This study explored the role of school-based teacher financial incentives on student academic achievement. Despite great efforts made by Zimbabwean government towards improving the education system in terms of infrastructure development and increasing number of schools, prior and after 1980, not much attention had been paid to the role of teachers’ extra-financial incentives on enhancing teacher motivation which leads to student achievement in and outside classroom situation. Extra-financial incentives differ from government to government depending on the revenue base and political will by such governments to support these teacher incentives programmes. In developed countries, respective governments pay different teacher incentives while in developing countries, parents/guardians or School Development Committees (SDCs) shoulder the burden. This study contented that one of the ways to improve student achievement has been payment of school-based teacher incentives to supplement teachers’ low salaries. While the need to adequately compensate teachers had been a worldwide phenomenon, this is in contrast to Zimbabwean experience after 2014, when Government of National Unity (GNU) came to an end. Zimbabwean government banned payment of teacher incentives under unclear reasons which were widely purported to be political. This research adopted a qualitative approach and as such, collection of primary and secondary data were done using multiple data collection techniques. Techniques included interviews with key informants, focus group discussions and open ended questionnaires in selected secondary schools. Results from this study revealed that improving teacher motivation through school-based incentives had been central to improved student achievement. In schools where teacher incentive system was practiced pass-rates increased, with a sudden decline when teacher incentives were banned. Banning or lack of properly designed incentive systems, where teachers were consulted, was seen as negatively affecting student achievement in selected secondary schools of Makoni District. / Educational Foundations / D. Ed. (Socio-Education)

This study identifies additional investment incentives, applicable to the manufacturing sector, which the South African government could introduce to encourage investors to choose the South African manufacturing sector as a desired investment destination. A comparison is made between the relevant investment incentives provided to manufacturing companies by Malaysia and Singapore and those provided by South Africa, in order to examine the similarities and differences between these incentives. In the light of these findings, recommendations are made for revised or additional investment incentives in South Africa to promote investment in South African manufacturing companies and reduce some of the barriers that prevent local and foreign investment in South Africa. / Accounting / M. Com. (Accounting)

Visselblåsarbegreppet har blivit ett allt mer frekvent förekommande inslag inom den unionsrättsliga lagstiftningen, och vikten av att beskydda arbetstagare som bistår myndigheter med information som kan stoppa överträdelser har på senare år uppmärksammats och betonats världen över. I samband med en modernisering och uppdatering av den finansmarknadsrättsliga lagstiftningen, inte minst till följd av den tekniska utvecklingen inom området, valde EU:s lagstiftande organ att göra en markering mot fysiska och juridiska personer som ägnar sig åt överträdelser som kan vilseleda aktörerna på de finansiella marknaderna. Bland annat infördes, genom ett antal nya rättsakter, enhetliga sanktioner samt minimibestämmelser för kriminalisering av vissa ageranden. Vid framtagandet av lagstiftningen diskuterades även på EU-nivå huruvida ett potentiellt införande av ekonomiska incitament för visselblåsare som bidrar med värdefull information i fråga om marknadsmissbruk borde utgöra en del av det sociala skyddet för nämnda individer. Medlemsstaterna hade redan i samband med tidigare unionsöverskridande lagstiftning ålagts att vidta särskilda åtgärder för att säkerställa att visselblåsare erhåller skydd gentemot arbetsgivare avseende hämndaktioner, men här, tydligt inspirerade av den amerikanska lagstiftningen i motsvarande område, öppnade EU för första gången för att låta unionsmedlemmarna erbjuda monetära utbetalningar till visselblåsare. I förevarande uppsats presenteras den aktuella EU-lagstiftningen samt den inhemska lagstiftning som bestämmelserna genererat i Sverige. Nämnda inslag sätts i relation till den amerikanska visselblåsarlagstiftningen. En redogörelse för lagstiftningens mottagande och effekt – kombinerat med teoretiska såväl som statistiska studier avseende ekonomiska incitament kopplat till visselblåsning – används för att besvara frågan huruvida ett införande av nämnda incitament skulle kunna utgöra ett ändamålsenligt inslag inom den svenska lagstiftningen. Min argumentation, vilken presenteras i analysdelen, utmynnar i ståndpunkten att ekonomiska incitament mycket väl skulle kunna utgöra en funktionell beståndsdel av visselblåsarskyddet, men att lagstiftningens utformning och det praktiska utförandet skulle kunna optimeras jämfört med dess amerikanska motsvarighet. Vidare vill jag i analysavsnittet betona vikten av ett skifte i inställning och attityd inom europeisk rättskultur gentemot visselblåsare.

