Este trabalho tem como objetivo central compreender as possíveis relações entre os movimentos e práticas epistêmicos produzidos pelo professor e por alunos e a construção de argumentos. Apresentamos a análise das interações discursivas entre uma professora de ciências e alunos de sétimo ano do ensino fundamental ao longo de uma sequência didática intitulada O problema do costão rochoso. A metodologia foi feita a partir de uma abordagem qualitativa e envolveu a análise das transcrições das aulas registradas em vídeo. A sequência didática se baseou no modelo de teorias competitivas, em que são apresentadas hipóteses que podem sustentar uma afirmação. Além de escolher qual hipótese seria a adequada, os alunos deveriam também elaborar justificativas sobre as escolhas que fizeram. As análises realizadas abrangeram a identificação das relações entre tempo e práticas científicas escolares ou de exposição processual; identificação dos movimentos e práticas epistêmicos oriundos da interação entre professora e alunos; identificação do produto e processo argumentativos e análise comparativa dos discursos orais e escritos dos alunos durante a resolução do problema proposto. Foi possível constatar que as práticas epistêmicas muitas vezes especificam o movimento epistêmico evidenciando o objetivo a que ele se propõe, pois o mesmo movimento epistêmico pode estar relacionado a práticas epistêmicas diferentes. Na segunda parte da aula foram encontradas práticas epistêmicas referentes à construção de argumentos, as quais se relacionam principalmente à avaliação do argumento e à verificação da interpretação de dados/evidências. Os alunos de maneira geral, por meio das interações discursivas, e do papel mediador do professor, foram capazes de identificar os dados, organizar as informações e escolher uma das hipóteses, e produziram discursos orais e escritos, os quais apresentaram características bastante distintas em relação a estrutura e composição. / This work has as main objective to understand the possible relationship between the movements and epistemic practices produced by the teacher and students and the construction of arguments. The analysis of the discursive interactions between a science teacher and students in 7th grade of elementary school (students with eleven and twelve years) along a didactic sequence entitled The rocky shore problem\". The methodology was taken from a qualitative approach and involved the analysis of the transcripts recorded on video. The didactic sequence was based on the competitive theories model, in which hypotheses that can sustain a claim are presented. In addition to choosing which hypothesis is appropriate, students should also elaborate justifications for the choices they made. The analyzes included the identification of relationships between time and scientific scholar practices or procedural display; identification of movements and epistemic practices arising from the interaction between teacher and students; product identification and argumentative process and comparative analysis of oral and written discourse of students during solving the problem. The epistemic practices found often specify the epistemic move highlighting the goal to which he proposes as the same epistemic move can be related to different epistemic practices. In the second part of the lesson epistemic practices can be related to the construction of arguments, which relate primarily to the assessment of the argument and verification of interpreting data/evidence. Students in general, through discursive interactions, and the mediating role of the teacher, were able to identify the data, organize information and then choose one of the hypotheses and produce oral and written discourse , which showed very distinct features in structure and composition.

O estudo da argumentação e da construção de argumentos vem ganhando cada vez mais espaço na área de pesquisa de Ensino de Ciências. A mudança no foco de estudo do sujeito epistêmico, de uma perspectiva individual para a ideia de uma comunidade de conhecedores, nos permite analisar como se dá o processo de produção, comunicação e avaliação do conhecimento científico escolar por meio das interações discursivas. O presente trabalho se insere no contexto da necessidade de produzir conhecimentos acerca dos aspectos epistêmicos no processo de construção de argumentos tendo como foco professores e formador. Objetivamos investigar a mobilização de Práticas Epistêmicas dos professores para a construção de argumentos e suas relações com o Movimento Epistêmico do formador, analisando como as ações do formador favorecem a adoção de tais práticas e promove a construção de argumentos durante a aplicação de uma Sequência Didática em Ecologia em uma oficina de formação continuada de professores de ciências. Mediante a relação entre os Movimentos Epistêmicos do formador e a mobilização de Práticas Epistêmicas pelos professores, analisamos os aspectos epistêmicos na construção de argumentos, tendo como base os argumentos de referência que a Sequência Didática traz em seu escopo. Nossos resultados apontam dois aspectos relevantes desse processo: o direcionamento e a avaliação. O aspecto de direcionamento do formador se constitui na interação entre os objetivos da Sequência Didática e a comunidade de aprendizes. O aspecto de avaliação para a construção de argumentos se caracterizou nos momentos em que o direcionamento se relacionava com as crenças, valores e saberes dessa comunidade. Ressaltamos a importância de desenvolvimento de maiores estudos que se aprofundem sobre os aspectos relacionados ao que conta como conhecimento relevante e os meios para adquiri-lo no contexto de formação de professores. / The study of argumentation and the construction of arguments has been more discussed in the field of research in science teaching. Changing the focus of study of the epistemic subject, from an individual perspective to an idea of a community of experts, allow us to analyze hoe the process of knowledge production, process of communication and process of evaluation of the scientific knowledge through epistemic aspect in the argument-construction process focusing on teacher and trainers. It aims to investigate the mobilization of teacher\'s Epistemic Practices when constructing arguments and its relation to the educator\'s Epistemic Moves, analyzing how the educator\'s actions favor the adoption of such practices and promotes the construction of arguments when using a didactic sequence application in Ecology in a continuing education workshop for science teachers. Through the relationship between the educator\'s Epistemic Moves and the mobilization of teacher\'s Epistemic Practices, it was possible to analyze the epistemic aspects in the construction arguments, based on the reference arguments that are within the scope of Didactic Sequence. Our results show two relevant aspects of this process: targeting and evaluation. The trainer\'s targeting aspect is based on the interaction between the goals of the Didactic Sequence and the community of learners. The evaluation aspect focusing on the construction of arguments, based on situations in which the orientation was related to the beliefs, values and knowledge in the present community. We highlighted the importance of developing more efforts to go deeper on the aspects related to relevant knowledge and the ways to acquire in the context of teacher training.

