One year after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the administration of President George W. Bush introduced a revolutionary foreign policy strategy--the Bush Doctrine. Proponents of this strategy advocated the use of American 'hard power' as a tool to promote freedom and democracy, beginning with the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Opponents of the doctrine saw it as dangerously nationalistic, with the potential to entangle the United States in a myriad of protracted international conflicts. This thesis will identify aspects of nationalism within post-9/11 American foreign policy and illuminate the incompatibility of nationalism and the fundamental tenets of conflict resolution. This study theorizes that nationalism played a significant role in the development of the Bush Doctrine. Although its advocates promote specific policies historically associated with nationalism, as a rule they have not acknowledged its influence. Conversely, opponents of the doctrine acknowledge this influence and warn of its destructive characteristics. The study presented herein identifies nationalism as a powerful force in American culture and politics--one that has a profound influence on American foreign policy and on the longevity of our foreign wars.

This paper seeks to determine under what conditions a U.S. president can implement a grand strategy given the nature of domestic and international opportunities and constraints. It will examine three comparative case studies: Jimmy Carter, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, with the goal of determining what conditions are necessary at the individual, domestic, and systemic levels of analysis for grand strategy implementation. At the individual level, it will apply operational code analysis, as well as an examination of personal characteristics for each case study. At the domestic level, it will apply a five-prong test for examining factors that are key to grand strategy implementation: (1) unity of foreign policy team; (2) strength of presidency; (3) party alignment between Congress and the president; (4) public opinion; and (5) strength of domestic economy. At the systemic level, it will examine significant events faced by each president that tested whether his grand strategy could respond effectively to international imperatives. Ultimately, it will assess the success of each president's attempt at grand strategy implementation based on: (1) how closely U.S. policies aligned with his grand strategy; and (2) whether policies put in place that aligned with his grand strategy improved the global standing of the U.S. Through this analysis, it will assess the larger implications of having a grand strategy on U.S. foreign policy.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 transformed the way in which Americans and their leaders viewed the world. The tragic events of that day helped give rise to a foreign policy strategy commonly referred to as the “Bush Doctrine.” At the heart of this doctrine lay a series of propositions about the need to foster liberal democracy as the antidote to terrorism. President George W. Bush proclaimed in a variety of addresses that democracy now represented the “single surviving model” of political life to which all people aspired. In the course of making this argument, President Bush seemed to relate his policies to an overarching “teleology” of progress. This discourse implied that the United States might use force to hasten the emergence of liberal norms and institutions in selected states. With a sense of irony, some commentators soon referred to the Bush administration’s position as “Leninist” because of its determination to bring about the so-called “end of history” today. Yet, surprisingly, these critics had little more to add. This thesis is an attempt to assess in greater depth the Bush administration’s claim to comprehend historical eschatology. Developing a concept termed “democratic vanguardism,” this study investigates the idea of liberal modernity, the role of the United States as a force for democracy, and the implications of using military intervention in the service of idealistic ends. It examines disputes among political theorists, public intellectuals and elected statesmen which help to enrich our understanding of the United States’ efforts under President Bush at bending history to its will.

Thesis (master's)--Universität, Mainz. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 195-205).

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:27:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2009Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:48:06Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 jorge_bwga_me_mar.pdf: 806060 bytes, checksum: c3dbcac513f11151071767ea461e5ad7 (MD5) / A reação inicial da administração de George W. Bush aos atentados de onze de setembro de 2001 foi atacar o governo Talebã no Afeganistão, visando a derrubar o regime do pregador religioso Omar do poder e a estabelecer bases que serviriam para a caçada à al- Qaeda, que tinha naquele país um santuário para planejar suas ações. A capital Cabul, assim como outras regiões no interior afegão, foram conquistadas rapidamente, isto teoricamente em função do plano militar estadunidense, baseado no emprego de Forças de Operações Especiais, poderio aéreo e na utilização de um parceiro local: a Aliança do Norte. O suposto sucesso dos Estados Unidos seria decorrente, conforme o discurso oficial norte-americano, da “transformação militar” que estava sendo promovida pelo secretário de Defesa Donald Rumsfeld. O chamado modelo afegão foi considerado um “novo” modo de guerra americano e, a partir de então, dentro do contexto de “guerra ao terror”, as Forças de Operações Especiais passaram a ocupar, como nunca antes na história dos EUA, um lugar por demais proeminente dentro da concepção estratégica de Washington. Todavia, passados cerca de sete anos dos movimentos iniciais de invasão, a situação afegã não é das melhores, o que leva ao questionamento da validade e aparente inovação daquelas ações militares americanas. / The initial reaction of the George W. Bush administration to the violent acts of september 11, 2001 was to attack the Taliban government in Afghanistan, aiming to bring down the Mullah Omar regime and to set up bases that would serve to the hunting of al- Qaida, organization which had that country as its sanctuary to plan its actions. The capital Cabul, as well as another regions in the countryside, were quickly conquered, theoretically because the american military plan, based on Special Operations Forces, air power and in the use of a local allie: the Northern Alliance. The supposed success of the United States would be the result, according to the official speech, of the “military transformation” that was being encouraged by the Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The afghan model was considered a “new” american way of war and the Special Operations Forces, inside the context of “global war on terror”, went on to the center of the american strategic conception. However, after seven years of the invasion, the afghan situation is not good, so it is possible to question the validity and the apparent inovation of that american military actions.

