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The most comm.on academic interest in Mahatma Gandhi centers around the theory and practice of Satyagraha. This thesis departs, in part, from this because it focuses upon the Satyagrahi. Every Satyagraha presupposes a Satyagrahi. Mahatma Gandhi was a Satyagrahi -a being in quest of truth. This quest consisted of two major components: the experiential and the existential. Ethics formed the basis of Gandhi's experiential quest, while political existence provided the forum in which he could experiment with his beliefs and convictions. Satyagraha was, therefore, a direct consequence of this intimate relationship between experience and existence. What is significant about Gandhi is that he did not dissociate his spiritual search from the struggle for political justice. He aimed at harmonizing the two seemingly opposite but complementary aspects of life into a meaningful whole -the ideal with the practical, the rational with the emotional and the religious with the secular. This study emphasizes the qualities of a disciplined Satyagrahi rather than the techniques of Satyagraha because the essence of the Satyagrahic struggle is rooted in the nature of the Satyagrahi. In effect, this thesis argues that all revolutions rest fundamentally on the quality of the revolutionary since the nature of any protest is bound to be determined by those who wage it. This is more acute in Satyagraha because it is the true expression of a conscious being. A Satyagrahi is a conscious entity in the highest sense. The unity of his life and thought conditions the purity of his means. Whereas most revolutionaries aim at transforming the "outer", a Satyagrahi concentrates on the "inner" in the hope of bringing about change through "self" transformation. No such change can be possible unless the Satyagrahi himself transcends the narrow limits of cognition -the exoteric and the esoteric aspects of experience. Chapter I and II are devoted to exploring the metaphysical foundations of Gandhi's tradition. They elaborate upon those aspects of the philosophical thought of India which are relevant to a Satyagrahi's understanding. Chapter III discusses and analyses the two complementary components of Satyagraha -the experiential and the existential. Chapter IV examines the way Gandhi's contemporaries viewed him. It outlines and interprets some basic tenets of his philosophy. Finally, Chapter V summarizes the relationship between the act and the actor, Satyagraha and the satyagrahi~and ends with an assessment. In emphasizing the role of the Satyagrahi in the context of the ethical experience, this thesis seeks to shift the emphasis in Gandhiana scholarship from Satyagraha to Satyagrahi. It argues that there is a need for critical re-evaluation of the relationship between Satyagraha and the Satyagrahi. That need has to do with the experiential aspect of realization. It is not enough to initiate a Satyagraha. It is of crucial importance to provide a milieu which would foster the virtues of ethical living and inculcate a "wholistic" view of life, in harmony with the 'self' and 'others'. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

A SURVEY OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ETHICS AND POLITICS WITH AN ARISTOTELIAN APPRAISAL &Ccedil / elik, Sinan Kadir Ph.D., Department of Philosophy Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ahmet &amp / #272 / nam March 2010, 189 pages In the history of philosophy, ethics and politics have either been considered as two unrelated, irreducible realms or as identical to each other. In the thesis the historical transformation of the problematic relation between ethics and politics is critically evaluated. It is argued that from the emergence of the conflict in Ancient Greece following the &ldquo / Socratic ideal&rdquo / to the modern attempt for its resolution by the &ldquo / Machiavellian revolution,&rdquo / the prominent theories developed for dealing with the problem have defined politics as an amoral practice, as a science, a technique or an art. An alternative Aristotelian approach is tried to be developed so as to elucidate the nature of the distinction between ethics and politics. According to this view, ethics and politics can neither be strictly separated from each other nor be reduced into one another. The Aristotelian conception of politike as &ldquo / philosophy of human affairs&rdquo / has ethical, practical and technical dimensions. The thesis tries to clarify at which point ethics and politics should be conceived as two different practices and at which point they cannot be treated as independent from each other. Hence, the present study aims to determine the peculiarities and the strong sides of Aristotelian practical philosophy in order to offer an alternative to resolve the problem under consideration.