Este trabalho tem como objetivo central compreender as possíveis relações entre os movimentos e práticas epistêmicos produzidos pelo professor e por alunos e a construção de argumentos. Apresentamos a análise das interações discursivas entre uma professora de ciências e alunos de sétimo ano do ensino fundamental ao longo de uma sequência didática intitulada O problema do costão rochoso. A metodologia foi feita a partir de uma abordagem qualitativa e envolveu a análise das transcrições das aulas registradas em vídeo. A sequência didática se baseou no modelo de teorias competitivas, em que são apresentadas hipóteses que podem sustentar uma afirmação. Além de escolher qual hipótese seria a adequada, os alunos deveriam também elaborar justificativas sobre as escolhas que fizeram. As análises realizadas abrangeram a identificação das relações entre tempo e práticas científicas escolares ou de exposição processual; identificação dos movimentos e práticas epistêmicos oriundos da interação entre professora e alunos; identificação do produto e processo argumentativos e análise comparativa dos discursos orais e escritos dos alunos durante a resolução do problema proposto. Foi possível constatar que as práticas epistêmicas muitas vezes especificam o movimento epistêmico evidenciando o objetivo a que ele se propõe, pois o mesmo movimento epistêmico pode estar relacionado a práticas epistêmicas diferentes. Na segunda parte da aula foram encontradas práticas epistêmicas referentes à construção de argumentos, as quais se relacionam principalmente à avaliação do argumento e à verificação da interpretação de dados/evidências. Os alunos de maneira geral, por meio das interações discursivas, e do papel mediador do professor, foram capazes de identificar os dados, organizar as informações e escolher uma das hipóteses, e produziram discursos orais e escritos, os quais apresentaram características bastante distintas em relação a estrutura e composição. / This work has as main objective to understand the possible relationship between the movements and epistemic practices produced by the teacher and students and the construction of arguments. The analysis of the discursive interactions between a science teacher and students in 7th grade of elementary school (students with eleven and twelve years) along a didactic sequence entitled The rocky shore problem\". The methodology was taken from a qualitative approach and involved the analysis of the transcripts recorded on video. The didactic sequence was based on the competitive theories model, in which hypotheses that can sustain a claim are presented. In addition to choosing which hypothesis is appropriate, students should also elaborate justifications for the choices they made. The analyzes included the identification of relationships between time and scientific scholar practices or procedural display; identification of movements and epistemic practices arising from the interaction between teacher and students; product identification and argumentative process and comparative analysis of oral and written discourse of students during solving the problem. The epistemic practices found often specify the epistemic move highlighting the goal to which he proposes as the same epistemic move can be related to different epistemic practices. In the second part of the lesson epistemic practices can be related to the construction of arguments, which relate primarily to the assessment of the argument and verification of interpreting data/evidence. Students in general, through discursive interactions, and the mediating role of the teacher, were able to identify the data, organize information and then choose one of the hypotheses and produce oral and written discourse , which showed very distinct features in structure and composition.

