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Showing 41 to 47 of 47 (0.034 seconds)Spelling suggestions: "subject:"eneral assembly"" "subject:"eneral asssembly""
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中華民國在聯合國專門機構席位喪失之研究(1971-1972) / The study on the Republic of China's loss of seats in the Specialized Agencies of the United States (1971-1972)石君灝, Shih, Chun Hao Unknown Date (has links)
本論文以中央研究院近代史研究所所典藏的「外交部檔案」為主，輔以聯合國年鑑與相關聯合國專門機構的資料，首先整理出中華民國喪失各專門機構席位的時序與過程，接著探討中華民國政府是否有何事前的應對策略，並嘗試探究中華民國政府在喪失聯合國中國代表權以後，面對專門機構席位問題的態度是否具彈性思維。
聯合國專門機構僅是一個代表性的名詞，本質上就是一個由各國政府代表組成的國際組織，一個國際組織與聯合國經濟暨社會理事會簽署合作協定後，就成為聯合國專門機構。兩者之間互不隸屬，是屬於合作的關係，意即一個國家若喪失聯合國的席位，並不代表同時喪失專門機構的席位，需再由專門機構討論之。現今聯合國共有19個專門機構，1971年時則是擁有13個專門機構。
中華民國在1971年喪失聯合國中國代表權之前，在13個聯合國專門機構中，除了聯合國糧食及農業組織(FAO)為觀察員外，其餘12個專門機構皆擁有會員國資格。而擁有會員國資格的專門機構中，除了4個金融性專門機構於1980年時才喪失席位，其餘8個專門機構則先後於1971年10月下旬至1972年5月下旬間陸續喪失席位，本研究探討的就是這一段時間。而由於資料與篇幅的限制，選擇世界衛生組織(WHO)、世界氣象組織(WMO)與國際電信聯盟(ITU)三個專門機構，深入探討中華民國喪失聯合國專門機構席位以及中華民國政府如何因應的過程。
由本文的討論可知道，聯合國大會396號決議案與2758號決議案與此議題息息相關，396號決議案決定了當一國政府的代表權發生爭議時，聯合國體系各組織應顧及聯合國大會的態度，而2758號則決定了聯合國中國代表權的歸屬。兩個決議案是專門機構處理中國席位問題的關鍵。而中華民國面對聯合國專門機構席位問題時，其態度是認為中華人民共和國的加入，並不能以排除中華民國為前提，但席位問題的屬性卻是聯合國中國代表權問題的延伸，也就是說，聯合國專門機構要處理的是機構內「誰來代表中國」的問題。事實上，在那段時間，立場較親近中華民國的國家曾推動類似於「兩個中國」或「一中一台」的提案，希望中華民國與中華人民共和國同時存在於聯合國專門機構之中，只是中華民國政府卻未主動與這些國家合作，使得相關議案未獲通過。
本論文另外發掘當時介於行政院與外交部之間的決策單位，此單位是由當時的行政院政務委員葉公超主持，邀請行政院各部會首長成立的跨部會小組，名為光華小組，運作時間起於1971年11月下旬，至1972年5月底結束，旨在因應中華民國喪失聯合國中國代表權後，所引發的後續外交鉅變效應，處理議題的內容亦包含專門機構的席位問題。
聯合國專門機構的席位議題，如同聯合國大會2758號決議案，只處理了「誰來代表中國」的問題，實際上台灣地位的議題並沒有被提及，留有彈性空間。而現今台灣的困局在於，要成為聯合國專門機構正式會員的條件必須是個國家，所以目前首要處理的，仍是國家定位的問題。從本研究中可知道，中華民國在聯合國專門機構的會籍問題，本質就是中國代表權問題，如果使用中華民國名義申請加入聯合國專門機構，無疑是抵觸1971年至1972年間各個專門機構的決議，這些決議已闡明「China」席位的歸屬，如此一來，其阻力只有更大而已。
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L’autorisation de recourir à la force accordée par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations UniesEkomodi Totshingo, Patrice 08 1900 (has links)
L’autorisation de recourir à la force est une pratique par laquelle le Conseil de sécurité permet à des États membres des Nations Unies ou à des accords ou organismes
régionaux, voire au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies de recourir à la coercition
militaire. Elle est l’une des circonstances excluant l’illicéité face à l’interdiction de
recourir à la force dans les relations internationales dont la règle est posée à l’article 2,§ 4 de la Charte des Nations Unies.
