Constitutional amendments in federal political systems have to be negotiated between national and sub-national actors. While theories of negotiation usually explain the outcome by looking at these actors, their preferences and bargaining powers, the theoretical model developed in this article also includes their interaction orientation. The article determines a typical sequence of bargaining and arguing and identifies favourable conditions for cooperation based on different interaction orientations. The article states that actors can reconcile the conflicting logics of intergovernmental or party competition and joint decision-making in constitutional politics through a sequence of bargaining and arguing. However, constitutional amendments negotiated in this way run the risk of undermining the legitimacy and functionality of constitutions.

Staatliche Innovationsförderung erklärt Firmen, besonders kleinere Unternehmen, die Hindernissen zur Innovationstätigkeitgegenüberstehen, zu unterstützen. Frühere Studien haben gezeigt, dass staatliche Programme diese Ziele nicht erreichen. Aber in der Vergangenheit wurde hierbei selten die Differenzierung unterschiedlicher politischer Ebenen analysiert. Dieses Projekt analysiert deshalb die unterschiedlichen Eigenschaften von geförderten Firmen, die entweder von der regionalen, der nationalen oder der europäischen Ebene unterstützt wurden und verknüpft dies mit der theoretischen Literatur und Erkenntnissen zu Föderalismus. Die Evaluation nutzt dabei zuerst Daten des Mannheimer Innovation Panel für die Untersuchung in Deutschland und später Daten der Community Innovation Survey für die Untersuchung in Europa. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die drei verschiedenen Ebenen der Förderung Unternehmen mit unterschiedlichen Charakteristika erreichen. Die regionale Ebene in föderalen und semiföderalen Ländern erreicht dabei KMU als Unternehmen mit Problemen bei der Innovationstätigkeit signifikant besser als andere Ebenen dies tun. Aber die Effektivität der staatlichen Innovationsförderung ist nach der Analyse sehr zweifelhaft. Deshalb muss seitens der Politik ein Zielkonflikt zwischen einer größeren Vielfalt an geförderten Firmen und höherer Effektivität der Förderung berücksichtigt werden.

Constitutional amendments in federal political systems have to be negotiated between national and sub-national actors. While theories of negotiation usually explain the outcome by looking at these actors, their preferences and bargaining powers, the theoretical model developed in this article also includes their interaction orientation. The article determines a typical sequence of bargaining and arguing and identifies favourable conditions for cooperation based on different interaction orientations. The article states that actors can reconcile the conflicting logics of intergovernmental or party competition and joint decision-making in constitutional politics through a sequence of bargaining and arguing. However, constitutional amendments negotiated in this way run the risk of undermining the legitimacy and functionality of constitutions.

This habilitation thesis consists of seven published journal articles and one published book chapter. Part I, consisting of chapter 1, introduces the overarching theme of environmental policy instruments and discusses the current use of and prospects for economic instruments in conservation policies. A number of research gaps are identified which are addressed in the subsequent chapters. Part II, consisting of chapters 2–5, encompasses four papers focused on a single type of policy instrument: intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Although well documented in public finance literature, intergovernmental fiscal transfers remain a somewhat neglected instrument in environmental policy. Despite being well suited to address the spillover benefits that often accrue with conservation policies, there is scant research literature on ecological fiscal transfers compared to other economic instruments such as environmental taxes or tradable permits. In fact, very few countries make practical use of them to achieve conservation objectives. Thus intergovernmental fiscal transfers are an innovative instrument in conservation policies in particular, so that advances in both theory and applied research may prove especially beneficial here. Part III, consisting of chapters 6–9, combines a number of articles in integrative biodiversity research and applied biodiversity governance, themes that are often neglected in the economic analysis of environmental policy instruments. However, when implementing policy instruments in societal settings, interdisciplinary research bridging the natural and social sciences is as much a prerequisite as policy-relevant research that responds to the needs of decision makers and other stakeholders. Both policy design and policy evaluation yield the best outcomes when they involve ecologists, economists, legal and other social scientists, as this ensures that consideration is given to ecological effectiveness, economic efficiency, administrative feasibility, social acceptance, and perception by stakeholders. Policy-relevant research also responds to current societal developments and prospective changes in legislation which may provide windows of opportunity to propose new instruments. Meanwhile, sound empirical research and case study design are indispensable in making concrete policy recommendations, taking into account existing formal and informal institutions.

This habilitation thesis consists of seven published journal articles and one published book chapter. Part I, consisting of chapter 1, introduces the overarching theme of environmental policy instruments and discusses the current use of and prospects for economic instruments in conservation policies. A number of research gaps are identified which are addressed in the subsequent chapters. Part II, consisting of chapters 2–5, encompasses four papers focused on a single type of policy instrument: intergovernmental fiscal transfers. Although well documented in public finance literature, intergovernmental fiscal transfers remain a somewhat neglected instrument in environmental policy. Despite being well suited to address the spillover benefits that often accrue with conservation policies, there is scant research literature on ecological fiscal transfers compared to other economic instruments such as environmental taxes or tradable permits. In fact, very few countries make practical use of them to achieve conservation objectives. Thus intergovernmental fiscal transfers are an innovative instrument in conservation policies in particular, so that advances in both theory and applied research may prove especially beneficial here. Part III, consisting of chapters 6–9, combines a number of articles in integrative biodiversity research and applied biodiversity governance, themes that are often neglected in the economic analysis of environmental policy instruments. However, when implementing policy instruments in societal settings, interdisciplinary research bridging the natural and social sciences is as much a prerequisite as policy-relevant research that responds to the needs of decision makers and other stakeholders. Both policy design and policy evaluation yield the best outcomes when they involve ecologists, economists, legal and other social scientists, as this ensures that consideration is given to ecological effectiveness, economic efficiency, administrative feasibility, social acceptance, and perception by stakeholders. Policy-relevant research also responds to current societal developments and prospective changes in legislation which may provide windows of opportunity to propose new instruments. Meanwhile, sound empirical research and case study design are indispensable in making concrete policy recommendations, taking into account existing formal and informal institutions.