This study identifies additional investment incentives, applicable to the manufacturing sector, which the South African government could introduce to encourage investors to choose the South African manufacturing sector as a desired investment destination. A comparison is made between the relevant investment incentives provided to manufacturing companies by Malaysia and Singapore and those provided by South Africa, in order to examine the similarities and differences between these incentives. In the light of these findings, recommendations are made for revised or additional investment incentives in South Africa to promote investment in South African manufacturing companies and reduce some of the barriers that prevent local and foreign investment in South Africa. / Accounting / M. Com. (Accounting)

This study reviews Rational Choice theory and Informal Institutions theory and uses new data to explain the persistence and scale of Argentina's informal domestic work sector. The domestic work sector in Argentina represents a typical case in Latin America: almost entirely dominated by women and high informality levels. The sector has had legal recognition for over a decade, but most of the sector's workers work under precarious conditions without access to those stipulated rights. In line with the adoption of new feminist policies during the last decade in Argentina, recent governments have brought more attention to women working in the domestic sector. This study investigates the implementation of a current financial incentive called Registradas which aims to increase registration levels in the domestic work sector. The material was collected during 29 weeks in Buenos Aires through interviews, surveys with employers, and observational studies from a Facebook group with domestic workers. The findings suggest that the two theories complement each other. Employers and employees in the domestic work sector act rationally from self-interest. However, unwritten rules, expectations of others' behavior, and perceptions of domestic work as an occupation also influence both groups' perceptions of choice and cost evaluation. These unwritten rules restrict and disadvantage employees due to power imbalances, gender norms, lack of information about their labor rights, and poverty. Finally, the study found that the program Registradas has had little effect on the sector's informality rates. The RCT suggests that the low impact could be due to formal employment not being a costly beneficial choice for the employers and neither the employees. This conclusion, however, needs to be understood in a context where labor laws and social security are not systematically and effectively enforced. Weak formal institutions thus enable a competing informal institution of informal employment and, ultimately, costs and benefits of the available choices for employers and employees. / Este estudio revisa la teoría de la Elección Racional y la teoría de las InstitucionesInformales, y utiliza nuevos datos para explicar la persistencia y la escala del sector informaldel trabajo doméstico en Argentina. El sector del trabajo doméstico en Argentina representaun caso típico en América Latina: está dominado casi en su totalidad por mujeres y presentaaltos niveles de informalidad. Aunque el sector cuenta con reconocimiento legal desde hacemás de una década, la mayoría de las trabajadoras del sector laboran en condicionesprecarias, sin acceso a los derechos estipulados. En línea con la adopción de nuevaspolíticas feministas durante la última década en Argentina, los últimos gobiernos hanprestado más atención a las mujeres que trabajan en el sector doméstico. Este estudioinvestiga la implementación del incentivo económico actual llamado Programa Registradas,el cual tiene como objetivo aumentar la formalidad del sector doméstico. El material serecopiló durante 29 semanas en Buenos Aires, mediante entrevistas, encuestas aempleadores y estudios observacionales de un grupo de Facebook con trabajadorasdomésticas. Los resultados sugieren que las dos teorías se complementan. Tanto losempleadores como los empleados del sector doméstico actúan racionalmente en función desus propios intereses. Sin embargo, las reglas no escritas, las expectativas sobre elcomportamiento de los demás y la percepción del trabajo doméstico como una ocupacióntambién influyen en la percepción de la elección y la evaluación de costos de ambos grupos.Estas reglas no escritas restringen y perjudican a las empleadas debido a los desequilibriosde poder, las normas de género, la falta de información sobre sus derechos laborales y lapobreza. Finalmente, el estudio encontró que, hasta la fecha, el Programa Registradas noha tenido ningún efecto significativo en la reducción de la tasa de informalidad del sector. Lateoría de la Elección Racional sugiere que el bajo impacto podría deberse a que el empleoformal no es una opción costosa ni beneficiosa ni para los empleadores ni para losempleados. Sin embargo, esta conclusión debe entenderse en un contexto en el que lalegislación laboral y la obra social no se aplican de forma sistemática y eficaz. La debilidadde las instituciones formales permite, por tanto, una institución informal competidora delempleo informal y, en última instancia, influye en los costos y beneficios de las opcionesdisponibles para empresarios y trabajadores.