Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duquesne University, 2005. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 213-219) and index.

Zugl.: München, Techn. Univ., Diss., 2009

Diss.--Fachbereich Germanistik--Berlin--Freie Universität, 1993. / Bibliogr. p. 227-238.

The Fitchean Project of a Penal Right Independent from Ethics. in this paper I intend to examine the Fitchean Project of building a theory of right independent from ethics, especially in the sphere of penal right. I consider that the ideas of atonement for pure and applied right are different. This difference responds to the psychological and moral presuppositions of each and puts the internal consistency of the theory into checkmate. / En este trabajo me propongo examinar el proyecto fichteano de construir una teoría del derecho independiente de la ética, en especial en el ámbito del derecho penal. Considero que la idea de expiación del derecho puro y el aplicado son diferentes, en razón de los supuestos psicológico-morales de cada una, lo cual pone en jaque la consistencia interna de la teoría.

Orientador: Marcos Lutz Muller / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-27T01:06:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tomioka_SergioLuis_M.pdf: 11124015 bytes, checksum: 7d9fd848d49240cc6b69e5b1b19f39e1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2000 / Resumo: Essa dissertação tem como tema a questão do princípio da ciência filosófica na obra hegeliana. O intuito da dissertação é mostrar que esse problema é uma preocupação perene na obra madura de Regel, desde o período em que o autor ministrava aulas na Universidade de Iena, nos inícios do século dezenove, até as últimas formulações do sistema, trinta anos depois. Esse problema é retomado nas interpretações do sistema hegeliano, tanto nas mais recentes como naquelas de seus discípulos e adversários, durante todo o século dezenove. Para mostrar como esse problema é tratado no período ienense, analisa-se um texto de 1801, A Diferença entre os sistemas de filosofia de Fichte e de Schelling, procurando por um lado relacioná-lo com as questões pós-kantianas da época, bem como com suas relações com o resto do sistema hegeliano posterior / Abstract: This dissertation focuses the problem of the begining of Science, considered from a hegelianpoint of view, that means, from a logic-speculative point of view. The intention is to show that this question is a long-term preocupation in Reger' s work. From his Iena-period until the last formulationsof his sistem, the question of how to make the begining of the philosophie appear. The critics and disciples contemporary to him and his modern commentators debate this theme of Regel' s work, as well. The problem has two main sides, one is to know how one counscience an approach that speeulative (philosophieal) point of view, and the other to know how do the speculative Science must beginn. To present this aspects of the so called Iena-period of Regel, is our intention to analyse the Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie (The diference between the systems of philosophy of Fichte and of Schelling) and to conect it with the pos-kantian discussion of the begining of the XIXth century, as with the rest of Regel' s philosophical Sistem / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosofía

The aim of this PhD project was to transfer the remarkable mechanical properties of compression wood to technical applications. Compression wood can be strongly deformed because of its high cellulose microfibril angle and allows permanent plastic deformation without significant damage. These special features of compression wood make this material particularly suitable for the three-dimensional processing of veneers. By applying advanced technologies high deformation levels were achieved. / Das Anliegen dieses Promotionsprojektes bestand in der Überführung der beachtenswerten mechanischen Eigenschaften von Druckholz in eine technische Anwendung. Druckholz kann aufgrund seines großen Cellulose-Mikrofibrillenwinkels stark verformt werden und erlaubt eine permanente plastische Verformung ohne signifikante Materialschädigung. Insbesondere diese Eigenschaften lassen Furniere aus Druckholz für eine dreidimensionale Verarbeitung geeignet erscheinen und führen unter Verwendung neuartiger Verformungstechnologien zu hohen Verformungsgraden.

