Then the process of Enlargement has started, it was expected that Accession of much more agrarian and less developed countries from Eastern and Central Europe, compared to the Member States at that time, should encourage the radical reforms of the EU redistributive policies – Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Cohesion Policy. Some researchers provided with numbers proving that Enlargement without reforming the EU redistributive policies would substantially increase the funding for implementation of these policies. While the other group of scientists noticed that the Enlargement process is getting momentum, whereas the internal EU reforms are postponing. The decision on the CAP reform was taken in 2003 by the Agricultural Council, while the Cohesion Policy reform was agreed in the Brussels European Council of 2005. In the Commission’s reform proposals as well as during Member States’ negotiations much attention was paid, especially in the case of the Cohesion Policy reform, to the challenges of Enlargement. In this paper the aforementioned last reforms of the EU redistributive policies are analysed: the CAP reform of 2002–2003 and the Cohesion Policy reform of 2004–2006 aiming to evaluate the impact of Enlargement on the Commission’s reform proposals and the reform results. It is argued that the factor of Enlargement, although in the Commission’s reform proposals was emphasised as encouraging to reform the CAP and the Cohesion Policy radically, in reality for the EU... [to full text] / Prasidėjus ES plėtros procesui buvo pradėta kalbėti apie tai, kad kur kas labiau agrarinių ir silpniau išsivysčiusių, palyginus su tuometinėmis ES valstybėmis narėmis, Rytų ir Vidurio Europos valstybių prisijungimas paskatins ES perskirstomųjų politikų – Bendrosios žemės ūkio politikos (BŽŪP) ir Sanglaudos politikos – radikalias reformas. Tyrinėtojai pateikinėjo skaičius, įrodančius, kad plėtra, ES perskirstomųjų politikų nereformavus, stipriai padidins ir taip dideles šių politikų įgyvendinimui skiriamas lėšas. Tuo tarpu kiti tyrinėtojai atkreipė dėmesį į pagreitį įgaunantį plėtros procesą bei vis atidedamas vidines ES reformas. Dėl BŽŪP reformos buvo sutarta 2003 m. Žemės ūkio ministrų taryboje, o dėl Sanglaudos politikos reformos – 2005 m. Briuselio Europos Viršūnių Taryboje. Europos Komisijos pasiūlymuose ir valstybių narių derybų dėl reformų eigoje daug dėmesio, ypač Sanglaudos politikos reformos atveju, buvo skiriama ES plėtros iššūkių akcentavimui. Šiame darbe išsamiai nagrinėjamos dvi minėtos paskutinės ES perskirstomųjų politikų reformos: 2002–2003 m. BŽŪP reforma ir 2004–2006 m. Sanglaudos politikos reforma, siekiant įvertinti, kokį iš tikrųjų poveikį Europos Komisijos pateiktiems reformų pasiūlymams ir reformų rezultatams turėjo ES plėtra. Darbe įrodinėjama, kad ES plėtros veiksnys, nors Europos Komisijos pasiūlymuose buvo akcentuojamas kaip skatinantis iš esmės reformuoti BŽŪP ir Sanglaudos politiką, iš tikrųjų minėtoms ES perskirstomųjų politikų reformoms... [toliau žr. visą tekstą]