Il est évident que cette pratique ne correspond pas clairement à la lettre de la Charte mais elle tire sa légitimité du fait qu’elle permet au Conseil de sécurité de s’acquitter de sa mission principale de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, étant donné que le système de coercition militaire prévu par la Charte s’avère inapplicable dans la pratique. Il reste que cette pratique est empreinte d’ambiguïté : elle apparaît tantôt comme
une intervention des Nations Unies, tantôt comme une action unilatérale au profit de
certaines puissances capables de mener des opérations de grande envergure. Cette ambiguïté est encore exacerbée par le problème de l’autorisation présumée que certainsÉtats pourraient déduire des actes du Conseil de sécurité, pour intervenir dans divers conflits.
Dans les faits, la pratique de l’autorisation de recourir à la force semble actualiser une tendance belliciste qui caractérisait les époques antérieures. Elle peut, si l’on n’y prend garde, refondre, par pans entiers, les legs du droit contre la guerre (jus contra bellum) issu
du XXème siècle, droit qui a été le fruit de longues tribulations dans l’histoire des relations internationales. Le danger le plus grave est que des acquis chèrement négociés risquent d’être jetés par-dessus bord avec trop de facilité et sans délai, pour servir des visées à court terme. / Authorization to use force is a practice whereby the Security Council allows member
States of the United Nations or regional arrangements or agencies or the Secretary
General of the United Nations to use military coercion. Such authorization circumvents the wrongfulness of using force in international relations as prohibited by article 2, § 4 of the UN Charter.
It is obvious that this practice does not match the letter of the Charter, but it derives its legitimacy from the fact that it allows the Security Council to fulfill its primary mission of maintaining peace and security, since the system of military coercion under the Charter is inapplicable in practice. Nonetheless, this practice is marked by ambiguity: sometimes it appears as a UN intervention, and yet sometimes as a unilateral action of certain powers capable of conducting major operations. This ambiguity is exacerbated by the issue of presumed consent to intervene in various conflicts that some States attribute to
the Security Council.
In fact, the practice of authorization reinforces a hawkish tendency that characterized earlier periods. It can, if unchecked, undo the legacy of the law against war (jus contra bellum) of the twentieth century, which was the fruit of much effort in the history of international relations. The most serious danger is that hard-won negotiated achievements be thrown easily overboard and without delay, in order to serve short term goals.
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L’autorisation de recourir à la force accordée par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations UniesEkomodi Totshingo, Patrice 08 1900 (has links)
L’autorisation de recourir à la force est une pratique par laquelle le Conseil de sécurité permet à des États membres des Nations Unies ou à des accords ou organismes
régionaux, voire au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies de recourir à la coercition
militaire. Elle est l’une des circonstances excluant l’illicéité face à l’interdiction de
recourir à la force dans les relations internationales dont la règle est posée à l’article 2,§ 4 de la Charte des Nations Unies.
Il est évident que cette pratique ne correspond pas clairement à la lettre de la Charte mais elle tire sa légitimité du fait qu’elle permet au Conseil de sécurité de s’acquitter de sa mission principale de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, étant donné que le système de coercition militaire prévu par la Charte s’avère inapplicable dans la pratique. Il reste que cette pratique est empreinte d’ambiguïté : elle apparaît tantôt comme
une intervention des Nations Unies, tantôt comme une action unilatérale au profit de
certaines puissances capables de mener des opérations de grande envergure. Cette ambiguïté est encore exacerbée par le problème de l’autorisation présumée que certainsÉtats pourraient déduire des actes du Conseil de sécurité, pour intervenir dans divers conflits.
Dans les faits, la pratique de l’autorisation de recourir à la force semble actualiser une tendance belliciste qui caractérisait les époques antérieures. Elle peut, si l’on n’y prend garde, refondre, par pans entiers, les legs du droit contre la guerre (jus contra bellum) issu
du XXème siècle, droit qui a été le fruit de longues tribulations dans l’histoire des relations internationales. Le danger le plus grave est que des acquis chèrement négociés risquent d’être jetés par-dessus bord avec trop de facilité et sans délai, pour servir des visées à court terme. / Authorization to use force is a practice whereby the Security Council allows member
States of the United Nations or regional arrangements or agencies or the Secretary
General of the United Nations to use military coercion. Such authorization circumvents the wrongfulness of using force in international relations as prohibited by article 2, § 4 of the UN Charter.
