<p>Gilles Deleuze's definition of the other as the expression of a possible world has introduced a novel ontological organization into philosophy. It makes possible the conception of a singular being which may be expressed by a potentially infinite number of possible worlds. This, in turn, has lead Deleuze to propound the idea of "a life," immanent and impersonal but singularly determinate, as different from the universe of subjects, objects, and the transcendence that appears as their concomitant. This study resituates Wallace Stevens in the ontological universe of "a life" as opposed to the common practice of associating him with the questions of subject, object, and transcendence. It observes that Stevens's poetry primarily invests the field of the other, which functions as the structure of the perceptible. The result is a poetry predominated by a yearning for the immanence of "a life," an outside, that escapes the limits of the subject and is "disappointed" with the function of transcendence, rather than being explained by them. The study argues that Stevens's poetry can be read as a dramatization, itself regulated by an affective charge, of the passion for an outside, which goes beyond the framework of subjectivity and "feels" the inhuman stirring beneath the human.</p> / Dissertation

Le présent travail de recherche cherche à éclairer le rapport entre le sujet, le délire et le temps. Les prémisses de cette question sont essentiellement cliniques : dans notre pratique nous avons rencontré des patients délirants dont les états ont présenté des organisations subjectives qui ne pouvaient pas être ni décrites, ni comprises dans la terminologie traditionnelle de la psychiatrie ou de la psychologie. Cette expérience clinique nous a confronté à deux difficultés majeures : premièrement, les agencements subjectifs du délire contredisent souvent la conception du sujet dont dispose la psychologie, deuxièmement, dans de nombreux cas toute tentative de réduction de la forme clinique du délire à la conception médicale de l’évolution continue conduit à une méconnaissance du fondement subjectif de l’organisation temporelle du phénomène. Dans notre travail nous démontrons que le phénomène délirant demande un concept du sujet et une notion du temps qui répondent à l’exigence de sa structure clinique. D’abord, en réinterrogeant la clinique classique des états délirants dans la perspective structurale, nous expliquons pourquoi l’étude des états délirants nécessite une transgression du plan de la psychopathologie traditionnelle. Ensuite, sur le fond d’une élaboration approfondie du concept de temps logique, nous conceptualisons une approche clinique qui met en évidence que le rapport de la formation délirante au temps est une série discontinue de modes de subjectivation de la jouissance qui permet d’identifier la temporalité du délire à un agencement de la succession de modes de temporalisation. Ainsi notre recherche aboutit à démontrer la thèse qui postule une solidarité structurale de la fonction du sujet avec la fonction-temps dans la clinique des états délirants / The present research seeks to shed light on the relationship between the subject, delusion and time. The premises of this question are essentially clinical: in our practice we have encountered delusional patients whose states have presented subjective organizations that could not be described or understood in traditional terminology of psychiatry or psychology. This clinical experience has confronted us with two major difficulties: firstly, the subjective organization of the delusion often contradicts the psychological conception of the subject, secondly, in many cases the attempt to reduce the clinical form of delusion to the medical conception of continuous evolution leads to a ignorance of the subjective basis of the temporal organization of the phenomenon. In our work we demonstrate that the delusional phenomenon demands a concept of the subject and a notion of time, which meet the requirement of its clinical structure. Firstly, by re-examining the classic clinic of delusional states in the structural perspective, we explain why the study of delusional states requires a transgression of the traditional psychopathology approach. Then, on the basis of the detailed elaboration of the concept of logical time, we conceptualize a clinical approach, which shows that the relation between delusion formation and time is a discontinuous series of modes of subjectivation of jouissance which permit to identify the temporality of delusion with an arrangement of the succession of modes of temporalization. Thereby our research results in demonstrating the thesis, which postulates a structural solidarity of the function of the subject with the function-time in the clinic of delusional states.

