La thèse "L'équilibre institutionnel dans L'Union européenne" vise à reconstruire les développements juridiques et jurisprudentiels qui ont défini l'évolution de l'équilibre au sein de l'Union à partir du début du processus d'intégration. L’approche choisie est double : juridique et politique. Juridique, car il s’agit de déterminer quelles sont les possibilités données par l’ordre juridique communautaire aux institutions pour définir l'équilibre interne sur la base des dispositions des traites. Politique, car cette approche permet de replacer le principe dans son environnement général et de prendre en considération des facteurs de contraintes et des comportements que la logique juridique omet parfois. L'étude a été organisée en deux parties principales, en premier lieu par un examen du cadre institutionnel définie par le Traité sur l' Union européenne puis par une analyse des bases juridiques introduites par la dernière révision des traites, susceptibles d'influencer et modifier les relations interinstitutionnelles dans le domaine de l'adoption des actes juridiques et de l'éxécution des actes de l'Union. / The institutional balance can be envisaged in two different ways. As a principle it has been developed and defined by the Court of justice since Meroni jurisprudence, whilst the practise of the institutions in the implementation of the treaties and the treaty changes concerning the institutional framework and the legal basis governing legislative and budgetary procedures defined the institutional balance as a dynamic concept. The thesis is aimed at analysing the evolution of the institutional balance in the practical sphere and it has been organized in two main parts composed respectively of 2 chapters. The results of the study were that the institutional balance is in a permanent state of evolution and this process didn’t come to an end after the entry in to force of the Lisbon treaty. The institutional innovation failed to eliminate the structural tension which characterized the institutional interaction in the past. Despite the fact that the Lisbon Treaty was adopted after fifteen years of debate and reflection on institutional reforms it was found that the juridical instrument provided in order to implement the inter-institutional cooperation in the Lisbon Treaty are not adequate if one considers the high-level interaction they are required to observe to the scope of achieving the objectives of the Treaty.

The misappropriation sanctions refer to the European Union sanctions adopted against foreign kleptocrats to address the suspected theft of public funds. After the regimes had been successfully overthrown in the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 as well as the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine in 2014, the misappropriation sanctions were imposed, in all three cases, as the ousted leaders and their close associates were suspected of stealing vast amounts of public funds from their respective countries and hiding the misappropriated funds overseas. The misappropriation sanctions take the form of asset freezes against individuals considered being responsible for “misappropriation of state funds”. The sanctions in question have been extensively reviewed by the Court of Justice of the European Union as numerous of the targeted individuals have applied for annulment of the sanctions in the parts that concern them. The purpose of this thesis is to examine, on the basis of the case law of the CJEU, the threshold for legitimate listing of a targeted individuals in the misappropriation sanctions. It is concluded that threshold vis-à-vis the criteria or the listing grounds must be regarded as reasonable, while the threshold concerning the respect of fundamental rights is creating a heavy burden to bear.

L’actualité du droit de la consommation est aujourd’hui intrinsèquement marquée par le droit européen. Qu’il s’agisse du droit européen des contrats en général ou du droit européen de la consommation en particulier, la matière est au cœur d’une tension opposant les institutions communautaires qui, animées par la volonté de construire un Code civil européen couvrant le droit des contrats, de la responsabilité délictuelle, quasi-délictuelle et même la gestion d’affaires, sont confrontées aux craintes et réticences locales attachées à leurs spécificités. Le débat juridique analyse et évalue les impacts structurels et conjoncturels résultant de cette européanisation du droit de la consommation. Que celle-ci soit souhaitée ou subie, la réalité de l’évolution du contexte socio-économique ne permet plus aujourd’hui de faire l’économie d’une approche globale et de portée européenne, ne serait-ce qu’au regard de la nécessité de promouvoir et développer le marché intérieur. Le droit de la consommation représente la matière au carrefour d’intérêts divergents qu’il convient de concilier, d’où les propositions d’homogénéisation du droit au niveau européen, portant la promesse d’un droit homogène dont la lisibilité et l’accessibilité seraient le gage d’une protection efficiente du consommateur, acteur clé dans ce vaste processus. / Consumer protection law is inherently impacted by EU law. European contract law in general, and European consumer protection law specifically, are at the heart of tensions between EU institutions. Driven by a desire to create a European Civil Code covering contract law, tort and negligence law, and negotiorum gestio, EU institutions are confronted with fear and hesitation at the local level regarding their specific characteristics. The legal debate analyses and assesses the short-term and structural impacts resulting from the 'Europeanisation' of consumer protection law. Like it or not, socio-economic conditions are changing and we can no longer disregard a global and European approach, if only to promote and expand the internal European market. Consumer protection law is an area where opposing interests collide, and these should be reconciled. That's why there have been proposals to standardise law at the European level – to create a homogeneous group of laws that are clear and accessible and that would guarantee efficient protection for consumers, who are key to this whole process