It is obvious that this practice does not match the letter of the Charter, but it derives its legitimacy from the fact that it allows the Security Council to fulfill its primary mission of maintaining peace and security, since the system of military coercion under the Charter is inapplicable in practice. Nonetheless, this practice is marked by ambiguity: sometimes it appears as a UN intervention, and yet sometimes as a unilateral action of certain powers capable of conducting major operations. This ambiguity is exacerbated by the issue of presumed consent to intervene in various conflicts that some States attribute to
the Security Council.
In fact, the practice of authorization reinforces a hawkish tendency that characterized earlier periods. It can, if unchecked, undo the legacy of the law against war (jus contra bellum) of the twentieth century, which was the fruit of much effort in the history of international relations. The most serious danger is that hard-won negotiated achievements be thrown easily overboard and without delay, in order to serve short term goals.
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A historical study of the polity of the gay and lesbian ordination and/or installation, and same-gender marriage debates in the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) and its predecessor churchesVermaak, Roche Francois 04 July 2009 (has links)
Since the 1970s, the Presbyterian Church in the United States has dealt with its most divisive issue ever: same-gender relationships. Two polity debates have occurred simultaneously: 1) The ordination and/or installation of partnered gay and lesbian Christians as church officers, i.e. deacons, elders, and ministers of the Word and Sacrament; 2) The permissibility of ministers to perform and officers to participate in same-gender blessings and marriages, both liturgical and civil. This period is characterised by an absence of theological discussion and formulation of biblical and/or theological statements. Rather, the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), and its predecessor churches, the United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. and Presbyterian Church in the U.S., all used polity to guide them. This is in line with the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, which decided in 1927 to solve controversial theological issues, not through theological discussion, but through polity. Since 1978, various polity processes have guided and shaped the two debates to form the current policies: 1) Presbyteries send overtures to General Assemblies, which, in turn issue “definitive guidance” statements and Authoritative Interpretations; 2) General Assembly Permanent Judicial Commissions (GAPJC) issue Authoritative Interpretations in both remedial and disciplinary cases, after complaints have moved through the ecclesiastical courts at Presbytery and/or synod level; 3) The 173 Presbyteries vote on amendments, approved by General Assemblies, to amend the Book of Order. The most notable amendment was the addition of G-6.0106b in 1997. This writer argues that G-6.0106b in the Book of Order, requiring “fidelity within the covenant of marriage between a man and a woman, or chastity in singleness,” is a form of subscription, and, therefore, contrary to the entire history of the Presbyterian Church, which has rejected all forms of subscriptionism since 1706. Subscription to five standards briefly existed from 1910-1925, and was rejected by the 1926 and 1927 General Assemblies of the PCUSA. One ordination standard is now elevated above all other standards and, since 1997, there have been three attempts to rid the Book of Order of this requirement. W-4.9001 and G-6.0106b in the Book of Order reflect the changes made in the Westminster Confession of Faith in the 1950s, allowing for the divorce and remarriage of officers; namely marriage is between a man and a woman. Yet, it is used to exclude partnered gay and lesbian Christians from ordination and/or installation, and from participating in same-gender liturgical marriages. The debates have created camps of conservatives, centrists, and liberals, which consistently threaten the peace, unity, and purity of the church. Thousands of evangelicals and conservatives, opposed to partnered gay and lesbian officers, have left the denomination for the Evangelical Presbyterian Church. Additionally, Special Organisations, which are not accountable to the denomination, have added to the tension and created intolerance of others’ views. Copyright / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2009. / Church History and Church Policy / unrestricted
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Reforma Rady bezpečnosti OSN a úskalí s ní spojené / Reform of the UN Security Council and the associated stumbling blockJindřich, Petr January 2013 (has links)
Reform of the UN Security Council and a stumbling block associated with it - abstract This thesis deals with matter of the Security Council reform, the most crucial body of the United Nations. It examines approaches of eleven specific countries which are divided into two groups. The first group is comprised by permanent members of the Security Council, the second one by states which, in case of their creation, could claim new permanent seats in this body. This thesis examines not only their real policies, but also their policies from theoretical - specifically neorealistic - point of view. Two different hypotheses were deduced from neorealism which were tested and subsequently evaluated as (in)valid. Hypothesis emerging from a standard neorealism put emphasis on policy whose goal is to maintain, alternatively to increase a state's autonomy (autonomy-seeking policy). International organizations are viewed as entity which limits, to some extent, this autonomy. On the other hand, hypothesis emerging from a modified neorealism put emphasis on policy whose goal is to gain, alternatively to increase influence on other actors (influence-seeking policy). On the contrary, within this policy international organizations are an useful entity because it is possible to achieve such an influence by means of them. In the...
