Cette thèse explore les stratégies financières et organisationnelles adoptées par les petites et moyennes entreprises (PME) qui leur permettent de concilier croissance et indépendance. Les quatre chapitres apportent des contributions théoriques et empiriques à cette question. Le premier chapitre teste le lien entre contrôle familial et croissance sur un large échantillon de PME françaises. Le lien négatif entre contrôle familial et croissance s’explique par le fait que les entreprises familiales adoptent un comportement de croissance particulier consistant à créer un réservoir de fonds propres. Le second chapitre développe un modèle théorique afin d’expliquer ce comportement. Le cadre théorique fournit une explication au comportement patient des PME familiales et démontre que la constitution de réserves de trésorerie est une politique rationnelle et optimale en présence d’opportunités de croissance illiquides. Le troisième chapitre interroge les avantages et les coûts de la constitution d’un groupe de PME en utilisant une base de données sur les liens entre entreprises françaises. La constitution d’un groupe de PME est une stratégie organisationnelle qui favorise la croissance des entreprises affiliées au groupe et la croissance globale du groupe, en raison de l’efficience du marché interne des groupes de PME. Le dernier chapitre traite de la question des motivations de l’entrepreneur à créer un groupe de PME. Les observations corroborent l’hypothèse d’immunisation. La structuration sous forme de groupe de PME a pour objectif de limiter l’exposition du patrimoine de l’entrepreneur au risque de son activité, et non d’exproprier les actionnaires minoritaires. This thesis explores the financial and organizational strategies adopted by small businesses in order to conciliate growth and independence. The four chapters present theoretical and empirical contributions to this issue. The first chapter tests the relationship between family control and growth on a large sample of French small businesses. The negative relationship between family control and growth relates to the fact that family controlled small businesses have a higher propensity to adopt patient growth behavior. The second chapter presents a theoretical framework that explains why small businesses hold large amount of cash. The model demonstrates why small businesses, with illiquid growth opportunities, need constituting capital in advance to maintain their growth capacity. The third chapter investigates whether small business groups (SBG) are an organizational strategy that promotes growth. The results show that grouping small businesses promotes small business development, because SBGs improve capital allocation. The last chapter explores entrepreneur motivation to grow the business by building a SBG. According to the results SBGs are built in order to immunize entrepreneur wealth exposure to the business risk, not to increase entrepreneur private benefits of control.

A large number of firms around the world are family firms. Many of these family firms are involved in internationalization strategies. Despite the breadth of knowledge on the internationalization of large family firms, not enough attention has been paid to some of the aspects of internationalization. Specifically, the literature is scarce with respect to understanding the mechanisms that may help or harm family firms in their internationalization strategies and the impact of these strategies on firm performance. In my dissertation, I use property rights theory to argue that family firms are able to minimize their negotiating and policing costs, allowing them to benefit from internationalization, but not in all environments. I add to the literature by further finding that family firms internationalize more in environments that have lower levels of legal and political, physical, and intellectual property rights. Also, I find that family firms experience higher performance in environments that have lower levels of property rights protection. Therefore, this dissertation creates various avenues for future research, and provides more evidence toward the superiority of family firms in some, but not all environments.