The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a regional economic community established by Treaty in 1992 and comprising fifteen southern African countries. The Tribunal, SADC’s judicial organ, is situated in Windhoek, Namibia and became operational in 2005. The Tribunal enjoys a wide mandate to hear and determine disputes between states, states and SADC, and between natural and legal persons and states or SADC. It is mandated to develop its own jurisprudence having regard to applicable treaties, general rules and principles of public international law, and principles and rules of law of member states. Being new in the field, the Tribunal has not as yet developed a significant jurisprudence although it has delivered a number of judgments some of which are referred to in the study. The Tribunal is expected to develop its own jurisprudence having regard to the jurisprudence developed by other international courts involved in the judicial settlement of disputes. The study offers a comparative review and analysis of the jurisprudence of two selected courts: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ). The focus is on four selected areas considered crucial to the functioning of the Tribunal and the selected courts. The study discusses the parties with access to the Tribunal and compares this with access to the ICJ and ECJ. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is contrasted with that of the two selected courts. The sources of law available to the Tribunal are discussed and contrasted to those of the two courts. Lastly, the enforcement of law in SADC is contrasted to what applies in relation to the selected courts. In each selected area, similarities and differences between the Tribunal and the two courts are noted and critically evaluated. Further, rules and principles developed by the two selected courts are explored in depth with a view to identifying those which could be of use to the Tribunal. Recommendations are made on rules and principles which could be of use to the Tribunal and on possible improvements to the SADC treaty regime. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

On July 1 2010 new rules regarding cross-border group deductions came into force in Sweden. The rules are based on a series of judgements which were delivered by the Court of Justice of the European Union and subsequent rulings deriving from the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court. The new set of rules is supposed to make the Swedish group consolidation system in line with EU law in the area of cross-border group consolidations. The new rules allow a resident parent to deduct the losses stemming from its non-resident subsidiary but only if the subsidiary has exhausted all the possibilities to take those losses into account in its own state of origin and the losses cannot be utilized in the future by the subsidiary or a third party. Furthermore, the non-resident subsidiary needs to be liquidated for the parent to be able to show that the possibilities have been exhausted. However, before even considering whether the subsidiary has exhausted the losses there is one criterion that need to be fulfilled; the criterion of a wholly owned subsidiary. The criterion of a wholly owned subsidiary requires a resident parent to directly own its non-resident subsidiary without any intermediate companies and that shareholding must correspond to more than 90 percent. It is the requirement of a direct shareholding which post a concern to whether that criterion can be seen as in compliance with the case-law stemming from The Court of Justice of the European Union and the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court. After revising and analysing the case-law stemming from the Court of Justice and the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court it is the author’s belief that the criterion of a wholly owned subsidiary, due to the requirement of a direct shareholding, is not in conformity with EU law and cannot be justified by the justification grounds put forward by the Swedish government.

The protection of individual rights arising out of EC law,and the state liability for a breach of EC law entailing damages to such individuals, are the issues dealt with in the thesis. The thesis deals with the state liability doctrine as formulated by ECJ, identifies grounds for giving rise to remedies as a result of a breach of EC Law by a member state, examines the practice of ECJ and national courts in application of the state liability in the light of EC Law.

ABSTRACT University: Växjö University, school of social science, department of political science Level: Bachelor’s thesis in political science Title: SHIFTING BALANCE OF POWER? – an analyze of the new EU-treaty’s consequences for the EC-court. Academic adviser: Associate professor Stefan Höjelid Author: Magnus Nordahl This study focuses on the increased role of the European Court of Justice through the establishment of a Constitution for Europe and its impact on the balance of power, both horizontal and vertical. To do this, the study takes its aims from the research problem, formulated as follows: Does the establishment of a constitution for Europe contribute to an increased role for the European Court of Justice and does it create a more legible horizontal and vertical division of power? To reach the relevant analyses and conclusions two precise questions are presented as well as an analytical model. The precise questions are: • Which are the relevant contributions for the balance of power from a perspective of juridification in the new EU-treaty? • What impacts do those contributions have on the so called ‘European federalism’? The theoretical perspective of this study is rooted in the concept of federalism with special emphasizes on constitution and sovereignty as well as a part about the process of juridification. Along with the presented analytical model consisting of a horizontal and vertical division of power, the empirical material is presented with focus on the new EU-treaty about a constitution for Europe and the European Court of Justice. By doing this, analyses are made about the changing power of the ECJ and the new EU-treaty from a perspective of division of power, federalism and juridification. Through the establishment of the EU-treaty about the creation of a constitution the ECJ receive a clearer platform to act upon which contributes to a more legible division of power, both horizontal and vertical. This due to the fact that the new EU-treaty will take place as the highest law within the EU, something that the ECJ have the right to interpret. The whole process is also a broader recognition of the process of juridification where judicial power increases on the cost of politics. Keywords: Constitution, Division of power, EU, ECJ, Federalism, Juridification, and Sovereignty.