Combatants in war inflict untold devastation. They lay waste the environment, destroy cultural heritage, wound, maim, and kill. Most importantly, they kill. These deeds would be, in any other context, paradigmatically unjust. This thesis asks whether they can be justi-fied. There are two possible approaches: first, deny that killing in war is in fact unjust; sec-ond, argue that the injustice is overridden by weightier moral reasons. In Part I, I reject the view that principles of self-defence can render killing in war just. I argue that the most plausible theories of self-defence are hardest to apply in the cha-otic context of war, while the most practicable theories are least philosophically defensible. Moreover, none of them encompasses the inevitable noncombatant deaths that all wars bring. If killing in war is almost always unjust, perhaps we should advocate pacifism. In Part II, I propose an alternative, arguing that these injustices might be all things con-sidered justified. Combatants have morally important relationships: they have deep personal relationships with friends and family, and comrades-in-arms; if they are citizens of just communities, then that relationship is valuable too. I argue that they have associative duties to protect these relationships against the threat posed by war, and that these duties may override the injustices they must commit to avert that threat. After defending a conception of associative duties, I support this conclusion with the following argument. As well as our general duties not to harm, we have general duties to protect. Our general duties to protect sometimes override our general duties not to harm, in particular, in cases of justified humanitarian intervention. Our associative duties to protect, however, are stronger than our general duties to protect. If our associative duties to protect are stronger than our general duties to protect, and our general duties to protect can override our general duties not to harm, then our associative duties to protect should also be able to override our general duties not to harm.

Richard Rorty found Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of epistemology (perspectivism) to be a helpful tool in getting us to stop thinking of knowledge as something we find, and instead as something that we create. He also found perspectivism to be a helpful tool in that of the private sphere, of private self-creation. The Nietzsche that provides perspectivism is “The Good Nietzsche”. Rorty, however, conceived of Nietzsche’s ideas as being absolutely useless when it comes to politics, along with his ideas regarding morality, the Will to Power, and the Übermensch. These are the ideas of “The Bad Nietzsche”. Rorty’s actual usage of Nietzsche’s ideas, however, defies such easy, self-defined categorization, because these ideas extend outside of their spheres into the realm of politics in Rorty’s own writings. Most traditional analyses of the relationship between Nietzsche and Rorty as it regards politics tend to focus on Nietzsche. By focusing on Rorty’s appropriation of Nietzsche, through looking at his extensive writings and interviews, a more subtle, and complex relationship between Nietzsche’s various ideas and Rorty’s politics is seen to exist.

Richard Rorty found Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of epistemology (perspectivism) to be a helpful tool in getting us to stop thinking of knowledge as something we find, and instead as something that we create. He also found perspectivism to be a helpful tool in that of the private sphere, of private self-creation. The Nietzsche that provides perspectivism is “The Good Nietzsche”. Rorty, however, conceived of Nietzsche’s ideas as being absolutely useless when it comes to politics, along with his ideas regarding morality, the Will to Power, and the Übermensch. These are the ideas of “The Bad Nietzsche”. Rorty’s actual usage of Nietzsche’s ideas, however, defies such easy, self-defined categorization, because these ideas extend outside of their spheres into the realm of politics in Rorty’s own writings. Most traditional analyses of the relationship between Nietzsche and Rorty as it regards politics tend to focus on Nietzsche. By focusing on Rorty’s appropriation of Nietzsche, through looking at his extensive writings and interviews, a more subtle, and complex relationship between Nietzsche’s various ideas and Rorty’s politics is seen to exist.