L’objectif de notre présente étude est d’examiner un contexte philosophique dans lequel s’inscrit la recherche de la subjectivité liée à l’idée de l’extériorité à travers une étude des liens entre la philosophie de Franz Rosenzweig et celle d’Emmanuel Levinas. L’idée de socialité dans notre recherche se fonde sur la question de l’extériorité et sur celle de la subjectivité dans leurs philosophies. Ces deux philosophes soutiennent tous deux l’idée de la rupture de la totalité et défendent la subjectivité. Toutefois, leurs divergences sont profondescar la tentative de Levinas qui aboutit à la recherche d’une subjectivité consistant dans le dérangement de l’ordre ne renvoie pas au système rosenzweigien. Dès lors, quel est l’héritage de Rosenzweig dans la philosophie de Levinas ? Dans la première partie, nous déterminons la portée de la notion de système et celle de totalité dans leurs philosophies. Dans la seconde partie, nous observons la divergence entre leurs philosophies sur la conception du Soi et son rapport à l’extériorité. Dans la troisième partie, nous examinons la signification de la socialité fondée sur la question du temps. Selon nous, la question du langage qui fonde la relation entre le sujet et autrui se déploie à travers les analyses du temps, et ce sont des modalités du langage – le rapport entre le dialogue du « face-à-face » et l’intrusion de l’autre dans le sujet exprimé par Levinas comme « Dire sans Dit » - qui nous permettent de relier encore une fois la philosophie de Levinas à la philosophie de Rosenzweig. Levinas approfondit la question rosenzweigienne du dialogue sans dévaloriser sa signification et sans la systématiser, en partant de la pensée du système. / The objective of our present study is to examine the philosophical context in which the research of a subjectivity which would be linked to the idea of the exteriority becomes possible. This objective will be achieved thanks to the study of the connection between Franz Rosenzweig’s philosophy and Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy. In our research the idea of sociality is founded upon the question of the exteriority and upon the question of the subjectivity. Both Rosenzweig and Levinas are determined to put the idea of the totality into question and to defend the subjectivity. However, their differences are great: Levinas’s endeavor to open the field for a new understanding of the subjectivity, which consists in the disturbance of the order, doesn’t appear in Rosenzweig’s system. If such is the case, what does Levinas’s philosophy owe to the heritage of Rosenzweig? In the first part, we try to determine the realm of the notion of system and that of totality in their philosophies. In the second part, we try to observe the difference between their philosophies about the conception of the Self and of its link to the exteriority. In the third part, we examine the meaning of a sociality founded upon the question of time. In our view, the question of language, which is the basis of the relationship between a subject and the other, is inseparable from a profound analysis of time. The modalities of language – the connection between the dialogue of the “face-to-face” and the intervention of the other into the subject expressed by Levinas as “ Saying without Said” - allow us to underline the relation between the philosophy of Levinas with that of Rosenzweig. Levinas has deeply studied Rosenzweig’s understanding of the dialogue without depreciating its signification.

Esta dissertação versa sobre a incomunicabilidade humana. A pergunta problematizadora que temos como objetivo aprofundar é: o ser humano é, ontologicamente, um ser capaz de se comunicar? ou de outra forma: é possível a existência da comunicação? A hermenêutica imanente dos textos de natureza filosófica, seguida da reflexão analítica, nos aproxima da problemática sobre a incomunicabilidade humana, iluminando os enfoques chave do estado instaurado de incomunicação radical e generalizada, por outro lado a possibilidade do ser de relacionar-se e abrir a comunicação para sua existência. A possibilidade do ser humano de relacionar-se é mínima no sistema planetário de comunicação, o que nos faz concluir que vivemos na era da incomunicabilidade humana, por primeiro da incomunicabilidade entre eu e o outro. / This dissertation deals with human incommunicability. We intend to further study the following problematizing issue: Ontologically speaking, is the human being capable of communicating? In other words: can communication exist? The immanent hermeneutics of philosophical texts, followed by analytical reflection, leads us to the problem of human incommunicability, throws light on key approaches to the state of radical and generalized incommunication, and, on the other hand, the possibility for human beings to establish relationships and open lines of communication for their survival. The planets communication system allows for minimal possibilities of human beings establishing relationships; we have, therefore, to conclude that we live in an era of human incommunicability, starting with the incommunicability between the self and others.

Esta dissertação versa sobre a incomunicabilidade humana. A pergunta problematizadora que temos como objetivo aprofundar é: o ser humano é, ontologicamente, um ser capaz de se comunicar? ou de outra forma: é possível a existência da comunicação? A hermenêutica imanente dos textos de natureza filosófica, seguida da reflexão analítica, nos aproxima da problemática sobre a incomunicabilidade humana, iluminando os enfoques chave do estado instaurado de incomunicação radical e generalizada, por outro lado a possibilidade do ser de relacionar-se e abrir a comunicação para sua existência. A possibilidade do ser humano de relacionar-se é mínima no sistema planetário de comunicação, o que nos faz concluir que vivemos na era da incomunicabilidade humana, por primeiro da incomunicabilidade entre eu e o outro. / This dissertation deals with human incommunicability. We intend to further study the following problematizing issue: Ontologically speaking, is the human being capable of communicating? In other words: can communication exist? The immanent hermeneutics of philosophical texts, followed by analytical reflection, leads us to the problem of human incommunicability, throws light on key approaches to the state of radical and generalized incommunication, and, on the other hand, the possibility for human beings to establish relationships and open lines of communication for their survival. The planets communication system allows for minimal possibilities of human beings establishing relationships; we have, therefore, to conclude that we live in an era of human incommunicability, starting with the incommunicability between the self and others.