L’analyse de la jurisprudence de l’Union Européenne a trop longtemps fait l’objet de la seule attention des juristes. Mais, si des analyses jurisprudentielles successives ont jusqu’à présent appréhendé les principes structurant de cette jurisprudence et se sont tentés à des conceptualisations, il sera avancé que ces entreprises n’ont été que partielles. En effet, le principe principal, quoiqu’implicite, de l’évolution de la jurisprudence de l’Union Européenne est le principe d’efficience économique. Cette carence, ne rendant l’effort de conceptualisation de la jurisprudence européenne qu’imparfait, est due à l’absence d’analyse économique méthodique et systémique du droit européen et, plus particulièrement, de la jurisprudence européenne. Cette thèse entend combler cette lacune. Au-delà d’entreprendre une analyse économique approfondie de la jurisprudence européenne permettant une conceptualisation renouvelée et précisée de la figure du juge européen, notre étude permettra de s’inscrire dans le débat de la supériorité alléguée des systèmes de Common Law en termes d’efficience économique. De plus, notre thèse, par une grille d’analyse originale renouvelant l’analyse du droit (européen), mettra en exergue les points de convergence et de divergence entre lignes de jurisprudence. La systématisation de notre analyse jurisprudentielle par la perspective du principe d’efficience économique nous permettra, ainsi, d’élaborer une 10 véritable hypothèse scientifique falsifiable et falsifiée. Nous formulerons une hypothèse de l’efficience économique de la jurisprudence européenne. / For too long, lawyers were the only scholars scrutinizing the ECJ case-law. Consequently, numerous jurisprudential analyses have scarcely portrayed the complexity of the underpinning concepts beneath the ECJ case-law. These approaches to the ECJ case-law have only been partial, it will be argued, due to the neglect of the fundamental principle driving the ECJ case-law’s evolution – meaning, the principle of economic efficiency. This neglect can be explained from the absence of thoroughly in-depth economic analyses of European law, and especially of the ECJ case-law. This thesis aims at filling up this gap. Beyond the economic analysis of the ECJ case-law allowing for an original, updated and renewed perspective of the EU judicial reasoning, this thesis shall pave the way for a better grasping of the academic debate pertaining to the alleged economic efficiency of the Common law over civil law traditions. Moreover, this thesis, from this original viewpoint that is an overtly economic perspective of the EU judicial reasoning, shall draw new conclusions on some specific stances of the EU judges. The systemic approach undertaken here from the perspective of the principle of economic efficiency shall lead us to formulate the scientific hypothesis that is falsifiable and falsified. Indeed, the hypothesis of the economic efficiency of the ECJ case-law shall be advanced.

General and individual exemptions in the provision of state aid under European law This diploma thesis refers to the European regulation of the provision of state aid by member states. Because of the fact that under certain circumstances state aid can affect the economic competition among concurrents both within a member state and within the internal market of the EU and thus have a significant bad influence on it, art. 107 subsection 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states a general interdiction of providing state aid by the memeber states. It defines state aid as financial aid in any form (direct grant, soft loan, tax allowance, interest subsidy etc.), payed out of financial ressources belonging to the state ("state" defined in a large sense as both the central state sphere and local government sphere), which give preferential treatment to certain companies or certain production sectors and thereby affects or may affect competition, and lastly which have an influence on business between the member states (have an effect on the internal market). Of course there have to be exemptions from this general interdiction. The exemptions are regulated in art. 107 subsection 2 TFEU (general exemptions) and 3 TFEU (individual exemptions). There are three general exemptions:...