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2018-09-25T16:41:47Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Estevo Mateus Olesiak_.pdf: 1287399 bytes, checksum: ba171ae27ae9275a5cb985d6d58d263b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-09-25T16:41:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Estevo Mateus Olesiak_.pdf: 1287399 bytes, checksum: ba171ae27ae9275a5cb985d6d58d263b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-04-24 / Nenhuma / Este estudo objetivou analisar a relação entre o controle familiar e a manutenção do posicionamento estratégico em empresas listadas na BM&FBovespa. Para isso, realizou-se um levantamento nos Relatórios de Administração (RA), Formulários de Referência e Demonstrações Financeiras do exercício de 2002 a 2016 de 110 companhias de setores diversos, bem como levantamento do controle familiar disponibilizados pelas mesmas. Para a categorização dos dados dos RA, utilizou-se relação de categorias e subcategorias com base nos posicionamentos estratégicos custo e diferenciação, já validadas em estudos anteriores, por meio da Técnica Delphi. Os discursos sobre estratégia e nível de controle familiar, depois de categorizados, foram analisados por meio de análise de correlação de Spearman e o teste de Kruskal-Wallis. Os resultados permitem considerar a não comprovação da hipótese central da pesquisa, pois se esperava correlação negativa entre as variáveis, de forma que quanto maior a inserção familiar no controle, menor a variação entre estratégias, o que não ocorreu. Inobstante, os resultados demonstraram uma correlação positiva, porém fraca, entre controle familiar e a variação do discurso entre estratégias. A análise por setor novamente não comprovou a hipótese em algum setor, contudo, reafirmou os achados na análise geral. A existência de tal correlação positiva sugere duas interpretações: primeiramente a existência de trocas geracionais no controle e/ou gestão das empresas familiares, que podem incentivar mudanças nas estratégias como já sugerem estudos anteriores. A segunda interpretação considera que a menor burocracia em empresas familiares possibilita famílias interferirem nos relatórios de administração a fim de justificar variações em índices econômicos e/ou financeiros em nome da manutenção da imagem/reputação da organização, o que reafirma, em parte, a visão de longo prazo, e maior interesse na imagem, e continuidade do negócio familiar. Ademais os resultados imediatos pesquisados propiciam outras contribuições, como a correlação negativa entre “controle estatal” e “variação do discurso entre estratégias”, demonstrando que quanto maior o controle estatal, menor a variação do discurso entre estratégias. Outras contribuições demonstram haver correlação negativa entre controle familiar e o discurso total nos 15 anos, evidenciando que quanto maior o controle familiar menor a quantidade de discurso de estratégia no decorrer dos anos. / This study aimed to analyze the relationship between family control and the maintenance of strategic positioning in companies listed on BM & FBovespa. For this purpose, a survey was carried out in the Management Reports (RA), Reference Forms and Financial Statements for the financial year 2002 to 2016 of 110 companies from various sectors, as well as a survey of the family control provided by them. For the categorization of RA data, a list of categories and subcategories was used based on the strategic positions cost and differentiation, already validated in previous studies, through the Delphi Technique. The speeches on family strategy and level of control, after categorized, were analyzed using Spearman's correlation analysis and the Kruskal-Wallis test. The results allow to consider the non-proof of the central hypothesis of the research, since it was expected negative correlation between the variables, so that the higher the family insertion in the control, the lower the variation between strategies, which did not occur. Nonetheless, the results showed a positive but weak correlation between family control and speech variation between strategies. The analysis by sector again did not prove the hypothesis in any sector, however, it reaffirmed the findings in the overall analysis. The existence of such a positive correlation suggests two interpretations: first, the existence of generational exchanges in the control and / or management of family businesses, which may encourage changes in strategies as already suggested in previous studies. The second interpretation considers that the lower bureaucracy in family businesses enables families to interfere in management reports to justify changes in economic and / or financial indices in the name of maintaining the image / reputation of the institution. This reaffirms, in part, the long-term vision, and greater interest in the image, and continuity of the family business. In addition to the immediate results, the research provides other contributions, such as the negative correlation between "state control" and "variation of the discourse between strategies", demonstrating that the greater the state control, the less the variation of the discourse between strategies. Other contributions show a negative correlation between family control and total speech in 15 years, evidencing that the higher the family control the less the amount of strategy speech over the years.