In post-colonial Africa, conceptions of the nature and purposes of development as well as the theories and strategies for achieving them have remained a territory traversed predominantly by non-African social scientists. In this context, social scientists studying Africa's development proclaimed, at the dawn of the 1990s, a "paradigmatic crisis" and embarked on a quest for new paradigms . In advancing this quest, a number of "homegrown" development strategies have emerged. This work argues that these are mere adaptations and reconstructions of dominant Eurocentic paradigms that exaggerate the value of economic goods and wealth creation founded on a competitive marketplace by making them immutable features of development. Yet the ethic of competition theoretically condones a trajectory of killing in the quest for wealth accumulation. In this way, internalist epistemologies perpetuate epistemicide and valuecide in Africa's strides towards development. The stranglehold of internalist epistemologies has resulted in the impasse of rationality. By this we mean that Reason, apotheosized since the Enlightenment, has advanced humanity out of barbarism to "civilization" but has now placed humanity on the brink of unredeemable barbarism. Reason, through its manifestations in the philosophy of Mutual Assured Destruction and global warming, has condemned humanity to willful but avoidable suicide. Since the subjects and objects of development must be one and the same, development is necessarily culture-derived and culture-driven, with the preservation and improvement of human dignity and welfare as its ultimate aims. Accordingly, we defend the thesis that it is necessary for a framework meant for Africa's development to be founded on indigenous knowledge and values, if it is to succeed. And at this moment of impasse reached by Reason, an African ethics-based development paradigm, predicated on humaneness and "life is mutual aid", can restore Reason to sober rationality and liberate Africa's development efforts from the intoxicating prison of profit making. Hence the institutions and frameworks devoted to Africa's development, such as the Constitution and Strategic Plan of the African Union as well as NEPAD, must incorporate salient features of the philosophic ethic emanating from the knowledge and ontological systems of indigenous Africa into visions of the African future. / Philosophy / D. Phil. (Philosophy)

In post-colonial Africa, conceptions of the nature and purposes of development as well as the theories and strategies for achieving them have remained a territory traversed predominantly by non-African social scientists. In this context, social scientists studying Africa's development proclaimed, at the dawn of the 1990s, a "paradigmatic crisis" and embarked on a quest for new paradigms . In advancing this quest, a number of "homegrown" development strategies have emerged. This work argues that these are mere adaptations and reconstructions of dominant Eurocentic paradigms that exaggerate the value of economic goods and wealth creation founded on a competitive marketplace by making them immutable features of development. Yet the ethic of competition theoretically condones a trajectory of killing in the quest for wealth accumulation. In this way, internalist epistemologies perpetuate epistemicide and valuecide in Africa's strides towards development. The stranglehold of internalist epistemologies has resulted in the impasse of rationality. By this we mean that Reason, apotheosized since the Enlightenment, has advanced humanity out of barbarism to "civilization" but has now placed humanity on the brink of unredeemable barbarism. Reason, through its manifestations in the philosophy of Mutual Assured Destruction and global warming, has condemned humanity to willful but avoidable suicide. Since the subjects and objects of development must be one and the same, development is necessarily culture-derived and culture-driven, with the preservation and improvement of human dignity and welfare as its ultimate aims. Accordingly, we defend the thesis that it is necessary for a framework meant for Africa's development to be founded on indigenous knowledge and values, if it is to succeed. And at this moment of impasse reached by Reason, an African ethics-based development paradigm, predicated on humaneness and "life is mutual aid", can restore Reason to sober rationality and liberate Africa's development efforts from the intoxicating prison of profit making. Hence the institutions and frameworks devoted to Africa's development, such as the Constitution and Strategic Plan of the African Union as well as NEPAD, must incorporate salient features of the philosophic ethic emanating from the knowledge and ontological systems of indigenous Africa into visions of the African future. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / D. Phil. (Philosophy)