EGMR und EuGH stehen grundsätzlich gleichberechtigt und autonom nebeneinander. Beide verstehen sich als Hüter der Grund- und Menschenrechte auf europäischer Ebene und als Kontrollinstanzen. Sie urteilen aber beide auch auf Grundlage der EMRK. Für den EGMR ist dies die originäre Rechtsgrundlage, während der EuGH mangels eines geschriebenen Grundrechtskatalogs aus ganz unterschiedlichen Rechtsquellen schöpft. Zudem ist er nicht zwingend an eine vom EGMR gewählte Auslegung einer EMRK-Norm gebunden. Diese Situation begünstigt die Möglichkeit divergierender Entscheidungen beider Gerichtshöfe bezüglich ein- und derselben EMRK - Norm und letztendlich auch die Entwicklung unterschiedlicher Grundrechtsschutzniveaus in Europa. Diese Arbeit möchte einen Weg aufzeigen, wie eine derartige Entwicklung vermieden werden kann. / ECHR and ECJ stand in principle equally and autonomously side by side. Both courts understand themselves as guardians of the basic rights and human rights on a european level. However, they both judge also on the basis of the European Charta on Human Rights. For the ECHR, this is the original legal-basis, whereas the ECJ, due to the lack of a written privilege-catalog, developes basic rights from quite different legal-sources. Moreover, it is not necessarily tied to an interpretation of an ECHR-Norm chosen by the EGMR. This situation favors the possibility of diverging decisions of both courts concerning the same ECHR - norm and ultimately the development of different privilege-protection-levels in Europe. This work would like to show a way how a such a development can be avoided.

<p>This paper studies the structural issues concerning possible human rights violations found in the Dublin Regulation; An EU regulation aiming to allocate a responsible member state to a third-country-nationals asylum application. It is one of the criticized legal documents within the scholarly field of human rights. Hence, this study aims to study the details of the regulation to find out the elements of the regulation that are prone to human rights violations. Asking the question: What are some details of the Dublin Regulation that could potentially result in human rights violation of the third-country nationals seeking international protection within the territory of member states? Hence, exploring the gap found between the regulation and human rights of the asylum seekers. This was done by a normative legal analysis study of the law, studying the text of the regulation, relevant human rights law, and jurisprudence from two courts of law: ECHR and ECJ. The findings of the study highlights, first, the regulation upholds only the superficial elements of human rights law. Second, the regulation assumes that every member state is a safe country. Third, there is an imbalance of responsibility on either of the two or more member states involved. These are the details of the regulation highlighted in this study that is potentially the result of possible human rights violations and the criticism of the topic. </p>