In this thesis, I explore the issue of epistemic responsibility. I start by examining an argument against the use of critical thinking made by Michael Huemer. Huemer argues that critical thinking is not epistemically responsible, because it is not as truth conducive as credulity. Huemer instead argues that credulity should be the default approach taken by non-experts. After dissecting this argument, I go on to examine one of the critics to Huemer’s argument: David Kary. Kary argues that critical thinking and credulity are not mutually exclusive and can therefore be combined in an epistemically responsible way. Kary further argues that one must consider the social components of epistemic responsibility, and that when one does so, it is evident that truth conduciveness is not the only component of epistemic responsibility. I extend Huemer and Kary’s discussion by arguing that epistemic responsibility is even more complex. Epistemic superiority, equality and inferiority are fluid positions that change depending on context, and this must be considered when evaluating epistemic responsibility. The consequence of this approach is that a combination of critical thinking and credulity is the most responsible alternative. I end by arguing for the intellectual virtues and benefits of embracing this argument.

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There has been a long debate about values and science. Especially about the appropriateness of the value-free ideal. The impact of values on science is crucial if science is to maintain its credibility as an undisputed source of knowledge. In this work, I analyze the impact of values in science based on a work by Heather Douglas and try to clarify the difference between epistemic and non-epistemic values and the relevance of the value-free ideal. My conclusion is that Douglas' claims about the inappropriateness of the value-free ideal do not hold and should be rejected. I propose instead a reformulation of the value-free ideal based on the justification of knowledge. / Det har varit en lång debatt om värderingar och vetenskap. Särskilt om lämpligheten av det värdefria idealet. Värdegrundens inverkan på vetenskapen är avgörande om vetenskapen ska behålla sin trovärdighet som en oomtvistad kunskapskälla. I detta arbete analyserar jag värderingarnas inverkan i vetenskapen utifrån ett verk av Heather Douglas och försöker klargöra skillnaden mellan epistemiska och icke-epistemiska värderingar samt relevansen av det värdefria idealet. Min slutsats är att Douglas påståenden om det värdefria idealets olämplighet inte håller och börförkastas. Jag föreslår istället en omformulering av det värdefria idealet som bygger på kunskapensrättfärdigande.

Epistemic injustices are the distinctly epistemic harms and wrongs which undermine or depreciate our capacities knowers. This dissertation develops a theory of epistemic injustice and justice which accounts for excesses in epistemic goods as a source of epistemic injustice. This is a theory of epistemic overload as epistemic injustice. The dissertation can be divided into three parts: 1) motivational, 2) theoretical, 3) applications and implications. First, Chapters 1 and 2 motivate the study of epistemic injustice and epistemic overload. Chapter 1 identifies a gap in the literature on epistemic injustice concerning excesses in epistemic goods as sources of epistemic injustice while canvassing the major themes and debates of the field. Chapter 2 levels an objection to ‘proper’ epistemology, thereby providing an indirect defense of the study of epistemic injustice. Second, theoretical development occurs in are Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6. Chapter 3 initiates the argument for epistemic overload, while Chapter 4 extends the case for epistemic overload, identifying several epistemic injustices arising from excesses of understanding, credibility, and truth. Chapter 5 explains the oversights of prior theorists by developing a more descriptively adequate account of social epistemics that explains the many sites of epistemic injustice. Chapter 6 develops a two-stage contractualist theory of epistemic in/justice to explain the bad-making features of epistemic injustices and generates the duty of epistemic charity. The third part of the dissertation applies the findings of earlier chapters to contemporary practical and theoretical problems. Chapter 7 employs the contractualist reasoning of Chapter 6 to address and ameliorate problems from excesses in the uptake and circulation of hermeneutical resources and true-beliefs. Chapter 8 considers the mutual dependence relations between political phenomena and epistemic in/justice, showing that accounts of political justice depend upon or presuppose epistemic justice. Finally, Chapter 9 applies epistemic overload to the use of big data technologies in the context of predive policing algorithms. An abductive argument concludes that the introduction of the “Strategic Subjects List” as part of a Chicago policing initiative in 2013 introduced understandings which likely contributed to gun-violence in Chicago and which constitutes an epistemic overload. In sum, the dissertation shows the theoretical and practical significance of epistemic overload as epistemic injustice. / Ph. D. / Epistemic injustice refers to the ways in which people can be wronged in their capacities as knowers and thinkers. What we know and how we think are of central importance to our identity and well-being. Theories of epistemic injustice endeavor to explain the emergence, nature, and effects of these injustices, while developing accounts for promoting the intellectual agency of persons. Epistemic injustices are important to recognize for social justice when they systematically undermine marginalized people, rendering people unable to resist oppression as they become unintelligible, lose credibility, or are overwhelmed by epistemic excesses. The centrality of “Black Lives Matter,” “#MeToo,” and “FakeNews” to contemporary social movements demonstrates how the circulation of phrases accompanying understandings are crucial for effective public deliberation and political progress, particularly in diverse societies. Yet, subtleties of social epistemics often conceal epistemic injustices, as willful misinterpretations of “Black Lives Matter,” for example, are immeasurable and defy conventional distinctions between ethical and epistemic conduct. These considerations motivate studying epistemic injustice. The central thesis of this dissertation is that excesses in epistemic goods such as credibility, understanding, and true-beliefs can constitute epistemic injustices. Hence, epistemic overload as epistemic injustice. Theoretically, this dissertation extends the challenge to the univocal status of traditional epistemic goods. Recurrent and long-held views on the value of truth, credibility, and understanding are upended as I show that these goods can undermine epistemic agency itself. Practically, it shows how epistemic goods and resources can be harmful and counterproductive to persons as epistemic agents and for the achievement of social justice. These results are applied to the identity-types generated by predictive policing big-data algorithms.