La thèse présente une relecture chronologique et systématique de la question de Dieu dans la philosophie d’Emmanuel Levinas : elle se propose d’examiner le mouvement plurivoque et ambiguë de la « trace » par lequel se dessine le sens du mot ‘Dieu’ dans cette philosophie. En identifiant l’enchevêtrement de trois champs de recherche qui se déploient à travers l’oeuvre – les foyers thématiques de la sortie, de la socialité et de la signifiance –, nous tentons de montrer qu’à travers eux se découvrent trois modalités de la notion de la « trace » qui pénètre la pensée de Levinas sur Dieu et sur l’homme inséparablement. Nous avons d’abord suivi l’émergence de la question de Dieu depuis les premières insinuations jusqu’aux textes parus entre Totalité et Infini et Autrement qu’être (1e partie) ; ensuite, nous avons exploré le déploiement autrement accentué d’une pensée de Dieu jumelée à une reformulation du sujet, au centre de la deuxième oeuvre maîtresse (2e partie) ; enfin, nous avons relevés les points culminants de la recherche de la signifiance du mot Dieu tels qu’ils ont été approfondis et affirmés dans les oeuvres de la maturité (3e partie). La complexité du travail de Levinas sur la question de Dieu en philosophie se lit dans la densité de la notion de la trace : inscrite (1) dans le visage d’autrui, (2) dans la passivité du sujet et (3) dans le dire prophétique, elle permet de penser Dieu comme l’absence-présence d’unetranscendance radicale, transcendance qui dans toute sa séparation absolue néanmoins affecte l’immanence ets’incarne comme intelligibilité première. / The theses presents a chronological and systematic re-reading of the question of God in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, and examines the ambiguous and equivocal movement of the “trace” through which is delineated the meaning of the word ‘God’ in this philosophy. By identifying three areas of research interweaving throughout his work – the three thematic clusters of ‘exit’, of ‘sociality’ and of ‘significance’ –, it is shown how three modalities of the notion of the “trace” are exposed through these areas: the “trace” in its equivocal formulation penetrates the thinking of Levinas on God and man inseparably. First we follow the emergence of the question of God from the first early suggestions through the texts appearing between Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than being (part 1); then we explore the more accentuate thinking on God in association with a reformulation of the subject, at the heart of Levinas’ second major work (part 2); finally we drawn attention to the culminating points of the research on the meaning of the word ‘God’ as deepened and corroborated in Levinas’ later works (part 3). The complexity of the work of Levinas on the question of God in philosophy may be read through the density of the notion of the trace: Inscribed in (1) the face of the other, (2) the passivity of the subject (3) the prophetic saying, it makes it possible to think God as the absence-presence of a radical transcendence, a transcendence that in all its absolute separation still affects immanence and incarnates itself as original intelligibility.