Prasidėjus ES plėtros procesui buvo pradėta kalbėti apie tai, kad kur kas labiau agrarinių ir silpniau išsivysčiusių, palyginus su tuometinėmis ES valstybėmis narėmis, Rytų ir Vidurio Europos valstybių prisijungimas paskatins ES perskirstomųjų politikų – Bendrosios žemės ūkio politikos (BŽŪP) ir Sanglaudos politikos – radikalias reformas. Tyrinėtojai pateikinėjo skaičius, įrodančius, kad plėtra, ES perskirstomųjų politikų nereformavus, stipriai padidins ir taip dideles šių politikų įgyvendinimui skiriamas lėšas. Tuo tarpu kiti tyrinėtojai atkreipė dėmesį į pagreitį įgaunantį plėtros procesą bei vis atidedamas vidines ES reformas. Dėl BŽŪP reformos buvo sutarta 2003 m. Žemės ūkio ministrų taryboje, o dėl Sanglaudos politikos reformos – 2005 m. Briuselio Europos Viršūnių Taryboje. Europos Komisijos pasiūlymuose ir valstybių narių derybų dėl reformų eigoje daug dėmesio, ypač Sanglaudos politikos reformos atveju, buvo skiriama ES plėtros iššūkių akcentavimui. Šiame darbe išsamiai nagrinėjamos dvi minėtos paskutinės ES perskirstomųjų politikų reformos: 2002–2003 m. BŽŪP reforma ir 2004–2006 m. Sanglaudos politikos reforma, siekiant įvertinti, kokį iš tikrųjų poveikį Europos Komisijos pateiktiems reformų pasiūlymams ir reformų rezultatams turėjo ES plėtra. Darbe įrodinėjama, kad ES plėtros veiksnys, nors Europos Komisijos pasiūlymuose buvo akcentuojamas kaip skatinantis iš esmės reformuoti BŽŪP ir Sanglaudos politiką, iš tikrųjų minėtoms ES perskirstomųjų politikų reformoms... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / Then the process of Enlargement has started, it was expected that Accession of much more agrarian and less developed countries from Eastern and Central Europe, compared to the Member States at that time, should encourage the radical reforms of the EU redistributive policies – Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Cohesion Policy. Some researchers provided with numbers proving that Enlargement without reforming the EU redistributive policies would substantially increase the funding for implementation of these policies. While the other group of scientists noticed that the Enlargement process is getting momentum, whereas the internal EU reforms are postponing. The decision on the CAP reform was taken in 2003 by the Agricultural Council, while the Cohesion Policy reform was agreed in the Brussels European Council of 2005. In the Commission’s reform proposals as well as during Member States’ negotiations much attention was paid, especially in the case of the Cohesion Policy reform, to the challenges of Enlargement. In this paper the aforementioned last reforms of the EU redistributive policies are analysed: the CAP reform of 2002–2003 and the Cohesion Policy reform of 2004–2006 aiming to evaluate the impact of Enlargement on the Commission’s reform proposals and the reform results. It is argued that the factor of Enlargement, although in the Commission’s reform proposals was emphasised as encouraging to reform the CAP and the Cohesion Policy radically, in reality for the EU... [to full text]

This diploma thesis examines with the Dutch attitude towards enlargement of the European Union. In Netherlands the EU enlargement is a politically sensitive issue. Dutch foreign policy is traditionally closely connected with the concept of "merchant and the vicar", reflecting both values of the society and national interests. Interestingly the attitude of the government, reflecting the public opinion, is much more conservative compared to other member states and strictly support the democratic conditionality as the core strategy of the EU to induce candidate states to comply with its human rights and democracy standards. Netherlands gives also special value to the need to give particular regards to the current absorption capacity of EU. The main purpose of the thesis is to evaluate to what extent is the official attitude of the Dutch government towards enlargement shaped by either interests or values of the society as a whole. I put the current Dutch attitude in the context of the current development in Serbia, as the most significant candidate state form the region of Western Balkans and Iceland. The thesis analyses two very similar cases: the cooperation with the ICTY in Hague and the Icesave dispute. Netherlands has long and persistently blocked the accession negotiations with Iceland and...

The European Union have continued to grow since its inception with more and more nations becoming member states. In 2016 that changed, when, for the first time, a member state decided to leave, and the EU might explore its enlargement strategy to fill the void left by the United Kingdom. Turkey is a potential addition to the EU, one that could provide a valuable ally from both a monetary and a security perspective. However, there are some doubts regarding democracy in the country, which is one of the cornerstones of the EU. This paper is a qualitative case study that examines Turkish democracy in the period of 2011-2021, and its alignment with the EU accession criteria. Robert Dahl’s famous definition of democracy will be used as the theoretical framework of the study, and the European Commission’s own reports on Turkey’s progress on the EU accession criteria will be the material used for the analysis. The main conclusion of the study is that Turkish democracy is in sharp decline, and fundamental freedoms are regressing in the country. The negotiations have stalled in the wake of the coup attempt in 2016, and restrictive and anti-democratic measures introduced by the government has brought Turkey further away from having a realistic chance of becoming a member state. Future research could focus on other aspects of the Turkey-EU accession talks, for example the economic criteria.