Cette recherche doctorale part de l’hypothèse générale selon laquelle la méthode communautaire classique serait concurrencée dans les faits par de nouveaux instruments juridiques qui, loin de constituer des initiatives isolées, participent d’un modèle alternatif de gouvernance communautaire qui la transforme en profondeur. <p><p>Afin d’identifier les caractéristiques, les contours et les nouvelles formes de normativités de ce modèle alternatif, cette recherche a adopté une approche pragmatique de l’étude droit et étudie empiriquement et systématiquement six politiques publiques européennes :la stratégie européenne pour l’emploi (SEE) et la Méthode Ouverte de Coordination (MOC), le programme européen REACH; la politique européenne de l’eau; la politique comptable européenne; la politique de régulation des services financiers; et la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique et le marché européen du carbone. Ces politiques publiques sont étudiées au moyen d’une approche par les instruments d’action publique qui s’inspire de la démarche et des recherches effectuées par Michel Foucault sur la « gouvernementalité ». <p><p>Cette analyse nous aura permis de démontrer que la transformation de la méthode communautaire classique se constate à au moins trois niveaux. Au niveau des acteurs, on assiste à un renforcement de la place des acteurs privés et de la société civile dans les politiques publiques étudiées. La transformation de l’action publique européenne réside également dans l’utilisation abondante de nouveaux instruments d’action publique - plus techniques que politiques et plus incitatifs que contraignants (du type benchmarking) - qui impliquent systématiquement une collaboration entre acteurs publics et privés à différents niveaux du processus décisionnel (coproduction normative). Enfin le mode de sanction est devenu une « contrainte par l’image » reposant sur la figure du « mauvais élève de la classe » véhiculée principalement par des publications de classements basées sur une classification des bonnes pratiques. Corrélativement, cette transformation se constate également dans les phases d’élaboration, d’exécution et de contrôle du droit de l’Union européenne. <p><p>Une fois les caractéristiques et les contours de ce modèle alternatif dessinés sur base des politiques publiques étudiées, cette recherche s’est ensuite tournée vers une présentation des discours (politiques et juridiques) et écoles de pensées (Law and Economics / New Public Management / Démocratie délibérative / Expérimentalisme démocratique) permettant de justifier son existence et, par là, de fonder sa légitimité. Enfin, si ce nouveau modèle peut prétendre à une certaine légitimité ou nécessité et s’il n’apparaît pas envisageable de revenir en arrière, sa non-concordance avec le traité est problématique. En effet, ce modèle pose une série de questions relatives au manque de contrôle sur l’activité des institutions de l’Union et à la sauvegarde de l’ordre juridique constitutionnel européen. Plus précisément, l’étude de la question de la protection juridictionnelle effective et du respect du principe de l’équilibre des pouvoirs permet d’identifier un certains nombre d’écueils et de proposer des suggestions d’amélioration pragmatique du modèle décisionnel européen au regard des nouveaux instruments juridiques de la gouvernance européenne.<p><p><p>The starting point of my doctoral research is that the Classic Community Method, as described in the Lisbon Treaty, does not enable one to understand the manner in which law is currently produced in the European Union. I claim that the Community Method is in fact challenged and transformed by new legal instruments that, far from being isolated initiatives, are part of an alternative model of governance.<p><p>My research adopts a programmatic approach as to identify the features, contours and new forms of normativity of this alternative model. It studies empirically and systematically six European public policies through “an approach by instruments” inspired in the writings of Michel Foucault on "governmentality”.<p><p>This analysis shows that the transformation of the Classic Community method occurs at least at three levels. First, there is a strengthening of the role of private actors and civil society in policy making. Second, the transformation of European public action also lies in the abundant use of new policy instruments - rather technical and political incentives than binding rules (benchmarking) - that involve a systematic collaboration between public and private actors at different levels of decision-making (co-regulation). Third, control and sanctions rely greatly on a “constrained by image” system based primarily on publications of rankings and classifications of good practices.<p><p>After I present the features and contours of this alternative model, my research analyzes the political and legal discourses, as well as the schools of thought (Law and Economics / New Public Management / Deliberative Democracy / Democratic Experimentalism), that justify its existence and, therefore, its legitimacy.<p>Finally, my doctoral work rises the question about the lack of control over these regulatory activities and brings to light the safeguards that should be taken by the European Court of Justice to respect European Union’s Constitutional law<p> / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

