Economic sanctions are frequently used for political objectives in foreign policy in order to coerce other states into a wanted behavior. Economic sanctions are popular due to that they are considered more humane and less costly than military interventions. However, economic sanctions have far from always been successful in inducing policy change. Previous studies have shown that variables such as the goal of the sanctions, the cost (both economic and political) and the type of strategy affects the propensity to induce policy change within the target state. It has also been argued that economic sanctions affect democracies and dictatorships differently and that dictatorships are less likely to accept senders’ demands. This essay focuses solely on sanctions directed to dictatorships. The aim is to examine whether some dictatorships are more likely to make concessions than others and if it is possible to get an enhanced understanding of the role of regime types when assessing the effects of economic sanctions. Based on previous research, four variables are examined; repression, structure of the leadership, personalism and dogmatic goal. The analysis is conducted by a quantitative study with a sample of 95 cases of implemented economic sanctions towards dictatorships. The result of the study indicates that personalism and dogmatic goal affects the propensity of making concessions negatively. The level of repression and structure of leadership do not seem to affect the likelihood of making concessions in a substantial way. The significant variables, personalism and dogmatic goal, are used to categorize dictatorships in order to examine whether the propensity of concessions differ among different dictatorial regimes. The result indicates that the effectiveness of economic sanctions differ among dictatorial regimes especially among dictatorships that either have both or none of the variables personalism and dogmatic goal. Sanctions directed to dictatorial regimes with a personalist leader and a dogmatic goal have been least successful among the observations included in the study.

För att nå de säkerhetspolitiska målsättningarna har både enskilda stater och mellanstatliga organisationerett antal maktmedel till sitt förfogande. Syftet med ”Ekonomiska och militära maktmedel– en samordnadstrategi” har varit att undersöka de ekonomiska maktmedlens betydelse och användande vid kriser ochkonflikter samordnat med militär planering och genomförande.Slutsatserna av fallstudierna pekar på att det inte är de ekonomiska maktmedlen som infriat sändarenssäkerhetspolitiska målsättningar. För att nå de säkerhetspolitiska målen har dock ekonomiska maktmedeloch ekonomisk krigföring en viktig roll. Signalvärdet är stort, insatsen är låg i jämförelse medvåldsanvändning och sändaren får ett större urval av handlingsalternativ. För att skapa högre effekt börekonomiska maktmedel samordnas med militära maktmedel, genom hot om eller genomförande avvåldshandlingar riktade mot mottagarens ekonomiska beroenden. Att bedriva nämnda krigföring kräver enmetodutveckling på strategisk och operativ nivå. Slutsatserna av ovanstående resonemang har presenteratssom exempel på hur den strategiska planeringen kan genomföras med inriktning på ekonomisk krigföring.Uppsatsen är inte på något sätt heltäckande avseende de ekonomiska effekterna av ekonomisk krigföringutan har fokuserat på det säkerhetspolitiska resultatet. Det ekonomiska systemet är komplext ochanvändandet av ekonomiska maktmedel kan få ett antal sidoeffekter. Det är därför viktigt att strategier sombygger på ekonomisk krigföring tar hänsyn till detta och att det finns kompetens hos beslutsfattare för attgöra dessa analyser på strategisk och operativ nivå. / The purpose of the essay has been to investigate the significance and use ofeconomic statecraft in conflicts co-ordinated with military planning andconduct.The conclusions show that economic statecraft has not fulfilled theobjectives of the transmitter’s security policy. In order to reach theobjectives of the security policy, economic statecraft and economicwarfare will continue to be important. The main reasons for this are:the signal effects are important, the stake is low compared to the use ofmilitary force and the transmitter has more courses of action available.In order to increase the effect of economic statecraft, it should be coordinatedwith military force, by threats of use, or use of military forceagainst the receiver’s economic dependence. This kind of warfarerequires development at the strategic and operational level. Theconclusions of the above mentioned are presented as an example ofhow to plan economic warfare at a strategic level.The essay has focused on the security policy results. The economicsystem is complex and the use of economic statecraft has side effects. Itis important that strategies, built on economic statecraft, take this intoconsideration. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 01-03