Ce mémoire s’intéresse au travail d’enquête et plus spécifiquement à la méthode du détective privé dans le diptyque que composent Un privé à Tanger (1987) et ma haie : Un privé à Tanger II (2001) du poète français Emmanuel Hocquard. Suivant l’hypothèse que le diptyque ne constitue pas seulement un travail sur l’enquête, mais bien un travail d’enquête, nous chercherons à rendre compte, dans toute sa complexité et sa richesse, de la teneur de cette enquête. Puisant à la fois dans les théories de l’enquête, les études littéraires, les études médiatiques et la philosophie, ce mémoire s’affairera à montrer le fonctionnement du diptyque comme ouvrage de savoir. Dans un premier temps, nous travaillerons à détailler la généalogie de la figure du privé et du polar sous le signe desquels est posé le diptyque. En insistant sur les nombreuses affinités entre la pratique littéraire de l’écrivain hard-boiled états-unien Raymond Chandler et celle d’Emmanuel Hocquard dans Un privé à Tanger I et II, nous chercherons à aborder leur relation sous l’angle de l’héritage plutôt que sous celui du pastiche. Puis, fort de cette compréhension du rapport étroit entre le poète français et le polar américain, nous travaillerons, dans un second temps, à analyser la structure du diptyque à l’aune de ce que nous appellerons, à la suite de Christophe Hanna et Philippe Charron, la méthode du privé. Dans un troisième temps, nous nous intéresserons à l’objet et aux visées de l’enquête hocquardienne. Si, comme l’affirme Gilles A. Tiberghien et Jean-François Puff, l’enquête hocquardienne est autoréflexive et autobiographique, notre travail sera non pas de montrer un caractère spéculaire, mais plutôt de cerner la façon dont, chez Hocquard, l’anecdotique et le personnel sont intégrés à une réflexion politique et éthique. / This dissertation explores the investigative work and the implementation of the private detective method in the diptych Un privé à Tanger, an oeuvre written by the French poet Emmanuel Hocquard and composed of Un privé à Tanger (1987) and ma haie : Un privé à Tanger II (2001). Following the hypothesis that the diptych is not only a work on investigation, but also a work of investigation, we will seek to understand the terms of this inquiry in all its complexity. Through the use of a diverse theoretical framework – combining investigation studies, literary studies, media studies and philosophy –, this dissertation aims to make plain of the inner operations of the diptych as a work of knowledge. Firstly, we will delineate the genealogy of the diptych and detail its relation with the hard-boiled novel and the writings of Raymond Chandler; a relation that can’t and won’t be described as a pastiche. Secondly, we will analyse the structure of the diptych through its connection to what we’ll name, following the works of Philippe Charron and Christophe Hanna, the private’s method. Thirdly, we will turn our attention to the object of the diptych’s investigation. As claimed by Gilles A. Tiberghien and Jean-François Puff, the hocquardian investigation can be characterize as self-reflective and autobiographical, our work will then be to make clear of the ways in which, in the works of Hocquard, the realm of the anecdotal and the personal, is used for ethical and political thinking.

Text in English, abstract in English, Afrikaans and Northern Sotho / This study examines why post-colonial African states are not able to institutionalise the ideal ethical and democratic societies, given their access to international best practices and the abundance of human and natural resources; why the future of democracy in Africa remains uncertain despite the current efforts at democratisation; if western democracy can be implemented in Africa; why the West is able to produce better systems of governance; why leaders and managers find it daunting to create the kind of society that is inspiring, ethical, immune to bureaucracy, and that possesses excellent economic performance; how leaders, members of the community, bureaucrats, corporate executives and managers can contribute to the realisation of the ethical and ideal African state; and the options for alternative democratic order for the African continent. The inability of post-colonial