地中海島嶼賽普勒斯，於1960年脫離英國統治，建立賽普勒斯共和國。島上兩大族裔－希臘裔與土耳其裔居民，長久以來對於生存權力之競奪，導致國內動亂不斷。1974年，賽普勒斯發生憲政危機，土耳其派兵佔領賽島北部36.4%之領土，賽普勒斯遂成為分裂國家。 1990年，賽普勒斯向歐盟提出入會申請。賽普勒斯入會案，為其本身之政治分裂問題、聯合國調停行動，以及土耳其、希臘、歐盟三方關係，投下新的變數。在歐盟第五波擴大的十個新會員國當中，賽普勒斯之政治情況最為特殊，所牽涉之議題最為廣泛。本文旨在研究賽普勒斯加入歐盟之過程，並分析其動機、影響其入會過程之變數、以及入會後所產生之影響。 / As a small island located in the East Mediterranean, Cyprus decolonized from British domination in 1960. It was named The Republic of Cyprus. The perennial political distemper in the country is derived from contending for political powers and living resources between the two main ethnic groups – the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In 1974, after the constitutional crisis of Cyprus, the Turkish army invaded the northern part of the country and occupied 36.4% of its territory. Thereupon Cyprus became a divided country. In 1990, the Cyprus government applied to the European Union for membership. Cyprus’ application for EU membership had unprecedented effects on Cyprus’ political problem, particularly for UN mediation in Cyprus and the tripartite relationship between Greece, Turkey and the EU. Compared to the nine new member states that joined the EU in 2004, Cyprus is in the most complicated political situation. This thesis focuses on Cyprus’ accession to the EU. The author analyzes Cyprus’ motivation for its application for EU membership, variables which affect its accessing process and the effects after joining the EU.

1990 年代俄羅斯與歐盟的關係並不是很熱絡，雙方皆因專注於內部的改革而對彼此興趣缺缺。葉爾欽政府對於歐盟充滿了無知與誤解，而布魯塞爾對於中、東歐國家的關注也遠超過俄羅斯。不過，90年代末期之後，隨著歐盟東擴的進行與雙方經貿互賴程度越來越深，莫斯科再也無法承擔誤解歐盟的後果。同時，歐盟亦為了穩定東擴後的東部邊境，不得不與俄羅斯進一步的加強合作。然而，俄羅斯與歐盟的政經關係日益密切，彼此間隱含的問題也一一浮現。 　　俄羅斯與歐盟無論是在安全、反恐、車臣、民主、人權、內政與司法事務、加里寧格勒、經貿與能源、世貿組織、京都議定書以及環境保護等議題上都存在著巨大的認知差異與分歧，使得雙方很難有真誠的合作。不過，若要因此強調俄羅斯與歐盟的衝突面似乎太過於悲觀。因為，與歐洲整合並非不符合俄羅斯的國家利益，而歐盟遇到困難便會再協商或擱置爭議的特殊運作模式也讓它在與俄羅斯的交往過程中不至於陷入危機。俄羅斯與歐盟還是能夠透過不斷的對話、談判與妥協來解決紛爭，雙方的夥伴關係仍然有相當大的發展潛力。 / In the 1990s, the relationship between Russia and the EU was not very enthusiastic. Both parties concentrated mainly on their own internal reforms, and therefore they had no interest in each other. Yeltsin’s regime was full of ignorance and misunderstanding about the EU, and Brussels also paid much more attention on the Central and Eastern European states than on Russia. However, since the late 1990s, the EU’s enlargement has been underway, and the level of interdependence between the EU and Russia has become higher and higher, Moscow can no longer afford the consequences of misunderstanding about the EU. Meanwhile, in order to stabilize the EU’s eastern border after enlargement, the EU has no choice but to enhance cooperation with Russia. Nevertheless, the closer political and economic relationship between Russia and the EU becomes, the more underlying problems emerge. There is a wide cognitive gap and many disputes between Russia and the EU over various issues, such as security, anti-terrorism, Chechnya, democracy, human rights, justice and home affairs, Kaliningrad, economic and trade, energy, WTO, Kyoto Protocol and environmental protection, etc. Therefore, it is unlikely for them to engage in any serious cooperation. However, it would be too pessimistic to highlight the aspects of conflicts for the above reason, because integration with Europe is also corresponding to Russia’s national interests. Besides, the EU’s particular working model of consulting with each other again and again or leaving aside the disagreements when encountering problems prevents the disputes between the EU and Russia from escalating to crisis. Russia and the EU can solve problems through talks, negotiations and compromises. It still has great potential for the further development of partnership between Russia and the EU.