Submitted by DANIEL MARTINS SILVA null (daniel_m105@hotmail.com) on 2016-06-13T12:09:12Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação-Final-2016.pdf: 1232731 bytes, checksum: a3b1a459a153bdc0df5be33dcfc2b83a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Juliano Benedito Ferreira (julianoferreira@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2016-06-15T19:30:27Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 silva_dm_me_mar.pdf: 1232731 bytes, checksum: a3b1a459a153bdc0df5be33dcfc2b83a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-15T19:30:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 silva_dm_me_mar.pdf: 1232731 bytes, checksum: a3b1a459a153bdc0df5be33dcfc2b83a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-05-17 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Entre o fim do governo George W. Bush e o primeiro mandato do governo Barack Obama os Estados Unidos iniciou sua participação na Parceria Transpacífica (PTP). A fim de entender as motivações norte-americanas para este acordo regional de comércio, a dissertação trabalhou com a hipótese de que a evolução do novo regionalismo asiático, a partir dos anos 2000, teve um peso significativo na estratégia estadunidense de comércio. Destacam-se a ASEAN+3 e a ASEAN+6, grupos liderados pelo Japão e China para incrementar a integração econômica do Leste Asiático. Diante da emergência desta configuração, os Estados Unidos estiveram excluídos do processo. Para averiguar esta afirmação utilizamos a plataforma Inside Trade, entrevistas e notícias de jornais relevantes; arquivos da Casa Branca (relatórios dos principais órgãos decisórios e discursos); relatórios anuais e outros documentos do USTR; além de arquivos do Departamento de Estado (em especial do Escritório de Assuntos do Leste Asiático e Pacífico). A análise do material empírico revelou que o receio de exclusão dos Estados Unidos e da predominância da China como ator político no comércio intra-asiático foram questões frequentemente levantadas pelo empresariado e policy-makers da política comercial norte-americana. Além de circunstâncias regionais, o envolvimento dos Estados Unidos no acordo se explica pelo seu interesse em moldar as regras que conformam o regime global de comércio. Demonstramos que expandir a presença política do país na Ásia-Pacífico e constranger a emergência chinesa eram tarefas fundamentais para alcançar este objetivo. / Between the end of George W. Bush’s government and Barack Obama’s first term, the United States began its participation in Transpacific Partnership (TPP). In order to understand american motivation for this regional trade agreement, our hypothesis supported that new asian regionalism dynamics had a weight in US trade policy strategy. We highlitgh ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6, groups leading for Japan and China to increase economic integration of East Asia. In this configuration, the United States had been excluded. Aiming to check this, we use the “Inside Trade” platform, interviews and news of important newspapers; the White House archives (reports of the main agencies and discourses); annual reports and other documents from USTR; also US Department of State’s archives (especially the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs). The empirical analysis reveal that fear of United States’ exclusion and the China’s predominance as political actor in intra-asian trade were often raised by business and policy makers of US trade policy. Beyond regional reasons, US envolvement is explained by its interest to shape the rules conforming global trade regime. We demonstrate that raising US political presence and constraining chinese emergence were fundamental tasks to achieve this goal.