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Terrorism, war and international law: the legality of the use of force against Afghanistan in 2001Williamson, Myra Elsie Jane Bell January 2007 (has links)
The thesis examines the international law pertaining to the use of force by states, in general, and to the use of force in self-defence, in particular. The main question addressed is whether the use of force, which was purported to be in self-defence, by the United States, the United Kingdom and their allies against al Qaeda, the Taliban and Afghanistan, beginning on 7 October 2001, was lawful. The thesis focuses not only on this specific use of force, but also on the changing nature of conflict, the definition of terrorism and on the historical evolution of limitations on the use of force, from antiquity until 2006. In the six chapters which trace the epochs of international law, the progression of five inter-related concepts is followed: limitations on the resort to force generally, the use of force in self-defence, pre-emptive self-defence, the use of forcible measures short of war, and the use of force in response to non-state actors. This historical analysis includes a particular emphasis on understanding the meaning of the 'inherent right of self-defence', which was preserved by Article 51 of the United Nations' Charter. This analysis is then applied to the use of force against Afghanistan which occurred in 2001. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, the US and the UK notified the United Nations Security Council of their resort to force in self-defence under Article 51. Each element of Article 51 is analysed and the thesis concludes that there are significant doubts as to the lawfulness of that decision to employ force. In addition to the self-defence justification, other possible grounds for intervention are also examined, such as humanitarian intervention, Security Council authorisation and intervention by invitation. This thesis challenges the common assumption that the use of force against Afghanistan was an example of states exercising their inherent right to self-defence. It argues that if this particular use of force is not challenged, it will lead to an expansion of the right of self-defence which will hinder rather than enhance international peace and security. Finally, this thesis draws on recent examples to illustrate the point that the use of force against Afghanistan could become a dangerous precedent for the use of force in self-defence.
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Sovereignty, Peacekeeping, and the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), Suez 1956-1967: Insiders’ PerspectivesHilmy, Hanny 13 February 2015 (has links)
This research is concerned with the complex and contested relationship between the sovereign prerogatives of states and the international imperative of defusing world conflicts. Due to its historical setting following World War Two, the national vs. international staking of claims was framed within the escalating imperial-nationalist confrontation and the impending “end of empire”, both of which were significantly influenced by the role Israel played in this saga. The research looks at the issue of “decolonization” and the anti-colonial struggle waged under the leadership of Egypt’s President Nasser. The Suez War is analyzed as the historical event that signaled the beginning of the final chapter in the domination of the European empires in the Middle East (sub-Saharan decolonization followed beginning in the early 1960s), and the emergence of the United States as the new major Western power in the Middle East.
The Suez experience highlighted a stubborn contest between the defenders of the concept of “sovereign consent” and the advocates of “International intervention”. Both the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and its termination were surrounded by controversy and legal-political wrangling. The role of UNEF and UN peacekeeping operations in general framed the development of a new concept for an emerging international human rights law and crisis management. The UNEF experience, moreover, brought into sharp relief the need for a conflict resolution component for any peace operation. International conflict management, and human rights protection are both subject to an increasing interventionist international legal regime. Consequently, the traditional concept of “sovereignty” is facing increasing challenge.
By its very nature, the subject matter of this multi-dimensional research involves historical, political and international legal aspects shaping the research’s content and conclusions. The research utilizes the experience and contributions of several key participants in this pioneering peacekeeping experience. In the last chapter, recommendations are made –based on all the elements covered in the research- to suggest contributions to the evolving UN ground rules for international crisis intervention and management. / Graduate / hilmyh@uvic.ca
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