Cette thèse tente de démontrer que la rationalité épistémique est normative, ou plus précisément, que les agents doivent être épistémiquement rationnels. On peut dire provisoirement que la rationalité est un code – ou un ensemble de règles – en ce sens qu’elle correspond à une collection systématique d’exigences. En particulier, la rationalité est souvent identifiée à un ensemble systématique de lignes de conduite ayant pour but de faire en sorte qu’un agent réponde correctement à ses raisons, qu’il évite de se contredire, d’être incohérent ou akratique. La thèse poursuit aussi certains objectifs secondaires, en particulier: (i) montrer que les raisons épistémiques apparentes de croire que P (comprises comme des propositions apparemment vraies qui, si elles étaient vraies, militeraient en faveur de la conclusion que P) sont normatives; (ii) montrer qu’il n’y a pas de dilemme insoluble de la rationalité épistémique; (iii) montrer que, relativement à un ensemble de données probantes ou de raisons épistémiques, un agent idéalement rationnel n’a jamais la permission épistémique de croire que P et de croire que ~P simultanément. Si ces objectifs secondaires sont intéressants en eux-mêmes, ils contribuent aussi à confirmer l’idée selon laquelle la rationalité épistémique est normative. / This thesis argues that epistemic rationality is normative, or that agents ought to be epistemically rational. The property of rationality is here understood as a code. Specifically, the code of epistemic rationality requires various things, such as responding correctly to epistemic reasons one has, remaining coherent and avoiding akratic combinations of beliefs. Additionally, this thesis has secondary aims, such as: (i) arguing that apparent epistemic reasons to believe P (understood as apparently true propositions which, if they were true, would count in favour of the conclusion that P) are deontically significant; (ii) arguing against unsolvable normative dilemmas of epistemic rationality; (iii) arguing against a specific type of permissiveness which roughly states that, relative to a body of epistemic reasons, it can be epistemically rational for an ideal agent to believe P and to disbelieve P. While these secondary aims are interesting in their own right, they confirm the main claim of this thesis, namely, that epistemic rationality is normative.

Thesis advisor: Daniel J. McKaughan / When you learn that you disagree with an epistemic peer, what should you believe about the proposition you disagree about? The epistemology of peer disagreement has made considerable progress in answering this question. But to this point, we have largely neglected a significant resource which can help us to determine how peers who disagree can rationally respond to their disagreement. Closely examining actual disagreements in scientific and nonscientific contexts can help us to understand why peers find themselves in disagreement. And knowing why you disagree with your peer can help you to understand how you can rationally respond to your disagreement. Examining specific scientific and nonscientific disagreements shows us that some peers disagree because they disagree about what evidence is relevant to the proposition they disagree about. Dual disagreements about propositions and evidence can be found in numerous areas of disagreement, including ethical, political, philosophical, and scientific arenas. When you find yourself in these dual disagreements, you can rationally believe that your belief is rational and that your peer’s belief, though it diverges from yours, is also rational. But some philosophers have suggested that this situation in which you and your peer have rational beliefs and recognize each other as holding rational beliefs is impossible. A primary motivation for thinking that at least one of you must be believing irrationally is the thesis of Uniqueness about rationality, which states that at most one doxastic attitude can be rationally held given a body of evidence. However, when you consider the epistemic context of your actual disagreements with your peer carefully, you need not think that at least one of you is believing irrationally, even if Uniqueness is true. In response to your disagreement with a peer who disagrees with you both about what evidence is relevant to the proposition you disagree about and the proposition itself, you can even rationally hold a belief which splits the connection between your evidence and your evidence about your evidence. When we consider their epistemic contexts in full relief, peers in disagreement can simultaneously be believing rationally, even if only one of them is right. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2019. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.