Master’s Thesis in Competition Policy Title: ”The Microsoft Case – A reflection on the tying of Windows Media Player and the Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 (Case COMP/C- 3/37.792)” Author: Ursula Ferrari Tutor: Göran Wahlgren Date: [2005-05-23] Subject terms: Competition Policy, EU law, Abuse of dominance, tying Abstract This Master’s thesis is an analysis of the European Commission Decision in the Microsoft Case-COMP/C-3/37.792 and the tying as an abusive practice prohibited by Article 82 of the EC Treaty. In this case the European Commission (Commission) applied a rule-of-reason approach for the first time to Microsoft’s tying practice and considered it to be anticompetitive. Microsoft tied its Windows Media Player (WMP) to its client operating system Windows and after a thorough analysis done by the Commission, Microsoft was considered to have abused its dominant position. In the past the Commission and the European Court of Justice used a per se illegality approach to tying practices and it was enough to establish that a company which applied the tying strategy was dominant in the tying product market. The hostile approach taken by the Commission and the ECJ has been criticized by economists mainly because tying is a commonly applied business strategy in the world economy and companies apply this be-cause of the economic efficiencies that this business strategy leads to. The efficiency gains are indirectly past on to the consumers in the form of product quality and innovation, reduced transaction costs and lower prices. It is argued that tying in fact increase consumer welfare. Economists would therefore rather see a per se legality approach or at least a rule-of-reason approach in the future. Due to the complexity of the Microsoft case, the Commission had to do a thorough analysis of the actual impact that the tying of WMP had on the market and the foreclosure effects that this strategy might lead to. This was therefore the first time that a rule-of-reason approach was applied on the matter of tying. However, after the Commission’s Decision of the Microsoft case there is still uncertainty in this matter. There is a strong need for future clarification. Microsoft Corporation has lodged an appeal against the Commission’s Decision with the European Court of Justice but it will take several years before the ECJ will be able to give a final judgement of the case. Until then the legal certainty is yet still very unclear.