African states to institute systems and strategies that adequately address the needs and expectations of their citizens has created chaos and anarchy that in some states can be likened to Hobbes state of nature where the weak is at the mercy of the strong and life is nasty, brutish and short. While the West has been largely blamed for playing a significant role in Africa’s inability to effectively manage itself, other theorists criticise African leaders and the community members for their inability to conduct themselves ethically and to implement a constructive and effective system of governance. It is imperative that African states devise adequate means of ethically administering their territories in a manner that meets societal expectations and needs, and in order to avoid intractable socio-political and economic complications. / Hierdie studie ondersoek die redes waarom postkoloniale Afrika-lande nie die ideale etiese en demokratiese samelewings instabiliseer nie, gegewe hul toegang tot internasionale beste praktyke en die oorvloed van menslike en natuurlike hulpbronne; waarom die toekoms van demokrasie in Afrika onduidelik bly ten spyte van die huidige pogings vir demokratisering; as westerse demokrasie in Afrika geïmplementeer kan word; waarom die Weste beter stelsels van bestuur kan lewer; hoekom leiers en bestuurders dit skrikwekkend vind om die soort samelewing wat inspirerend, eties, immuun vir burokrasie is, te skep en wat uitstekende ekonomiese prestasie besit; hoe leiers, lede van die gemeenskap, burokrate, korporatiewe bestuurders en bestuurders kan bydra tot die verwesenliking van die etiese en ideale Afrika-staat; en die opsies vir alternatiewe demokratiese orde vir die Afrika-kontinent. Die onvermoë van post-koloniale Afrika-state om stelsels en strategieë in te stel wat die behoeftes en verwagtinge van hul burgers voldoende aanspreek, het chaos en anargie geskep wat in sommige state vergelykbaar kan wees met Hobbes se toestand van die natuur, waar die swakeling aan die genade van die wat sterk is afhanklik is en die lewe ‘n nare, brutaal en kort lewe is. Terwyl die Weste grotendeels die blaam kry in terme van hul groot bydra in Afrika se onvermoë om homself doeltreffend te bestuur, kritiseer ander teoretici Afrika-leiers en die gemeenskapslede vir hul eie onvermoë om eties op te tree en om 'n konstruktiewe en effektiewe bestuurstelsel te implementeer. Dit is noodsaaklik dat Afrika-state voldoende middele voorsien om hul gebiede eties te administreer op 'n wyse wat voldoen aan maatskaplike verwagtinge en behoeftes, en om onwikkelbare sosio-politieke en ekonomiese komplikasies te vermy. / Thuto ye e lekola mabaka a gore ke eng dinaga tša ka morago ga bokoloneale di sa kgone go hloma dipeakanyo tša maswanedi tša maitshwaro le ditšhaba tša temokrasi, tšeo di filwego phihlelelo go ditiro tše kaonekaone tša boditšhabatšhaba le bontši bja methopo ya semotho le tlhago: ke ka lebaka la eng Bodikela bo kgona go tšweletša mekgwa ye kaone ya pušo; ke ka lebaka la eng baetapele le balaodi ba hwetša go le boima go hlama mokgwa wa setšhaba seo se nago le mafolofolo, maitshwaro, se sa huetšwego ke mokgwa wa pušo wo o diphetho di tšewago ke bahlanka ba mmušo bao ba sa kgethwago, gomme ba na le tiro ye kgahlišago ka ikonomi; ka moo baetapele, maloko a setšhaba, batšeasephetho ba mmušo ba sa kgethwago, malokopharephare a dikoporasi le balaodi ba ka aba mo go phihlelelong ya maitshwaro le naga ya maswanedi ya Afrika; le go dikgetho tša peakanyo ye e hlatlolanago ya temokrasi mo kontinenteng ya Afrika. Go se kgone ga dinaga tša ka morago ga bokoloneale go hlama mekgwa le maano ao a maleba a go bolela ka ga dinyakwa le ditetelo tša baagi ba bona di hlotše tlhakatlhakano le tlhokapušo yeo mo go dinaga tše dingwe e ka bapetšwago le naga ya Hobbes ka tlhago moo mofokodi a lego ka fase ga yo maatla gomme bophelo bo se bose, bo le šoro le go ba bjo bokopana. Mola Bodikela bo pharwa molato kudu mo go bapaleng karolo ye e tšweletšego mo go se kgonego ga Afrika go itaola ka tshwanelo, borateori ba bangwe ba solago baetapele ba Afrika le maloko a setšhaba mo go se kgonego go itshwara gabotse le go phethagatša mokgwa wo hlamilwego gabotse wo o šomago wa pušo. A bonagala gore dinaga tša Afrika di loga maano a makaone a go laola ka tshwanelo dinagadilete tša bona ka mokgwa wo o tla fihlelelago ditetelo tša setšhaba le dinyakwa, le gore go thibelwe go se boelemorago ga dipolotiki tša selegae le tlhakatlhakano ya ikonomi. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / D. Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)