Economic sanctions are an instrument that states can use to punish or influence other states. Such sanctions may include the freezing of assets of individuals and organizations but may also in some cases constitute total bans on trade with the state hit by the sanctions. Being hit by sanctions means that the targeted person risks having their human rights restricted. This is because sanctions are a kind of "punishment" with the aim of getting the entity who is hit to stop a certain be-havior. The risk with this "punishment" is that the restriction of human rights is far too disproportionate in relation to the purpose of the sanctions. This paper examines the extent to which those who are hit by sanctions have their human rights restricted. The focus of the paper is on two rights. The right to life and the right to a fair trial. Both comprehensive and targeted sanctions are discussed in the paper. Furthermore, the paper argues that comprehensive sanctions are prob-lematic and that they risk leading to violations of the right to life. The paper also argues that targeted sanctions are also problematic in relation to human rights, even if these are less problematic than comprehensive sanctions. This is because targeted sanctions are fraught with restrictions on the right to a fair trial, and that the entity hit by targeted sanctions cannot be guaranteed a fair trial if he wishes to overturn the sanction decision. In addition, the paper explores the role of the European Court of Justice as a sanctions review body and explores future solu-tions that could improve the legal certainty of targeted sanctions.

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Zimbabwe har varit utsatt för ekonomiska sanktioner sedan 2002 och syftet med studien har varit att analysera perioden mellan år 2001 och 2005 för att se om sanktionerna bidragit till oavsedda konsekvenser i landet. Utöver detta var syftet att förklara sambandet mellan ekonomiska sanktioner och ökat statligt förtryck som i sin tur leder till ökade kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter. Den kvalitativa inomfallsmetoden - kongruensmetod - användes för att testa Dursun Peksens (2009) teori om fyra faktorer i ekonomiska sanktioner, som kan bidra till ökat förtrycks överensstämmelse med situationen i Zimbabwe. Tre av fyra faktorer stämde överens tämligen väl med situationen i Zimbabwe, medan den fjärde faktorn inte stämde överens lika väl. Studien kom fram till att de ekonomiska sanktionerna hade bidragit till ökat statligt förtryck, vilket i sin tur hade bidragit till ökade kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter i Zimbabwe. Sambandet kan förklaras enligt följande. De ekonomiska sanktionerna bidrog till en ekonomisk kris som negativt påverkade de genomsnittliga medborgarnas levnadsvillkor på många områden. De försämrade livsvillkoren bidrog till ökad aktivitet i oppositionen och befolkningen vilket i sin tur bidrog till att staten ökade sitt förtryck. Vidare målade staten upp de ekonomiska sanktionerna som ett extern hot mot landet och staten legitimerade därmed sitt ökade förtryck med att de skyddade landets suveränitet mot ett externt hot.

Fleets have the ability to affect an adversary’s use of the seas for transportation. Nations have in numerous occasions exercised this power in order to ravage their opponent’s trade in times of conflict with the purpose of diminishing their military might. Great naval thinkers like Mahan and Corbett have described this use of seapower during conflicts in great depth but theories regarding the use of seapower to affect a nation’s peacetime economy in order to achieve limited political goals is lacking. This thesis attempts to analyze the use of seapower in the form of economic sanctions to answer the question; “How is seapower exercised in economic sanctions?” in order to remedy this. The results show that seapower is mostly used to halt the inward flow of goods to a nation and general sanctions are more often used than sanctions targeting specific commodities. What these sanctions aim to achieve is often to limit military capacity and to disrupt military aggression. This thesis comes to the conclusions that a force capable of operating anywhere on the globe for an extended period of time is vital for the effectiveness of economic sanctions, seapower is a necessary part of the enforcement of economic sanctions and that naval theory has been too preoccupied with large scale conflicts and neglected the use of seapower to achieve limited political goals with economic measures during times of peace.