Déjà en son temps, les contemporains de Fichte ne s’entendaient pas sur l’esprit de sa philosophie et encore aujourd’hui la plupart de ses interprètes ont produit à son sujet des explications éloignées les unes des autres. Dans ce mémoire, notre recherche se donnera pour point de départ cette diversité des interprétations de la philosophie de Fichte dans la Doctrine de la science de 1794 (Grundlage). Nous proposerons de montrer que les divergences d’interprétations de cette doctrine sont dues en partie au fait que le mode de réfutation de Fichte n’a pas été suffisamment pris en compte. Si ses écrits paraissent sans cesse adopter différents camps, ce n’est pas parce qu’il les adopte, mais bien parce qu’il les problématise et les évalue à l’aune de sa propre méthode. Le chapitre 1 aura pour but d’identifier les notions les plus essentielles de la Grundlage. Pour ce faire, nous contextualiserons le développement de la pensée de Fichte depuis le début de l’Aufklärung jusqu’au post-kantisme, car nous pensons qu’en cette période se profile une méthode d’héritage sceptique, qui permet non seulement d’expliquer la nature du transcendantal, mais aussi les sources de la spécificité méthodologique de Fichte. La généalogie de ces notions nous permettra de comprendre dans le chapitre 2 comment Fichte les unifie dans un système et, dans le chapitre 3, comment il les intègre sous la méthode de réfutation que nous nommerons rétorsion apagogique, et qui consiste à s’approprier le discours de ses adversaires tout en prouvant leur contradiction. Enfin, le chapitre 4 illustrera cette méthode par le dépassement du criticisme où il s’agit pour Fichte de penser avec et contre Kant. / Already in his time, Fichte’s contemporaries disagreed about the spirit of his philosophy, and even today most of his interpreters have produced explanations of it that are far from each other. In this thesis, my research will take as its starting point this large range of interpretations of Fichte’s philosophy in the Science of Knowledge of 1794 (Grundlage). I will propose to demonstrate that the divergent interpretations of this doctrine are partly due to the fact that Fichte’s mode of refutation shows lack of sufficient consideration. If his writings seem to adopt different sides, it is not because he embraces them, but because he calls them into question and evaluates them according to his own method. Chapter 1 will identify the most essential notions of the Grundlage. To do so, I will contextualize the development of Fichte’s thought from the beginning of the Aufklärung to PostKantianism, for I believe that in these times a method of skeptical inheritance emerges, which allows to explain not only the nature of the transcendental, but also the sources of Fichte’s methodological specificity. The genealogy of these notions will allow understanding in Chapter 2 how Fichte unifies them in a system and, in Chapter 3, how he integrates them under the method of refutation that we will call apagogic retorsion, which consists in appropriating the discourse of his opponents while proving their contradiction. Finally, Chapter 4 will illustrate this method through the overcoming of criticalism where Fichte has to think with and against Kant.