Cette thèse d’arts plastiques s’appuie sur ma pratique personnelle. Toutes deux interrogent les contradictions que soulèvent le concept d’insularité et la conscience d’être sur une île qui détermine la condition insulaire (Bonnemaison, Péron). Le rapport à l’extériorité parait ici primordial. Entre ouverture et enfermement : entre l’ici et l’ailleurs, l’eau qui borde l’île est source de tensions. Par cette apparition d’un lointain si proche soit-il (Benjamin) du lieu ou du non-lieu (Augé), l’insularité relève d’un intervalle qui nous interroge et nous fascine. Dans l’île mais aussi dans l’œuvre d’art, qu’est-ce qui lui donnesa forme, en définitive ? Ma production personnelle qui met en jeu transparences, stratifications et décalages convoque l’intervalité. Elle sous-tend des questionnements que nous développerons à la lumière de théories esthétiques déterminantes. Il s’agit de vérifier l’hypothèse selon laquelle les tensions de l’insularité ouvrent à la création artistique. Nous étudierons des structures insulaires comme celle du désert et du labyrinthe (Jabès, Parmiggiani). Les ruptures et liens rhizomatiques (Deleuze) conditionnent toute démarche créatrice. L’enjeu, à la lumière de théories reposant sur l’étude des entre-deux, qu’ils soient physiques (Lestocart), anthropologiques (Buci-Glucksmann), ou encore psychanalytiques (Winnicott), est de mettre au jour les conditions de manifestation des phénomènes poïétiques. L’élucidation des contradictions insulaires et artistiques représente un itinéraire complexe, reposant sur plusieurs niveaux d’interprétation simultanés. Du champ sémantique proposé émerge alors l’expérience artistique et inversement. A l’instar des réseaux mondiaux, les ramifications de cette réflexion sur l’insularité nous mèneront au dépassement de la conscience rhizomatique de nos conditions d’existence stratifiées par des intervalles ; conscience que nous nommerons « l’espace de conciliation ». / This thesis is based on my personal practice. Both of them interrogate the contradictions triggered by the concept of insularity and the awareness of being on an island, which determines the condition of insularity (Bonnemaison, Péron). Here, the relation to exteriority appears to be essential. Between the here and the elsewhere, between openness and confinement : the water surrounding the island is a source of tension. Withthe apparition of a distance, however near it may be (Benjamin), of a place or a non-place (Augé), the insularity involves an interval that questions and fascinates us. How does the insularity eventually shape the island and the work of art ? My work attempts to answer this question through the use of transparencies, stratifications and displacements, which summons up the concept of intervality. Questionnings stemming from this concept will bedevelopped in the light of decisive aesthetic theories. My attempt is to test the assumption that tensions emerging from insularity enable artistic creation. My study will ponder on insular structures such as the desert and the labyrinth (Jabès, Parmiggiani), and on the ways splits and rhizomatic links influence all artistic process. My goal is to highlight the conditions in which these poietic phenomena may arise, using theories drawing upon thestudy of in-betweens, be they physical (Lestocart), anthropological (Buci-Glucksmann) or psychoanalytical (Lacan). Solving insular and artistic contradictions involves a complex route building on several simultaneous levels of interpretation. Thus the artistic experience emerges from the semantic field set forth, and conversely. In the manner of global networks, the ramifications of this reflection on insularity will lead us to overcome the rhizomatic consciousness of our conditions of existence, which are stratified by intervals. This specific consciousness will here be called “the space of conciliation”.

<p>This essay examines the adaptation of <em>The French Lieutenant’s Woman;</em> proclaiming that it is based on the same core of meaning as the novel. This core, or interiority, of the art work, is the <em>freedom</em> which Sarah Woodruff presents. The interiority is immanent within the novel as well as the film. The freedom that Sarah presents creates <em>gaps in time</em> and is mainly <em>freedom from time</em>. From an exterior perspective though, these art works look different. The exteriority is visualized and described by being denominated as different narrative levels. In the film Mike falls in love with Sarah as an escape from his own time, one that is characterized by more lenient moral views than those prevalent in the Victorian Age. This present-day character is not, of course, in the novel but is invented by Harold Pinter as part of a metaphor for Fowles’ metafictional stance. In the novel, freedom is partly represented by an extradiegetic narrative level and suggested in various comments made by the apparent author of the work: John Fowles. This essay highlights the contrasts between the fictive world (on a hypodiegetic level), and the real world (on a diegetic level). By doing this, this essay suggests a motive for Pinter’s “narrative innovation” as a “brilliant metaphor” for Fowles´ novel. With these contrasts we find that the restraints of a seemingly open society (the 1980s in which Pinter was writing the screenplay) are able to contain an inner, rather implicit, restraint for the individual of the 1980s. The longing for freedom is triggered as soon as man is deprived of freedom, irrespective of how and when. Sarah is an escape from Victorian Age for Charles, at the same time as she is an escape from the 1980s for Mike. On the whole, Sarah is an escape from the linearity of all time. Freedom is immanent with both of the artworks, yet they are completely different, seen from outside.</p><p> </p><p> </p>

This essay examines the adaptation of The French Lieutenant’s Woman; proclaiming that it is based on the same core of meaning as the novel. This core, or interiority, of the art work, is the freedom which Sarah Woodruff presents. The interiority is immanent within the novel as well as the film. The freedom that Sarah presents creates gaps in time and is mainly freedom from time. From an exterior perspective though, these art works look different. The exteriority is visualized and described by being denominated as different narrative levels. In the film Mike falls in love with Sarah as an escape from his own time, one that is characterized by more lenient moral views than those prevalent in the Victorian Age. This present-day character is not, of course, in the novel but is invented by Harold Pinter as part of a metaphor for Fowles’ metafictional stance. In the novel, freedom is partly represented by an extradiegetic narrative level and suggested in various comments made by the apparent author of the work: John Fowles. This essay highlights the contrasts between the fictive world (on a hypodiegetic level), and the real world (on a diegetic level). By doing this, this essay suggests a motive for Pinter’s “narrative innovation” as a “brilliant metaphor” for Fowles´ novel. With these contrasts we find that the restraints of a seemingly open society (the 1980s in which Pinter was writing the screenplay) are able to contain an inner, rather implicit, restraint for the individual of the 1980s. The longing for freedom is triggered as soon as man is deprived of freedom, irrespective of how and when. Sarah is an escape from Victorian Age for Charles, at the same time as she is an escape from the 1980s for Mike. On the whole, Sarah is an escape from the linearity of all time. Freedom is immanent with both of the artworks, yet they are completely different, seen from outside.