La tesi ha per oggetto l’autotutela amministrativa, specialmente quella c.d. decisoria “spontanea”, ovvero quell’insieme di poteri che consentono all’amministrazione di riesaminare i propri provvedimenti e di rimuoverli a vario titolo.
Di questi poteri si è indagato il fondamento dogmatico e positivo. La questione del fondamento è stata per lunghi anni affrontata dalla dottrina e dalla giurisprudenza in termini totalmente pre-critici e non problematici: l’esistenza di questi poteri era semplicemente scontata e le riflessioni sulla loro base giuridica si esaurivano perlopiù nella constatazione della loro necessità nell’immemore consenso circa la loro ammissibilità. Negli ultimi anni, invece, una parte degli Autori ha disconosciuto la natura implicita e per così dire “originaria” di questi poteri e ne ha perciò patrocinato la stretta riconduzione al principio di legalità: in altre parole, l’annullamento e la revoca non sarebbero affatto conseguenza della c.d. inesauribilità del potere amministrativo – negata da questa dottrina – e sarebbero perciò oggi ammissibili unicamente nei casi e nei modi disciplinati dalle due norme introdotte nella legge sul procedimento nel 2005. Ciò a garanzia della certezza dei rapporti giuridici e del legittimo affidamento dei destinatari dei provvedimenti ampliativi. Secondo un filone ricostruttivo in pare contrastante con il primo, altri Autori hanno inteso valorizzare gli elementi de iure condito a favore della obbligatorietà dell’avvio del procedimento di riesame, auspicandone contemporaneamente la generalizzazione, nell’ottica di una più complessiva trasformazione dell’annullamento d’ufficio in un nuovo istituto ibrido, rispondente alla funzione di alternative dispute risolution system o, se si vuole, di ricorso gerarchico. Per le stesse ragioni, l’istituto dovrebbe perdere il carattere ampiamente discrezionale, in favore di una vincolatezza totale o parziale. Questo secondo “fronte di attacco” alla ricostruzione tradizionale intende offrire soluzione al venir meno del sistema dei controlli di legalità sull’azione amministrativa. Lo studio ha sottoposto a verifica entrambi i filoni evolutivi richiamati, discostandosi dal secondo e, pur accogliendo parte delle argomentazioni ad esso sottostanti, anche dal primo. Quanto alla teoria dell’esauribilità del potere amministrativo, oggetto della prima linea evolutiva, si è ritenuto di condividere le considerazioni circa la tutela dell’affidamento degli interessati e della stabilità dei rapporti giuridici. È parsa tuttavia meglio rispondente alle categorie generali e alle esigenze del sistema (anche sulla base di una visione del diritto amministrativo quale “diritto dei terzi”, per natura volto alla tutela dell’interesse generale e non solo dell’interesse privato particolare coinvolto dall’esercizio del potere) la conservazione della tradizionale inesauribilità del potere, seppur assai mitigata, nella pratica, con riferimento all’esercizio dei poteri di ritiro degli atti favorevoli ai privati il cui affidamento sia concretamente meritevole di tutela. La natura discrezionale dell’annullamento d’ufficio (e della revoca), sottoposta a critica dalla seconda linea evolutiva, viene difesa sia sul piano del diritto positivo e pretorio (attraverso la riconduzione dei principali casi di annullamento c.d. doveroso al modello generale), sia sul piano delle categorie generali, a partire dalla natura dei poteri coinvolti e dall’analisi delle posizioni giuridiche dei soggetti interessati dai procedimenti di secondo grado. / The thesis focuses on the Italian system of so called autoprotection or selfprotection. This expression refers to the powers of public administration to revoke its own acts when deemed necessary to repair a vice of legitimacy or a vice of opportunity, without being bind to resort to the courts. Given the aim of this powers – the same of first grade powers plus a semi-judicial one – they are usually meant by judges and scholars as “widely discretionary”. Furthermore, it has always been believed that the choice to activate the correspondent proceeding is totally free for public administration; consequently, a demand of interested parties does not make binding the start of the procedure, opposite to what happens with administrative appeal proceedings. In recent years ECJ, ECHR and national case law has emboldened the limits to selfredress, making clear that legitimate expectations and the public interest to legal certainty must be taken into consideration and given sufficient protection. Lately, also the Legislator followed, making the annulment and the revocation harder to be put in effect when the first act is favorable to the addressed subject. In such cases, the revocation cannot be ordered for a mere reconsideration of already known circumstances (ius poenitendi) but only if new ones show up. At the same time, ex officio annulment is precluded after 18 months from the issuing of the first act, instead of the previous general limit of a “reasonable time”. On the other hand, the case law has apparently pointed out some hypothesis of mandatory annulment, such as for “anticomunitarian acts” and cost-producing acts. Based on these two orientation, some scholars suggested a global rethinking of the self-protection, its bases and its rules. The study analyzes the case law and the latest legislative reforms, proving that no mandatory annulment exists in the Italian legal system. Therefore, nor the ECJ principle of equivalence nor other principles require that selfredress become generally obliged. The thesis also aims to prove that selfprotection remains a discretionary power, in order to ensure that the contrasting needs (the rule of law on the one hand, and the legal certainty and legitimate expectation on the other hand) can be properly balanced in every decision, according to the Constitutional provision of article 97, which requires that both impartiality and good administration are pursued.