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:26:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Matheus Fernandes Junior.pdf: 862744 bytes, checksum: 7ae0f1de3ba158af12066864631a3dad (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-02-10 / Fundo Mackenzie de Pesquisa / Family control and management can be considered efficient and beneficial to corporate performance by reducing conflicts between shareholders and managers, lowering administrative myopia, reducing information asymmetry and profiting from social and political family influence. On the other hand, they may also be inefficient and harmful to performance by bringing conflicts between majority and minority shareholders, by being subject to nepotism and particularism, by obstructing takeovers and by extending family conflicts into the firm. It ends in doubts about positive, negative or null correlation of family control and management and corporate performance. This study investigated this issue, bringing two main contributions: the analysis of family or individual control, founding family control and founder CEO administration and its relation with performance for the Brazilian environment, and the deployment of a specific measurement index for corporate governance, which is usually approached via proxies in existing literature. Empirical analysis evaluating the performance of 230 companies with higher liquidity (on the Sao Paulo stock exchange BM&FBOVESPA) in the years of 2006, 2007 and 2008 and evaluated taking into consideration family control, founding family control and CEO position occupied by the person who founded the company (CEO founder). They were compared with control groups without such characteristics. Econometric models showed no evidence of different market performance for family or founding family control. However, CEO founder showed superior market performance compared with non CEO founder firms. Operational performance measured by accountancy parameters of family controlled, founding family controlled and founder CEO managed companies was lower than operational performance of other companies. Such results differ from the ones obtained in the US and Western Europe, which showed both superior market and operational performance for family, founding family control and founder CEO administration. / As estruturas de controle e administração familiares são apontadas, por um lado, como eficientes e benéficas ao desempenho das empresas pelo seu potencial de redução de conflitos entre acionistas e administradores, menor miopia administrativa, reduzida assimetria de informação e possível influência social e política das famílias, entre outros fatores. Por outro, são apontadas como estruturas prejudiciais ao desempenho, por serem fonte de conflitos entre os acionistas majoritários e minoritários, estarem sujeitas ao nepotismo e particularismo, pela inibição de takeovers, por estenderem os conflitos familiares à empresa e assim por diante. As conclusões sobre a correlação (positiva, negativa ou inexistente) destes fatores com o desempenho das empresas seguem dúbias. Este trabalho investigou esta questão, trazendo duas contribuições principais: o estudo da relação entre controle familiar ou individual, famílias fundadoras e administração do fundador no contexto nacional e o uso de um índice específico para a medida da governança corporativa como variável de controle, o qual usualmente é tratado pela literatura estrangeira através de proxies. Na análise empírica foi investigado o desempenho das 230 empresas mais líquidas listadas na BM&FBOVESPA, nos anos de 2006, 2007 e 2008 frente ao controle familiar, ao controle da família fundadora da empresa e ao fato do cargo de CEO ser ocupado pela pessoa que fundou a firma, comparandoas aos grupos de controle não familiares ou não geridos pelo fundador. Modelos econométricos indicaram que, sob o ponto de vista de mercado, não há evidências claras de diferenças de desempenho entre empresas cujo controle é familiar ou individual e das famílias fundadoras e as empresas em geral. Já as empresas administradas pelo fundador (CEO fundador) apresentaram desempenho de mercado (Valor de Mercado sobre o Valor Contábil e Q de Tobin) superior às demais. Por outro lado, o desempenho operacional, medido por critérios contábeis, foi menor para o controle familiar, da família fundadora e para a administração do CEO fundador, comparado às empresas em geral. Os resultados referentes ao desempenho operacional diferem dos obtidos em estudos realizados nos Estados Unidos e Europa Ocidental que apontam relações positivas entre o desempenho de mercado e operacional - e o controle e administração familiares.