Après une intrusion chaotique dans la théorie de la responsabilité pénale, l’imputabilité peut aujourd’hui apparaître comme une donnée d’essence classique. Elle répond à une définition subjective faisant consensus en doctrine et supposant l’addition du discernement et d’une volonté libre de l’agent. Dans le prolongement, elle est unanimement entendue comme constituant le fondement de la responsabilité pénale. Cependant, la cohabitation entre les différentes conditions de la responsabilité pénale, en particulier entre les concepts de culpabilité et d’imputabilité, n’est peut-être pas aussi pacifiée qu’il n’y paraît. En réalité, la question de l’indépendance des notions n’a jamais été clairement résolue, car leurs composantes respectives participent des conditions subjectives à l’engagement de la responsabilité pénale. Pourtant, la question est loin d’être anecdotique, en particulier si l’on considère certaines institutions fondamentales du droit pénal, au rang desquelles figurent les notions d’infraction et de complicité. Il apparaît ainsi, à l’analyse, que la définition traditionnelle de l’imputabilité mérite quelques ajustements, conduisant à une reconfiguration du champ de la condition de liberté relevant de l’imputabilité. Cette recherche vise aussi à établir que l’imputabilité est une donnée étrangère à l’infraction concrètement commise. Cette place spécifique au sein de la responsabilité pénale, mettant en évidence le lien entre l’imputabilité et la sanction infligée en rétribution de l’infraction commise, permet d’adopter une vision plus large du concept, susceptible d’affronter le bouleversement consécutif à l’entrée du droit pénal dans l’ère de la post-modernité. Cette dernière, que l’on pourrait associer au néopositivisme pénal du début du siècle, s’est accompagnée d’une résurgence des concepts de risque et de dangerosité. L’impact de cette évolution sur l’imputabilité peut apparaître radical : rupture du caractère unitaire de la notion, émergence du concept d’imputation à l’égard des personnes morales, voire même effacement pur et simple de l’imputabilité à l’égard des personnes physiques. Pourtant, des modalités de restauration de l’exigence d’imputabilité seront envisagées sur les terrains substantiel, par le truchement de l’imputabilité comprise comme capacité pénale, et processuel – par des propositions concernant les procédures pensées en considération de la psychologie de l’agent. Au bout du compte, il apparaît que l’imputabilité est de nature à jouer un rôle décisif dans l’organisation d’une cohabitation raisonnée avec le concept de dangerosité, en condamnant la prise en compte de la dangerosité seulement hypothétique sans exclure la possibilité d’une rétention après la peine. / After a chaotic intrusion in the theory of penal liability, imputability can today appear as a classical notion. The general doctrinal consensus is that it depends on a subjective definition, implying the offender’s discernment and free will. Moreover, the notion of imputability is unanimously considered as the basis of penal liability. However, cohabitation between the various conditions of penal liability, particularly between the concepts of guilt and imputability, may not be as steady as it seems. Indeed, the independence of these notions has actually never been clearly demonstrated, for their respective components represent the subjective conditions creating penal liability. Nevertheless, this topic is far from being anecdotal, specifically among several fundamental institutions of criminal Law, in which the notions of infraction and complicity are involved. Thus, the definition of imputability may deserve some adjustments, and imply, consequently, a reworking of the release condition coming under imputability. This study also aims at proving that imputability is an irrelevant element to the concretely committed offence. This specific part in penal liability, highlighting the link between imputability and the penalty imposed in response to the committed offence, enables a wider vision of the concept that could help facing the upheaval resulting from the entry of criminal Law in the post-modernity era. The latter, that one could associate with the beginning of the century’s penal neopositivism, also implied the resurgence of the concepts of risk and dangerousness. The impact of this evolution about imputability may seem radical : end of the unitary aspect of the notion, emergence of the concept of imputation towards legal entities, and even total erasure of imputability towards natural persons. And yet, some solutions to the reconstitution of the exigence of imputability will be developed, not only in a substantial approach, where imputability will be understood as penal capacity, but also in a procedural approach – thanks to suggestions of procedures taking the offender’s psyche into account. In the end, imputability seems to play a major part in the organization of a balanced cohabitation with the concept of dangerousness, by condemning a strictly hypothetical consideration of dangerousness, without excluding a potential reservation after the penalty.