Déjà en son temps, les contemporains de Fichte ne s'entendaient pas sur l'esprit de sa philosophie et encore aujourd'hui la plupart de ses interprètes ont produit à son sujet des explications éloignées les unes des autres. Dans ce mémoire, notre recherche se donnera pour point de départ cette diversité des interprétations de la philosophie de Fichte dans la Doctrine de la science de 1794 (Grundlage). Nous proposerons de montrer que les divergences d'interprétations de cette doctrine sont dues en partie au fait que le mode de réfutation de Fichte n'a pas été suffisamment pris en compte. Si ses écrits paraissent sans cesse adopter différents camps, ce n'est pas parce qu'il les adopte, mais bien parce qu'il les problématise et les évalue à l'aune de sa propre méthode. Le chapitre 1 aura pour but d'identifier les notions les plus essentielles de la Grundlage. Pour ce faire, nous contextualiserons le développement de la pensée de Fichte depuis le début de l'Aufklärung jusqu'au post-kantisme, car nous pensons qu'en cette période se profile une méthode d'héritage sceptique, qui permet non seulement d'expliquer la nature du transcendantal, mais aussi les sources de la spécificité méthodologique de Fichte. La généalogie de ces notions nous permettra de comprendre dans le chapitre 2 comment Fichte les unifie dans un système et, dans le chapitre 3, comment il les intègre sous la méthode de réfutation que nous nommerons rétorsion apagogique, et qui consiste à s'approprier le discours de ses adversaires tout en prouvant leur contradiction. Enfin, le chapitre 4 illustrera cette méthode par le dépassement du criticisme où il s'agit pour Fichte de penser avec et contre Kant. / Already in his time, Fichte's contemporaries disagreed about the spirit of his philosophy, and even today most of his interpreters have produced explanations of it that are far from each other. In this thesis, my research will take as its starting point this large range of interpretations of Fichte's philosophy in the Science of Knowledge of 1794 (Grundlage). I will propose to demonstrate that the divergent interpretations of this doctrine are partly due to the fact that Fichte's mode of refutation shows lack of sufficient consideration. If his writings seem to adopt different sides, it is not because he embraces them, but because he calls them into question and evaluates them according to his own method. Chapter 1 will identify the most essential notions of the Grundlage. To do so, I will contextualize the development of Fichte's thought from the beginning of the Aufklärung to Post-Kantianism, for I believe that in these times a method of skeptical inheritance emerges, which allows to explain not only the nature of the transcendental, but also the sources of Fichte's methodological specificity. The genealogy of these notions will allow understanding in Chapter 2 how Fichte unifies them in a system and, in Chapter 3, how he integrates them under the method of refutation that we will call apagogic retorsion, which consists in appropriating the discourse of his opponents while proving their contradiction. Finally, Chapter 4 will illustrate this method through the overcoming of criticalism where Fichte has to think with and against Kant.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 FIL - Edson Dognaldo Gil.pdf: 1469522 bytes, checksum: 93803423295828ce6d57adf7e6ced90d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-10-19 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / The aim of this dissertation is to present and toanalyse the first principle of Fichteʹs Doctrine of Science, namely, that of the self‐position of the I, in the same way the German idealist philosopher expounds it in the firstparagraph of his masterpiece Grundlage der gesammten issenschaftslehre [Foundation of the Entire Doctrine of Scientific Knowledge], published in 1794‐1795. The historical presentation situates Fichteʹs issue in the context of the modern philosophy in general, and of German idealism in particular. Remarks are provided on the relation and mutual influence of German thinkers, especially on the continuity between the transcendental philosophy of Kant and that of Fichte, pointing out, however, the originality of the project of the Doctrine of Science. Some attention is also given to the current state of the Fichte‐Forschung. The systematic analysis, wish constitutes the core of the work, concentrates on the thorough reading of the first paragraph of the Grundlage, pointing out its implications to the question of the relation between being and thinking, morespecifically, the respective transcendental transformation of the Cartesian cogito. Thus, the I, in so far as it is (characterized as) pure intelligence, is the genetic, originary and pre-predicative Act (Tathandlung). Therefore, it is previous toboth discursive thought and objective consciousness (ofa substantiated Cartesian subject), and yet it is accessible by means of an intuitive method; it is nonetheless purely intellectual and authentically meditative meditative philosophy, philosophy as art (ars). There is enclosed a reproduction of the original text of the first paragraph of the Grundlage, as well as the respective translation, of my authorship. There is also a small glossary of the most important terms used by Fichte translated from German into Portuguese / O escopo desta dissertação consiste em apresentar e analisaro chamado Primeiro Princípio da autoposição do Eu da Doutrina da Ciência de Johann Gottlieb Fichte, tal qual o idealista alemão o expõe no primeiro parágrafo de sua obra‐prima Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre als Handschriftfür seine Zuhörer [Fundamento de toda a Doutrina da Ciência como manual para seus ouvintes], publicada em 1794‐1795. A apresentação histórica visa a situar a problemáticafichteana no contexto da filosofia moderna, em geral, e, em particular, do idealismo alemão. Tecem‐se considerações sobre a relação e a influência mútua dos pensadores alemães, especialmente sobre a continuidade entre a filosofia transcendental deKant e a de Fichte, destacando‐se porém a originalidade do projeto da Doutrina da Ciência. Dedicam‐se, além disso, algumas palavras ao estado atual da Fichte‐Forschung. A análise sistemática, que constitui o cerne do trabalho, concentra‐se na leitura minuciosa do primeiro parágrafo da Grundlage, destacando‐se suas implicações no que respeita à questão da relação entre ser e pensar, mais especificamente, a respectiva transformação transcendental do cogito cartesiano. Conclui‐se que, para Fichte, o eu, enquanto inteligência pura, é Ato genético, originário (Tathandlung), pré‐predicativo e, portanto, anterior ao pensamento discursivo e à consciência objetiva (de um sujeito hipostasiado, cartesiano), ao qual se tem acesso por meio de um método intuitivo, mas puramente intelectual, autenticamente meditativo filosofia meditativa, filosofia como arte (ars). Como anexos, seguem‐se a reprodução do texto original do primeiro parágrafo da Grundlage, bem como a respectiva tradução, de minha autoria. Além disso, um pequeno vocabulário, alemão‐português, dos termos mais importantes utilizados por Fichte