Enforcement of financial reporting has gained new momentum in the European Union (EU) due to the so-called ‘IAS Regulation‘ (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002), with recital 16 requiring EU member states to take appropriate actions to ensure compliance with international accounting standards. Accordingly, several EU member states took concurrent or subsequent measures to increase the level of accounting enforcement, either by establishing new enforcement institutions, or by reforming existing ones. While these actions are designed to enhance accounting compliance by unfolding a preventive and sanctioning function of enforcement, a thorough literature review reveals that there is only scarce empirical evidence on whether this aim has been indeed achieved. Striving to shed light on the impact of recent enforcement reforms, this dissertation examines the sanctioning function in the German enforcement system by investigating shareholder reactions to error announcements. Moreover, a cross-country analysis of 20 EU member states provides novel insights on the postulated preventive function in the aftermath of enforcement reforms. In summary, this dissertation aims to improve the understanding of the economic impact of accounting enforcement in Germany and the EU.:I. Does Enforcement of Financial Reporting Matter? Empirical Evidence from Germany and Europe – Overview of the Dissertation 1 Introduction to the Research Context 2 Overview and Findings of the Manuscripts II. Enforcement of Financial Reporting – A Corporate Governance Perspective 1 Introduction 2 Theoretical Background 3 Identification and Description of Relevant Literature 4 Critical Discussion 5 Conclusion and Limitations III. Determinants of Investor Reactions to Error Announcements – Extended Evidence from Germany 1 Introduction 2 The German Enforcement System 3 Previous Research and Hypotheses Development 4 Methodology 5 Results 6 Robustness Tests 7 Conclusion IV. Error Announcements, Auditor Turnover, and Earnings Management – Evidence from Germany 1 Introduction 2 Institutional Background: The German Enforcement System 3 Previous Research and Hypotheses Development 4 Methodology 5 Results 6 Robustness Tests 7 Conclusion V. Does Enforcement Change Earnings Management Behavior? Evidence from the EU after Mandatory IFRS Adoption 1 Introduction 2 The Development of National Enforcement Institutions in the EU 3 Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 4 Research Design and Data Description 5 Results 6 Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests 7 Conclusion

Die vorliegende kumulative Doktorarbeit umfasst drei Arbeiten aus dem Bereich der empirischen Rechnungslegungsforschung. Die erste Arbeit untersucht die Rolle persönlicher Eigenschaften von Rechnungslegungsstandardsetzern bei der Entwicklung der Internationalen Rechnungslegungsstandards IFRS. Sie dokumentiert, dass in den IFRS insgesamt ein Rückgang der Bedeutung von Prinzipien gegenüber Regeln sowie ein Anstieg der Bedeutung des beizulegenden Zeitwerts im Zeitablauf zu verzeichnen sind. Zwischen Änderungen von IFRS-Eigenschaften sowie beruflichen und kulturellen Eigenschaften von Mitgliedern des International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) wird ein Zusammenhang festgestellt. Die zweite Arbeit widmet sich Ursachen und Folgen fehlerhafter Finanzberichterstattung im Rahmen des deutschen Systems der Durchsetzung von Rechnungslegungsregeln. Sie findet systematische Unterschiede in der Unternehmensführung von Unternehmen, bei denen fehlerhafte Finanzberichte festgestellt werden, gegenüber einer Kontrollgruppe. Weitere Ergebnisse lassen die Vermutung zu, dass die Aufdeckung fehlerhafter Finanzberichte Verbesserungen in der unternehmensspezifischen Aufsicht über den Rechnungslegungsprozess auslösen könnte. Die dritte Arbeit nutzt umfangreiche Befragungsergebnisse deutscher Privatanleger zur Untersuchung der Ursachen ihres Unternehmensüberwachungsverhaltens. Demnach üben Anleger, die ein geringeres Vertrauen in andere Anspruchsgruppen eines Unternehmens haben, zugleich eine geringere Unternehmensüberwachung aus. Darüber hinaus dokumentiert die Arbeit, dass Vertrauen und Unternehmensüberwachung in einem Zusammenhang mit dem Ausmaß der Teilnahme am Aktienmarkt und dem Bildungshintergrund der Anleger stehen. / This cumulative doctoral thesis consists of three papers within the field of empirical financial accounting research. The first paper examines the role of personal characteristics of accounting standard setters in the development of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). It documents that the full set of IFRS exhibited a decrease in the importance of principles relative to rules and an increase in its fair value orientation over time. Changes in IFRS properties are found to be associated with the professional and cultural background of International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) members. The second paper investigates determinants and consequences of erroneous financial reporting under the German financial reporting enforcement regime. The corporate governance of firms detected with erroneous financial reporting is found to differ systematically from that of control firms. Further results suggest that error detection might trigger improvements in firm-level accounting oversight. The third paper uses large-scale survey evidence from German individual investors to explore the determinants of their monitoring behavior. Investors who are less trusting in their fellow stakeholders are found to engage in less monitoring. Furthermore, trust and monitoring are documented to be associated with the stock market exposure and the educational background of investors.