Orientador: Reginaldo Mattar Nasser / Banca: Oliveiros S. Ferreira / Banca: Shiguenoli Miyamoto / O Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais é instituído em parceria com a Unesp/Unicamp/PUC-SP, em projeto subsidiado pela CAPES, intitulado "Programa San Tiago Dantas" / Resumo: A reação inicial da administração de George W. Bush aos atentados de onze de setembro de 2001 foi atacar o governo Talebã no Afeganistão, visando a derrubar o regime do pregador religioso Omar do poder e a estabelecer bases que serviriam para a caçada à al- Qaeda, que tinha naquele país um santuário para planejar suas ações. A capital Cabul, assim como outras regiões no interior afegão, foram conquistadas rapidamente, isto teoricamente em função do plano militar estadunidense, baseado no emprego de Forças de Operações Especiais, poderio aéreo e na utilização de um parceiro local: a Aliança do Norte. O suposto sucesso dos Estados Unidos seria decorrente, conforme o discurso oficial norte-americano, da "transformação militar" que estava sendo promovida pelo secretário de Defesa Donald Rumsfeld. O chamado modelo afegão foi considerado um "novo" modo de guerra americano e, a partir de então, dentro do contexto de "guerra ao terror", as Forças de Operações Especiais passaram a ocupar, como nunca antes na história dos EUA, um lugar por demais proeminente dentro da concepção estratégica de Washington. Todavia, passados cerca de sete anos dos movimentos iniciais de invasão, a situação afegã não é das melhores, o que leva ao questionamento da validade e aparente inovação daquelas ações militares americanas. / Abstract: The initial reaction of the George W. Bush administration to the violent acts of september 11, 2001 was to attack the Taliban government in Afghanistan, aiming to bring down the Mullah Omar regime and to set up bases that would serve to the hunting of al- Qaida, organization which had that country as its sanctuary to plan its actions. The capital Cabul, as well as another regions in the countryside, were quickly conquered, theoretically because the american military plan, based on Special Operations Forces, air power and in the use of a local allie: the Northern Alliance. The supposed success of the United States would be the result, according to the official speech, of the "military transformation" that was being encouraged by the Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The afghan model was considered a "new" american way of war and the Special Operations Forces, inside the context of "global war on terror", went on to the center of the american strategic conception. However, after seven years of the invasion, the afghan situation is not good, so it is possible to question the validity and the apparent inovation of that american military actions. / Mestre

Abstract The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the way George W. Bush used moral metaphors to intensify the language in his statements on Operation Iraqi Freedom. Three moral metaphors are presented within two different models that are applied on the data. The collected material for the metaphors is constituted of cognitive linguistic books from prominent linguists, such as George Lakoff, Alan Cruse and William Croft, and the data is collected from the official White House website. The scientific method used in this study has been qualitative text analysis where the hermeneutic approach has been an essential part of it. The main question: In what way did George W. Bush use moral metaphors in his statements to justify Operation Iraqi Freedom?, resulted in use of moral metaphors that sermons people’s moral values, depict Saddam Hussein’s characteristics as immoral, activate people’s moral priorities to help the Iraqi people, and addresses both conservatives and liberals in America. The conclusion of my study is that President Bush deliberately intensified the language in his statements through moral metaphors to justify Operation Iraqi Freedom. Keywords: Cognitive Linguistics, Metaphor, Figurative Language, Operation Iraqi Freedom, War on Terror, George W. Bush, Saddam Hussein, USA, Iraq, Qualitative Text Analysis, Hermeneutics.

This thesis is set out with the purpose to investigate the potential shifts in how victory is presented in the duration of contemporary conflicts. The argumentation is focused on how democratic states, involved in wars, seem to announce different statements regarding victory in its outreach to its inhabitants. This paper will study the case of the American administration of George W. Bush, who initiated and ruled during the first years in the Global War on Terror. By investigating the seven annual State of the Union speeches in a combined quantitative–qualitative method, with Martel’s theoretical framework on victory, the analysis searched after such potential shifts or static usage of the linguistics approach to victory. The answer to the stated research question according to the study conducted by this author is that the publicly announced implications of victory have been subjected to an ongoing shift during the examined time period.

This paper offers a thorough examination of the United States 2002 National Security Strategy. The document is explored in its broader context, which allows us to understand it in its uniqueness and therefore offer sufficient interpretation. Special attention is devoted to the decision making process of the U.S. National Security Council due to primary responsibility of NSC for coordination of American security policy. Further attention is paid to three particular problem- related parts that are often considered to be the most revolutionary issues of this document. Preemption, unilateralism and U.S. support for the spread of democracy are examined in the broader context of the U.S. foreign policy tradition, American identity and historical development. On the basis of thorough research, the paper supposes that all major parts of this particular document are rather compatible with the development of U.S. security policy and they represent rather the outcome of developments than a fundamental change or reformulation of the strategy. The role of strategic documents is implicitly examined as well, while the study suggests that it should be perceived as a product of bureaucratic politics as summarized in a model by Graham Allison.