本文主要分別探討家族控制、負債與高階經營團隊薪酬的關係。實證結果發現，根據利益一致效果，家族企業通常會發放較少變動薪酬給高階經營團隊。然而，當家族企業偏離問題較嚴重，且由家族成員擔任高階經理人時，則會支付較高變動薪酬給家族高階經營團隊，此種現象在非電子業中尤為明顯。本文亦探討負債與薪酬的關係，結果發現，負債與高階經營團隊薪酬呈非線性關係，再將負債進一步細分，發現長期銀行負債對薪酬的監督效果高於短期銀行負債及一般公司債。本文也發現相較於非家族企業，負債對高階經營團隊薪酬的監督效果在家族企業中較弱。 / This paper investigates the variable compensation of top management teams. Prior literature suggests that compensation policy can help firms reduce the agency problem between principals and agents. Most of these studies, however, emphasize the agency problem between shareholders and managers, and only a few examine those between controlling and minority shareholders and between shareholders and debtholders. This study investigates the effects of family control and debt on top management compensation, respectively. The empirical results show that, on average, family-controlled firms are associated with a lower proportion of variable compensation, which is consistent with the alignment effect. However, family-controlled firms with greater control divergence and whose CEO is a family member, which gives rise to a central agency problem, pay higher variable compensation to family top management, as evident in the non-electronic industry. Furthermore, the empirical results find a U-shaped relationship between debt and top management compensation. In addition, the monitoring effect of long-term bank debt on top management compensation is greater than that of short-term bank debt and common bond. Finally, the monitoring effect of debt on top management compensation is weaker in family-controlled firms than in non-family-controlled firms.

企業自願性盈餘預測屬資訊公開體系的一環，我國相關法令雖要求自願性盈餘預測必須於發布後二日公告，並經會計師核閱，且錯誤超過盈餘之20%必須要強制修正，但是實務上企業管理者常游走法律邊緣，而主管機關也沒有嚴格執法，使得公司盈餘預測常被詬病，甚至有淪為股票炒作工具之說，嚴重損害投資人的利益，這樣的現象或許可以透過規範董事會的組成進而強化公司監管的機制來獲得解決。先前有關盈餘預測的研究並沒有將公司監管機制以及董事會中的家族因素納入考量，因此，本研究試圖以公司監管的角度出發，並加入家族因素，以橫斷面迴歸分析的方法，探討一般董事會結構及公司監管機制（自變數）與自願性盈餘預測行為（應變數）之關聯性。 在自變數中，一般董事會結構方面除了包括董事會持股比例外，尚採用Cubbin and Leech（1983）的表決機率模型，做為家族企業判斷的依據，以便將家族因素納入考量，而公司監理機制方面則包括非關係企業法人董事、法人投資機構以及法人以外第二勢力等三項。在應變數中，本研究將應變數依照是否發布自願性盈餘預測、自願性盈餘預測發布次數以及自願性盈餘預測發布準確性等，分為三個主題依序探討。研究結論如下： 1.董事會持股愈高，企業愈不會發布自願性盈餘預測，一旦發布，錯誤的機會較高。 2.家族愈能掌控董事會時，企業愈有發布自願性盈餘預測的意願，一旦發布，修正的機會並不高。而家族企業中，家族持股愈高時，發布自願性盈餘預測的意願愈強烈，但是準確性也愈低。 3.董事會中法人第二勢力存在（非關係企業法人持股大於3%），同時持股較高時，會提高企業對外發布自願性盈餘預測的意願，其修正預測的機會比較低。 4.董事會中法人以外第二勢力存在，同時持有股數較高時，愈會降低自願性盈餘預測修正的機會，而盈餘預測準確性也會比較高。 5.公司董事會被家族所掌控時，在第一次盈餘預測發布時，較有可能發布比實際情況樂觀的盈餘預測，而公司當年度有好消息或是規模較大時，也較可能發布比實際情況樂觀的盈餘預測。至於負債比率較大的公司，發布盈餘預測的態度反而比較保守，較可能出現低估的情形。

Cette thèse explore les stratégies financières et organisationnelles adoptées par les petites et moyennes entreprises (PME) qui leur permettent de concilier croissance et indépendance. Les quatre chapitres apportent des contributions théoriques et empiriques à cette question. Le premier chapitre teste le lien entre contrôle familial et croissance sur un large échantillon de PME françaises. Le lien négatif entre contrôle familial et croissance s’explique par le fait que les entreprises familiales adoptent un comportement de croissance particulier consistant à créer un réservoir de fonds propres. Le second chapitre développe un modèle théorique afin d’expliquer ce comportement. Le cadre théorique fournit une explication au comportement patient des PME familiales et démontre que la constitution de réserves de trésorerie est une politique rationnelle et optimale en présence d’opportunités de croissance illiquides. Le troisième chapitre interroge les avantages et les coûts de la constitution d’un groupe de PME en utilisant une base de données sur les liens entre entreprises françaises. La constitution d’un groupe de PME est une stratégie organisationnelle qui favorise la croissance des entreprises affiliées au groupe et la croissance globale du groupe, en raison de l’efficience du marché interne des groupes de PME. Le dernier chapitre traite de la question des motivations de l’entrepreneur à créer un groupe de PME. Les observations corroborent l’hypothèse d’immunisation. La structuration sous forme de groupe de PME a pour objectif de limiter l’exposition du patrimoine de l’entrepreneur au risque de son activité, et non d’exproprier les actionnaires minoritaires.