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31	Situerad Moral : Är det tanken som räknas? / Situated Morals : Is it the thought that counts? Molander, Fanny January 2020 (has links) Hur tillskriver vi moraliskt ansvar, och varför? Inom filosofin debatteras häftigt huruvida vi har fri vilja eller ej, och således ifrågasätts om vi kan tillskrivas moraliskt ansvar över huvud taget. Ett av argumenten som sägs hota den fria viljan är den omfattande situationistiska litteraturen, som verkar visa på att människors beteende påverkas mer av situationella faktorer än av personlighetsdrag. EH (Explanation Hypothesis) är en psykologisk hypotes som, förutom att redogöra för vardagliga moraliska bedömningar, kan reda ut filosofiska frågor såsom varför våra intuitioner kring moraliskt ansvar ter sig inkonsekventa. Denna studie testade EH experimentellt med en enkätstudie som dessutom undersökte folks intuitioner i moraliskt signifikanta situationer med kopplingar till den situationistiska litteraturen. Resultaten stärkte EH i enlighet med tidigare resultat, samt visade på att folks moraliska bedömningar inte påverkades av vetskapen om starka psykosociala fenomen som kan ha haft inverkan på agenternas beteenden. Implikationerna för den filosofiska debatten kring fri vilja och moraliskt ansvar, liksom begreppet determinism, diskuteras och förslag på fortsatt forskning läggs fram. / How do we attribute moral responsibility, and why? The notion of free will is heavily debated within philosophy, thus questioning whether we can truly be morally responsible for our actions. One of the arguments said to threaten the notion of free will is the vast collection of situationist literature that seem to show that human behavior is often more influenced by situational factors rather than personality traits. The Explanation Hypothesis (EH) is a psychological hypothesis that make general claims about everyday moral judgements, as well as accounting for philosophical issues such as the inconsistency of folk-intuitions on these issues. This study used surveys to test EH experimentally, also investigating folk-intuitions on moral responsibility in scenarios related to the situationist literature. The results support the hypothesis according to an earlier, similar study, as well as showing that the participants moral judgements were not influenced by being made aware of strong, psychosocial phenomena that seem to have had an impact on agents behaviors. The implications for the philosophical debate on free will and moral responsibility as well as the notion of determinism is discussed and further research is proposed. cognitive science philosophy moral philosophy the hard problem experimental philosophy ethics virtue ethics free will determinism indeterminism compatibility inkompatibilism situationism situationist literature kognitionsvetenskap filosofi moralfilosofi experimentell filosofi etik dygdetik fri vilja determinism indeterminism kompatibilism inkompatibilism situationism situationistisk litteratur Philosophy, Ethics and Religion Filosofi, etik och religion
32	Margaret Cavendish and Scientific Discourse in Seventeenth-Century England Bolander, Alisa Curtis 06 May 2004 (has links) Although the natural philosophy of Margaret Cavendish is eclectic and uncustomary, it offers an important critique of contemporary scientific methods, especially mechanism and experimentalism. As presented in Observations upon Experimental Philosophy and Blazing World, Cavendish's natural philosophy incorporates rationalistic and subjective elements, urging contemporary natural philosophers to recognize that pure objectivity is unattainable through any method of inquiry and that reason is essential in making sense and use of scientific observation. In addition to its scientific implications, Cavendish's three-tiered model of matter presents interesting sociopolitical associations. Through her own use of metaphor and her theoretical fusion of matter and motion, Cavendish confronts the masculinist metaphors and implications of mechanism. Through the dramatization of her model of matter in the narrative Blazing World, Cavendish exposes the theoretical failings of contemporary methods and legitimizes her alternative to pure experimentalism. By envisioning a new planet to place the utopia of Blazing World, Cavendish actively uses the rational functions of the mind, showing that reason and rational matter are above all else in natural philosophy. Although Cavendish's scientific theory in some ways promotes the participation of women in natural philosophy, it becomes complicated as she simultaneously reinforces her social biases and urges a traditional class system with a monarchical government. Cavendish actively separates the gender constraints in philosophical inquiry from the social limitations placed on the lower classes to promote herself and other aristocratic women in the pursuit of natural philosophy, urging that the rational realm, where all sexes are equal, should govern scientific investigation. Margaret Cavendish Blazing World natural philosophy Newcastle Duchess England scientific revolution natural philosophy scientific philosophy seventeenth-century science scientific discourse metaphor mechanism mechanist experimentalism experimentalist rationalism rationalist empericism empiricist Descartes Boyle Hooke Hobbes Bacon New Atlantis women woman feminist inductive deductive model matter utopia rational eschatology eschatological gender inquiry political monarchy aristocracy monarchical aristocratic English Language and Literature
33	La responsabilité criminelle a-t-elle un avenir? : enquête sur les fondements philosophiques, juridiques et psychologiques de l’imputabilité pénale à l’ère des neurosciences Gilbert Tremblay, Ugo 04 1900 (has links) La présente thèse a une vocation à la fois descriptive et prospective. Descriptive, d’une part, en ce qu’elle entend mettre au jour les fondements juridiques actuels de la responsabilité criminelle tout en déterminant l’étendue des rapports qu’ils entretiennent avec la notion philosophique de libre arbitre. Prospective, d’autre part, en ce qu’elle entend évaluer les chances de survie de ces fondements à la lumière de la nouvelle vision de l’homme qui se dégage des avancées récentes en neurosciences. Nous aurons pour ce faire à soupeser la vraisemblance de deux grandes prophéties concernant l’avenir de la responsabilité criminelle : l’une, que nous qualifierons de « scientiste », prétend que le concept juridique actuel de responsabilité criminelle est voué à tomber en désuétude en raison de son incompatibilité avec notre connaissance du cerveau. L’autre, que nous qualifierons de « légitimiste », prétend que c’est plutôt en modifiant les intuitions populaires en matière de responsabilité que les neurosciences bouleverseront l’édifice pénal. Dans les deux cas, nous découvrirons qu’une erreur de diagnostic quant au fonctionnement juridique et psychologique des jugements de responsabilité conduit à une erreur de pronostic. / This doctoral dissertation is both descriptive and prospective. Descriptive, on the one hand, by seeking to identify the current legal foundations of criminal responsibility and by trying to determinate the extent of their relationship with the philosophical notion of free will. Prospective, on the other hand, by seeking to evaluate the chances of survival of these foundations in the light of the new vision of man that emanates from advances in neuroscience. To this end, two great prophecies concerning the future of criminal responsibility will have to be weighed: one, which we will call ‘‘scientist’’, claims that the current legal concept of criminal responsibility is incompatible with what neuroscience teaches us and is, therefore, destined to fall into disuse. The other, which we will call ‘‘legitimist’’, claims that it is rather by altering the popular intuitions about responsibility that neuroscience will threat the penal edifice. In both cases, we will discover that a misdiagnosis concerning the legal and psychological functioning of the judgments of responsibility leads to an error of prognosis. Responsabilité morale et criminelle Libre arbitre Déterminisme Blâme Neurosciences Neurodroit Philosophie expérimentale Psychologie populaire Intuitions morales Moyens de défense Criminal and moral responsibility Free will Determinism Blame Neuroscience Neurolaw Experimental philosophy Folk psychology Moral intuitions Legal defenses

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