utility maximization virtue weakness of the will willpower

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