<p><p>This thesis explores the financial and organizational strategies adopted by small businesses in order to conciliate growth and independence. The four chapters present theoretical and empirical contributions to this issue. The first chapter tests the relationship between family control and growth on a large sample of French small businesses. The negative relationship between family control and growth relates to the fact that family controlled small businesses have a higher propensity to adopt patient growth behavior. The second chapter presents a theoretical framework that explains why small businesses hold large amount of cash. The model demonstrates why small businesses, with illiquid growth opportunities, need constituting capital in advance to maintain their growth capacity. The third chapter investigates whether small business groups (SBG) are an organizational strategy that promotes growth. The results show that grouping small businesses promotes small business development, because SBGs improve capital allocation. The last chapter explores entrepreneur motivation to grow the business by building a SBG. According to the results SBGs are built in order to immunize entrepreneur wealth exposure to the business risk, not to increase entrepreneur private benefits of control. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Les sociétés familiales sont les plus anciennes, les plus nombreuses et les plus importantes de notre économie. Pourtant, elles ne font l’objet d’aucune définition légale et n’ont que rarement suscité l’intérêt du juriste. Nous avons donc cherché à caractériser la société familiale en nous intéressant plus particulièrement à certaines d’entre elles, les sociétés cotées sur le marché financier. La société cotée familiale combine deux univers, la famille et le marché, qui sont fondés sur des valeurs et des modes de fonctionnement diamétralement opposés. Cette opposition nous permet de mieux distinguer les spécificités, mais également les risques attachés aux sociétés familiales. C’est à travers l’exemple des chaebol, des conglomérats familiaux coréens, que cette étude a été menée. L’analyse emprunte une méthode comparative où les sociétés chaebol sont opposées aux sociétés familiales françaises. Notre étude a permis de mettre en évidence l’impact du contrôle familial sur le fonctionnement de la société cotée. Elle souligne également l’échec relatif du transfert des normes américaines dans l’environnement coréen, confirmant ainsi la théorie de la dépendance au sentier. Parallèlement, cette étude invite à réfléchir sur la réception possible du droit français, plus proche de la réalité coréenne / Family-owned companies contribute the largest share to our economy. Yet, there is still no legal definition of what a family-owned company is and the topic has not drawn a lot of interest from legal academics. This study aims at differentiating family-owned companies by focusing more specifically on companies listed on a financial market. Family-owned listed company combines two worlds, family and financial market, which are based on diametrically opposed values and modus operandi. This conflict helps us to understand the specific features of these companies, as well as the risks attached to them. Taking the example of the chaebol, the Korean family-owned conglomerates, we highlighted the impact of the family control on the management and the governance of these groups. We compared French and Korean companies and legal frameworks, drawing the conclusion that the French legal system might have been a better fit to the Korean environment than American rules. Our research also underlines the relative failure of the transplant of U.S. standards in South Korea, which can be explained by the theory of path dependence.