CFC lagstiftningen har i syfte att förhindra eller försvåra skatteplanering genom transaktioner med lågbeskattade utländska juridiska personer som leder till att skattebasen i Sverige minskar. Lagstiftningen innebär att en delägare i ett lågbe-skattat utländskt bolag kan beskattas löpande för sin andel av det överskott som uppkommer. Efter EU- domstolens dom i Cadbury Schweppes målet 2006 , införde regeringen en ny undantagsregel i 39a kap. 7a § IL för att harmonisera de svenska CFC reglerna med EU rätten. Undantagsregeln gav delägaren i CFC bolaget en möjlighet att undvika CFC beskattning om denne kunde bevisa att bolaget hade en ”verklig etablering från vilken en affärsmässigt motiverad verksamhet bedrivs.” Den ordalydelsen som införlivades i svensk rätt skiljde sig från den som angavs av EU domstolens i Cadbury Schweppes målet. Det har sedan dess diskuterats om den svenska formuleringen har samma betydelse som den som angavs av EU domsto-len.Uppsatsen utreder innebörden av verklig etablering och vad som krävs för att en sådan ska föreligga. Begreppet affärsmässigt motiverad har inte definierats i inkomstskattelagen. Därför görs en analogi med andra paragrafer i inkomstskattelagen för att utreda begreppet. Ledning tas även från Cadbury Schweppes-målet vid utredningen då paragrafen har sitt ursprung i målet och EU rätt är överordnad svensk rätt. I 39a kap 7a§ IL anges tre omständigheter som särskilt ska beaktas vid bedömning. Detta för att de ansetts indikera på när en verklig etablering föreligger. Dessa undersöks i avsikt att förstå vad som krävs för att en verklig etablering ska föreligga.Av utredningen framkom att ordet affärsmässigt motiverat enligt paragrafen, krävde att delägarens syfte med transaktionerna till CFC bolaget var huvudsakligen affärsmässiga, med vilket menas att huvudsyftet eller ett av huvudsyftena inte var att undvika skatt. Vidare innebar ordet ett krav på att det utländska juridiska bolaget bedrev någon form av reell ekonomisk verksamhet och inte endast etablerats i utlandet av skatteskäl. Det framkom att det var troligt att begreppet enligt den svenska formuleringen krävde att verksamheten som bedrevs i utlandet var vinstdrivande. Enligt min mening bör dock genom en EU konform tolkning, även verksamheter som är huvudsakligen affärmässig men innehåller inslag av ideell verksamhet kunna ses som verkligt etablerade.Omständigheterna som särskilt ska beaktas krävs endast i den mån de är nödvändiga för verksamheten. Detta innebar att om dessa inte var nödvändiga för verksamheten behövdes hänsyn inte tas till dem alls. Detta gjorde att de i slutändan blev lika viktiga som alla andra relevanta omständigheter i fallet. Då andra relevanta omständigheter inte definierats i paragrafen och hänsyn inte alltid behövdes tas till dem blev beviskravet oförutsägbart. / The purpose of the CFC legislation is to prevent transactions with low taxed foreign le-gal entities that lead to tax losses in Sweden. The legislation allows partners in a low taxed foreign corporation to be taxed for their share of the surplus arising. Following the European Courts judgment in the Cadbury Schweppes case in 2006, the Swedish government implemented a new exception rule in 39a cap. 7a § IL to harmonize the Swedish CFC rules with EU law. The exemption gave a partner of a CFC company an opportunity to avoid CFC taxation if he could prove that the company had an “actual establishment from which commercially motivated activities were carried out.” The wording that was incorporated into Swedish law differed from the one provided by the European Court in the Cadbury Schweppes case. It has since been discussed if the Swedish phrasing has the same meaning as that set by the European Court.The essay investigates the meaning of an actual establishment and what it takes to meet the requirements. The words commercially motivated have not been defined in the Swedish Income tax law. Therefore, an analogy will be made with other laws in the Income tax law to clarify the concept. Guidance is also taken from Cadbury Schweppes case, because the new exception rule has its origin in the case and because EU law is superior to Swedish law. 39a cap. 7 a § IL provides three circumstances that in particular should be consid-ered when judging if the low taxed foreign legal company has an actual establishment. These circumstances indicate when an actual establishment exists. The circumstances’ are examined in the essay in order to understand what it takes for a low taxed foreign legal company to have an actual establishment.The investigation revealed that the words commercially motivated in 39a cap. 7a § IL demanded that the shareholders purpose for the transactions related to CFC company was mainly commercial, which means that the main purpose or one of the main aims was not to avoid tax. Furthermore, the word meant a requirement for the low taxed foreign legal company to engage in real economic activity and not only to be established abroad for tax reasons. It also appeared that it was likely that the meaning of the Swedish wording demanded that the business conducted abroad had to be aiming to make a profit. In my opinion however, by an EU compatible interpretation even businesses’ that are primarily commercial but contain elements of nonprofit could be seen as an actual established.The circumstances that in particular were to be considered when judging if an actual estab-lishment exists are only necessary to the extent that they are needed for the business. This meant that if these were not necessary for the business, they should be disregarded. This ultimately made them became equally as important as any other relevant circum-stances of the case. Since other relevant factors were not defined in 39a cap. 7a§ IL and accounts should not always be taken to the circumstances’ that in particular were to be considered, the requirements for an actual establishment became unpredictable

This paper aims to study, from a legal dogmatic method, the Swedish legislation on fixed-term work related to the EU directive 99/70/EC 1. In particular, the directives demand to prevent abuse of frequent temporary employment. An employer may, in agreement with the Swedish legislation combine different types of temporary employment, to prolong the time in the temporary employment. In this proceeding an employer can avoid employing an employee in a permanent position. For example, an employee can be employed in a probationary period of six months, in a general temporary employment for a maximum of 24 months, and thereafter in a temporary position for a maximum of 24 months before the employment turns into a permanent position. This provided that the employments were made by the same employer, and within five years. The EU Commission has requested Sweden to change its legislation in harmony with the fixed-term work directive requirements to prevent abuse of repetitive fixed-term contracts. Sweden now has two months to implement the Directive otherwise the Commission may bring an action against Sweden at the European Court of Justice. The Ministry of Employment and the TCO have presented a legislative draft on how the Swedish law should instead be designed. In 2012 there were 661,000 people with fixed-term contracts in Sweden, 288,000 of them were men and 373,000 were women. There are mostly women who have fixed-term employments. This may result in women being more vulnerable than men in terms of for example the economy. Fixed-term employments can cause difficulties in obtaining loans or gaining access to the housing market. For society, temporary jobs lead to higher costs compared to permanent employment. If fixed-term employments are increasing, it will lead to more short periods of unemployment and rising costs including unemployment insurance.

Establishment in foreign countries can be achieved through a subsidiary company or a permanent establishment. Profit of a subsidiary company is normally taxed in accordance with the law of the country of where it is established, since a subsidiary company constitutes a separate legal entity. A permanent establishment on the other hand is not a separate legal entity, therefore profit in a permanent establishment is usually added on to the company’s total profit and taxed in accordance with the law of the country of where the company is established. Establishing business activities in foreign countries do normally not create problems, unless the business is carried on in a low tax jurisdiction. If that is the case, unlimited opportunities are created for companies to circumvent domestic taxation by transferring profit to the low tax jurisdiction, which in turn decreases the domestic tax base. In Sweden this kind of circumvention is precluded by chapter 39a ITA, in the meaning that a shareholder in a foreign company can be tax liable of low taxed profit in a foreign. The question that arises is whether chapter 39a ITA infringes on freedom of establishment. The outcome in the analysis is that there is a likeliness that chapter 39a ITA constitutes a restriction on the freedom of establishment. The escape provided in article 52 TFEU cannot justify the measure. Nor is it likely that the measure can be justified by the rule of reason. In the light of the assessment done in the analysis, it can be concluded that the chapter 39a ITA is applied in a non-discriminatory manner, satisfies a mandatory requirement (prevention of tax avoidance) and is regarded as appropriate in securing the achievement of the objectives. But there is a potential risk that measure will fail in the proportionality test.

According to the Principle of Formal Justice like cases must be treated alike, and different cases must be treated differently. This principle is derived from the Aristotelian concept of distributive justice. Aristotle held that ‘All men agree that what is just in distribution should be according to merit of some sort, but not all men agree as to what that merit should be’. The classical concept of illegal discrimination, in Community law referred to as direct discrimination, seeks to decide what these merits must not be. This is done by declaring disparate treatment on certain grounds, in certain circumstances, illegal. It is argued in this paper that exceptions to this principle are made through acknowledging that discriminations on prohibited grounds are sometimes justified, and that this should be called justified direct discrimination. It is submitted that it is only obscuring to the concept to suggest otherwise, since the concept of discrimination as such, just as the Principle of Formal Justice, should not be carrying substantive or emotive meanings. The subsequent concept of indirect discrimination aims instead at prohibiting disparate impacts of neutral criteria. There is some ambiguity to this concept, specifically on what it is that amounts to ‘discrimination’ in this context, and how the available defences should be perceived. It is submitted that to pursue clarity, it must be acknowledged that this concept is built on the second element of the Principle of Formal Justice, i.e., that different cases must be treated differently, and that ‘discrimination’ occurs when discriminators omit to do so, causing disparate impacts statistically connected to prohibited grounds of discrimination. A justification defence, if successful, should in such circumstances prompt courts to hold that there has been discrimination, but that it is justified. It is further argued that the concept of positive action is a formal concept through which disparate treatment is required on specific grounds, i.e., that the legislature in this case indeed recognises some ‘merits’ according to which distribution is ‘just’ (according to the legislature). Unlike direct and indirect discrimination, positive action is necessarily a one-way vessel, designed to promote preference for individuals belonging to a certain class of people identified by the positive action norm. The author concludes that all these concepts are built upon a formal structure taken from the Principle of Formal Justice, and that the acknowledgment of this fact can contribute to clarity in anti-discrimination law.

<p>Master’s Thesis in Competition Policy Title: ”The Microsoft Case – A reflection on the tying of Windows Media Player and the Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 (Case COMP/C- 3/37.792)” Author: Ursula Ferrari Tutor: Göran Wahlgren Date: [2005-05-23] Subject terms: Competition Policy, EU law, Abuse of dominance, tying Abstract This Master’s thesis is an analysis of the European Commission Decision in the Microsoft Case-COMP/C-3/37.792 and the tying as an abusive practice prohibited by Article 82 of the EC Treaty. In this case the European Commission (Commission) applied a rule-of-reason approach for the first time to Microsoft’s tying practice and considered it to be anticompetitive. Microsoft tied its Windows Media Player (WMP) to its client operating system Windows and after a thorough analysis done by the Commission, Microsoft was considered to have abused its dominant position. In the past the Commission and the European Court of Justice used a per se illegality approach to tying practices and it was enough to establish that a company which applied the tying strategy was dominant in the tying product market. The hostile approach taken by the Commission and the ECJ has been criticized by economists mainly because tying is a commonly applied business strategy in the world economy and companies apply this be-cause of the economic efficiencies that this business strategy leads to. The efficiency gains are indirectly past on to the consumers in the form of product quality and innovation, reduced transaction costs and lower prices. It is argued that tying in fact increase consumer welfare. Economists would therefore rather see a per se legality approach or at least a rule-of-reason approach in the future. Due to the complexity of the Microsoft case, the Commission had to do a thorough analysis of the actual impact that the tying of WMP had on the market and the foreclosure effects that this strategy might lead to. This was therefore the first time that a rule-of-reason approach was applied on the matter of tying. However, after the Commission’s Decision of the Microsoft case there is still uncertainty in this matter. There is a strong need for future clarification. Microsoft Corporation has lodged an appeal against the Commission’s Decision with the European Court of Justice but it will take several years before the ECJ will be able to give a final judgement of the case. Until then the legal certainty is yet still very unclear.</p>

<p>On January 1, 2010, the Swedish government changed the national rule on taxation of loans between Swedish companies and their shareholders to also comprise loans granted by foreign companies. By changing the rule to also comprise foreign companies, the government aimed to eliminate the newly discovered tax planning which is carried out by an owner establishing a holding company in another Member State from which he lends tax-free means for private consumption. These proceedings result in major tax revenue losses for Sweden since the shareholder’s income was not taxable in Sweden before the change. This change has been subject for criticism by the consultative bodies in the government bill and in the legal debate. The expression of discontent is due to the fact that the changes do not comply with the freedom of establishment. As far as is known, no one has analyzed whether this statement is correct. Therefore, this thesis aims to provide an answer to whether the changes of the rule on taxation of prohibited loans are compatible with the freedom of establishment and consequently whether the Swedish government made a mistake when changing the rule to also comprise foreign companies. Due to the freedom of establishment, it is prohibited for the Member States to take measures which restrict or make nationals refrain from establishing abroad. Intra-state loans are prohibited why they hardly ever occur and the taxation on loans therefore in practice only applies to foreign companies. Legislation in a Member State which only applies to foreign persons constitutes prohibited discrimination. Further, the high tax burden hinders nationals from taking advantage of another Member State’s more favourable legislation and makes the nationals refrain from establishing in other Member States. It is therefore considered that the rule is restrictive to the freedom of establishment. However, such a restrictive rule as in this case is justified by the aim of preventing tax avoidance taken together with the balanced allocation of taxing power between the Member States. Thus, the government makes Sweden breach EU law since the rule is not proportionate despite the justifications. The rule is too general designed since it is restrictive to all foreign undertakings and not just the holding companies with which the tax planning are performed. Further, there are other less restrictive solutions to the problem which have the same effect as the rule in question.</p>